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FOUNDATIONS  OF  NORMAL 
AND  ABNORMAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


BORIS   SIDIS 


THE  WORKS  OF  BORIS  SIDIS 


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THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  NORMAL  AND 
ABNORMAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


WORKS  BY  BORIS  SIDIS 

The  Psychology  of  Suggestion. 

Multiple  Personality. 

Psychopathological  Researches. 

The  Psychology  of  Laughter. 

Philistine  and  Genius. 

An  Experimental  Study  of  Sleep. 

The  Foundations  of  Normal  and 
Abnormal  Psychology. 

Symptomatology,  Psychognosis, 

and  Diagnosis  of  Psychopathic  Maladies. 

The  Causation  and  Treatment 
of  Psychopathic  Diseases. 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF 

NORMAL  AND  ABNORMAL 

PSYCHOLOGY 


BY 


BORIS  |SIDIS,  A.  M.,  Ph.D.,  M.  D, 


BOSTON:   RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

TORONTO:  THE  COPP CLARK  CO.,  Limitb) 


Copyricbt,  igx4i  by  Boris  Sidis 


All  Rights  ReierTvd 


Th«  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.  S.  A 


To  the  Memory  of  My  Master  and  Friend 

WILLIAM  JAMES 

JVho,  being  the  foremost  pioneer  in  the  vast  domain  of 

the  human  mind,  has  generously  encouraged  others 

in  their  efforts  at  clearing  fresh  trails,  leading 

to  an  ever  more  comprehensive  view  of 

the  rich  varieties  of  mental  life. 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arciiive 

in  2007  witii  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


littp://www.arcliive.org/details/foundationsofnorOOsidiiala 


PREFACE 

In  this  volume  I  made  an  attempt  to  formulate  the 
fundamental  assumptions  and  main  principles  that  un- 
derlie normal  and  abnormal  psychology.  Every  science, 
mathematical,  physical  or  biological,  has  its  postulates 
as  the  foundation  of  its  structure.  Psychology  as  a 
science  has  also  its  own  assumptions  which  have  to  be 
clearly  formulated.  The  object  of  the  first  part  of  this 
volume  is  the  unravelling  of  the  principal  concepts  and 
hypotheses  which  form  the  basis  of  the  study  of  men- 
tal phenomena. 

All  through  the  domain  of  the  sciences  there  is  a  vast 
movement  for  the  search  of  fundamental  concepts  and 
for  the  close  investigation  of  such  concepts.  Even 
such  an  exact  science  as  mathematics  has  felt  this  spirit 
of  examination  of  its  fundamental  assumptions,  axioms, 
and  postulates.  Men  like  Lobatchcvsky,  Bolyai,  Rie- 
man  and  others  have  given  the  start  and  a  number  of 
mathematicians  have  recently  followed  in  their  foot- 
steps, with  the  result  of  getting  a  wider  horizon  and  of 
opening  unknown  regions.  The  same  we  find  in  the 
case  of  physical  sciences,  such  as  physics,  mechanics  and 
chemistry.  Mach,  Poincare,  Ostwald,  Pearson  and 
others  have  contributed  to  this  spirit  of  investigation  in 
the  domain  of  physical  sciences.  This  spirit  of  inquiry 
has  become  of  late  specially  intensified  by  the  revolu- 
tionary discoveries  of  radio-active  bodies. 

We  are  acquainted  with  the  great  movement  which 
has  swept  all  over  biological,  sociological,  and  eco- 
nomical sciences  due  to  the  influence  of  the  theory  of 

(i) 


ii  '      Preface 

evolution.  The  spirit  of  free  inquiry  into  fundamental 
concepts  has  seized  on  all  sciences.  Throughout  the 
whole  domain  of  human  thought  there  is  felt  this  re- 
juvenating and  invigorating  breath  of  the  new  revolu- 
tionary spirit.  Philosophy,  ethics,  aesthetics,  history, 
law,  economics  all  have  been  awakened  out  of  their 
long  sleep  of  centuries.  Every  science  has  been  shaken 
by  this  mighty  movement  to  its  very  foundation.  Even 
such  a  dry  study  as  logic  has  left  the  vital  breeze  of 
the  inquiring  spirit  of  modern  times. 

I  make  an  attempt  in  this  volume  to  examine  in  an 
elementary  way  the  foundations  of  normal  and  abnor- 
mal psychology.  This  is  all  the  more  necessary  as  phy- 
siologists, biologists,  biological  chemists,  and  recently 
students  of  comparative  psychology,  a  science  which  lies 
on  the  borderland  of  psychology  and  biology,  have  a 
tendency  to  make  incursions  into  psychology  proper, 
and  favor  mechanical  or  purely  physiological  concepts 
to  the  detriment  and  even  total  exclusion  of  mental  pro- 
cesses. 

This  tendency  towards  elimination  of  psychic  life 
by  mechanical  processes  or  by  "The  Unconscious" 
is  also  observed  in  the  writings  of  some  workers  in  the 
domain  of  psychopathology.  They  think  it  is  in  the  in- 
terest of  strict  science  to  express  wherever  possible  men- 
tal states  in  terms  of  physical  changes.  Finally  a  stage 
is  reached  in  which  all  consciousness  is  completely  dis- 
pensed with  in  favor  of  physiological  processes  or  "The 
Unconscious".  Psychology  is  thus  made  a  branch  of 
physiology  and  biology. 

Again,  philosophers  and  metaphysicians  are  apt  to 
make  intrusions  into  the  domain  of  psychology,  because 
the  latter  is  regarded  by  them  from  time  immemorial 


Preface  ili 

as  legitimate  prey,  inasmuch  as  their  own  domain  lies 
on  the  outskirts  of  mental  life.  In  the  interest  of  meta- 
physical systems  philosophers  attempt  to  subject  psy- 
chology to  their  own  speculative  purposes. 

The  popular  mind  has  a  tendency  of  regarding  psy- 
chology as  something  mystical  and  of  identifying  psy- 
chology with  all  kinds  of  faith  cures,  mind  cures,  spirit- 
ism, telepathy,  telaesthesia,  and  table  rapping.  It  is 
unfortunate  that  even  medical  men  of  note,  on  account 
of  lack  of  acquaintance  with  psychological  subjects  and 
inquiries,  are  apt  to  look  askance  at  psychology  and 
identify  it  with  religious  beliefs,  mental  cures  as  well 
as  with  the  more  shady  side  of  spiritistic  manifestations. 

Still  more  complicated  is  the  plight  in  which  the  psy- 
chologist finds  himself  in  regard  to  the  recent  claims 
put  forth  by  some  psychologists  in  having  achieved  re- 
sults of  importance  to  law,  industry,  and  to  the  reforma- 
tion of  social  ills.  The  demand  for  practical  results  in 
psychology  is  due  to  the  industrial  spirit  of  our  times,  a 
spirit  which  requires  immediate  results  that  can  be 
cashed  or  expressed  in  dollars  and  cents.  The  earnest 
psychologist  should  repudiate  such  industrial  business 
psychology,  for  the  simple  reason  that  such  a  psycholo- 
gy is  imaginary;  in  other  words,  such  a  psychology  does 
not  exist.  An  experienced  salesman,  an  intelligent  busi- 
ness man  knows  infinitely  more  about  business  and  how 
to  obtain  the  best  results  out  of  certain  combinations 
than  all  the  psychologists  with  their  laboratory  experi- 
ments, their  artificial  statistics,  and  puerile  trivial  ex- 
perimental arrangements,  giving  results  no  less  trivial 
and  meaningless. 

The  claims  made  by  psychologists  as  to  Industrial  ef- 
ficiency which  psychology  can  give  is  ludicrous  in  the 


iv  Preface 

extreme.  We  may  as  well  expect  the  astronomer  to 
claim  that  astronomy  can  give  points  how  to  conduct 
successfully  a  political  campaign.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
the  psychologist  has  nothing  to  say  on  the  subject  of 
advertisements,  industry,  and  business,  but  common- 
place trivialities  expressed  with  all  the  pomposity  of 
scholastic  authority.  Industrial  efficiency  does  not  be- 
long to  the  domain  of  psychology.  We  may  as  well  ex- 
pect the  comparative  psychologist  to  offer  practical 
points  on  the  efficiency  of  cows  to  give  milk  or  on  the 
efficiency  of  hens  to  lay  eggs.  The  success  of  ad- 
vertisement is  a  matter  of  experienced  business  men  and 
not  of  academic  psychologists  who  have  to  offer  nothing 
but  the  merest  platitudes. 

We  must  once  for  all  enter  a  protest  against  those 
psychologists  who  claim  that  they  have  some  great  psy- 
chological truths  to  reveal  to  business  men,  manufactur- 
er and  workingmen.  I  trust  that  both  the  businessman 
and  the  workingman  will  have  enough  common  sense 
to  take  such  psychological  truths  for  what  they  are 
actually  worth.  The  ordinary  psychologist  under- 
stands little  of  business  life,  knows  almost  nothing  of 
the  life  of  the  laborer,  and  is  woefully  ignorant  of  the 
economical  questions  of  the  times.  Psychological  busi- 
ness claims  are  illusory.  The  sooner  the  practical  busi- 
ness man  learns  this  fact  the  better  for  him,  and  also  for 
the  earnest  psychological  investigator. 

Psychology  is  just  emerging  from  its  metaphysical 
and  theological  stages  as  Auguste  Comte  would  put  it. 
Psychology  is  just  entering  the  circle  of  her  sister 
sciences.  At  present  it  is  in  a  state  similar  to  the  phy- 
sics of  the  sixteenth  century.  The  psychologist  should 
declare  frankly  and  openly  that  he  can  no  more  assist 


Preface  y 

the  businessman  and  the  manufacturer  than  the  mathe- 
matician with  his  non-Euclidean  geometry  or  the  logi- 
cian with  his  algebra  of  logic  can  help  the  solution  of 
the  great  problems  of  capital  and  labor. 

We  can  obtain  some  help  from  abnormal  psychology 
in  its  application  to  the  medical  treatment  of  nervous 
and  mental  maladies.  This  is  quite  natural  as  abnor- 
mal psychology  is  essentially  based  on  clinical  and  ex- 
perimental of  mental  diseases.  The  claim,  however, 
that  psychology  can  give  directions  for  vocations  of  life 
or  for  business  and  industry  is  entirely  unfounded. 

The  same  holds  true  of  the  practical  pseudo-psychol- 
ogy that  has  invaded  the  school,  the  court,  the  prison 
and  the  immigration  bureau.  The  intelligence  tests 
are  silly,  pedantic,  absurd,  and  grossly  misleading. 

I  have  not  discussed  in  this  volume  the  practical 
aspect  of  recent  quasi-business  psychology  for  the  reason 
that  such  claims  are  nothing  but  a  snare  and  delusion. 
Of  course  I  do  not  expect  that  this  warning  of  mine  as 
to  the  misleading  character  of  applied  psychology  will 
be  taken  graciously.  There  is  at  present  an  epidemic  of 
practical  or  applied  psychology.  People  however  will 
wake  up  from  their  psychological  dreams  and  will  real- 
ize that  applied  psychology  is  nothing  but  a  nightmare. 
I  am  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  my  present  protest  will 
draw  on  me  the  ire  and  severe  attacks  of  many  a  psy- 
chologist, but  I  sincerely  hope  that  some  of  the  more 
earnest  psychologists  will  sustain  me  in  my  present  con- 
tention. 

So  much  for  the  practical  limitations  of  psychology. 
In  discussing  the  theoretical  aspects  of  psychology  and 
attempting  to  point  out  its  limitations  I  have  had  to 
touch  on  problems  ultra-psychological,  but  this  was  un- 


ri  Preface 

avoidable.  It  had  to  be  done  in  order  to  clear  the  path 
and  see  the  lay  of  the  land.  I  have  no  doubt  that  there 
will  be  found  a  great  number  of  shortcomings  in  the 
foundations  as  well  as  vagueness  in  the  delineation  of 
the  main  postulates  and  psychological  principles.  I 
shall  be  fully  satisfied,  if  this  volume  will  stimulate 
others  to  better  work  in  the  same  direction. 

The  second  part  of  this  work  deals  with  my  theory 
of  "moment-consciousness."  This  theory  was  advanced 
by  me  some  sixteen  years  ago  in  my  "Psychology  of  Sug- 
gestion." It  was  further  touched  upon  in  my  "Multi- 
ple Personality,"  but  I  had  not  stated  the  theory  as  dis- 
tinctly as  I  did  in  this  volume.  I  may  add  that  when 
James  read  the  theory  in  "The  Psychology  of  Sugges- 
tion" he  told  me  he  found  it  valuable,  and  urged  me  to 
develop  it  more  in  detail. 

The  theory  of  moment-consciousness  presents  a  gen- 
eral view  of  the  nature  and  development  of  conscious- 
ness, from  reflex  consciousness  to  compound  reflex  and 
instinctive  consciousness  reaching  the  highest  form 
of  consciousness,  that  of  self-consciousness.  Con- 
sciousness and  the  adaptation  of  the  psychic  in- 
dividuality or  of  the  organism  to  the  external  en- 
vironment is  looked  at  not  only  from  a  psychological, 
but  also  from  a  biological  standpoint.  Consciousness 
in  the  course  of  its  development  is  presented  in  a  series 
of  stages  and  types,  each  lower  stage  leading  to  the  next 
higher  and  more  complicated  stage  and  type.  This  does 
not  mean  that  the  higher  type  is  included  in  the  lower 
We  must  assume  spontaneous  mental  variations,  or 
psychic  mutations,  so  that  while  the  stages  and  types  are 
arranged  in  a  progressive  series  of  their  development 
and  complication,  they  at  the  same  time  differ  qualita' 


Preface  vii 

tively  in  type  of  mental  life. 

I  may  add  that  most  of  the  ideas  developed  in  this 
volume  have  been  formulated  by  me  some  fourteen 
years  ago,  and  then  retouched  from  time  to  time.  A 
few  of  the  chapters  with  some  modifications  have  been 
published  by  me  in  various  psychological  and  medical 
journals. 

Boris  Sidis. 

Sidis  Psychotherapeutic  Institute, 
Portsmouth, 
New  Hampshire, 
January,  1914. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  AND 
PRINCIPLES 


CHAPTER 

I. 

11. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

XI. 
XII. 

xin. 

XIV. 
XV. 

xvi. 

XVII. 
XVIII. 


PAGE 

Psychology  as  a  Science   1 1 

Physical  and  Psychic  Facts 1 8 

The  Definition  of  the  Psychic  Process.  26 

Psychic  States  as  Objects 31 

The  Scope  of  Psychology 36 

The  Sources  of  Psychology 40 

Psychology  and  Psychopathology ....  45 
The    Spiritualistic    and   Materialistic 

Hypotheses    51 

The  Transmission  Hypothesis 59 

The  Metaphysical  Hypotheses  of  Par- 
allelism      64 

The  Unitary  Experience  of  Voluntar- 
ism      67 

The  Inductive    Basis  of   the    Positive 

Psychological  Hypothesis   73 

The  Deductive  Basis  of  the  Positive 

Psychological  Hypothesis   82 

Life  and  the  Psychic  Process 87 

The  Chance  Aspect  of  Life  and  Mind.  93 

Activity  of  Mental  Life 10 1 

The  Postulates  of  Psychology 106 

Mental  Synthesis 113 


CHAPTER 

XIX. 
XX. 

XXI. 

XXII. 

XXIII. 

XXIV. 

XXV. 

XXVI. 
XXVII. 

XXVIII. 
XXIX. 

XXX. 
XXXI. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Theories  of  Perception 119 

The  Structure  and    Function    of    the 

Percept    126 

Primary  and  Secondary  Sensory  Ele- 
ments   137 

Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Hal- 
lucinatory Perception 146 

The  Attributes  of  Sensory  Elements.  .  160 

Sensation  and  External  Reality 164 

The    Subconscious    and   Unconscious 

Cerebration    175 

The  Subconscious  and  Automatism.  .  186 
The  Subconscious  and  the  Passive  Con- 
sciousness      194 

Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Ideas..  198 
The  Subconscious,  Conscious  and  Un- 
conscious      207 

The  Threshold  and  Mental  Systems..  213 

The  Principle  of  Reserve  Energy.  ...  219 


PART  II 

THE  THEORY  OF  THE  MOMENT  CON- 
SCIOUSNESS 

I.     The  Moment  Consciousness 229 

II.     Types    of     Moments    and   Moment- 
Threshold    239 

III.  Modifications  of  Moments  in  the  Or- 

ganized Aggregate   249 

IV.  Mental  Organization 254 

V.     The  Growth  and  Function  of  the  Mo- 
ment     260 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

VI.     The  Relation  of  the  Moment  to  the 

Environment    265 

VII.     The  Assimilation  of   the    Moment  in 

Normal  States    272 

VIII.     Abnormal  Moments 283 

IX.     Mental  Continuity  and    the    Psychic 

Gap    287 

X.     The  Moment-Threshold 297 

XI.     The  Process  of  Moment-Disaggrega- 

tion 308 

XII.     Reproduction  and  the  Reflex  Moment  317 

XIII.  Desultory  Consciousness   322 

XIV.  The  Synthetic  Moment  and  its  Repro- 

duction     326 

XV.     The  Accumulative    Character   of   the 

Synthetic  Moment 332 

XVI.     The  Simple  and  Compound  Synthetic 

Moment    337 

XVII.     The  Desultory  Type  in  Pathological 

States    346 

XVIII.     Presentations  and  Representations...   351 
XIX.     Representations  and  the  Laws  of  their 

Combinations    359 

XX.     Representation  and  Recognition  ....    365 
XXI.     The  Recognitive  Moment  and  its  Re- 
production        376 

XXII.     The  Synthetic  Recognitive  Moment.  .    384 
XXIII.     The  Synthetic  Moment   of    Self-Con- 
sciousness       388 

Appendix     I.     Consciousness   391 

Appendix  II.     Physiological  Traces 398 

Index 407 


PART  I 

FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS 

AND  PRINCIPLES 


The  Foundations  of  Normal  and 
Abnormal  Psychology 

CHAPTER  I 

PSYCHOLOGY  AS  A  SCIENCE 

WE  assume  that  the  reader  regards  psychol- 
ogy as  a  science.  It  is  however  one  thing 
to  label  a  subject  as  a  science  and  another 
thing  to  understand  clearly  in  what  sense 
the  term  science  is  used  in  the  case  of  psychology.  A 
clear  understanding  of  the  nature  of  science  is  here  of 
special  importance  on  account  of  the  peculiar  position 
psychology  occupies  in  the  hierarchy  of  human  knowl- 
edge. It  is  therefore  desirable  to  define  the  meaning 
of  science  before  we  proceed  to  discuss  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  psychology. 

Science  is  the  description  of  phenomena  and  the 
formulation  of  their  relations.  Science  describes  facts 
and  formulates  their  relations  in  laws.  The  task  of 
science  is  first  to  formulate  facts  belonging  to  the  same 
type,  and  then  to  generalize  them,  that  is  to  express 
their  general  relationship  by  one  comprehensive  for- 
mula, in  spite  of  the  many  individual  variations  in  the 
phenomena.  Thus  in  geometry,  possibly  the  most  an- 
cient of  all  sciences,  many  isolated  and  important  facts 
were  already  known  to  the  semi-civilized  nations  of 
antiquity,  but  it  required  the  rationalizing  spirit  of  the 

II 


12  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

Greek  mind  to  classify  and  generalize  the  facts  into 
theorems,  the  laws  of  space.  Many  important  proper- 
ties of  the  right-angled  triangle,  for  instance,  were  al- 
ready known  to  the  ancient  Chaldeans  and  Egyptians. 
They  knew  that  if  in  a  right-angled  triangle  the  two 
sides  are  respectively  three  and  four,  the  hypothenuse 
must  be  five  and  so  on;  that  is,  they  knew  only  con- 
crete facts,  but  what  they  lacked  was  just  the  scientific 
side.  It  required  a  Pythagoras  to  discover  that  in  all 
right-angled  triangles  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the 
two  sides  is  equal  to  the  square  of  the  third.  No  mat- 
ter what  the  size  of  the  triangle  be,  no  matter  how  dif- 
ferent in  length  its  sides  are,  once  the  triangle  be  of  the 
same  type,  namely  right-angular,  the  same  general  re- 
lationship must  obtain. 

To  take  an  illustration  from  physics.  Falling 
bodies  form  one  type  of  movement.  Now  the  bod- 
ies themselves  may  be  different  in  kind,  in  nature, 
may  be  of  various  material,  may  differ  widely  in 
structure,  weight,  and  shape,  and  still,  since  they 
all  belong  to  the  same  type  of  motion,  they  are,  in 
spite  of  their  manifold  diversity,  expressed  in  one  gen- 
eral formula,  in  one  law,  namely,  that  the  spaces  tra- 
versed are  proportional  to  the  square  of  times. 

In  other  less  exact  sciences  the  facts  are  exhaustively 
described  and  a  general  statement  is  formulated  as  to 
their  relationship.  In  physiology,  for  instance,  we  find 
mainly  descriptions  of  facts  classified  into  types,  the 
relationships  of  which  are  expressed  in  general  for- 
mulae, or  laws.  Thus  in  the  cerebro-spinal  nervous  sys- 
tem, each  part  and  its  functions  are  described  as  fully  as 
possible,  and  then  all  the  facts  are  brought  under  one 
comprehensive  formula  such  as  the  reflex  arc.     In  em- 


Psychology  as  a  Science  13 

bryology  the  different  changes  of  the  embryo  are 
minutely  described,  classified  into  types,  into  a  certain 
number  of  definite  stages,  and  then  all  the  changes,  in 
the  infinite  wealth  of  their  variety,  are  expressed  in  the 
general  proposition  that  the  embryo  in  the  short  period 
of  its  development  traverses  in  an  abbreviated  form  all 
the  stages  that  the  species  has  passed  through  in  the 
many  ages  of  its  existence ;  all  the  changes  are  general- 
ized in  the  formula  that  the  ontogenetic  series  is  an  epi- 
tome of  phylogenetic  evolution.  We  may,  therefore,  say 
that  science  is  a  description  of  types  of  facts,  the  rela- 
tionships of  which  are  expressed  in  general  comprehen- 
sive formulae,  or  laws.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  un- 
derstand psychology  to  be  a  science;  it  classifies  phe- 
nomena into  types  and  searches  for  the  general  expres- 
sion of  their  relations,  or  for  what  is  termed  psycho- 
logical laws. 

We  must  come  to  something  more  precise  and  defi- 
nite. We  said  that  psychology  deals  with  classification 
and  generalizations  of  phenomena;  but  what  are  these 
phenomena?  In  the  different  branches  of  science,  we 
find  that  each  one  has  a  determinate  order  of  phenom- 
ena to  deal  with,  a  definite  subject  matter.  Thus  ge- 
ometry deals  with  spatial  facts,  mechanics  with  motion, 
physics  with  changes  of  molecular  aggregations,  chem- 
istry with  atomic  combinations  and  their  mutations, 
physiology  with  processes  going  to  make  the  equilib- 
rium of  organic  life,  sociology  with  phenomena  of  so- 
cial life,  and  so  it  is  in  the  case  of  all  other  sciences. 
Now  what  is  the  subject  matter  of  psychology?  What 
are  the  facts,  the  phenomena  with  which  psychology 
deals? — Psychology  deals  with  facts  of  consciousness. 

On  the  very  threshold  of  our  discussion,  we  may  be 


14  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

stopped  by  the  pertinent  question:  "You  say  that 
psychology  deals  with  facts  of  consciousness,  but  what 
is  consciousness?" — Consciousness  is  subjective  facts, 
such  as  the  elements  of  sensation,  feelings,  pains, 
thoughts,  acts  of  willing  and  the  like.  Positive  science 
must  have  given  facts,  data  to  work  upon;  these  data 
it  analyzes,  describes,  classifies  into  types  and  seeks  to 
find  the  formulae  of  their  relationships.  Psychology 
can  accomplish  no  more  than  any  other  science.  The 
data  of  psychology  are  facts  of  consciousness,  these  facts 
are  analyzed  into  their  simplest  elements,  and  the  laws 
of  their  relations  are  searched  for.  But  psychology  does 
not,  and  legitimately  cannot  possibly  go  beyond  con- 
sciousness. Consciousness  is  the  ultimate  datum  which 
psychology  must  assume  as  given  and  which  is  from 
a  psychological  standpoint  unanalyzable.  Conscious- 
ness must  be  postulated,  if  we  wish  to  enter  the  temple 
of  psychology. 

In  this  relation  psychology  is  as  positive  as  the  rest 
of  her  sister  sciences.  Geometry,  a  science  to  which 
no  one  will  deny  exactness,  deals  as  we  know  with  the 
laws  of  space-relations.  Should  we  ask  the  geometrician 
the  same  question  just  put  to  the  psychologist:  You 
say  that  your  science,  geometry,  deals  with  facts  of 
space  and  their  relations,  but  what  is  space?  The  geo- 
metrician will  smile  at  us.  He  will  tell  us  that  by  space 
he  means  such  forms  as  lines,  angles,  triangles,  quadri- 
laterals, circles,  cubes,  cylinders,  pyramids,  etc.  Should 
we  persist  and  ask  further,  "Yes,  that  is  true,  but  all 
these  are  so  many  forms  of  space,  what  is  the  space  it- 
self with  which  you  deal?"  The  geometrician  will  no 
doubt  answer :  "My  dear  sir,  geometry  deals  with  facts 
of  space,  space  itself  is  taken  as  an  ultimate  datum.  The 


Psychology  as  a  Science  15 

work  of  geometry  is  not  to  ask  what  space  Is  in  itself, 
but  what  the  relations  are  of  spatial  forms,  space  itself 
being  postulated." 

Mechanics  deals  with  the  laws  of  energy  and  motion, 
physics  with  molecular  changes  of  matter,  but  neither 
physics  nor  mechanics  would  have  gone  far,  had  they 
stopped  to  answer  the  questions  as  to  what  motion, 
energy,  matter  are  in  themselves.  These  are  simply  post- 
ulated, taken  for  granted,  they  are  the  ultimate  data  of 
these  sciences.  In  this  respect  psychology  does  not 
differ  from  other  sciences.  It  takes  Its  subject  matter  as 
given  and  does  not  inquire  as  to  what  the  nature  of  the 
material  is  in  itself.  The  reader  must  remember  that 
the  question  as  to  what  things  are  in  themselves  is  not 
at  all  a  question  of  positive  sciences,  but  of  metaphysics. 
I  do  not  mean  In  any  way  to  detract  from  the  dignity 
of  metaphysics,  what  I  wish  is  simply  to  point  out  the 
limits  of  positive  science.  The  problem  as  to  what  things 
are  In  themselves  does  not  fall  within  the  province  of 
science,  but  within  the  domain  of  metaphysical  re- 
search. 

The  question  as  to  the  nature  of  consciousness,  what 
it  is  in  itself,  may  be  a  very  important  one,  but  it  lies 
outside  the  ken  of  psychology,  just  as  the  laws  of  aes- 
thetics do  not  concern  the  chemist,  although  the  latter 
may  be  a  great  lover  of  beauty.  In  the  contemplation 
and  enjoyment  of  a  beautiful  picture  he  will  not  intro- 
duce a  chemical  formula,  and  in  his  chemical  experi- 
ments he  will  not  Introduce  aesthetic  considerations.  The 
same  holds  true  in  the  case  of  psychology.  The  psy- 
chologist may  be  a  metaphysician,  but  in  his  psycholog- 
ical work  he  must  keep  clear  of  metaphysics.  Conscious- 
ness therefore  is  a  presupposition,  a  postulate  of  psy- 


1 6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

chology. 

There  is  one  more  important  assumption  which  psy- 
chology must  start  with  in  order  to  be  a  positive  sci- 
ence at  all,  namely,  uniformity.  Under  similar  condi- 
tions like  results  follow.  Suppose  a  geometrician  should 
prove  to  you  that  the  sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a  tri- 
angle is  equal  to  two  right  angles,  suppose  that  some 
sceptic  should  come  in  and  say,  "Yes,  that  is  all  right  in 
relation  to  the  triangles  in  this  particular  space,  in 
another  portion  of  space,  on  some  other  star,  or  planet 
the  theorem  will  not  hold  good."  The  only  answer  the 
geometrician  could  give  is  that  we  must  assume  that 
space  is  uniform,  so  that  wherever  we  form  our  tri- 
angles we  obtain  the  same  results.  The  same  is  true 
in  mechanics.  The  laws  of  motion  and  inertia  hold 
good  of  the  pebble  on  the  roadside,  of  the  dust  grains 
dancing  in  the  sunbeam,  and  of  distant  stars  in  the  milky 
way.  Uniformity  of  relations  among  phenomena  must 
be  postulated,  if  science  is  to  be  at  all.  If  under  the 
same  conditions  different  results  follow,  science  would 
have  been  an  impossibility.  Uniformity  of  nature  is 
one  of  the  most  fundamental  postulates  of  science.  Psy- 
chology assumes  uniformity;  it  assumes  that  there  exist 
constant  uniform  types  of  mental  activity  with  definite 
relations  that  can  be  formulated  into  psychological  laws. 
Thus  psychology  at  the  very  outset  postulates  conscious- 
ness and  uniformity  of  mental  phenomena. 

We  can  now  see  in  what  relation  psychology  which 
deals  with  phenomena  of  consciousness  differs  from 
philosophy  whose  subject  matter  is  also  consciousness. 
Philosophy  has  no  postulates,  psychology,  like  all  other 
sciences,  must  have  its  postulates  which  it  cannot  tran- 
scend.    Philosophy  deals  with  the  ultimate  in  conscious- 


Psychology  as  a  Science  ij 

ness,  it  investigates  the  very  postulates  of  conscious  ac- 
tivity. Psychology  on  the  contrary  accepts  the  facts  of 
consciousness  as  ultimate  data. 


CHAPTER  II 

PHYSICAL  AND  PSYCHIC  FACTS 

PSYCHOLOGY  we  said  deals  with  facts  of  con« 
sciousness,  but  this  is  too  broad  a  statement, 
for  there  are  other  sciences  that  also  deal  with 
facts  of  consciousness,  such  as  ethics,  aesthet- 
ics, logic.  In  what  respect  does  psychology  differ  from 
these  sciences?  It  differs  in  this  that  ethics,  aesthetics 
and  logic  are  normative  regulative  sciences ;  psychology 
is  a  positive  natural  science.  Ethics  deals  with  ideals 
of  moral  life,  aesthetics  with  ideals  of  beauty,  and  logic 
with  ideal  ways  of  correct  reasoning.  All  these  sciences 
deal  with  ideals,  with  norms  to  which  the  matter  of  fact 
consciousness  ought  to  conform,  if  it  is  to  act  rightly. 
They  put  a  value  on  the  phenomena.  Psychology,  how- 
ever, like  all  other  natural  sciences  has  no  other  ideal 
than  fact,  it  admits  of  no  "ought."  From  a  strictly 
psychological  standpoint,  the  ugly  and  the  beautiful,  the 
good  and  the  evil,  the  true  and  the  false  are  of  equal 
value.  Psychologically  they  are  all  facts  of  conscious- 
ness and  must  be  studied  as  such;  just  as  the  serpent 
and  the  dove  are  of  equal  interest  and  value  to  the  nat- 
uralist. The  ravings  of»a  maniac  are  of  the  same  psycho- 
logical interest  and  value  as  the  subtle  reasoning  of  a 
Newton.  Psychology  is  a  positive  natural  science,  it  does 
not  deal  with  the  subjective  evaluation  of  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, but  with  their  objective  natural  existence. 

Having  shown  in  what  psychology  agrees  with  other 
positive  natural  sciences,  we  must  now  point  out  in  what 

i8 


Physical  and  Psychic  Facts  19 

it  differs  from  them.  Psychology  deals  with  phenomena 
of  consciousness  as  facts  of  objective  natural  existence. 
Are  these  facts  of  the  same  order  with  those  of  the 
physical  world,  the  subject  matter  of  the  natural  phys- 
ical sciences?  We  must  answer  in  the  negative.  The 
objects  of  the  natural  sciences  of  the  physical  world  are 
of  a  material  and  spatial  nature.  A  physical  body  has 
weight,  occupies  a  certain  portion  of  space,  so  has  the 
molecule,  the  atom.  Can  we  say  the  same  of  psy- 
chological facts?  By  no  means.  They  arc  different 
in  kind,  and  this  I  wish  especially  to  impress  on  the 
mind  of  the  reader.  To  realize  this  truth,  I  think  it 
a  good  preliminary  psychological  exercise  for  the  reader 
to  try  to  find  how  many  grams,  or  grains  his  idea 
of  beauty  weighs,  how  many  millimeters  long,  wide  and 
high  his  feelings  of  love  are;  let  him  indulge  in  the 
fancy  of  conceiving  an  engineer  building  a  bridge  with 
mathematical  formulae  as  links,  and  his  feelings  of  vir- 
tue and  patriotism  as  supports.  On  the  other  hand  let 
him  think  of  a  logician  trying  to  fill  up  the  defects  of 
his  train  of  reasoning  with  solid  bricks,  and  using  as 
connecting  links  bars  of  pig  iron.  In  short,  psychol- 
ogy differs  from  physical  sciences  in  this,  that  its  facts, 
the  facts  of  consciousness  are  not  of  a  material  nature. 
"Do  not  physical  sciences"  it  may  be  asked  "deal  with 
such  phenomena  as  sound  and  light?"  Certainly  they 
do,  but  these  sciences  regard  these  phenomena  from 
a  standpoint  radically  different  from  that  of  psychology. 
Sound  in  physics  is  not  the  sensation  sound,  but  the 
external,  material  vibration  of  air,  which  may  or  may 
not  give  rise  to  a  sensation  of  hearing.  The  same  holds 
true  in  the  case  of  light.  What  physics  investigates  is 
not  light  as  sensation,  but  vibrations  of  ether  which 


20  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

may  or  may  not  give  rise  to  a  sensation  of  sight.  It  is, 
however,  just  such  facts  as  sensations,  facts  not  spatial 
in  their  nature  which  constitute  the  subject  matter  of 
psychology. 

"May  not  facts  of  consciousness  be  some  kind  of  mat- 
ter, some  form  of  material  substance  the  constitution  of 
which  we  do  not  as  yet  know  ?"  Such  was  the  question 
put  by  a  medical  man,  when  he  heard  me  expounding 
the  difference  in  kind  between  physical  and  psychical 
facts.  "That  might  be"  I  answered,  "but  then  that 
substance,  if  it  ever  be  discovered,  will  not  have  the 
properties  of  matter;  it  will  be  a  "matter"  totally 
different  in  kind  from  that  studied  by  the  physicist.  For 
the  "matter"  of  physical  sciences  is  essentially  one  of 
extension;  a  matter  however  that  occupies  no  space  is 
an  existence  altogether  different  in  kind  from  that  of 
extended  things,  and  is  certainly  no  "matter"  for  the 
physicist. 

The  persistent  antagonist  may  raise  here  a  further 
objection.  "Are  not  the  phenomena  of  consciousness" 
he  may  ask  "facts  of  activity?  And  is  not  activity, 
kinetic  energy?  And  if  this  be  the  case  must  not  the 
facts  of  consciousness  be  ranged  along  with  physical 
phenomena,  be  reduced  to  the  manifestations  and  trans- 
formations of  kinetic  energy  and  thus  really  and  ulti- 
mately fall  within  the  domain  of  the  mechanical  sci- 
ences?" 

Change  certainly  is  manifested  in  the  mutations  of 
states  of  consciousness,  but  this  change  is  not  the  phys- 
ical change  of  translocation.  Change  in  the  states  of  con- 
sciousness may  no  doubt,  be  regarded  as  activity,  and 
if  you  please  as  energy,  but  this  activity  is  not  the  en- 
ergy of  mechanics.    Activity  in  mechanical  or  physical 


Physical  and  Psychic  Facts  21 

sciences  means  molar,  molecular,  or  atomic  movement 
of  matter  through  space,  while  psychic  activity  is  not  a 
translation  of  matter  through  space,  a  thought  is  not  a 
material  mass  having  extension,  weight  and  locomotion. 
This  truth,  simple  as  it  may  appear,  cannot  be  too 
often  repeated  and  too  strongly  emphasized,  since  one 
frequently  meets  with  this  fallacy  of  "thought-materiali- 
zation" in  the  world  of  psychiatry.  Words  are  often  mis- 
leading and  the  metaphorical  expression  "mental  en- 
ergy" is  taken  in  its  literal  meaning  of  mechanical  en- 
ergy. While  I  am  writing  these  lines  I  find  in  one  of 
the  number  of  the  Russian  "Archives  of  Psychiatry  and 
Neurology"  edited  by  Prof.  Kowalevsky,  an  article, 
in  which  an  attempt  is  made  to  express  mental  activity 
in  terms  of  mechanical  energy.  The  writer  might  as 
well  attempt  to  change  inches  into  pounds.  He  who 
undertakes  the  examination  and  study  of  mental  phe- 
nomena must  bear  in  mind  the  simple  and  important, 
but  frequently  forgotten  truth,  that  facts  of  conscious- 
ness are  not  of  a  physical,  mechanical  character. 

Against  our  view  may  be  urged  the  fact  that  in 
proportion  as  a  science  tends  to  become  exact,  it  takes 
on  more  a  quantitative  aspect,  its  phenomena  are  re- 
duced to  molecular  or  atomic  changes.  If  now  psy- 
chology is  a  science  at  all,  it  will  reach  its  exactness, 
when  it  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion, 
so  that  the  phenomena  presented  by  consciousness,  al- 
though at  present  impenetrable  to  our  imperfect  instru- 
ments and  methods  of  investigation,  must  ultimately 
be  reduced,  in  some  way  or  other,  to  mechanical  terms. 
Psychology  has  not  yet  had  its  Galileo. 

This  objection  may  be  easily  disposed  of  by  the  simple 
answer  that  the  exactness  of  science  is  not  at  all  in  pro- 


22  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

portion  to  its  degree  of  reduction  to  terms  of  matter 
and  motion.  No  one  will  deny  that  mathematics  is  an 
exact  science,  but  is  it  exact  because  it  is  reduced  to  me- 
chanical terms  ?  While  mechanics  must  be  logical,  logic 
is  not  mechanical. 

Within  certain  limits  this  generalization  of  the  re- 
lation of  scientific  exactness  to  mechanical  formulae 
may  be  fully  granted,  if  it  be  restricted  to  the  concrete 
physical  sciences,  but  it  cannot  possibly  hold  good  in 
case  of  psychology,  as  the  latter  does  not  fall  within 
the  circle  of  the  physical  sciences. 

The  weakness  of  this  last  objection  from  scientific 
exactness  becomes  clearly  disclosed,  if  we  get  a  little 
deeper  into  the  matter.  The  reason  why  there  is  such 
a  persistent  tendency  to  reduce  science  to  mechanical 
terms  is  based  on  the  tacit  understanding  that  atoms 
and  motion  are  the  only  ultimate  realities.  We  see  at 
a  glance  that  this  consideration  is  at  bottom  purely 
metaphysical;  it  is  a  consideration  which  science  has 
not  to  take  into  account.  Nothing  is  so  dogmatically 
metaphysical  as  just  the  common  sense  that  has  an  ab- 
horrence of  metaphysics.  That  atoms  and  their  motions 
are  the  only  ultimate  realities  is  certainly  metaphysics 
and  bad  metaphysics  too,  as  it  is  unguarded  by  reflective 
critical  thought.  Since  this  unreflective  metaphysics  of 
atomism  is  widely  spread  in  the  medical  world,  and  is 
considered  scientific,  one  cannot  help  discussing  it,  point- 
ing out  its  deficiencies,  showing  up  the  obstacles  it  puts 
in  the  way  of  positive  science.  Metaphysics  is  a  branch 
of  philosophy  which  deals  with  the  nature  of  reality. 
As  philosophy  it  accepts  no  unanalyzcd  concepts;  un- 
like science  it  has  no  postulates  taken  blindly  on  faith. 
The  proposition  now  before  us,  namely  that  atoms  and 


Physical  and  Psychic  Facts  23 

their  motion  are  ultimate  realities,  is  bad  metaphysics, 
because  it  is  a  blind  unanalyzed  postulate.   How  do  we 
know  that  atoms  and  their  motions  are  ultimate  reali- 
ties?   Why  not  ask  what  is  reality?    Once  we  are  on 
metaphysical  ground,  why  not  take  it  in  real  earnest? 
Why  stop  on  atoms  and  motions?     Atoms  themselves 
are  not  ultimate  simple  units,  they  have  shape,  size, 
weight.     Now  shape,  size,  weight,  what  are  they  after 
all  ?    They  are  so  many  resultants  of  masses  of  tactual, 
visual  and  muscular  sensations,  which  are  as  little  ulti- 
mate as  are  the  sensations  of  color  or  of  pain.     It  is 
out  of  sensations,  percepts  and  ideas  that  the  concept 
"atom"  is  framed.     Subtract  from  the  atom  its  sensa- 
tional, perceptual  and  ideational  elements,  abstract  from 
it  its  shape,  size,  weight  and  the  ultimate  reality  of  the 
atoms  will  become  a  bare  nothing.     The  atom  there- 
fore is  ultimately  resolved  into  terms  of  consciousness. 
The  same  holds  true  in  case  of  motion.     Motion  is  a 
mental  product  of  what  is  known  as  muscular  and  retin- 
al sensations.     What  is  most  ultimately  known  is  only 
consciousness  and  its  facts.     The  atom  and  its  motions 
are  after  all  nothing  else  but  constructs  of  consciousness. 
From  the  standpoint  of  epistemology,  or  what  the  Ger- 
mans   call    "Erkenntnisstheorie,"    we    have    only    a 
double  series  of  mental  phenomena,  one  standing  for 
the  internal  and  the  other  for  the  external  world,  and 
not  atoms,  but  mental  life  may  be  regarded  as  the  ulti- 
mate reality. 

From  a  strictly  scientific  standpoint,  however,  we 
have  no  right  to  resolve  matter  into  mind  or  still  less 
mind  into  matter,  because  the  two  are  presented  to  con- 
sciousness as  different  in  kind,  even  though  they  both 
may  belong  to  a  general  consciousness.     Between  the 


24  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

two  scries  of  facts,  the  physical  and  the  psychical,  there 
exists  a  fundamental  difference.  The  door  yonder  is 
covered  with  white  paint,  the  inkstand  before  me  is 
made  of  glass,  is  round,  is  heavy,  is  black,  but  my  idea 
of  the  door  is  not  covered  with  white  paint,  my  idea 
of  the  inkstand  is  neither  made  of  glass,  nor  round,  nor 
heavy,  nor  black.  In  short,  the  facts  of  consciousness 
are  not  spatial. 

A  fallacy  prevalent  among  the  medical  profession  and 
now  also  extant  among  the  populace  is  the  placing  of 
psychic  life  in  the  brain.  The  neurologist,  the  patholo- 
gist ridicule  the  old  Greek  belief  that  the  place  of  the 
mind  is  in  the  heart.  Modern  science  has  discoverd  that 
the  heart  is  nothing  but  a  hollow  muscle,  a  blood  pump 
at  best,  the  place  of  mental  processes  is  in  the  brain. 
This  medical  belief  now  circulating  in  the  popular  and 
semi-scientific  literature  of  to-day  differs  but  little 
from  the  ancient  Greek  belief,  it  is  just  as  fallaci- 
ous and  superstitious.  It  is  true  that  psychic  life  is 
a  concomitant  variable  function  of  nervous  processes 
and  brain  activity,  but  neurosis  is  not  the  cause  of 
psychosis.  The  brain  does  not  secrete  thought  as  the 
liver  secrets  bile.  The  mind  is  not  in  the  brain,  nor 
in  fact  is  the  mind  anywhere  in  the  universe  of  space; 
for  psychosis  is  not  at  all  a  physical  spatial  process. 

As  fallacious  and  superstitious  is  the  recent  tendency 
of  medical  investigation  to  localize  psychic  processes,  to 
place  different  psychic  processes  in  different  seats  or 
localities  of  the  brain,  thus  implying  that  each  psychic 
process  respectively  is  placed  inside  some  cerebral  cen- 
tre or  nerve  cells.  Psychic  life  is  no  doubt  the  conco- 
mitant of  nervous  brain  activity,  and  certain  psychic 
processes  may  depend  on  definite  local  brain  processes, 


Physical  and  Psychic  Facts  25 

but  the  given  psychic  process  is  not  situated  in  a  definite 
brain  centre,  nor  for  that  matter  is  it  situated  anywhere 
in  space. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   DEFINITION  OF  THE   PSYCHIC   PROCESS 

THE  definition  thus  far  given  of  psychic  life 
is  rather  of  a  negative  character.  We  de- 
fined the  psychic  phenomenon  in  opposition 
to  the  physical  phenomenon.  Physical  phe- 
nomena are  in  space,  psychic  phenomena  arc  not  spatial. 
Now  a  negative  definition  may  to  many  prove  rather 
unsatisfactory.  It  is,  therefore,  desirable  to  define 
psychic  phenomena  in  more  positive  terms. 

It  is  now  the  tendency  to  define  the  physical  process 
in  social  terms  and  the  psychic  process  in  terms  of  indi- 
vidual cognition.  A  physical  phenomenon  is  defined  as 
one  common  to  many  minds,  while  a  psychic  phenomenon 
is  an  object  of  an  individual  consciousness.  I  think 
that  such  a  view  of  the  external  physical  object,  as  that 
which  is  common  to  many  minds  in  contrast  to  the 
psychic  or  that  belonging  to  an  individual  mind  only 
is  incorrect  from  a  purely  psychological  standpoint. 
Psychologically  considered  the  characteristic  trait  of  a 
physical  object  is  not  that  it  is  common,  but  that  it  is 
external.  The  tree  yonder  is  to  me  a  physical  object, 
not  because  it  is  common  to  many  minds,  but  because  T 
perceive  it  as  external,  the  sensory  elements  of  the  per- 
ception carry  with  them  external  objectivity. 

The  social  perception  of  an  object  may  be  one  of  the 
criteria  of  external  reality,  but  certainly  not  the  only  one, 
and  surely  not  the  chief  one.  In  perceiving  an  object  I 
do  not  consider  it  as  a  physical  object,  because  I  know 

26 


The  Definition  of  the  Psychic  Process  27 

that  it  is  common  to  my  fellow-beings,  but  because  the 
very  psychic  process  of  perception  gives  the  immediate 
knowledge  of  externality.  An  object  is  considered  as 
physical,  not  because  of  its  social  aspect,  but  because  of 
its  perceived  external  aspect.  Had  my  perception  of  the 
house  yonder  been  a  hallucination,  I  would  have  still 
seen  it  as  external  and  therefore  regarded  as  a  physical 
object;  and  should  this  hallucination  furthermore  be 
confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  all  my  other  senses, 
should  I  be  able  to  touch  it,  press  against  it  and  feel  re- 
sistance, knock  myself  on  it  and  feel  concussion  and  pain, 
and  have  a  series  of  tactual  and  muscular  sensations  by 
walking  into  it  and  around  it,  and  should  I  further  have 
.this  hallucination  of  all  the  senses  every  time  I  come 
to  this  identical  spot,  the  object  would  be  to  me  an 
external  physical  object,  and  no  amount  of  social  con- 
tradiction could  and  would  make  it  different.  Regarded 
from  a  psychical  standpoint  an  object  is  considered  as 
physical,  not  because  it  is  common  to  other  minds,  but 
because  it  is  projected  as  extensive  and  external  to  mind. 
Not  community,  but  extension,  externality  is  the  psy- 
chological criterion  of  the  physical  object. 

It  is  true  that  community  of  object  is  one  of  the  cri- 
teria of  external  reality,  but  it  is  certainly  not  true  that 
the  community  of  the  object  gives  rise  to  the  perception 
of  externality.  It  may,  on  the  contrary,  be  claimed,  and 
possibly  with  far  better  reason,  that  it  is  the  object's 
externality  that  gives  rise  to  its  community. 

The  child  in  its  growth  learns  to  discriminate  be- 
tween things  and  persons.  Persons  move,  act,  make 
adaptations,  while  things  are  moved,  acted  upon,  adapt- 
ed to;  persons  initiate  movements,  things  do  not;  per- 
sons are  prime  movers  and  it  is  to  them  that  one  has  to 


28  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

look  up  in  the  satisfaction  of  needs  and  in  the  acquisi- 
tion and  use  of  things.  As  against  persons  things  are 
contrasted  as  impersonal.  Gradually  the  child  learns 
to  include  himself  within  the  class  of  persons, — his 
hopes,  wishes  and  desires  come  in  contact,  as  well  as  in 
conflict  with  those  of  other  persons,  and  he  learns  more 
and  more  of  inner  life  and  activity  with  which  he  finally 
identifies  all  personality.  Personality  is  more  and  more 
stripped  of  the  thing  aspect  until  the  inner  mental  life, 
especially  in  its  will  aspect,  remains  as  its  sole  charac- 
teristic. Persons  are  ivillers,  and  it  is  these  wills  which 
are  of  the  utmost  importance  for  the  child  to  learn  as 
the  fulfillment  of  his  will  depends  on  them.  He  then 
learns  to  class  himself  within  the  category  of  willers; 
he  himself  is  a  wilier.  Impersonal  things,  falling  out- 
side and  being  contrasted  with  the  class  of  willers,  are 
conceived  as  independent  of  persons. 

Moreover,  while  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case 
each  wilier  bears  to  things  a  direct  relation,  his  relation 
to  other  willers  is  only  to  be  established  through  things. 
Wills  come  in  contact  not  through  the  mere  fact  of  will- 
ing, but  through  their  relations  to  things.  Coming  in 
direct  relation  with  things,  things  alone  give  direct  ex- 
perience, experience  in  its  first  intention.  In  other  words, 
only  things  give  rise  to  sensation  or  rather  perception; 
hence  sensory  life  with  its  time  and  space  experience  giv- 
ing rise  to  externality  is  the  criterion  of  the  universe  of 
things,  conceived  as  independent  of  will.  Only  thing  is 
external,  will  is  not.  Wills,  however,  can  come  in  rela- 
tion through  things,  and  only  through  the  same  things; 
the  universe  of  things  must  be  a  common  one  to  all  the 
wills,  if  these  wills  are  to  come  into  relation  at  all.  In 
other  words,  the  physical  universe,  genetically  regarded, 


The  Definition  of  the  Psychic  Process  29 

is  external  not  because  it  is  common,  but  it  is  common, 
because  it  is  external. 

The  definition  of  the  physical  object  as  that  which  is 
common  to  many  minds  and  of  the  psychic  object  as  that 
which  is  present  to  one  mind  only  is  not  acceptable, 
since  it  postulates  the  result  of  complicated  epis- 
temological  reflection  and  psychological  research,  still 
very  doubtful  in  themselves,  at  the  very  outset  of  the 
science  of  psychology.  It  may  be  that  the  world  is  noth- 
ing but  consciousness  and  that  the  physical  universe  is 
nothing  but  the  social  object  of  many  minds;  still  all  this 
belongs  to  the  domain  of  epistemology  and  metaphysics. 
The  psychologist  deals  with  phenomena  and  not  with 
the  "really  existent."  Standing  on  the  ground  of  psy- 
chology the  psychologist  has  no  right  to  reduce  the 
physical  world  to  psychic  terms;  in  fact,  such  a  pro- 
cedure would  undermine  his  science,  as  all  distinction 
between  psychic  and  physical  facts  would  become  oblit- 
erated. For  if  by  an  "object"  common  to  many  minds 
we  mean  an  object  external  to  those  minds,  then  we  gain 
nothing  at  all  by  introducing  the  "many,"  it  is  just  this 
"external"  that  has  to  be  defined;  if  by  the  "common 
object"  we  mean  an  object  psychic  in  its  character,  but 
only  of  a  social  nature,  then  we  reduce  the  physical  uni- 
verse to  consciousness  and  thus  identify  physical  and 
psychic  processes.  Such  identification  is  an  obliteration 
of  the  opposition  between  the  psychic  and  physical  facts, 
an  opposition  with  which  the  psychologist  must  set  out, 
if  he  is  to  place  psychology  in  the  hierarchy  of  natural 
sciences.  The  psychologist  must  postulate  the  existence 
of  an  external  physical  world,  just  as  the  geometrician 
postulates  space  or  the  mechanician  matter  and  mo- 
tion. 


30  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

It  is  the  task  of  the  epistemologlst  and  metaphy- 
sician to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  that  physical  world 
whether  it  really  exists  independent  of  consciousness. 
Without,  therefore,  going  into  metaphysical  considera- 
tions, I  think  it  is  best  to  define  the  physical  phenomenon 
as  the  object  or  process  conceived  as  being  independent 
of  consciousness,  while  the  psychic  object  or  process  is 
one  that  is  conceived  as  being  directly  dependent  on 
consciousness.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  definition  has 
the  merits  of  being  positive  as  the  one  given  by  the 
representatives  of  the  idealistic  school;  it  has  not  the 
defects  of  bringing  in  irrelevant  metaphysical  and  epis- 
temological  considerations;  and  it  has  furthermore  the 
advantage  of  being  fully  in  accord  with  the  data  and 
postulates  of  psychology. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PSYCHIC  STATES  AS  OBJECTS 

THE  attacks  may  now  be  renewed  from  quite 
a  different  direction.  We  asserted  that  psy- 
chology deals  with  facts  of  objective,  natural 
existence,  the  subject  matter  of  science  in  gen- 
eral. How  does  it  rhyme,  it  may  be  asked,  with  the  con- 
clusion just  arrived  at,  namely,  that  the  facts  of  psychol- 
ogy are  different  from  those  with  which  other  natural 
sciences  deal  ?  To  this  may  be  answered  that  facts  may 
agree  in  being  objective,  and  still  differ  widely  as  to 
kind, — a  square  and  a  man,  a  pound  and  a  mile,  are  all 
objective,  and  still  their  difference  is  certainly  a  funda- 
mental one. 

An  objection  may  be  raised  that  may  to  some  appear 
as  a  very  grave  one.  Is  psychology  a  science  at  all? 
Does  it  actually  deal  with  objective  natural  existence? 
Physics,  chemistry  and  other  concrete  sciences  treat  of 
objects,  of  facts,  in  the  external  world.  Any  one  can 
go  and  verify  those  phenomena  and  their  relations.  This, 
however,  is  not  the  case  with  facts  of  consciousness,  they 
are  essentially  subjective.  Psychology,  therefore,  prop- 
erly speaking,  is  not  a  science  in  the  same  sense  as  other 
sciences  are.  This  objection  may  be  easily  obviated  by 
the  very  simple  consideration  that  the  facts  of  any  indi- 
vidual consciousness  are  as  much  objective  to  other  peo- 
ple, as  the  chair,  the  table,  the  molecule,  the  atom.  My 
individual  consciousness  is  considered  by  others  as  ex- 
ternal, as  objective,  as  existing  outside  of  their  con- 

31 


32  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sciousness,  and,  in  fact,  were  it  not  so,  there  would  have 
been  no  individuality. 

After  this  lengthy  discussion  we  at  last  arrive  at  the 
conclusion,  that  although  the  facts  which  psychology 
treats  of  are  not  of  a  material,  physical  nature,  they  are 
none  the  less  objective  in  character.  Objective  however, 
as  the  facts  are,  they  are  not  independent  of  conscious- 
ness in  the  same  way  as  the  objects  of  the  external  world 
are  regarded,  they  are  essentially  facts  of  consciousness. 

"What  is  the  relation,"  it  may  be  asked,  "of  psychol- 
ogy to  the  physical  and  biological  sciences?"  The 
physical  and  biological  sciences  constitute  a  system  of 
knowledge  of  the  material  world.  Psychology  investi- 
gates the  genesis  of  this  knowledge.  Mechanics,  for 
example,  treats  of  motion  and  space.  Psychology  in- 
vestigates not  what  motion  and  space  are  in  themselves, 
but  what  the  elementary  acts  of  consciousness  are  out 
of  which  the  space  and  time  perceptions  are  developed. 

The  different  objects  which  other  sciences  treat  of 
may  be  regarded  psychologically,  and  studied  from  the 
standpoint  of  their  rise  and  development  in  conscious- 
ness. For  objects  to  be  known  at  all  must  first  be  per- 
ceived or  conceived  by  consciousness.  Psychology  im- 
plies knowledge  of  the  physical  world  as  the  content 
of  consciousness.  In  order  to  know  how  perception  and 
conception  of  objects  originate,  those  objects  must  first 
of  all  be  given.  A  thing  that  is  not  yet  in  existence  can- 
not possibly  be  analyzed.  It  is  only  when  knowledge 
of  objects  is  already  formed  that  one  can  begin  to  think 
about  knowledge  itself,  how  it  originated  and  how  it 
came  to  be  in  the  shape  possessed  by  the  knowing  mind. 
Physical  sciences  are  in  that  relation  independent  of 
psychology,  the  former  can  be  carried  on  to  a  high 


Psychic  States  as  Objects  33 

degree  of  perfection  without  any  knowledge  of  psychol- 
ogy, while  psychology  without  knowledge  of  the  physic- 
al world  would  simply  lack  subject  matter. 

Apart,  however,  from  the  fact  that  psychology 
has  as  its  subject  matter  the  objects  of  physical  sciences 
as  perceived  by  and  developed  in  consciousness,  it  also 
studies  the  forms,  the  character,  the  way  of  working  of 
consciousness,  it  formulates  the  laws  of  how  conscious- 
ness works,  and  analyzes  into  simplest  elements  and 
their  combinations,  the  rich  material  that  goes  to  make 
up  the  mental  life  of  individual  existence,  or  what  is 
known  as  mind. 

The  postulated  objective  reality  acts  upon  the  given 
individual  consciousness  and  gives  rise  to  mental  states 
which  along  with  the  objective  representation  of  that 
reality  has  also  its  own  coloring,  its  own  subjective  side. 
The  represented  object  floats  so  to  say  in  a  stream  of 
consciousness.  The  subject  matter  which  the  psycholo- 
gist investigates  is  not  the  objective  reality  itself,  but 
objective  states  of  consciousness. 

We  may  represent  the  relation  of  the  psychologist  to 
his  object  of  study  by  the  following  series : 

I  2  3 

The  objective      The  represented      The  subjective 
reality.  object.  stream. 

4  5 

The  objective     The  psychologist, 
state  of  con- 
sciousness. 

We  must  be  on  our  guard  and  not  confuse  objective 


34  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

thought,  the  thought  of  the  object,  and  the  object  of 
thought.  The  three  differ  fundamentally,  and  the 
standpoints  from  which  the  matter  is  regarded  must  be 
constantly  kept  in  view.  The  thought  contemplates  and 
holds  the  object  by  the  function  of  knowledge  it  pos- 
sesses, but  the  knowledge  constituting  the  thought  and 
the  object  of  that  thought  are  totally  different  in  their 
nature.  The  object  in  the  external  world  may  undergo 
change,  but  the  thought  that  got  hold  of  the  object  may 
still  persist,  or  on  the  other  hand,  the  thought  may 
change  and  the  object  still  remain  the  same;  or  again 
the  thoughts  and  the  object  may  both  change.  As  I  am 
writing  these  lines  a  red  book  lying  on  my  table  strongly 
attracts  my  attention,  and  for  the  time  being  consti- 
tutes the  object  of  my  thought.  I  can  close  my  eyes  and 
continue  to  represent  to  myself  the  red  book,  its  color, 
its  size,  its  content,  in  short  all  about  the  red  book,  the 
red  book  constituting  so  to  say  the  "focal-object"  of  my 
thought  constantly  renewing  itself  by  the  fresh  material 
which  it  draws  from  the  surrounding  marginal  stream. 
Meanwhile  the  book  may  be  changed,  the  cover  may  be 
torn,  the  pages  may  be  mutilated,  the  book  may  be  burnt 
or  substituted  by  another  body  or  by  a  totally  different 
object,  say  an  ink-stand;  or  on  the  other  hand,  the 
book  may  remain  lying  on  my  desk  undisturbed,  but  my 
thought  may  change.  I  may  begin  to  think  of  some- 
thing else,  say  of  the  coming  election  or  the  Spanish  war; 
or  both  the  book  and  thoughts  may  change,  the  book 
may  be  taken  away  and  I  at  the  same  time  may  think 
of  something  else,  say  of  the  watch  and  its  mechanism. 
The  cognizant  thought  that  possesses  the  object  and 
the  object  of  that  thought  are  from  a  purely  scientific 
psychological  standpoint,  independent  variables. 


Psychic  States  as  Objects  35 

Thought  itself  with  its  object  may  in  its  turn  become 
an  object  of  thought,  and  here  once  more  the  same  rela- 
tions obtain.  The  contemplations  or  psychological  an- 
alysis of  a  thought  must  be  discriminated  from  the 
thought  as  the  material  or  object  of  that  analysis.  From 
the  confusion  of  these  different  aspects  many  a  fallacy 
results.  Thus  the  schematic  incessant  change  in  the  flow 
of  objective  time  is  confused  with  the  state  of  conscious- 
ness having  time  as  its  object,  and  the  attributes  of  one 
are  fallaciously  ascribed  as  undergoing  continuous 
change.  Another  fallacy  often  committed  by  the  so- 
called  "new  psychology"  is  the  substitution  of  the 
attributes  of  the  object  for  those  of  the  functioning 
thought. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  SCOPE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

PSYCHOLOGY,  we  said,  deals  with  states  of 
consciousness,  but  these  states  are  not  indepen- 
dent, floating  in  the  air  so  to  say.  They  are  in 
connection  with  some  material  existence,  and 
not  with  physical  reality  as  a  whole,  but  with  some 
definite  individual  body.  We  must  keep  in  mind  that 
psychology  is  first  of  all  a  natural  science,  and  the  only 
thing  it  has  to  take  into  consideration  is  experience. 
Now  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  never  find  a  thought,  an 
idea,  a  sensation  setting  up  on  its  own  hook  and  having 
complete  independence  of  all  physical  reality.  Were 
even  such  a  thing  possible,  we  could  not  know  of  it, 
because  the  only  way  we  come  to  know  of  other  thoughts 
is  through  their  physical  activities  perceived  by  our  sense 
organs.  We  know  of  the  existence  of  other  individual 
hate,  love,  anger,  friendship,  kindness  by  the  physical 
expressions  of  those  feelings,  by  the  acts  that  accom- 
pany them.  We  know  of  the  thoughts,  of  the  emotions, 
of  our  companions,  by  the  muscular  expressions  of  the 
face,  by  the  changes  in  the  brilliancy  of  the  eye,  by  the 
general  bodily  state,  such  as  quietness  or  restlessness,  by 
their  gestures,  by  many  other  physical  expressions,  but 
principally  by  means  of  those  physical  manifestations 
known  as  speech.  Were  all  those  concomitant  physical 
processes  absent,  there  would  have  been  no  means  what- 
ever of  knowing  of  the  very  existence  of  external  states 
of  consciousness.     As  an  empirical  science  psychology 

36 


The  Scope  of  Psychology  37 

studies  only  such  states  of  consciousness  as  are  connected 
with  physical  reality,  or  truer  to  say  with  some  indi- 
vidualized physical  being.  In  short,  psychology  treats 
of  states  of  consciousness  as  dependent  on  or  connected 
with  the  corporeal  individual. 

The  meaning  of  the  concept  "corporeal  individual" 
must  not  be  left  in  a  vague  state.  From  a  purely  me- 
chanical standpoint  we  may  say,  that  a  corporeal  indi- 
vidual is  a  closely  interrelated  system  of  material  parts 
forming  a  more  or  less  stable  equilibrium.  This  equilib- 
rium is  constantly  being  interfered  with,  by  the  forces  of 
the  external  environment,  but  as  long  as  that  equilibrium 
maintains  itself  in  resisting  the  disaggregating  influences 
of  external  forces,  it  may  practically  be  considered  as  a 
corporeal  individual.  In  other  words,  a  corporeal  indi- 
vidual is  a  system  of  material  parts  organically  inter- 
connected, and  functioning  as  one  determinate  whole. 
Any  living  being  will  answer  our  definition.  From  the 
lowest  stage  to  the  highest;  from  the  monocellular 
amoeba  to  the  highest,  most  complicated  multicellular 
organism,  we  meet  with  the  same  fundamental  traits, 
characteristic  of  what  we  term  the  "corporeal  individ- 
ual." Now  it  is  the  mental  states  of  the  corporeal  in- 
dividual that  psychology  investigates  and  studies. 

In  our  last  discussion  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  consciousness  depends  on  the  corporeal  individual 
and  can  only  be  known  from  physical,  bodily  manifes- 
tations. Each  living  being  manifests  some  activity  in  its 
reactions  to  the  stimuli  of  the  external  environment. 
Now  what  are  the  reactions  characteristic  of  conscious- 
ness? Where  are  the  distinctive  marks  that  stamp  a 
physical  manifestation  with  the  impress  of  psychic 
states?    The  only  sure  way  to  tell  is  by  purposive  ac- 


38  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

tivity.    We  know  that  our  neighbor  is  conscious,  because 
of  his  active  purposive  life.    When  a  fly  is  on  his  nose, 
he  raises  his  hand  and  brushes  it  away;  he  knows  how 
to  walk  and  preserve  equilibrium ;  avoids  obstacles ;  lives 
in  a  house  for  protection  from  the  changes  of  weather 
and  from  harmful  intruders;    seeks  shelter  from  rain; 
dresses  himself  warmly  on  a  frosty  winter  day;   a  thou- 
sand other  movements  all  of  them  expressive  of  pur- 
posive activity  tell  us  of  our  neighbor's  consciousness, 
intelligence.     The  stone  on  the  road  changes  its  place 
according  to  the  influences  of  incident  forces ;  the  grain 
of  dust  is  blown  hither  and  thither  by  the  wind;   they 
do  not  show  a  more  or  less  definite  purposive  activity 
under  changing  circumstances.    The  disturbance  of  their 
equilibrium  does  not  stimulate  them  to  induce  changes 
in  the  external  environment,  changes  that  would  tend  to 
restore  that  lost  equilibrium.    They,  therefore,  have  no 
purpose.     For  a   purpose  is  the  tendency  to   realize 
some  external  action  which  is  useful  or  indispensable  to 
the  life-existence  of  the  particular  individual  being.  The 
tendency  to  the  maintenance  of  a  definite  activity  in  op- 
position to  the  onset  of  disturbing  forces  of  the  environ- 
ment in  order  to  restore  the  lost  equilibrium,  may  be 
considered  as  the  universal  formula  for  purposive  life 
in  general. 

This  formula  holds  true  of  all  animal  life.  The 
man  in  running  after  the  car  has  purpose,  so  has 
the  cat  in  chasing  the  mouse,  so  has  the  deer  in  flee- 
ing from  the  hunter.  The  very  amoeba,  that  lump  of 
protoplasm,  in  extending  its  pseudopodia  to  draw  in  the 
bit  of  nutriment,  possesses  the  germ  of  purposive  activ- 
ity, and  some  primitive  psychic  state  must  therefore  be 
ascribed  to  it.    Life  is  essentially  purposive  in  its  na- 


The  Scope  of  Psychology  39 

ture.  Wherever,  therefore,  we  meet  with  life,  there 
some  form  of  psychic  state,  however  primitive  and  ele- 
mentary, must  be  present.  Psychic  states  stand  in  the 
most  intimate  relationship  to  life  activity.  The  two  in 
fact  cannot  be  separated.  Psychosis  is  concomitant  with 
biosis.  Psychologists  as  well  as  physiologists  all  agree 
thus  far,  that  there  is  no  psychosis  without  neurosis; 
some  go  further  and  affirm  that  there  is  no  neurosis 
without  psychosis;  I  think,  we  are  closer  to  the  truth, 
if  we  advance  still  further  and  assume,  that  there  is  no 
biosis  without  psychosis.  Psychic  states  must  be  pre- 
dicated not  only  of  highly  organized  animals,  possessed 
of  a  nervous  system,  but  also  of  the  most  elementary 
monocellular  organisms. 

The  evolutionist  especially  must  accept  our  last  con- 
clusion, for  he  will  agree  that  consciousness  did  not 
come  into  existence  per  saltum,  he  will  acknowledge  that 
the  germs  of  conscious  life  characteristic  of  the  highest 
organized  being  must  already  be  present  in  the  lowest 
types  of  life,  out  of  which  developed  the  higher,  the 
more  complex  organisms. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  define  the  scope  of  psy- 
chology. 

Psychology  is  the  science  of  psychic  states  both  as  to 
content  and  form,  regarded  from  an  objective  stand- 
point, and  brought  in  relation  to  the  living  corporeal  in- 
dividual. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  SOURCES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

FACTS  of  consciousness,  we  pointed  out,  are  the 
subject  matter  of  psychology.  The  question 
arises  as  to  the  sources  of  the  facts.  The  botan- 
ist, when  he  wishes  to  carry  out  a  series  of  ex- 
periments, goes  into  the  herbarium  or  into  the  field  to 
gather  the  material  for  his  study.  The  entomologist 
collects  his  specimens  on  the  street,  field,  and  forest.  The 
same  holds  true  in  the  case  of  all  other  sciences.  The 
external  world  is  infinitely  rich,  it  is  an  inexhaustible 
mine  from  which  physical  science  draws  Its  facts.  Now 
what  are  the  sources  of  the  psychologist?  The  psychol- 
ogist cannot  possibly  go  out  into  the  forest,  catch  his 
specimens,  dry  them,  and  pin  them  for  his  observation 
and  study. 

This  question  as  to  the  sources  of  psychology 
comes  to  us  with  greater  force,  when  we  realize, 
that  psychological  facts  are  not  of  the  same  order  with 
those  of  the  rest  of  natural  physical  sciences.  It  is,  of 
course,  evident  that  we  must  draw  our  material  from 
consciousness,  but  where  shall  we  turn  to  find  the  facts  ? 
Where  are  the  particular  localities  from  which  we  can 
work  out  and  bring  to  light  mental  facts?  Such  is  the 
difficult  question  that  arises  before  the  mind  of  the 
scientist,  who  has  been  trained  in  the  school  of  concrete 
natural  science.  He  finds  himself  helpless.  The  neurol- 
ogist to  whom  a  psychological  training  is  truly  invalu- 
able, finds  himself  ill  at  ease  when  in  his  investigations 

40 


The  Sources  of  Psychology  41 

he  strikes  a  problem  which  has  to  be  studied  mainly 
from  a  psychological  point  of  view.  A  piece  of  tissue, 
a  lump  of  protoplasm,  a  nerve  cell  with  its  dendrons  and 
axons  can  be  stained,  mounted,  observed,  and  exper- 
imented upon,  but  who  can  get  hold  of  a  fact  of  con- 
sciousness, of  an  elementary  psychic  state,  of  a  sensa- 
tion, of  a  feeling,  of  an  idea,  stain  them,  put  them  un- 
der the  microscope  for  scientific  investigation?  The 
facts  of  consciousness  are  so  peculiar,  so  different  in 
kind  from  those  which  form  the  subject  matter  of  other 
sciences  that  they  who  are  trained  exclusively  in  con- 
crete natural  sciences  are  at  a  loss  where  to  look  for 
"real"  psychological  facts. 

Some  even  go  so  far  as  to  doubt  whether  facts  of 
consciousness  are  "real"  facts  at  all.  Frequently  I 
have  heard  from  people  with  a  good  medical  educa- 
tion, people  who  were  far  from  being  unintelligent,  that 
they  doubted  the  reality  of  psychic  facts :  "they  are  not 
anything!  nothing  substantial!"  Comical  as  this  last 
assertion  may  appear,  one  can  understand  its  reason; 
one  can  understand  the  consternation  and  bewilderment 
of  him  who  for  the  first  time  puts  his  foot  on  the  thresh- 
old of  psychology.  What  they  meant  to  express  was  the 
strange  experience  of  having  been  confronted  with  facts 
of  a  nature  totally  different  from  the  ones  with  which 
they  usually  dealt.  The  facts  with  which  they  are  conver- 
sant are  of  a  tangible  nature,  but  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness are  not  tangible,  they  cannot  be  seen,  nor  tasted, 
nor  smelled,  nor  weighed  by  pounds  and  ounces,  nor 
measured  by  rulers  and  compasses.  In  short,  psycho- 
logical facts  cannot  be  reached  by  any  of  the  sense  or- 
gans; that  is  why  they  are  such  a  puzzle,  that  is  why 
some  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  f^cts  of  conscious- 


42  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ness  can  hardly  be  considered  as  facts,  that  they  are  not 
anything  substantial.  Still  on  further  reflection  any  of 
these  sceptics  will  admit  that  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness exist,  and  as  such  they  must  be  facts. 

In  fact,  if  one  wants  to  be  a  thorough  sceptic,  he  may 
doubt  the  reality  of  the  external  material  world.  All 
that  might  be  nothing  but  a  dream,  nothing  but  an  illu- 
sion, a  hallucination.  We  have  no  sure  criterion  of  the 
truth  of  the  external  material  reality,  but  one  thing  re- 
mains perfectly  clear  in  all  this  destructive  scepticism 
and  that  is  the  reality  of  the  doubting  thought,  the  ex- 
istence of  the  sceptic  consciousness.  That  is  why  Des- 
cartes, the  father  of  modern  philosophy,  beginning  with 
profound  scepticism  as  to  the  reality  of  things  finally 
found  his  criterion  of  the  truth  of  real  existence  in  his 
very  doubting  thought,  and  he  expressed  it  in  his  fa- 
mous "Cogito  ergo  sum."  Thought,  therefore,  is  even 
more  real  than  the  objects  of  the  material  world, 
we  know  of  the  latter  only  through  thought,  through 
consciousness.  In  short,  consciousness  is  a  stem  reality, 
and  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  are  real  facts. 

We  may  refer  here  to  the  behavior  hypothesis  recently 
advanced  by  Watson.  The  psychological  knowledge  of 
animals  can  only  be  obtained  from  the  observation  of 
their  action,  of  their  behavior,  or  of  their  adaptations  to 
their  environment.  The  same  holds  true  in  the  case  of 
human  psychology.  Man  does  not  differ  from  other 
animals  and  should  be  studied  in  the  same  way.  This, 
if  I  understand  Watson  aright,  is  essentially  his  posi- 
tion. Watson  goes  to  the  extent  of  denying  the  very 
existence  of  "centrally  initiated  processes,"  he  reduces 
all  psychology  to  peripherally  induced  processes,  sen- 
sory and  motor.  He  contests  the  presence  or  the  very 
existence  of  images  and  denies  the  presence  of  any  af- 


The  Sources  of  Psychology  43 

fective  elements.  Perhaps  it  may  be  best  to  quote  Wat- 
son's own  words: 

"Having  thus  summarily  dismissed  the  image  and  the 
affective  elements,  I  crave  permission  to  restate  the  es- 
sential contention  of  the  behaviorist.  It  is  this:  the 
world  of  the  physicist,  the  biologist,  and  the  psycholo- 
gist is  the  same,  a  world  consisting  of  objects — their 
interests  center  around  different  objects,  to  be  sure,  but 
the  method  of  observation  of  these  objects  is  not  essen- 
tially different  in  the  three  branches  of  science.  Given 
increased  accuracy  and  scope  of  technique,  and  the  be- 
haviorist will  be  able  to  give  a  complete  account  of  a 
subject's  behavior  both  as  regards  immediate  response 
to  stimulation,  which  is  effected  through  the  larger  mus- 
cles; delayed  response,  which  is  effected  through  the 
same  muscles  (so-called  action  after  deliberation)  — 
these  two  forms  comprising  what  I  have  called  explicit 
behavior;  and  the  more  elusive  types,  such  as  the  move- 
ments of  the  larynx,  which  go  on  in  cases  where  action 
upon  stimulation  is  delayed  (so-called  thought  pro- 
cesses). This  latter  form  of  behavior,  which  manifests 
itself  chiefly  in  movements  of  the  larynx,  but  which  may 
go  on  in  (to  the  eye)  imperceptible  form,  in  the  fingers, 
hands,  and  body  as  a  whole,  I  should  call  implicit  be- 
havior. For  years  to  come,  possibly  always,  we  shall 
have  to  content  ourselves  with  experimental  observation 
and  control  of  explicit  behavior.  I  have  a  very  decided 
conviction,  though,  that  not  many  years  will  pass  before 
implicit  behavior  will  likewise  yield  to  experimental 
treatment. 

"Possibly  the  most  immediate  result  of  the  acceptance 
of  the  behaviorist's  view  will  be  the  elimination  of  self- 
observation  and  of  the  introspective  reports  resulting 


44  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

from  such  a  method." 

The  view  taken  by  Watson  is  physico-biological. 
While  one  can  sympathise  with  his  views  in  making 
psychology  more  of  a  biological  study,  still  one  can- 
not help  realizing  the  fact  that  he  takes  an  extreme  view 
when  he  wishes  to  reduce  all  mental  processes  to  be- 
havior. His  view  of  affection  as  being  essentially  sense 
processes  seems  to  be  sound.  He  should  not,  however, 
involve  his  view  of  affection  with  the  more  narrow  sec- 
tarian view  of  sex  analysis  forced  gratuitously  on  clin- 
ical facts.  Affection  and  emotion  are  no  doubt  peri- 
pherally induced  and  are  probably  due  to  the  action 
of  the  central  nervous  system  and  glandular  secre- 
tions of  internal  organs.  In  this  respect  one  may 
fully  agree  with  the  behavior  hypothesis.  There  is  no 
need  of  invoking  sex  to  that  effect  as  Watson  himself 
states  it:  "It  is  not  essential  to  my  contention  that  the 
above  vague  suggestion  should  be  true.  //  is  essential 
to  our  position  to  have  affection  reducible  to  sense  pro- 
cesses. It  is  even  more  probable  that  the  mechanism  is 
glandular;  that  very  slight  increase  in  the  secretion 
products  gives  us  the  one  group;  checking  or  decreas- 
ing the  secretion,  probably  the  other." 

What,  however,  one  cannot  accept  is  the  extreme 
view  of  the  denial  of  introspection.  Introspection 
will  ever  remain  the  fundamental  method  in  normal  and 
abnormal  psychology.  The  very  problem  of  sensations, 
ideas,  images,  thoughts,  affects,  emotions,  has  no  mean- 
ing without  introspection.  JVe  must  know  the  psychic 
states  or  mental  processes  from  our  own  experiences. 
Pain,  pleasure,  feelings,  anger,  fear,  love,  acquire  their 
meaning  only  from  the  introspective  attitude  of  the 
observer. 


CHAPTER  VII 

PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 

THE  popular  scientific  literature  of  to-day  of- 
ten asserts  dogmatically  the  belief  that  the 
investigation  of  the  normal  precedes  that  of 
the  abnormal.  This  belief  is  erroneous  and  is 
only  given  credence  to  by  people  who  had  not  thought 
much  on  the  subject,  and  especially  by  those  who  belong 
to  the  so-called  "new  psychology"  school.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  abnormal  in  scientific  research  precedes  that 
of  the  normal.  The  investigation  of  the  abnormal  is 
one  of  the  most  potent  instruments  for  new  discoveries. 
The  method  of  experimentation,  the  most  powerful  tool 
of  modern  science,  is  in  fact  the  creation  of  artificial  con- 
ditions, in  other  words,  the  effecting  of  abnormal  states. 
Where  the  compound  is  highly  complex,  where  the  con- 
stituent factors  and  their  relations  are  imperfectly  or  all 
but  unknown  and  are  not  therefore  under  control,  the 
spontaneous  occurrence  of  some  anomaly  ought  to  be 
greeted  enthusiastically,  as  it  discloses  the  role  played  by 
the  modified  or  excluded  factor.  This  is  specially  true 
in  the  case  of  mental  life,  where  the  phenomena  under 
investigation  are  the  most  complex  in  the  whole  domain 
of  science,  where  a  direct  modification  of  the  functioning 
mental  activity  is  as  a  rule  impossible  without  the  pro- 
duction of  some  anomaly. 

In  the  case  of  psychic  life  experimentation  may  be 
conducted  on  two  different  lines  of  research.  The  one 
is  the  modification  of  the  objective  content  by  means  of 

45 


46  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

changing  the  objective  stimulus;  the  other  method,  and 
by  far  the  most  efficient  and  fruitful,  is  the  modification 
of  the  very  function  on  which  the  psychic  content  de- 
pends. 

Memory,  for  instance,  may  be  studied  by  giving  the 
subject  a  series  of  auditory  or  visual  impressions  at  giv- 
en intervals,  and  then  seeing  how  many  of  the  series  the 
subject  can  remember  after  a  given  interval.  We  can 
thus  determine  the  role  played  by  such  factors  as  time, 
number  of  impressions,  number  of  repetitions,  etc.  The 
function  of  memory  remains  the  same,  and  only  the 
stimuli  of  the  psychic  content  are  modified.  We  may, 
however,  study  memory  from  a  totally  different  stand- 
point, and  that  is  by  the  disturbance  of  its  function.  Dis- 
turbance of  function  may  be  studied  in  artificial  states 
produced  by  drugs,  or  induced  by  hypnosis;  or  by  in- 
vestigating cases  in  which  the  function  is  accidentally 
disturbed,  such,  for  instance,  as  are  to  be  found  in  dif- 
ferent forms  of  amnesia  and  aphasia. 

The  second  method  is  by  far  the  more  important 
of  the  two,  and  is  extremely  valuable.  For  it  is  only  by 
disturbances  in  the  function  of  thought  that  we  can 
learn  something  about  the  factors  and  nature  of  mental 
life.  We  cannot  possibly  learn  about  the  nature  of  a 
process,  unless  we  disturb  it  artificially,  or  unless  we  try 
to  study  cases  in  which  we  can  find  the  process  in  differ- 
ent stages  or  degrees  of  perturbation ;  here  one  factor  is 
missing,  there  another  is  exaggerated,  and  so  on.  From 
such  cases  it  is  easy  to  analyze  the  constituent  factors  and 
their  interrelations.  In  mechanics,  for  instance,  the  law 
of  inertia  would  have  never  been  discovered.  If  not  for 
the  imagining  of  such  a  case  as  the  absence  of  all  fric- 
tion, or  its  approximate  removal.     The  ancients  who 


Psychology  and  Psychopathology  47 

looked  to  the  ordinary  phenomena  of  common  life,  that 
is  to  the  normal,  considered  that  bodies  are  bound 
to  stop.  The  ancient  physicists,  relying  on  their  obser- 
vations of  the  normal,  believed  that  bodies  in  falling  tra- 
verse space  in  proportion  to  their  weight;  it  required 
a  Galileo  to  detect  the  fallacy  and  show  that  bod- 
ies, no  matter  what  their  size  and  weight  be,  fall- 
ing from  a  high  place  or  in  a  vacuum,  fall  to  the  ground 
at  the  same  time.  The  same  holds  true  in  the  case  of 
chemistry;  no  observer  of  water  in  its  "normal"  state 
would  have  detected  the  presence  of  hydrogen  and  oxy- 
gen. Only  under  highly  artificial  or  abnormal  condi- 
tions was  it  possible  to  discover  the  constituents  that  go 
to  make  up  the  compound  water. 

If  we  turn  to  the  sciences  dealing  with  more  com- 
plex phenomena,  we  find  illustrated  the  same  truth.  We 
know  how  highly  instructive  Darwin  found  it  to  follow 
closely  for  a  period  of  many  years  experiments  of  breeds 
in  artificial  selection,  and  to  what  capital  account  he 
turned  his  highly  valuable  observations  of  all  forms  of 
curiosities  and  monstrosities.  We  all  know  how  valua- 
ble the  observation  and  study  of  all  forms  of  anomalies 
or  variations  from  the  normal  type  or  species  proved  to 
the  final  establishment  of  the  theory  of  evolution.  The 
pre-Darwinian  zoologist  ignored  variation  regarding 
it  simply  as  an  exception  to  the  normal,  as  a  mere  ab- 
normality, as  a  pathological  manifestation  which  is  of 
little  value  to  the  scientist,  who  is  only  occupied  with 
the  discovery  of  general  laws,  laws  of  the  normal.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  was  just  these  neglected  variations, 
deviations  from  the  normal  that  turned  out  to  be  at  the 
very  foundation  of  biology,  revealing  the  nature  and 
mechanism  of  the  evolution  of  species. 


48  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

The  same  truth  we  find  illustrated  in  the  investiga- 
tions of  the  functions  of  the  different  parts  of  the  organ- 
ism. Experiments  on  animals  such  as  vivisection,  in- 
jecting of  toxin  matter,  etc.,  experiments  that  actually 
mean  the  putting  of  animals  in  pathological  states,  as 
well  as  the  investigation  of  pathological  cases  in  man, 
have  given  physiology  its  most  valuable  treasures. 
Knowledge  of  the  normal  arises  out  of  knowledge  of 
the  abnormal.  In  fact  we  may  even  say  that  the  nor- 
mal itself  originates  in  the  abnormal.  It  is  in  varia- 
tions, in  anomalies,  that  the  normal  species  takes  its 
origin. 

Strictly  speaking  the  normal  is  not  at  all  a  scientific 
concept,  it  is  purely  provisional  in  its  nature,  and  holds 
only  good  from  a  restricted  point  of  view  in  transitional 
stages  of  science.  The  normal  is  that  which  is  common; 
the  normal  is  the  usual ;  and  it  is  not  the  usual,  but  the 
unusual  that  gives  birth  to  new  hfe  in  science.  The  un- 
usual attracts  our  attention  and  reveals  to  us  the  function 
and  role  played  by  the  particular  affected  product  in  the 
total  compound. 

Taking  all  this  into  consideration,  I  think  that  they 
are  wrong  who  insist  that  the  abnormal  can  be  known 
only  from  the  normal.  We  can  realize  now  how  super- 
ficial are  those  who  tell  us  "we  learn  but  little  from  the 
abnormal,  for  first  of  all  comes  the  normal."  We  real- 
ize now  how  detrimental  to  scientific  investigation  such 
a  contention  is.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  progress  of 
science  is  not  from  the  normal  to  the  abnormal,  but  the 
very  reverse,  from  the  abnormal  to  the  normal;  the 
normal  is  but  an  arbitrary  temporary  concept,  modified, 
and  determined  by  the  abnormal  or  unusual. 

The   supreme   importance  of  pathological  research 


Psychology  and  Psychopathology  49 

holds  especially  true  in  the  case  of  psychology,  whert 
the  phenomena  and  the  conditions  on  which  these  de- 
pend are  so  highly  complex  and  so  intricate,  appearing 
at  the  same  time  so  simple  and  taken  as  a  matter  of 
course  in  ordinary  life. 

As  we  have  pointed  out  in  the  investigation  of  mental 
life  we  may  either  change  the  psychic  or  objective 
content,  or  effect  changes  in  the  mental  function  it- 
self. In  the  study  of  vision,  for  instance,  we  may  effect 
changes  in  the  conditions  of  external  objects,  leaving 
the  eye  itself  undisturbed.  We  may  keep  the  object  at 
different  distances  and  study  its  appearances,  put  the  ob- 
ject in  water  and  have  it  refracted  at  different  angles; 
we  may  look  at  it  through  different  prisms,  colored 
glasses  or  contrast  its  color  when  appearing  in  combina- 
tion with  other  colors,  whether  it  be  successive  or  simul- 
taneously. Instead,  however,  of  effecting  changes  in  the 
objects  taken  in  by  the  eye,  we  may  study  the  mechanism 
of  vision  by  investigating  the  disturbances  of  the 
function  of  sight  itself  under  the  influence  of  drugs  in- 
jected into  the  eye,  or  in  different  ocular  diseases.  The 
latter  method  is  by  far  the  more  valuable  for  revealing 
the  real  mechanism  of  the  visual  apparatus. 

Similarly  in  the  study  of  memory  we  may  follow  the 
method  of  the  German  school,  such  for  instance  as  that 
of  Ebbinghaus  and  others,  and  investigate  the  laws  of 
memory  by  analyzing  the  changes  effected  in  its  contents ; 
or  we  may  study  the  mechanism  of  memory  by  studying 
its  disturbances  in  different  forms  of  amnesia  and  mental 
diseases.  Since  psychology  prirfiarily  deals  with  the  laws 
of  psycho-physiological  functions,  it  will  be  admitted 
that  the  more  important  and  valuable  method  is  the  one 
that  has  for  its  subject  matter  the  changes  going  on  di- 


50  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

rectly  in  the  material  under  investigation.  The  investi- 
gations, however,  of  changes  or  disturbances  of  mental 
function  itself  arc  really  a  study  of  the  abnormal,  re- 
searches into  the  domain  of  mental  pathology.  In  psy- 
chology, as  in  many  other  sciences,  especially  those  of 
the  biological  order  to  which  psychology  naturally  be- 
longs, the  pathological  method  is  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant. 

We  can  realize  now  the  reason  why  it  would  be  well 
for  psychology  to  follow  closely  not  the  methods  of 
physical  sciences,  but  those  of  the  biological  sciences. 
The  material  with  which  physics  deals  lacks  the 
pathological  element,  it  can  be  introduced  only  fig- 
uratively, not  so  is  it  in  the  order  of  phenomena  with 
which  biology  deals.  In  biology  variations,  abnormali- 
ties, pathological  elements  stand  out  in  the  foreground, 
and  no  step  can  be  made  without  taking  them  into  con- 
sideration. The  psychologist  in  order  to  succeed  and  ob- 
tain more  efficient  and  valuable  results  must  keep  in 
mind  clearly  the  fact  that  the  psychic  process  is  a  form 
of  life  in  general,  its  phenomena  are  naturally  related 
to  the  province  of  biology,  and  that  of  the  highest  part 
of  it.  The  methods  of  psychological  investigation  must 
follow  the  line  not  of  the  physical,  but  of  the  biological 
sciences. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  SPIRITUALISTIC  AND  MATERIALISTIC  HYPOTHESES 

IF  we  scrutinize  more  closely  the  science  of  psy- 
chology, we  find  that  it  is  essentially  dynamical  in 
character.  Consciousness  is  the  subject  matter 
of  psychology;  but  consciousness  is  dynamic,  it  is 
first  of  all  an  activity,  a  process.  Now  all  sciences  that 
deal  with  processes  cannot  possibly  help  forming  some 
working  hypothesis  that  should  unify  the  facts  dealt 
with,  and  should  above  all  be  a  guide  for  further  re- 
search. Mechanics  has  its  hypothesis  of  masses,  forces, 
energy,  inertia,  conservation  of  matter  and  energy; 
thermotics  its  molecular  energy;  electricity  its  ether  vi- 
brations and  currents;  chemistry  the  affinity  of  atoms; 
dynamic  physiology  has  its  reflex  processes;  what  is 
the  fundamental  hypothesis  of  psychology? 
We  find  the  following  hypotheses : 

(I)  The  Spiritualistic,  or  soul  hypothesis, 

(II)  The  Materialistic  hypothesis, 

(III)  The  Faculty  hypothesis, 

(IV)  The  Transmission  hypothesis, 

(V)  The  Psycho-physiological  hypothesis. 

(a)  The  Metaphysical, 

(b)  The  Positive. 

We  give  here  a  brief  review  beginning  with  the  spirit- 
ualistic hypothesis.  At  the  very  outset  I  must  caution 
the  reader  against  the  grave  error  of  confounding  spirit- 
ualism with  spiritism.  The  latter  is  a  religious  doctrine 
of  life  after  death,  and  of  the  influences  of  natural  or 

51 


52  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

resurrected  spirits;  the  former  is  a  philosophical  theory, 
hoary  with  age,  that  attempts  to  explain  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness.  Such  men  as  Lotze  and  Ladd  are  ardent 
advocates  of  spiritualism.  According  to  this  hypothesis 
there  exists  a  spiritual  substance,  a  soul,  that  acts  in  all 
the  processes  of  consciousness.  The  soul  is  the  immuta- 
ble principle  that  unifies  all  the  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness ;  in  other  words,  all  mental  processes  are  but  man- 
ifestations of  the  soul's  activity. 

The  medical  man  trained  in  the  school  of  concrete 
physical  sciences  may  smile,  if  not  sneer,  at  the  mention- 
ing of  the  "soul."  Such  a  hypothesis  is  in  his  opinion 
nothing  but  an  anachronism.  He  may  consider  it  as 
a  theory  long  exploded  by  science  and  now  only  linger- 
ing among  the  lower  ignorant  classes,  a  theory  which  an 
intelligent  scientist  should  be  ashamed  to  introduce  into 
his  work  even  for  the  sake  of  discussion,  and  elucida- 
tion of  his  subject, — the  "soul"  is  nothing  but  supersti- 
tion. To  call  a  theory  superstition  does  not  refute  it. 
The  significant  fact  that  Prof.  Ladd  in  his  volume  on 
physiological  psychology  defends  it  valiantly,  that 
Sigwart  in  his  "Logic"  takes  up  arms  for  it,  and 
also  that  such  a  great  thinker  as  Lotze,  himself  a 
medical  man,  takes  it  under  his  protection  and  finds  it 
perfectly  rational,  and  in  fact  the  only  tenable  hypo- 
thesis, seems  to  show  that  there  must  be  something  in 
the  "soul,"  and  if  superstition  it  be,  it  is  one  that  has  to 
be  reckoned  with,  and  not  dismissed  with  contempt.  We 
must,  therefore,  examine  the  reasons  and  facts  that  urge 
some  thinkers  and  scientists  to  accept  the  soul  as  a 
working  hypothesis  for  the  phenomena  of  consciousness. 
There  are  two  weighty  considerations  that  are  strongly 
In  favor  of  spiritualism. 


The  Spiritualistic  and  Materialistic  Hypotheses   53 

We  have  already  pointed  out  in  a  previous  discus- 
sion that  mental  phenomena  are  different  in  kind  from 
those  of  the  material  world.  A  feeling,  an  idea,  an 
image,  a  thought  have  neither  length,  nor  breadth,  nor 
heighth,  nor  weight;  no  psychic  phenomenon  can  be  ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  material  magnitude.  Hence,  con- 
clude the  spiritualists,  consciousness  is  different  in  kind 
from  matter,  it  is  a  different  substance,  a  soul. 

Another  great  point  upon  which  spiritualism  rests 
is  mental  synthesis.  We  find  that  in  consciousness,  sen- 
sations, ideas,  thoughts,  feelings,  are  not  juxtaposed 
as  are  the  particles  of  some  material  body,  but  are  in 
unity,  in  synthesis.  The  chair  seen  yonder  consists  of 
numerous  impressions,  sensations  and  ideas,  but  all  these 
do  not  appear  in  consciousness  in  their  bare  separate- 
ness,  but  are  synthetized  in  one  percept,  a  chair.  The 
various  experiences  that  reach  the  mind,  in  spite  of  all 
their  multitudinousness  are  still  brought  into  relations 
and  are  unified,  synthetized  into  the  unity  of  conscious- 
ness, they  are  all  referred  to  the  same  personality.  Now 
reason  the  spiritualists,  many  different  phenomena  will 
remain  in  all  their  manifoldness  and  will  not  give  rise  to 
a  unity,  unless  there  is  a  medium  through  which  they 
are  unified.  If  a  resultant  is  to  be  formed  there  must 
be  something  on  which  the  forces  that  are  to  form  the 
resultant,  impinge.  If  then  we  do  not  assume  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  spiritual  substance,  mental  synthesis  is  incom- 
prehensible, if  not  impossible. 

We  must  now  point  out  the  weakness  of  the  soul  hy- 
pothesis. The  argument  of  spiritualism,  that  because 
mental  facts  differ  in  kind  from  material  facts,  a  spirit- 
ual substance  must  be  assumed  to  exist  is  certainly  fal- 
lacious.    Phenomena  may  differ  fundamentally  and  still 


54  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

we  have  no  right  whatever  to  conclude  that  they  require 
two  different  substances.  Time  is  different  from  space, 
but  are  they  two  different  substances?  Consciousness 
may  differ  widely  from  matter  and  still  require  no  one 
simple  substance  for  its  existence  and  activity. 

The  only  solid  argument  that  remains  for  the  soul 
hypothesis  is  that  of  mental  synthesis.  The  very  con- 
sideration, however,  on  which  the  spiritualist  lays  so 
much  stress  serves  as  his  best  refutation.  That  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness  differ  radically  from  material 
ones  is  a  fundamental  proposition  with  the  psychologist 
in  general,  and  with  the  spiritualist  in  particular,  but 
this  is  far  from  supporting  spiritualism.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  overthrows  his  last  stronghold.  For  if  mental 
facts  differ  in  kind  from  physical  material  facts,  it  is 
poor  reasoning  to  raise  difficulties  pertaining  to  one  re- 
gion, and  carry  them  over  into  a  totally  different  one. 
It  would  be  senseless  to  raise  aesthetic  difficulties  in 
chemistry  or  mechanics,  but  it  is  no  better  to  reason 
that  because  a  medium  is  required  for  physical  objects, 
movements,  forces  to  combine  their  effects  in  one 
resultant,  therefore,  a  medium,  a  substance,  a  soul,  is 
also  required  for  a  synthesis  of  a  totally  different  order 
of  phenomena,  those  of  consciousness.  The  two  orders 
differ  in  kind,  and  what  is  found  necessary  in  one,  is  not 
for  that  reason  also  proven  to  be  indispensable  to  the 
other.  It  must  first  be  proven  that  the  conditions  of 
unification  are  the  same  in  both  before  the  argument 
from  mental  synthesis  may  be  accepted  as  valid.  States 
of  consciousness  may  become  synthetized,  without  any 
medium,  without  any  tertium  quid,  without  any  soul. 

The  spiritualist  by  his  "soul"  hypothesis  really 
undermines  his   own   position.     For  if  It  be   grant- 


The  Spiritualistic  and  Materialistic  Hypotheses   55 

ed  that  the  conditions  of  unification  are  the  same  in 
mental  as  in  physical  activity;  that  a  medium  is  required 
in  both  in  order  to  get  a  unity,  a  resultant,  then  the 
whole  "soul"  structure  tumbles  to  the  ground. 
Material  and  mental  phenomena  cannot  possibly 
belong  to  two  radically  different  substances,  if  the  con- 
ditions of  their  activity  are  exactly  of  the  same  nature. 
It  would  have  been  perfectly  logical  had  the  difference 
between  consciousness  and  the  physical  world  been  as- 
serted and  emphasized,  and  had  the  medium,  the  soul, 
been  totally  left  out. 

The  greatest  difficulty,  however,  which  the  spiritualist 
encounters  is  the  interaction  of  the  two  substances.  If 
matter  and  soul  are  different  in  nature  how  can  they 
interact,  how  can  they  come  into  any  relation?  Hours 
in  so  far  as  they  are  different  from  pounds,  or  miles, 
have  nothing  in  common,  and  as  such  do  not  interact;  an 
hour  cannot  modify  a  pound,  nor  can  pounds  change 
hours,  and  if  this  holds  true  of  phenomena  of  the  extern- 
al world  where  the  difference  after  all  is  not  so  very 
great,  it  must  with  special  force  recoil  on  the  spiritualist 
where  the  soul  and  body  are  so  totally  different  in  all  re- 
spects. The  only  way  out  of  the  difficulty,  if  one  is  con- 
sistent and  is  not  afraid  to  take  the  consequences,  is  to 
introduce  the  miraculous  and  say  that  the  interaction  is 
due  to  the  intervention  of  the  deity.  This  view  was  in 
fact  taken  by  the  followers  of  Descartes.  The  spiritualist, 
however,  with  a  philosophical  and  scientific  training  will 
rather  be  inconsistent  and  support  his  view  by  all  kinds 
of  props  than  to  accept  such  a  conclusion,  because  he 
knows  that  it  practically  means  defeat,  it  means  that  the 
hypothesis  is  not  working,  and  that  the  soul  must  take 
shelter  under  the  wing  of  the  deity,  the  refuge  of  ig- 


^6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

norance. 

From  a  purely  scientific  standpoint  we  must  reject  this 
soul-hypothesis.  The  first  requirement  of  a  scientific 
hypothesis  is  that  its  hypothetical  cause  should  be  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  be  verifiable  by  experiment  and  ob- 
servation. Now  in  the  case  of  the  soul,  this  condition  is 
not  fulfilled.  The  soul  is  something  that  lies  outside 
the  range  of  experience,  and  could  never  be  brought 
within  the  limits  of  empiricism,  the  basis  of  science.  The 
spiritualist,  in  fact,  has  not  even  a  positive  notion  of  his 
"soul,"  he  either  frames  it  in  wholly  negative  terms, 
that  it  is  not  changeable,  that  it  is  not  material;  or,  if 
pressed  hard,  he  falls  back  on  the  phenomena  of  con- 
•ciousness,  the  very  phenomena  the  soul  is  called  for  to 
explain. 

Furthermore,  a  scientific  hypothesis  is  justified  and 
found  useful,  if  shown  that  it  makes  the  facts  more 
easily  understood.  This  cannot  be  shown  in  the  case  of 
the  soul.  As  a  hypothesis  the  soul  is  useless  and  scien- 
tifically unjustifiable.  The  acceptance  of  the  "spirit," 
of  the  soul,  does  not  make  it  a  bit  easier  for  us  to  com- 
prehend the  modus  operandi  of  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness. The  soul  is  an  immutable,  indefinite,  indescriba- 
ble, incomprehensible  being,  and  the  insuperable  diffi- 
culty of  how  it  gives  rise  to  conscious  activity  requires 
another  hypothesis.  If  mental  phenomena  present  dif- 
ficulties, spiritualism  doubles  them.  The  soul  in  fact,  is 
the  "double,"  the  ghost  of  consciousness.  The  soul  is 
an  unverifiable  superfluous  entity,  it  is  not  a  vera  causa 
in  nature;  it  explains  nothing,  and  without  removing 
difficulties  is  only  introduced  as  an  additional  burden. 

Before  we  dismiss  the  soul  hypothesis,  we  may  point 
out  that  It  must  be  rejected  on  quite  different  grounds, — 


The  Spiritualistic  and  Materialistic  Hypotheses   57 

it  is  at  bottom  unscientific,  it  is  metaphysical,  it  goes  into 
the  ultimate  nature  of  things,  an  investigation  that  does 
not  fall  within  the  province  of  science.  The  soul-hypo- 
thesis assumes  the  existence  of  an  abiding  unchangeable 
entity  behind  the  veil  of  mental  phenomena,  an  entity 
which  in  the  flow  and  change  of  the  phenomena  remains 
the  same  and  is  the  really  real,  the  ultimate  nature  of  the 
facts  of  consciousness.  This  belongs  to  the  ontological 
part  of  metaphysics,  but  should  not  be  introduced  into 
science.  The  reader  will  realize  now,  why  the 
whole  complicated  "soul  discussion"  is  taken  up  here. 
It  is  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  psychology  has  nothing 
to  do  with  substances,  noumena,  entities,  and  quiddities, 
that  psychology  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  "inner  na- 
ture" of  consciousness.  Psychology,  like  all  other  sci- 
ences, describes,  classifies,  and  investigates  by  means  of 
observation  and  experimentation  facts  of  consciousness 
and  their  relations,  and  endeavors  to  express  these  rela- 
tions in  general  formulae  or  laws ;  all  attempts  to  make 
of  psychology  more  than  this  can  only  result  in  bad  met- 
aphysics. 

The  materialistic  hypothesis  is  even  worse  metaphys- 
ics than  is  the  spiritualistic  one.  It  is  a  hypothesis  which 
in  spite  of  its  evident  absurdity  is  none  the  less  in  favor 
with  some  representatives  of  the  medical  profession. 
Matter  and  force,  as  Biichner  puts  it,  give  rise  to,  or  pro- 
duce consciousness,  or  as  Cabanis  and  Moleschott  ex- 
press it  "the  brain  produces  thought  as  the  liver  secretes 
bile."  This  hypothesis  is  unscientific  and  metaphysical, 
because  it  attempts  to  penetrate  into  the  inner  nature 
of  consciousness,  and  claims  to  have  it  resolved  into 
"matter."  It  is  bad  metaphysics,  because  it  takes  its 
"matter"  on  trust,  without  any  critical  reflection.    More- 


58  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

over  it  is  more  crude  and  worse  metaphysics  than  is  the 
soul  hypothesis,  because  it  lacks  even  the  recognition  of 
the  most  elementary,  psychological  proposition,  namely 
the  knowledge  of  fundamental  difference  between  mental 
and  material  phenomena. 

Turning  now  to  the  faculty-hypothesis,  we  find  that 
it  is  nothing  else  than  spiritualism  under  a  somewhat 
different  form.  The  faculty-hypothesis  chops  the  mind 
into  many  different  parts,  termed  faculties,  one  is  for 
reading,  another  for  speaking,  another  for  remember- 
ing, another  still  for  willing,  and  so  on.  Sometimes 
they  are  limited  to  a  few,  and  sometimes  they  are  mul- 
tiplied to  infinity. 

The  faculty-hypothesis  is  a  cheap  edition  of  spiritual- 
ism, it  is  spiritualism  many  times  over.  Instead  of  one 
soul  it  has  many  of  them.  Spiritualism  has  but  one  dif- 
ficulty and  that  is  the  soul  which,  like  an  omnipotent 
deity,  presides  in  some  mysterious  way  over  mental  and 
organic  activities.  The  faculty-hypothesis  has  an  infinite 
number  of  them,  inasmuch  as  it  multiplies  the  deity  into 
an  endless  number  of  gods  and  spirits  that  take  charge 
of  different  psychic  and  psychomotor  departments. 

One  can  see  the  reason  of  the  faculty  hypothesis.  It 
originated  with  people  who  as  a  rule  are  inclined  to  ac- 
cept uncritically  words  for  realities.  Thus,  will,  mem- 
ory, words  that  are  only  collective  terms  for  m^ny  dif- 
ferent states  of  mind,  names  furnished  by  the  language 
of  unreflective  common  sense,  are  naively  taken  as  indi- 
cating some  substantial  entities,  or  little  spirits  existing 
somewhere  in  the  brain. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  TRANSMISSION  HYPOTHESIS 

THE  transmission  hypothesis  advanced  by 
James  is  a  modification  of  the  soul  hypothesis. 
The  transmission  hypothesis  postulates  the 
existence  of  a  physical  world  and  of  an  inde- 
pendent universe  of  consciousness.  Consciousness,  how- 
ever, cannot  manifest  itself  in  this  sublunar  world  with- 
out the  occurrence  of  definite  physical  changes.  That 
level  of  physical  changes  which  makes  the  manifestations 
of  consciousness  possible  is  termed  the  physical  thresh- 
old. Now  the  ocean  of  consciousness  pours  forth  its  psy- 
chic waves  into  the  material  world  with  the  rise  and  fall 
of  the  physical  threshold.  The  threshold  is  to  be  pictured 
as  a  sort  of  flood  gate  regulating  the  volume  and  inten- 
sity of  the  transmitted  current.  The  rising  of  the  thresh- 
old diminishes  the  psychic  stream,  while  the  lowering  of 
the  threshold  permits  a  greater  volume  of  consciousness 
to  pour  over  into  our  physical  world. 

The  transmission  hypothesis  has  certain  advantages 
over  the  previous  ones  discussed  by  us.  While  this  hy- 
pothesis postulates  the  independence  of  consciousness,  it 
is  also  in  accord  with  the  scientific  proposition  now  gen- 
erally accepted,  namely  that  mental  life  is  somehow  con- 
nected with  or  is  a  function  of  brain  activity,  only  speci- 
fying that  this  function  is  one  of  transmission.  It  claims 
to  fall  in  line  with  the  threshold  concept  of  psycho- 
physics  as  worked  out  by  Fechner,  and  further  harrowed 

59 


6o  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

by  the  "new  psychology"  movement;  moreover,  it  is 
comprehensive  enough  to  embrace  all  the  facts  and 
speculations  brought  out  by  recent  investigations  in  the 
domain  of  mental  pathology. 

The  transmission  hypothesis,  however,  has  also 
disadvantages  which  are  of  such  a  grave  nature  as  to 
make  one  hesitate  to  accept  it.  The  transmission  hypo- 
thesis from  its  very  nature  is  unverifiable.  For,  if,  by 
hypothesis,  consciousness  manifests  itself  in  this  sublunar 
world  (the  only  one  we  know)  only  under  physical 
conditions,  how  can  we  ever  come  to  know  and  verify  a 
postulated  world  of  pure  consciousness?  Being  outside 
the  domain  of  our  psychophysical  world,  the  universe  of 
disembodied  consciousness  cannot,  by  hypothesis,  furnish 
us  the  means  for  its  verification.  In  this  sublunar  world 
we  can  know  of  the  existence  of  consciousness  through 
its  physical  expressions,  through  its  being  embodied. 
How  then,  can  we  ever  reach  a  universe  of  disembodied 
consciousness  ?  But  a  hypothesis  which  from  its  very  na- 
ture is  not  verifiable  cannot  possibly  be  accepted. 

The  transmission  hypothesis  is  all  the  more  unaccepta- 
ble as  the  terms  in  which  it  is  expressed  are  contradic- 
tory, and  the  analogy  on  which  it  is  based  is  essentially 
illegitimate.  Consciousness  is  supposed  to  be  different 
in  nature  from  the  physical  world  and  existing  inde- 
pendently, the  psychophysical  threshold  alone  regulating 
the  volume  of  the  stream  of  consciousness  to  be  poured 
over  into  the  material  world.  The  threshold  then  which 
is  physical  in  character  limits  consciousness,  but  how  can 
the  two  be  limited  by  each  other  when  they  are  totally 
different  in  nature  ?  In  assuming  two  different  universes, 
we  assert  that  the  two  cannot  limit  each  other,  but  in 
examining  again  the  concept  of  threshold  we  make  a 


The  Transmission  Hypothesis  6 1 

contradictory  assertion  that  the  two  can  and  do  limit 
each  other. 

The  very  analogy  on  which  the  concept  of  "transmis- 
sion function"  is  based  is  illegitimate  when  applied  to 
consciousness  in  its  relation  to  the  physical  world.  The 
concept  of  "transmission  function"  can  only  be  applied 
to  a  case  where  the  transmitter  and  the  thing  transmitted 
are  of  homogeneous  terms,  but  not  where  the  terms 
are  essentially  heterogeneous.  A  stream  of  liquid  can 
be  transmitted  through  a  pipe,  a  beam  of  light  through 
stained  glass,  or  a  Runtgen  ray  through  soft  or  more  or 
less  rarified  cellular  tissue.  Both  the  transmitter 
and  the  material  transmitted  are  physical  in  their 
nature,  but  how  can  an  idea  or  feeling  such  as  our 
idea  of  eternity,  or  of  infinity,  or  aesthetic,  or  moral 
sense  be  transmitted  through  a  tube?  How  then  can 
we  apply  the  concept  of  transmission-function  to  con- 
sciousness and  the  physical  world  where  the  two  arc 
totally  different  in  nature?  The  analogy  is  figurative 
and  scientifically  illegitimate. 

The  transmission  hypothesis  sins  further  by  reason  of 
its  transcending  the  legitimate  grounds  of  psychology. 
It  assumes  an  independent  world  of  consciousness  which 
cannot  be  brought  within  the  range  of  experience.  Now 
even  if  it  be  granted  that  such  a  world  does  exist,  it  still 
falls  outside  the  subject-matter  of  psychology.  For  psy- 
chology as  we  pointed  out  deals  with  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, with  experiences  and  their  relations.  If  it  be  ob- 
jected that  every  hypothesis  is  extra-experiential,  it  may 
be  pointed  out  that  a  hypothesis  must  be  framed  in 
terms  that  can  be  drawn  within  the  circle  of  experience, 
it  must  use  a  vera  causa,  an  agent  that  is  observable  in 
nature.    But,  as  we  have  already  shown,  the  transmit- 


62  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sion  hypothesis  lacks  this  essential  requirement.  Its 
agent,  disembodied  consciousness,  is  not  a  vera  causa, 
nor  can  it  ever  be  drawn  into  the  circle  of  experience.  A 
good  hypothesis  must  be  framed  with  a  view  of  becom- 
ing a  possible  fact,  but  this  hypothesis  from  its  very  na- 
ture disclaims  this  possibility,  since  its  agent  is  in  a 
region  that  lies  outside  our  world  of  experience. 

For  this  very  last  reason,  namely,  for  speculating  in 
things  extra-mundane,  the  hypothesis  may  also  be 
charged  with  committing  transgressions  in  metaphysics. 
Such  a  hypothesis  is  the  more  metaphysical  as  the  phe- 
nomena under  consideration  are  dealt  with  as  if  they 
were  entities. 

Furthermore,  the  hypothesis  only  seemingly  holds  to 
the  empirical  law  that  consciousness  is  a  function  of  the 
brain.  For  if  consciousness  is  in  a  separate  world  all 
the  psychic  phenomena  are  in  existence  from  all  eternity, 
ready  made,  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  have  really 
nothing  to  do  with  the  brain,  inasmuch  as  they  exist  from 
all  eternity,  in  a  region  outside  and  totally  independent 
of  the  brain.  Thus  the  hypothesis  by  its  very  character, 
even  if  the  matter  be  regarded  from  a  purely  logical 
standpoint  undermines  the  proposition  which  it  under- 
took to  explain,  and  as  such  can  hardly  be  considered  as 
valid. 

Finally,  it  may  be  urged,  that  the  invocation  of  an 
extra-mundane  world  helps  matters  little,  as  it  does  not 
show  the  modus  operandi  of  the  interdependence  of 
mental  and  physical  phenomena,  inasmuch  as  the  rising 
or  falling  of  a  physical  threshold  does  not  in  the  least 
explain  or  show  how  a  stream  of  consciousness  is  made 
possible  to  vary  in  volume  and  intensity.  Without  ex- 
plaining the  proposition  that  mental  processes  vary  as 


The  Transmission  Hypothesis  6% 

physical  processes,  the  transmission  hypothesis  only  as- 
sumes an  additional  world  of  disembodied  consciousness 
and  thus  gratuitously  multiplies  entities. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  METAPHYSICAL  HYPOTHESES  OF  PARALLELISM 

THESpinozistic  doctrine  of  parallelism  claims 
that  the  mental  and  physical  orders  run  par- 
allel to  each  other,  taking  its  stand  on  purely 
metaphysical  grounds,  namely,  on  the  ex- 
istence of  one  substance  with  an  infinite  number  of  at- 
tributes, all  expressing  the  nature  of  this  substance.  Two 
of  these  attributes,  being  mind  and  matter  which  in  an 
infinite  number  of  parallel  running  modes  or  phenomena 
express  the  nature  of  this  one  substance.  A  modification 
of  the  unitary  substance  regarded  under  the  attribute 
of  mind  is  a  mental  mode  or  phenomenon.  The  same  re- 
garded under  the  attribute  of  matter  or  extension  is  a 
material  mode  or  physical  phenomenon.  Mental  and 
physical  phenomena  are  both  manifestations  of  one  uni- 
tary substance.  There  is  no  need  for  me  to  point  out 
that  this  double  aspect  of  one  unitary  substance  belongs 
to  metaphysical  dogmatism,  of  substantialism,  and  as 
such  cannot  possibly  be  admitted  into  the  province  of 
psychology  as  a  natural  science. 

The  voluntaristic  school  does  not  acknowledge  a  strict 
parallelism  in  the  sense  of  a  double  aspect  of  the  same 
unknowable  or  of  two  infinite  attributes  of  the  eternal 
nature  of  the  same  substance,  but  it  does  teach  a  psycho- 
physiological parallelism,  grounding  it  on  the  double 
aspect,  subjective  and  objective,  of  one  "unitary"  ex- 
perience. This  differs  but  little  from  the  substantialistic 
dogmatism.    Instead  of  one  unitary  substance  the  volun- 

64 


The  Metaphysical  Hypotheses  of  Parallelism    6$ 

tarlst  substitutes  a  no  less  metaphysical  category  of 
"unitary  experience." 

Another  metaphysical  view  of  the  new  associationist 
or  sensationalist  school  grounds  parallelism  on  epis- 
temological  and  metaphysical  grounds.  Psycho-physio- 1 
logical  parallelism  is  partly  a  matter  of  pure  definition, 
partly  a  matter  of  philosophical  considerations.  This 
school  defines  a  psychic  object  as  one  belonging  to  a 
single  subject,  one  individual  only,  while  a  physical  ob- 
ject is  one  belonging  to  many  subjects.  Now,  reasons 
this  school,  if  psychology  is  to  be  a  science  at  all,  it 
must  surely  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  communicated 
to  other  subjects,  that  is,  it  must  become  common  prop- 
erty, and  since  by  definition,  only  a  physical  object  is  an 
object  of  many  and  is  communicable,  hence  a  psychic 
object  to  become  communicable  must  be  expressed  in 
physical  terms. 

This  excursion  into  the  region  of  metaphysics  and 
epistemology  of  the  otherwise  matter  of  fact  and  com- 
mon sense  school  is  the  result  of  good  intention  of  being 
thorough-going,  hence,  this  metaphysical  definition  of 
mental  and  physical  phenomena  of  the  "one"  and  the 
"many." 

Another  argument  adduced  by  the  same  school  seems 
to  be  somewhat  more  sound.  Physical  facts  it  is  alleged 
have  a  necessary  causal  connection,  while  psychic  facts 
are  only  connected  by  association,  which  is  not  one  of 
necessity.  An  idea  a  is  sometimes  followed  by  idea  b 
and  sometimes  by  idea  c  and  so  on.  There  is  no  invari- 
able connection  in  psychic  life,  such  as  is  to  be  found 
in  physical  facts.  The  soundness  of  this  argument,  how- 
ever, is  rather  questionable.  For  it  may  be  contended 
that  no  fastening  bonds  are  ever  observed  in  physical 


66  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

» 
phenomena,  the  only  thing  observed  is  a  relation  of  se- 
quence of  antecedent  and  consequent,  and  in  case  of 
causation  an  invariable  sequence  of  a  definite  antecedent 
and  definite  consequent.  Now  psychic  facts  also  mani- 
fest relations  of  sequence,  we  observe  antecedents  fol- 
lowed by  consequents. 

The  argument  that  an  idea  is  sometimes  followed  by 
one  and  sometimes  by  another  idea  showing  the  absence 
of  invariable  sequence  is,  if  looked  at  closer,  of  a  rather 
dubious  character.  An  idea  a  or  idea  b  is  only  ob- 
jectively the  same,  by  having  the  same  object, 
but  the  thought,  mental  stream,  or  moment  consciousness 
that  possess  that  idea  may  not  be  the  same,  but  it  is 
just  this  mental  stream,  the  moment-consciousness 
that  determines  the  content  of  the  succeeding  idea. 
The  thought  of  a  is  different  according  to  the  dif- 
ference of  the  mental  stream  or  moment  conscious- 
ness. It  is  one  of  the  psychologist's  fallacies  to 
consider  that  if  the  object  is  the  same  then  the  thought 
that  possesses  the  object  must  also  be  the  same.  Now 
ideas  of  the  same  a  are  totally  different  in  different  ment- 
al streams,  just  as  two  different  minds  regarding  the 
same  object  have  absolutely  different  psychic  states.  It  is 
therefore  clear  that  an  idea  a  may  be  sometimes  fol- 
lowed by  b  and  sometimes  by  another  idea.  An  idea 
a  followed  by  b  is  altogether  different  from  idea  a  fol- 
lowed by  c.  It  is  only  the  recurrence  of  the  same  mental 
stream  or  moment  consciousness  that  would  give  the 
same  sequence.  This  is  clearly  observed  in  hypnoidic 
states  where  the  same  moment  consciousness  recurs,  the 
same  sensations,  ideas,  feelings,  and  actions  follow  in 
invariable  succession. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  UNITARY  EXPERIENCE  OF  VOLUNTARISM 

IN  the  course  of  our  discussion,  we  had  again  and 
again  to  refer  to  the  data  and  postulates  of  psychol- 
ogy. It  would  be  well  to  give  now  a  short  review 
of  them  so  as  to  bring  them  clearly  before  the 
mind  of  the  reader.  The  fact  that  the  postulates  are 
not  kept  clearly  in  view  leads  one  to  commit  many  a  fal- 
lacy. 

Psychology  assumes  the  validity  of  unanalyzed  crite- 
ria of  reality  taken  as  valid  by  common  sense.  The 
verification  of  illusions,  hallucinations,  and  delusions  is 
finally  based  on  the  dictum  of  common  sense.  The 
work  of  science  may  after  all  be  nothing  but  an 
illusion,  an  hallucination,  or  a  delusion  of  consciousness. 
What  keeps  up  the  scientist  in  his  work  is  his  firm  belief 
that  mankind  believe  in  it,  and  that  when  other  people 
are  put  under  the  same  conditions  they  will  verify  his 
experiences. 

Science  assumes  the  postulates  on  which  all  experience 
of  common  sense  is  based.  Science  furnishes  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  external  world,  but  science  is  essentially  not 
self-conscious,  and  it  cannot  therefore  on  its  own 
grounds  answer  the  question  as  to  the  validity  of  its 
knowledge.  Is  there  something  independent  in  that  ex- 
ternally perceived  object,  the  house,  for  instance,  or  is 
the  psychic  account  all  there  is  to  it?  This  is  a  problem 
not  to  be  answered  on  psychological  grounds.  Knowl- 
edge, its  possibility,  its  nature,  and  its  general  aspect 

67 


68  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

must  be  taken  for  granted.  Psychological  knowledge, 
general  for  all  subjects  must  be  assumed,  as  well  as  gen- 
eral knowledge  of  the  objective  world.  The  psychologist, 
like  other  scientists,  must  assume  that  his  experiences 
are  so  conditioned,  that  though  they  may  be  unique, 
still  if  others  were  to  be  put  under  the  same  conditions 
and  confronted  with  the  same  external  realities,  they 
would  pass  through  similar  experiences.  In  short,  psy- 
chology assumes  the  validity  of  its  knowledge,  its  gen- 
eral validity  for  all  knowing  subjects,  also  knowledge 
of  an  externally  existing  object,  analyzed  from  the  sub- 
jective standpoint  into  its  psychological  elements.  Psy- 
chology, therefore,  has  really  far  more  assumptions  at  its 
basis  than  any  other  natural  science,  for  in  addition  to 
the  assumption  of  the  existence  of  an  external  world  it 
must  assume  a  knowing  or  sensitive  subject,  and  also  the 
interrelation  of  the  two. 

It  is  true  that  the  so-called  "Voluntaristic  school" 
claims  that  psychology  is  the  only  science  that  has  no 
assumption  at  its  basis.  The  representative  of  that 
school  claims  that  there  is  but  one  "unitary  ex- 
perience." From  this  "unitary  experience  natural  sci- 
ence abstracts  the  knowing  subject  and  as  such  deals 
with  abstract  mediate  experiences  requiring  auxiliary 
assumptions,  not  so  is  psychology  which  deals  with  ex- 
perience as  it  is  immediately  presented  to  the  experienc- 
ing subject."  According  to  the  voluntarist  natural  sci- 
ence deals  with  mediate  experience,  while  psychology 
deals  with  immediate  experience  requiring  no  assump- 
tions. 

This  argument  is  questionable  on  the  very  face  of  it. 
For  the  existence  of  that  "unitary  experience"  is  itself 
an  assumption;   It  Implies  that  the  experience  and  the 


The  Unitary  Experience  of  Voluntarism         69 

object  given  by  the  experience  are  one.  Such  a  unifica- 
tion of  experience  and  external  object  implied  in  "uni- 
tary experience"  is  a  metaphysical  assumption  which 
idealistic  philosophy  may  prove  as  being  true,  but  which 
the  psychologist  can  not  possibly  accept  as  given  directly 
by  experience  itself.  Furthermore,  the  concept  "experi- 
ence" cannot  stand  by  itself,  it  implies  assumptions;  an 
experience  must  be  of  something  that  lies  outside  that 
experience.  I  have  an  experience  of  a  house  yonder,  but 
the  house  yonder  is  not  an  experience  unless  regarded 
from  a  metaphysical  or  epistemological  standpoint,  but 
then  we  overstep  the  boundaries  of  psychology  which 
deals  with  experiences  of  individual  organisms  and  en- 
ter the  field  of  philosophy  that  deals  with  experience  in 
general. 

In  taking  the  most  simple  psychological  element, 
namely  sensation,  we  have  its  correlative  in  the  external 
stimulus ;  there  can  be  no  sensations  without  a  stimulus, 
but  that  stimulus  is  no  longer  a  sensation  nor  is  it  any 
other  psychic  process,  such  for  instance  as  an  idea.  Psy- 
chologically considered  the  identification  of  the  stimulus 
with  psychic  state  or  process  is  incorrect,  because  it 
would  mean  that  all  sensory  processes  are  initiated  only 
by  sensations  or  ideas. 

Again,  if  we  come  to  ask  in  what  sense  we  under- 
stand the  concept  "immediate  experience,"  we  find  furth- 
er difficulties.  For  if  the  consciousness  be  of  the  anoetic 
type,  to  borrow  the  term  from  Stout,  there  is  neither 
mediate,  nor  immediate  experience;  if  the  consciousness 
is  of  the  noetic  type  it  is  questionable  as  to  what  wc  , 
mean  by  "immediate."  For  it  may  be  contended  with  • 
the  modem  realist  that  the  knowledge  of_the  object  as 
given  in  sensation  is  immediate,  while  the  knowledge  of 


70  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sensation  itself  with  which  psychology  deals  is  not 
immediately  given;  it  requires  a  long  training  before 
this  is  separated  and  sifted  from  experience;  the  psy- 
chological aspect  of  experience  is  really  secondary,  and 
as  such  mediate. 

If  by  "immediate"  we  mean  to  indicate  the  fact  that 
the  psychic  process  must  antedate  the  knowledge  of  the 
external  objective  world,  the  proposition  can  be  contested 
once  more;  for  along  with  the  psychic  process  the  ob- 
ject also  is  given;  especially  is  this  true  of  the  idealistic 
metaphysical  presupposition  of  the  voluntaristic  school 
that  identifies  the  objective  world  with  the  given 
primary  experience.  The  objective  and  subjective  as- 
pects of  the  "unitary  experience"  are  both  supposed 
to  be  given  together  and,  as  such,  are  both  immedi- 
ate. Natural  science  abstracts  the  subjective  aspect  and 
psychology  abstracts  the  objective  aspect  the  "mediate 
experience."  We  should,  however,  question  the  term 
"mediate  experience."  What  may  "mediate  experience" 
mean?  If  experience  has  any  meaning,  it  means  some- 
thing gone  or  lived  through  directly,  immediately;  but 
then  all  experience  is  immediate,  otherwise  it  cannot  be 
experience.  A  mediate  experience  as  contrasted  with  im- 
mediate experience  can  only  mean  experience  inferred, 
experience  not  experienced,  a  concept  contradictory  in  its 
very  nature  and  definition,  and  must  be  therefore  reject- 
ed as  a  meaningless  term.  The  fact  is,  that  "mediate  ex- 
perience" is  an  inappropriate  and  misleading  term 
for  physical  processes  which  as  such  are  neither  experi- 
ence nor  mediate. 

The  very  statement  of  the  voluntaristic  psychologist 
discloses  the  hidden  assumption.  There  is  a  unitary  ex- 
perience which  falls  asunder  into  mediate  experience  of 


J'he  Unitary  Experience  of  Voluntarism        71 

natural  science  and  immediate  experience,  the  subject 
matter  of  the  psychologist.  If  this  be  so,  then  the  psy- 
chologist does  not  deal  with  the  totality  of  experience. 
Since  the  mediate  experience — part  of  the  "unitary  ex- 
perience" falls  outside  its  domain,  it  deals  only  with 
experience  in  so  far  as  it  is  regarded  as  immediate. 
Evidently  psychology  requires  presuppositions  to  supple- 
ment the  abstracted  mediate  aspect  of  the  unitary  ex- 
perience. For  the  voluntaristic  school  will  surely  admit 
that  unitary  experience  is  given  neither  in  the  mediate 
aspect  nor  in  the  immediate  aspect  alone,  and  as  science 
deals  either  with  the  one,  or  with  the  other,  presuppo- 
sitions are  ipso  facto  also  indispensable  in  psychology. 

Moreover,  psychology  even  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  voluntaristic  school  requires  more  presuppositions 
than  the  natural  sciences.  For  experience,  even  if  it  be 
immediate,  must  still  be  of  something  other  than  itself. 
The  sensation  white  is  of  something  white,  the  touch 
sensation  hard  is  of  something  hard,  the  pain  sensation 
prick  is  of  something  sharp,  and  so  on.  Now  if  this 
something,  if  that  other  of  which  there  is  immediate 
experience  be  the  so-called  "mediate  experience"  as  this 
is  the  supplementary  part  of  the  unitary  experience,  of 
the  total  reality,  then  "immediate  experience"  is  experi- 
ence of  "mediate  experience."  The  science  then  that 
deals  with  immediate  experience  must  postulate  mediate 
experience  as  one  of  its  fundamental  presuppositions. 
Thus  we  come  once  more  to  the  conclusion,  and  this  time 
from  quite  a  different  standpoint,  that  psychology  as  sci- 
ence in  general  has  its  presuppositions,  and  that  it  furth- 
ermore presupposes  all  the  presuppositions  of  the  natural 
sciences. 

Psychology  explains  the  subject  and  object  in  con- 


72  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sciousness,  and  that  only  in  relation  to  the  question  of 
"how," — how  we  come  to  know  this  or  that  object,  but 
whether  there  is  an  object  or  subject  independent  of  the 
experiencing  thought;  what  the  nature  of  that  object  or 
subject  is,  whether  of  mental  experience  stuff  or  of  some 
extra-mental  material,  is  a  question  that  does  not  belong 
to  the  domain  of  psychology.  The  answer  is  differently 
given  by  the  idealist,  materialist,  realist,  monist.  In 
short,  the  problem  of  "what"  belongs  not  to  psychology, 
but  to  the  province  of  metaphysics.  The  Voluntaristic 
school  in  denying  all  presuppositions  in  psychology  starts 
with  a  purely  metaphysical  speculation  of  the  idealistic 
stamp,  namely,  in  postulating  that  the  external  object  of 
psychic  experience  is  identical  with  that  same  experience. 
Psychology  or  any  other  science  must  reject  unhesitat- 
ingly such  metaphysical  speculations. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  INDUCTIVE  BASIS  OF  THE  POSITIVE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
HYPOTHESIS 

IT  now  remains  for  us  to  examine  the  psycho-physio- 
logical hypothesis.  This  last  hypothesis  fully  ac- 
cepts the  difference  between  the  two  series  of  facts, 
the  material  and  the  mental,  but  instead  of  going 
to  look  for  "the  other  side,"  instead  of  going  into  meta- 
physics, it  takes  the  two  different  series  as  its  data,  and 
considers  them  as  co-ordinate.  It  does  not  trouble  itself 
as  to  whether  there  is  a  soul  behind  the  scenes,  all  it  has 
to  consider  is  facts,  phenomena  that  can  be  observed 
and  experimented  upon.  The  co-ordination  it  assumes 
is  not  an  assumption  based  on  abstract  philosophical 
speculations,  on  subtle  hair-splitting,  but  is  based  on  ex- 
perience. 

Numerous  facts  from  pathology  and  experimental 
physiology  go  to  prove  that  mental  states  have 
their  physiological  correlatives.  It  is  enough  to  men- 
tion the  fact  of  the  influence  of  toxic  matters  on  the 
brain  and  the  effected  mental  disturbances.  In  alcoholic 
intoxication,  for  instance,  we  first  meet  with  an  unloos- 
ening of  higher  psychic  inhibitions;  in  the  initial  stage 
of  intoxication  there  is  an  apparent  heightening  of 
mental  and  motor  activity,  and  then  as  the  quantity  of 
the  poison  absorbed  by  the  blood  and  conveyed  to  the 
cerebro-spinal  nervous  system  is  increased,  a  progressive 
paralysis  of  psychomotor  life  sets  in.  At  first  the  high- 
est psychic  functions,  the  moral  and  intellectual  processes 

73 


74  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

are  disturbed  and  finally  paralyzed;  and  this  paralysis 
slowly  descends  to  the  lower  and  more  stable  functions, 
such  as  speech  and  writing,  then  affecting  the  coordina- 
tion of  grosser  movements,  such  as  running,  walking, 
standing,  sitting;  and  as  the  action  of  the  poison  in- 
creases, the  organic,  respiratory  functions  become  affect- 
ed, finally  ending  in  death.  Different  drugs  and  poisons 
that  act  on  the  cerebro-spinal  nervous  system  produce 
different  symptoms,  but  all  of  them,  while  influencing 
the  physiological  nervous  processes,  at  the  same  time  have 
their  action  manifested  by  a  parallel  modification  of 
psychic  processes.  Illusions,  hallucinations,  and  delu- 
sions, changes  in  reasoning  and  willing,  changes  in  mem- 
ory, amnesia  and  paramnesia,  all  these  can  be  induced  by 
the  influence  of  poisons.  Thus  we  find  that  the  two 
series  of  phenomena,  the  psychic  and  the  physiological 
or  physical  are  intimately  related. 

Pathology  and  psychiatry  with  their  vast  stores  of 
facts  go  to  confirm  the  psycho-physiological  hypothesis. 
In  general  paralysis,  for  instance,  we  meet  conditions 
somewhat  similar  to  those  of  alcoholic  intoxication.  At 
first  inhibitions  are  removed,  the  psychomotor  pro- 
cesses become  deranged  and  slightly  stimulated,  sooner 
or  later  to  be  followed  by  gradual  paralysis.  The  pro- 
cess of  dissolution  progresses  from  the  highest,  most 
complex,  least  stable  functions,  memory,  intelligence, 
will  and  so  on,  to  the  lower,  less  complex  and  more  sta- 
ble functions,  reading,  writing,  playing,  etc.,  finally 
reaching  to  the  very  lowest,  to  the  simplest  co-ordination 
of  movements,  mastication,  swallowing,  etc.  A  post- 
mortem examination  of  the  brain  uniformly  reveals  a 
profound  degeneration  of  the  brain  cells.  In  the  vari- 
o\i$  forms  of  epilepsy  ancj  in  most  cases  of  chronic  in- 


Inductive  Basis  of  Psychological  Hypothesis      75 

sanity,  ending  in  dementia,  we  find  on  examination  as  a 
rule,  some  degeneration  of  the  brain  cells. 

In  cases  of  the  many  forms  of  aphasia,  science  tri- 
umphed in  discovering  the  brain  lesion.  In  motor 
aphasia  the  third  frontal  convolution,  or  that  of 
Broca  is  found  to  be  degenerated,  in  sensory  aphasia 
the  degeneration  is  in  the  first  temporo-sphenoidal  con- 
volution, or  that  of  Wernicke.  In  many  other  nervous 
diseases  where  there  is  a  profound  change  in  the  sensori- 
motor functions,  such  as  posterior  spinal  sclerosis  or  loco- 
motor ataxia,  acute  ascending  paralysis,  acute  poleomy- 
elitis  anterior,  syringomyelia,  etc.,  we  also  find  degener- 
ation in  some  one  part  of  the  cerebro-spinal  nervous  sys- 
tem. Thus  in  tabes  we  find  a  degeneration  of  the  pos- 
terior root  zones  often  associated  with  similar  lesions  in 
the  intramedullory  continuation  of  the  several  cranial 
nerves.  In  poliomyelitis  anterior  we  find  an  inflamma- 
tion of  the  anterior  cornua  (sometimes  extending  in  the 
antero-lateral  columns) ;  the  multipolar  cells  with  their 
dendrons  and  neuraxons  are  destroyed.  In  syringo- 
myelia we  find  the  formation  of  one  or  more  cavities 
within  the  substance  of  the  spinal  cord,  usually  within 
the  horns  of  the  gray  matter  the  cavities  being  filled 
with  a  fluid  which  is  either  liquid  or  gelatinous.  We 
find  in  these  diseases  definite  organic  changes  concomi- 
tant with  definite  sensori-motor  modifications. 

In  the  functional  diseases  belonging  to  the  province  of 
psycho-pathology,  diseases  such  as  are  known  under  the 
vague  term  of  hysteria  in  all  its  protean  manifestations, 
the  different  forms  of  anaesthesia  and  amnesia,  abulia, 
psychopathic  chorea,  astasia-abasia  and  numerous  oth- 
ers, where  no  organic  lesion  in  the  cerebro-spinal  ner- 
vous system  can  possibly  be  discovered,  we  have  good 


J  6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

reasons  for  suspecting  some  functional  derangement  in 
the  psysiological  processes  of  the  nervous  system.  My 
own  psycho  physiological  investigations  in  this  line  tend 
strongly  to  confirm  the  theory  that  all  functional  dis- 
eases are  disassociations  of  functioning  brain  cell-sys- 
tems, and  that  the  gravity  of  the  disease  depends  on  the 
extension  of  such  functional  dissociations.  Thus  we 
find  that  neuro-pathology  and  the  recent  science  of  psy- 
cho-pathology with  all  the  wealth  of  facts  and  discover- 
ies at  their  disposal  give  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the 
psycho-physiological  hypothesis ;  in  fact,  this  is  their  only 
working  hypothesis  sine  qua  non  the  very  existence  of 
these  sciences. 

The  psycho-physiological  hypothesis  finds  special  sup- 
port in  the  brilliant  investigations  of  experimental  physi- 
ology. The  experiments  of  Munk,  Ferrier,  Hitzig, 
Brown-Sequard,  Goltz,  Schiff,  and  others  clearly  show 
the  correlation  of  brain  functions  with  psychic  activity. 
They  show,  for  instance,  in  animals  that  the  physiolog- 
ical processes  in  the  occipital  lobes  are  correlated  with 
vision,  that  those  of  the  temporal  lobe,  especially  of  the 
superior  temporo-sphenoidal  convolution  are  correlated 
with  hearing,  that  sensations  of  smell  are  concomitant 
with  the  function  of  the  median  descending  part  of  the 
temporal  lobes,  that  taste  is  probably  correlated  with  the 
processes  of  the  lower  temporal  regions,  that  tactual 
sensibility  is  intimately  connected  with  the  physiological 
processes  of  the  motor  zone;  and  the  recent  researches 
of  Bianchi  and  Flechsig  tend  to  correlate  the  highest 
psychic  activity  of  man  with  the  function  of  definite 
areas  in  the  cortex. 

Should  we  care  to  look  for  more  proofs  as  to  the 
validity  of  correlation  of  psychic  with  neural,  or  physical 


Inductive  Basis  of  Psychological  Hypothesis      77 

processes,  we  can  also  find  it  in  another  branch  of  ex- 
perimental physiology,  namely,  physiological  psychol- 
ogy. Thus  Doctor  Lombard  by  placing  sensitive  ther- 
mometers and  electric  piles  against  the  scalp  noted  a 
rise  in  temperature  during  intellectual  effort,  such  as 
calculation,  recitation,  composition.  The  temperature 
showed  a  marked  rise  exceeding  i  °  F.  during  an  intense 
emotion.  When  intellectual  activity  rose  in  intensity 
there  was  also  a  parallel  rise  in  temperature,  thus  the 
temperature  was  found  to  be  higher,  when  poetry  was 
recited  silently  than  when  the  same  was  done  aloud. 
Similar  results  were  arrived  at  by  Schiff  in  his  experi- 
ments on  dogs.  He  placed  thermo-electric  needles  on 
the  scalps  of  dogs;  the  sensations  of  the  animals  were 
then  tested  with  different  kinds  of  stimuli.  It  was  found 
that  whenever  the  stimulus  was  given  and  the  sensation 
experienced,  that  a  change  was  at  once  manifested  in  the 
cerebral  and  motor  processes  which  was  indicated  by  the 
deflection  of  the  galvanometer.  When  the  dog  was  lying 
motionless  and  a  rolled  up  piece  of  paper  was  given  to 
him,  the  galvanic  deflection  was  small,  when,  however,  a 
piece  of  meat  was  brought  near  the  dog,  the  deflection 
became  considerable.  Galvanometric  deflections  con- 
comitant with  psychomotor  activities  have  also  been 
shown  in  the  case  of  human  subjects. 

The  ponograph  is  well  adapted  to  demonstrate 
in  a  striking  way  to  the  doubting  layman  the  in- 
timate relation  of  physical  and  mental  phenom- 
ena. The  subject  is  put  on  table,  which  is  so 
delicately  balanced  that  at  the  slightest  alteration  in  the 
distribution  of  the  weight  of  the  subject,  it  tilts.  Now 
it  is  found  that  when  the  subject  is  spoken  to,  or  when 
making  some  Intellectual  effort,  the  table  at  once  tilts, 


78  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

possibly  because  of  the  increased  blood  supply  to  the 
brain  and  more  especially  on  account  of  the  motor  reac- 
tions. Pneumographic,  plethysmographic,  carotido- 
graphic,  cardiographic,  automatographic,  ponographic, 
and  ergographic  tracings  show  physiological  changes 
concomitant  with  the  slightest  modification  of  psychic 
processes.  As  simple  an  instrument  as  the  sphygmo- 
graph  can  demonstrate  the  same  truth.  A  sphygmogram 
taken  under  mental  activity  differs  from  the  one  taken 
under  mental  repose. 

All  these  facts,  and  many  more  could  be  adduced 
to  establish  on  a  firm  basis  the  psycho-physiological 
hypothesis  that  psychic  phenomena  are  accompanied 
with  physiological  or  physical  processes.  The  whole  of 
recent  psycho-physiological  research  work  is  based  on 
the  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  psychosis  without  neu- 
rosis. The  two  are  concomitant.  Psychic  and  physical 
phenomena  go  hand  in  hand,  the  two  processes  run 
parallel  to  each  other.  Thus  we  find  that  psycho-physi- 
ological parallelism  is  a  strictly  scientific  hypothesis. 

The  psychic  and  physiological  series  of  changes 
are  concomitant,  parallel,  but  they  do  not  stand  to  each 
other  in  relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  they  are 
not  causally  related.  I  take  here  the  opportunity  of 
emphasizing  the  non-causal  relation  of  mental  and  phys- 
iological processes.  It  is  usually  taken  for  granted  by 
many  medical  men,  and  even  by  some  scientists,  neurol- 
ogists, physiologists,  biologists,  who  do  not  happen  to 
think  out  clearly  the  more  theoretical  aspects  of  their 
investigations,  that  brain  processes  are  the  direct  cause 
of  mental  phenomena  and  that  psychology  therefore  is 
nothing  but  a  chapter  in  physiology.  Study  the  brain 
and  you  will  know  all  about  psychic  life.    This  view  is 


Inductive  Basis  of  Psychological  Hypothesis      79 

certainly  fallacious.  A  psychic  fact  as  we  have  pointed 
out  is  radically  different,  different  in  kind  from  a  phys- 
ical, mechanical  fact.  One  cannot,  therefore,  give  rise 
to  the  other. 

The  reason  why  it  is  thought  that  physical  processes 
give  rise  to  mental,  lies  in  the  fallacious  analogy  taken 
from  the  law  of  convertibility  and  equivalence  of  energy 
in  the  activity  of  physical  processes.  Heat,  it  is  reasoned, 
can  be  converted  into  electricity,  electricity  into  magnet- 
ism, magnetism  into  motion,  motion  into  sound  or  light, 
and  the  same  may  be  done  in  reverse  order ;  the  energy 
of  physiological  processes  therefore  is  converted  into 
mental,  or  psychic  energy.  The  whole  reasoning  is 
wrong.  We  must  remember  that  what  underlies  all 
these  different  physical  phenomena  is  various  forms  of 
molecular  and  molar  motion,  and  when  one  order  of 
physical  phenomena  passes  into  another,  it  is  after  all 
only  the  transformation  of  one  form  of  motion  into 
another  form.  Quite  different  is  it  in  the  case  of  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness.  The  activity  of  conscious-' 
ness  is  not  a  form  of  motion,  and  the  two  therefore, 
cannot  be  converted  into  each  other.  Mental  activity  \'*''"^-^ 
is  but  figuratively  termed  energy,  just  as  a  well  reasoned  \AJ^J^ 
argument  may  be  characterized  as  clear  and  lucid,  but 
it  does  not  mean  that  one  can  see  a  candle  shining 
through  it.  The  energy  of  mental  phenomena  is  as 
much  the  energy  of  physical  and  physiological  sciences 
as  the  idea  of  a  brick  is  a  brick  itself  and  made  up  of 
clay. 

Furthermore,  were  it  possible  that  a  physiological 
process  should  be  converted  into  a  mental  process,  the 
law  of  conservation  of  energy  would  have  to  be  given 
up,  and  along  with  it  the  whole  edifice  of  modem  science 


8o  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

would  tumble  to  the  ground.  For  according  to  the  law 
of  conservation  of  energy  no  physical  energy  can  pos- 
sibly be  lost.  One  form  of  energy  may  pass  into  another, 
but  the  physical  energy  which  is  some  form  of  motion, 
molar,  molecular,  atomic,  ionic  or  electronic  cannot  be 
lost,  that  is,  there  must  always  be  so  much  motion,  no 
matter  under  what  form  it  may  appear.  Now  on  the 
one  hand,  were  it  possible  that  a  physiological  process, 
which  is  nothing  but  a  form  of  physical  energy,  could 
pass  into  a  psychic  state,  which  is  no  motion  at  all,  we 
would  really  have  a  loss  of  energy.  Were  it  on  the 
other  hand  possible  that  a  mental  or  psychic  process 
should  pass  into  a  physiological  process,  we  would  have 
had  new  energy  generated,  energy  that  is  not  a  trans- 
formation of  some  previous  existing  energy,  or  physical 
activity. 

If    mental    and    physiological    processes    were    to 
stand  to  each  other  in  relation  of  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent, in  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  we  would  have  had 
with  each  beat  of  consciousness  a  new  creation  of  physi- 
cal energy  and  a  loss  of  it  with  each  cerebral  process.  This 
would  be  sufficient  to  undermine  the  basis  of  science,  and 
practically  we  might  have  had  good  hopes  that  in  the 
near  future  our  steam  engines  would  be  run  by  good 
intentions  and  windmills  by  aesthetic  feelings. 
j      Psychic  and  physiological  series  are  no  doubt  inti- 
'  mately  related,  but  their  relation  is  not  causal,  they  do 
not  stand  to  each  other  in  relation   of   invariable   suc- 
cession characteristic  of  cause  and  effect,  but  in  that 
of    co-existence.      The    two    series    of    processes    are 
I  concomitant,    they    run    parallel    to    each    other,    but 
'  neither    is    the    cause    of    the    other.       A    change    in 
the  one  means  also  a  simultaneous,  concomitant  mod- 


Inductive  Basis  of  Psychological  Hypothesis      8i 

ification  in  the  other.     In  other  words,  every  psychic 
change  must  have  its  physiological  concomitant,  and 
vice  versa,   every  physiological  process  may  have  its 
psychic  accompaniment.     This  hypothesis  of  psycho-) 
physical  parallelism  is  at  the  basis  of  all  modem  psycho- 
physiological, neurological,  and  psycho-pathological  in- 
vestigations, inasmuch  as  it  is  taken  for  granted  that  for 
every  manifested  sensori-motor  or  ideo-motor  "symp- 
tom" there  must  be  present  term  for  term  some  physio- 
logical process.    Psychology  takes  the  same  view  and  ac- 
cepts the  same  hypothesis;  it  does  not  trouble  itself 
in  the  least  with  the  philosophical  problem  as  to  whether 
the  two  series  of  phenomena,  the  mental  and  the  phys-  \\ 
ical,  have  behind  them  separate  substances,  or  whether 
they    are    but    two    different    aspects    of    the    same' 
thing.    This  belongs  to  metaphysics.    The  psycho-phys- 
iological theory  like  all  other  scientific  hypotheses  has\ 
nothing  to  do  with  metaphysical  substrata,  but  deals 
only  with  facts  and  their  relations. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  DEDUCTIVE  BASIS  OF  THE  POSITIVE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
HYPOTHESIS 

THE  concept  of  causality  cannot  be  worked  In 
psychology  in  the  same  way  as  it  can  be  done 
in  the  physical  science.  The  circle  of  physical 
processes  is  complete  in  itself.  A  physical 
process  without  ceasing  to  be  physical  can  be  traced 
endlessly  in  the  past  or  future,  all  the  links  of  the  endless 
process  must  all  be  physical  in  their  nature.  For  If  we 
permit  In  the  endless  chain  of  links  of  the  physical  pro- 
cess any  other  but  physical  links  to  be  interpolated,  all 
the  physical  sciences  must  fall  to  the  ground,  since  at  any 
stage  we  may  get  hold  of  a  process  of  which  the  antece- 
dent link  is  not  of  a  physical  nature.  In  short,  the  postu- 
late that  forms  the  basis  of  physical  science  is  that  the 
antecedent  and  consequent  of  a  physical  process  taken 
at  any  stage  of  the  process  are  physical  in  their  nature. 
This  Is  the  principle  of  continuity.  The  whole  edifice 
of  the  physical  sciences  Is  based  on  this  principle. 

If  we  now  turn  to  psychology,  we  find  that  it  cannot 
be  based  on  a  postulate  of  similar  character.  Psychol- 
ogy cannot  possibly  work  on  the  assumption  that  the 
processes  it  deals  with  can  be  traced  endlessly  in  either 
direction,  past,  or  future.  Unlike  the  physical,  the 
psychic  process  Is  finite  and  final, — it  has  a  beginning  and 
an  end.  It  begins  with  a  purpose,  conscious,  subconscious, 
or  unconscious,  and  ends  with  an  adjustment.  The 
psychic  process  begins  as  a  sensation,  and  Its  complete 

82 


Deductive  Basis  of  Psychological  Hypothesis    83 

qrcle  runs  its  course  as  an  idea  and  then  ends  in  a  voli- 
tion to  act.  The  stimulus  marking  the  beginning  of  the 
psychic  process  and  the  act  marking  the  end  of  the  pro- 
cess are  physical  links  of  a  continuous  physical  process, 
the  links  of  which  can  be  traced  endlessly  in  physical 
terms. 

Taking  the  psychic  process  from  the  ontogenetic 
standpoint,  we  find  again  the  same  thing.  If  the  psychic 
life  of  the  individual  is  taken  as  a  whole  and  traced  back- 
ward, in  the  past,  we  arrive  at  some  point,  when  the 
stream  of  consciousness  begins,  and  on  following  it 
forward,  we  finally  arrive  at  a  point  where  the  stream 
of  consciousness  ends.  If  we  view  the  question  phylo- 
genetically,  we  come  once  more  to  the  same  conclusion. 
In  the  history  of  biological  evolution  there  was  a  time 
when  psychic  life  began,  and  there  will  come  a  time  when 
all  psychic  life  will  disappear  from  our  globe.  The 
principle  of  continuity,  the  warp  and  woof  of  physical 
science,  cannot  be  worked  in  psychology,  instead  of  it  we 
can  only  discover  a  principle  of  finiteness  and  finality. 

In  a  physical  process  any  link  taken  at  random  must 
have  a  physical  antecedent  and  consequent;  not  so  is  it 
in  a  psychic  process,  not  each  link  of  the  series  has  its 
psychic  antecedent  and  consequent,  the  first  link  has  no 
antecedent  and  the  last  one  has  no  consequent.  The 
phenomena  of  sleep,  of  hypnosis,  of  amnesia,  of  uncon- 
sciousness, of  syncope  show  that  the  psychic  process 
may  be  cut  short  anywhere  in  its  course,  and  may  re- 
sume its  flow  from  any  given  link  or  stage.  The  links 
that  go  to  form  the  psychic  process  hang  loosely,  and 
any  link  may  really  be  without  an  antecedent  or  without 
a  consequent. 

In    many    cases     the     seemingly     lost     antecedent 


84  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

can  still  be  found  in  the  subconscious,  dissociated 
from  the  active  stream  of  consciousness  constituting  for 
the  time  being  the  conscious  personality  or  the  self-con- 
sciousness of  the  subject,  such  for  instance  is  the  case  in 
the  many  forms  of  functional  psychopathic  diseases  and 
also  in  hypnosis.  In  other  cases,  such  for  instance,  as 
unconsciousness  of  epilepsy,  the  stream  of  consciousness 
is  interrupted  and  resumed  only  after  a  certain  period  of 
time,  not  even  the  subconscious  can  supply  us  the 
missing  link.  In  normal  sleep  we  meet  once  more  with 
an  interruption  of  the  current  of  consciousness,  and  it  is 
only  under  certain  conditions,  such  as  dreaming,  that  the 
subconscious  can  supply  the  missing  states.  Each  psychic 
process  is  like  the  life  process  of  a  given  individual,  it 
has  a  definite  beginning  and  a  definite  end;  while  a 
physical  process  has  neither  beginning  nor  end,  and  can 
be  followed  out  endlessly  in  the  direction  of  the  line  of 
antecedents  or  consequents.  In  other  words  while  a 
physical  process  is  infinite,  a  psychic  process  is  finite. 

Let  P  be  a  physical  process  and  p  represent  a  link  in 
that  process,  then  p^,  p^,  p^^,  etc.,  may  be  represented 
as  its  consequents,  while  pi,  p^,  pa,  p*,  etc.,  may  be  rep- 
resented as  its  antecedents.  P  therefore  may  be  repre- 
sented by  the  following  infinite  series : 

P= +p»+p.+pa+px+(p)+pl+pll+pllH-pl^+ 

The  series  is  infinite  in  both  directions,  in  direction  of 
p»  antecedents,  and  in  the  direction  of  p*  consequents. 

Let  S  represent  a  psychic  process,  s  a  link  in  that  pro- 
cess, s^  s^  s^^  s"^^  etc.,  its  consequents  and  si,  S2,  ss,  s*, 
etc.,  its  antecedents,  then  the  psychic  process  can  be  rep- 
resented by  the  following  series ; 


Deductive  Basis  of  Psychological  Hypothesis    85 
S= +S4+SS+S3+S1+  (s)  Xs^+s"+s"H-s^+ ... 

Now  this  series  is  finite,  it  begins  at  some  link  and  ends 
with  some  link,  neither  the  beginning  nor  the  end  is  de- 
fined,— the  series  may  begin  at  any  link  and  end  at  any 
link.  Since  the  process  may  begin  anywhere  in  the  series, 
there  is  really  no  necessary  connection  between  the  links 
of  the  series.  In  the  physical  process  on  the  contrary, 
the  series  is  infinite,  and  any  link  has  a  determinate 
necessarily  given  preceding  and  succeeding  link.  In 
other  words,  while  the  links  of  the  physical  process  are 
necessarily  causally  connected,  the  links  of  the  psychic 
process  have  no  causal  necessity. 

Since  the  two  processes,  the  physical  and  the  psychic 
are  postulated  to  run  parallel  to  each  other,  their  co-or- 
dination may  be  represented  in  the  following  series : 

S +ss+s.+si+(s)+s*+s"+ 

II 


P +p«+p.+p.+pi+(p)+pM-pH-p"i+pii"+ 


Each  link  of  the  psychic  process  has  some  link  of  the 
physical  process  as  its  concomitant. 

s  has  p,  si, — pi,  s» — p',  s^ — pS  s" — p". 

The  psychic  process  not  having  its  links  causally  con- 
nected, the  causal  necessity  can  only  he  followed  along  its 
concomitant  physical  or  physiological  series.  Hence  we 
can  see  why  the  physiological  series  is  indispensable  to 
the  psychic  series. 

The  finiteness  of  the  psychic  process  makes  it  impos- 
sible to  apply  to  it  the  principle  of  necessity.  For  while 
a  physical  process  must  necessarily  have  a  physical  an- 


86  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

tecedent  and  physical  consequent,  a  psychic  process  and 
each  link  of  it  does  not  necessarily  have  an  antecedent 
or  consequent,  it  may  begin  and  end  at  any  link. 

It  is  only  by  means  of  the  physical  or  physiological 
series  that  the  principles  of  continuity  and  necessary 
causal  connection,  the  foundation  of  all  objective  science, 
can  be  worked  in  psychology.  Without  the  help  of  the 
concomitant  physiological  series  the  investigator  of  the 
psychic  process  is,  scientifically  considered,  completely 
helpless,  since  the  psychic  process  has  no  objectively 
necessary  causal  interconnection. 

The  "Voluntaristic"  school  in  attempting  to  make  of 
psychology  a  science  independent  of  all  physiology  is 
fundamentally  wrong.  Without  the  physiological  series 
psychology  has  no  cement  to  fasten  its  material  with,  it 
has  no  foundation  to  build  on.  Psychology  can  main- 
tain itself  in  the  work  of  objective  natural  sciences  only 
on  condition  of  its  intimate  interdependence  with  physi- 
ology. No  psychology  without  physiology.  The  psy- 
cho-physiological hypothesis  is  both  inductively  and  de- 
ductively the  sine  qua  non  of  the  science  of  psychology. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

s 
LIFE  AND  THE  PSYCHIC  PROCESS 

WE  have  pointed  out  that  the  psychic  process 
is  essentially  finite  and  final,  can  we  find  any 
other  process  that  should  be  characterized 
by  the  same  mark  of  finiteness  and  finality? 
We  find  an  analogous  process  in  life.  The  life  process 
is  one  that  has  the  aspect  of  finiteness.  Ontogenctically, 
the  life-process  of  an  organism  has  its  beginning  in  the 
fertilization  or  stimulation  to  life-activity  of  the  ovum, 
and  has  its  end  in  death.  Phylogenetically,  the  life  pro- 
cess runs  a  determinate  course.  There  was  a  time  when 
geological  conditions  did  not  permit  the  presence  of  life, 
and  there  will  come  a  time  when  life  will  be  extinct. 
Ontogenctically,  the  biological  process  is  analogous  to 
the  mental  process.  The  biological  process,  unlike  the 
physical  process,  is  not  endless ;  it  has  a  definite  beginning 
and  end.  Taking  any  stage  of  the  process  as  the  start- 
ing point,  we  find  that  neither  the  chain  of  antecedents, 
nor  that  of  consequents  can  be  followed  endlessly.  Being 
a  finite  process  we  find  in  it  the  same  relation  we  discov- 
ered in  the  psychic  process, — the  first  term  of  the  scries 
has  no  antecedent  and  the  last  one  has  no  consequent. 
Furthermore,  the  biological  process,  like  the  psycholog- 
ical one,  may  be  cut  short  at  any  stage, — the  organism  or 
the  protoplasm  may  die  or  be  killed.  It  is  only  mechan- 
ically regarded  that  the  biological  process  can  be  worked 
into  the  definite  texture  of  physical  series. 

The  finiteness  of  the  life  process  is  especially  manifest- 

87 


88  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ed  from  the  point  of  finality.  In  examining  the  char- 
acter of  living  beings,  in  contradistinction  to  physical 
things,  we  find  a  fundamental  difference  between  the 
two.  The  structure  and  function  of  living  beings  can 
be  regarded  under  the  concept  of  purpose  or  that  of 
final  causation,  the  purpose  being  the  good,  the  ad- 
vantage, the  utility  of  the  organism.  Inanimate  things 
cannot  be  regarded  under  the  concept  of  final  causation, 
but  under  that  of  efficient  causation.  The  stone  lying 
yonder  has  no  purpose,  it  has  no  special  advantage  for 
its  material  particles  from  its  particular  position.  The 
inner  relations  of  its  parts  and  the  relations  of  its  surface- 
angles  and  prominences  are  not  of  any  ultimate  good  to 
the  stone,  nor  do  we  ask  of  what  use  is  this  particular  vi- 
bration to  the  molecules.  We  do  ask,  however,  this 
question  of  utility  in  regard  to  organisms.  Of  what  use  is 
the  grazing  or  drinking  to  the  cow?  Of  what  use  is 
this  particular  organ  and  its  function  to  this  or  that 
organism  ?  The  problem  of  utility  is  one  that  can  only 
be  raised  in  the  case  of  organic  life,  but  not  in  the  case 
of  inorganic  things.  We  can  see  the  reason  why  it 
should  be  so.  Life  may  be  regarded  as  an  adaptation 
of  inner  and  outer  relations.  Adaptation  and  fitness  are 
important  criteria  with  biological  processes.  What  is 
the  fitness,  or  utility  of  organs  and  their  functions  to  the 
particular  organism,  and  how  have  they  come  to  this 
given  state  of  fitness?  These  problems  cannot  be  ig- 
nored by  biology  as  a  science.  The  whole  of  the  Dar- 
winian theory  aims  to  give  the  key  to  the  way  the  differ- 
ent forms  of  adaptations  have  come  about.  Adaptation 
and  utility,  however,  mean  aims.  A  biological  process 
is  not  an  endless  series  of  antecedents  and  consequents, 
but  one  that  has  an  end.    A  life  process  is  a  final  pro- 


Life  and  the  Psychic  Process  89 

cess  taking  place  in  the  organism  in  its  internal  and  essen- 
tial adjustments. 

The  finality  of  the  life  process  is  clearly  brought  out, 
if  looked  at  from  a  totally  different  point  of  view.  The 
most  characteristic  feature  of  a  living  organism,  is  its 
being  an  organic  whole,  a  unity,  an  individuality.  All 
the  parts  of  the  organism  bear  relation  to  and  have  their 
significance  with  regard  to  the  organism  as  a  whole.  The 
fin  of  the  fish,  the  wing  of  the  bird,  and  the  arm  of  the 
man  cease  to  be  what  they  are,  if  separated  from  the 
particular  individual  to  which  they  respectively  belong. 
The  structure  and  function  of  the  part  can  be  under- 
stood only  in  relation  to  the  needs  of  the  organic  whole. 
The  parts  of  the  individual  subserve  the  organic  unity. 
In  the  course  of  evolution,  both  ontogenetic  and  phylo- 
genetic,  parts  may  arise  or  drop  out  for  the  benefit  and 
advantage  of  the  whole.  Mechanically  considered,  an 
organism  is  nothing  but  a  heap  of  vibrating  molecules 
or  atoms;  biologically  regarded,  this  heap  constitutes  a 
whole,  an  individual,  and  each  vibration  is  for  the  good 
of  this  whole,  if  the  individual  is  to  maintain  itself  in 
existence. 

It  may  be  objected  that  a  machine,  though  purely  me- 
chanical, may  be  similarly  defined.  A  machine  consti- 
tues  a  whole,  a  unity,  and  every  part  bears  a  definite  re- 
lation to  the  whole,  and  cannot  in  fact  be  understood 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  machine  as  a  whole.  Who, 
without  knowing  a  watch  as  a  whole,  could  have  guessed 
the  function  of  a  particular  wheel  or  spring,  if  shown 
by  itself?  Each  part  within  a  mechanism  has  its  dis- 
tinctive character  only  in  relation  to  the  other  parts 
forming  an  interrelated  system.  Should  this  be  granted, 
in  what  sense,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  does  an  organism 


90  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

differ  from  a  mechanism?  Must  not  then  a  biological 
process  be,  after  all,  reduced  to  mechanical  terms;  and 
if  this  be  so,  is  not  rather  the  opposite  statement  the  cor- 
rect one,  namely,  that  a  biological  process  does  not 
really  differ  from  a  physical  process?  This,  however, 
is  not  so.  The  difference  between  the  two  is  a  funda- 
mental one.  The  unity  of  the  mechanism  does  not  lie 
in  the  machine  per  se,  but  in  the  needs  and  mind  of  the 
mechanician,  while  the  organic  unity  is  postulated  as  be- 
ing in  the  organism  itself.  The  purpose  of  the  machine 
does  not  lie  in  the  machine  itself,  but  in  needs  outside 
itself;  no  machine  exists,  for  its  own  advantage  and 
good,  from  its  very  nature  a  machine  is  for  something 
else. 

An  organism,  on  the  contrary,  constitutes  its  own 
purpose.  No  organism  in  nature,  not  as  yet  modified 
by  artificial  selection,  exists  entirely  for  the  good  of 
another.  The  structure  and  functions  of  the  parts  of 
an  organism  are  for  the  good  and  advantage  of  that 
particular  individual.  Unlike  a  machine,  the  purpose 
falls  not  outside,  but  inside  the  organism.  An  organ- 
ism forms  a  closed  circle,  a  microcosm,  to  which  the 
macrocosm  is  made  subservient.  Each  organism  is  a 
centre  from  which  rays  radiate  to  all  the  points  of  the 
universe;  in  other  words,  an  organism  is  an  end  for 
which  everything  else  is  nothing  but  a  means.  Darwin 
was  so  much  impressed  with  this  tcleological  aspect  of 
organic  life  that  he  frankly  admitted  that,  if  only  one 
example  in  a  natural  state  could  be  produced,  an  exam- 
ple of  an  organism  showing  structure  and  function  use- 
ful not  to  itself,  but  to  another  organism,  his  whole 
theory  of  evolution  would  fall  to  the  ground.  A  mech- 
anism is  a  means,  never  an  end;  an  organism  is  an  end, 


Life  and  the  Psychic  Process  91 

never  a  means. 

A  biological  process  is  finite,  it  has  a  definite  begin- 
ning and  end ;  it  is  also  final,  inasmuch  as  it  is  supposed 
to  be  of  some  use  to  the  organism  in  which  the  process 
takes  place.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the 
biological  process  cannot  be  looked  at  from  a  purely  me- 
chanical standpoint.  Every  object,  every  external  ob- 
jective process  can  be  looked  at  from  the  point  of  view 
of  pure  mechanism,  where  the  series  of  antecedents  and 
consequents  is  infinite,  where  only  atoms  and  their  move- 
ments have  supreme  sway;  but  while  some  objects  and 
processes  admit  only  of  this  standpoint,  others  admit 
also  of  another  point  of  view,  namely  the  teleological 
in  which  the  leading  principles  are  unity,  synthesis,  and 
purpose. 

Biological  processes  certainly  admit  of  mechanical 
treatment,  they  can  be  worked  into  the  infinite  series 
of  mechanical  causes  and  effect,  but,  then,  these 
processes  so  regarded,  arc  simply  mechanical  and  cease 
to  be  biological.  Life  is  regarded  under  a  teleo- 
logical aspect.  Science  need  not  necessarily  be 
entirely  mechanical,  it  may  also  deal  with  pur- 
poses, not  self-conscious,  not  even  conscious,  but 
still  with  purposes,  which  on  account  of  their  not  being 
conscious  are  to  be  treated  according  to  the  principle  of 
efficient  causation.  Such  is  the  method  of  Darwin,  in 
opposition  to  that  of  Lamarck.  The  purposive  life 
processes  are  treated  by  Darwin  on  the  principle  of 
efficient  causation. 

They  who  want  to  reduce  biology  to  mechanism 
should  reflect  on  the  meaning  of  evolution.  From  a 
mechanical  standpoint,  evolution, — the  basis  of  biology, 
is  meaningless.     Molecules,  atoms  and  their  vibrations 


92  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

can  have  neither  lower  nor  higher  stages,  they  are  all 
on  the  same  plane,  following  the  same  laws  from  all 
eternity. 

If  from  our  long  digression  on  the  nature  of  the  bio- 
logical process,  we  now  return  to  the  subject  under  dis- 
cussion, namely,  the  psychological  process,  we  can  re- 
alize clearly  the  point  of  view  from  which  psychic  life 
should  be  regarded.  The  psychic  process  is  primarily 
a  life  process. 

Since  the  life-process  is  regarded  under  a  teleological 
aspect,  it  follows  that  the  psychic  process  should  be 
treated  in  the  same  way.  The  psychic  process  is  the 
highest  stage  in  the  evolution  of  life,  and  as  such  should 
be  studied  not  by  the  instruments  of  mechanics  and 
chemistry,  but  by  the  methods  of  biology.  In  addition 
to  the  concept  of  efficient  causation,  psychology  even 
more  than  biology,  should  also  work  with  the  concepts 
of  unity,  synthesis,  and  purpose. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE   CHANCE  ASPECT  OF  LIFE  AND  MIND 

THE  teleology  of  the  biological  process  should, 
however,  be  somewhat  limited.  We  are  apt 
to  overestimate  the  utility  of  organs  and 
functions  in  the  world  of  living  beings.  There 
may  be  organs  which  are  of  no  use  to  the  organism,  and 
there  may  be  functions  which  are  indifferent  and  even 
positively  harmful  to  life.  It  is  questionable  whether 
the  thymus  gland,  the  tonsils,  the  appendix  are  of  any 
use  to  man,  and  it  is  quite  certain  that  a  number  of 
physiological  processes  take  place  in  the  organism  which 
are  indifferent  and  even  detrimental  to  the  life  existence 
of  the  individual. 

"In  every  organism"  says  Morgan,  "there  are  parts 
of  the  body  whose  processes  cannot  be  of  vital  import- 
ance to  the  individual.  The  rudimentary  organs,  so 
called,  furnish  many  examples  of  structures  whose 
presence  may  be  of  little  or  of  no  use  to  the  individual; 
in  fact  as  in  the  case  of  the  appendix  of  man  the  or- 
gans may  be  a  source  of  great  danger  to  the  individual. 
Another  example  of  the  same  thing  is 
found  in  the  rudimentary  eyes  of  animals  living  in  the 
dark,  such  as  the  mole  and  several  cave  animals,  fishes, 
amphibia,  and  insects.  There  are  still  other  organs 
which  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  rudimentary,  yet  whose 
presence  can  scarcely  be  considered  as  essential  to  the 
life  of  the  individual.  For  instance,  the  electric  organs 
in  some  of  the  rays  and  fish  can  hardly  protect  the  ani- 

93 


94  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

mal  from  enemies,  even  when  as  highly  developed  as 
in  the  torpedo;  and  we  do  not  know  of  any  other 
essential  service  they  can  perform.  Whether  the  same 
may  also  be  said  of  the  phosphorescent  organs  of 
many  animals  is  perhaps  open  in  some  cases  to  doubt, 
but  there  can  be  little  question  that  the  light  produced 
by  most  of  the  small  marine  organisms,  such  as  noctilica, 
jellyfish,  ctenophores,  copepods,  pyrosoma,  etc.,  can- 
not be  of  use  to  these  animals  in  protecting  them  from 
attack.  In  the  case  of  certain  bacteria  it  seems  quite 
evident  that  the  production  of  light  can  be  of  no  use 
as  such  to  them.  The  production  of  light  may  be  only 
a  sort  of  by-product  of  changes  going  on  in  the  organ- 
ism, and  has  no  relation  to  outside  conditions.  In  cer- 
tain cases,  as  in  the  glowworm,  it  has  been  supposed 
that  the  display  may  serve  to  bring  the  sexes  together; 
but  since  the  phosphorescent  organs  are  also  present  in 
the  larval  stages  of  the  glowworm,  and  since  even  the 
egg  itself  is  said  to  be  phosphorescent,  it  is  improbable, 
in  these  stages  at  least,  that  the  presence  of  the  light  is 
of  service  to  the  organism. 

While  it  is  difficult  to  show  that  the  wonderful  pat- 
terns and  magnificent  coloration  of  many  of  the  larger 
animals  are  not  of  service  to  the  animal,  however  scep- 
tical we  may  be  on  the  subject,  yet  in  the  case  of  many 
microscopic  forms  that  are  equally  brilliantly  colored 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  coloration  can  be  of  no 
special  service  to  them.  We  also  see  in  other  cases  that 
the  presence  of  color  need  not  be  connected  with  any 
use  that  it  bears  as  such  to  the  animal.  For  instance,  the 
beautiful  colors  on  the  inside  of  the  shells  of  many 
marine  snails  and  of  bivalve  mollusks,  can  be  of  no  use 
to  the  animal  that  makes  the  shell,  because  as  long  as 


The  Chance  Aspect  of  Life  and  Mind  95 

the  animal  is  alive  this  color  cannot  be  seen  from  the 
outside.  .  .  .  The  splendid  coloring  of  the  leaves 
in  autumn  is  certainly  of  no  service  to  the  organism. 

As  an  example  of  a  change  in  the  organism  that  is  of 
no  use  to  it  may  be  cited  the  case  of  the  turning  white  of 
the  hair  in  old  age  in  man  and  in  several  other  mam- 
mals. The  absorption  of  bone  at  the  angle  of  the  chin 
in  man  is  another  case  of  a  change  of  no  immediate  use 
to  the  individual.  We  also  find  in  many  other  changes 
that  accompany  old  age,  processes  going  on  that  are  of 
no  use  to  the  organism,  and  which  may  in  the  end  be 
the  cause  of  its  death." 

We  cannot  help  agreeing  with  Morgan  that  the  tele- 
ology of  the  biological  process  is  not  always  evident. 
A  number  of  processes  in  the  world  of  life  are 
indifferent,  useless,  and  even  detrimental  to  the  life 
existence  of  the  organism.  All  the  biological  pro- 
cesses that  lead  to  the  decline  of  the  organism  are  cer- 
tainly not  useful  to  the  individual;  neither  are  all 
the  processes  of  a  pathological  character  to  which 
organisms  are  often  subjected  in  their  relations  with 
and  adaptation  to  the  external  environment.  There 
is  certainly  no  more  flimsy,  more  superficial,  and  more 
specious  reasoning  than  the  one  that  ascribes  a  meaning, 
utility,  and  purpose  to  every  organ,  function,  and  physio- 
logical process  found  in  the  organism.  The  teleological 
speculations  are  often  a  matter  of  ingenious  casuistry. 

The  evolutionist  who  works  with  the  teleological  con- 
cept of  utility  must  assume  spontaneous  variation  as  an 
important  factor  in  the  development  of  life.  In  other 
words,  out  of  a  great  number  of  many  variations,  harm- 
ful, indifferent,  and  useful,  the  ones  that  are  useful  in 
their  adaptation  to  the  external  environment  survive 


g6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

or  are  selected  by  the  process  of  natural  selection.  This 
clearly  requires  the  presence  of  a  great  number 
of  variations  which  show  no  adaptations  and  therefore 
are  not  useful.  The  utility  and  adaptation  manifested 
by  the  biological  processes  are  due  to  the  presence  of 
an  immense  number  of  variations  of  biological  processes 
which  are  useless,  indifferent,  and  even  harmful. 

The  struggle  for  existence  with  its  survival  of  the  fit- 
test and  the  principle  of  spontaneous  variations  clearly 
indicate  the  presence  of  biological  processes  which  are 
essentially  purposeless.  The  theory  of  evolution,  at  least 
from  a  Darwinian  standpoint,  the  most  scientific  of 
evolutionary  hypotheses,  is  based  on  the  empirical  as- 
sumption that  the  unadapted  variations  far  exceed  in 
number  the  adapted  or  useful  variations.  Useful  pur- 
posive biological  processes  are  rare,  few,  and  accidental, 
while  the  indifferent,  the  useless  and  the  purposeless 
biological  processes  are  by  far  the  most  common.  The 
purposive  processes  are  the  accidental  and  the  excep- 
tional, while  the  purposeless  processes  are  the  rule.  It  is 
out  of  the  purposeless  that  the  purposive  processes  de- 
velop. The  fully  developed  biological  process,  the  fully 
developed  organism  is  purposeful,  because  of  its  selec- 
tion of  the  purposeful  out  of  the  great  mass  of  purpose- 
less biological  processes  and  unadapted  organisms. 

In  the  psychological  process  a  similar  state  prevails. 
The  general  outcome  may  have  purpose,  but  this  is  ac- 
complished at  the  expense  of  a  great  number  of  pro- 
cesses which  are  accidental,  meaningless,  and  purpose- 
less. The  sensations,  feelings,  emotions,  and  ideas 
that  arise  in  our  consciousness  are  spontaneous  or 
accidental  variations.  They  are  the  raw  material  for 
the  guiding  selective  consciousness.     Many  of  the  psy- 


The  Chance  Aspect  of  Life  and  Mind  97 

chic  states  as  they  arise  in  consciousness  are  rejected  by 
the  selective  action  of  attention  and  are  left  to  die  a 
natural  death  as  are  the  rejected  variations  by  the  pro- 
cess of  natural  selection.  Man  would  have  been  a  rav- 
ing maniac,  if  he  were  to  give  expression  to  the  various 
ideas  that  spring  up  spontaneously  in  his  mind.  The 
great  number  of  ideas  that  throng  in  the  antechamber 
of  consciousness  are  in  themselves  purposeless.  As 
Galton  well  puts  it  "Although  the  brain  is  able  to  do 
very  fair  work  fluently  in  an  automatic  way,  and  though 
it  will  of  its  own  accord,  strike  out  sudden  and  happy 
ideas,  it  is  questionable  if  it  is  capable  of  working  thor- 
oughly and  profoundly  without  past  or  present  effort. 
The  character  of  this  effort  seems  to  me  chiefly  to  lie 
in  bringing  the  contents  of  the  antechamber  more  near- 
ly within  the  ken  of  consciousness,  which  then  takes  com- 
prehensive note  of  all  its  contents,  and  compels  the  log- 
ical faculty  to  test  them  seriatim  before  selecting  the 
fittest  for  a  summons  to  the  presence  chamber."  In 
another  place  he  justly  remarks:  "The  thronging  of 
the  antechamber  is,  I  am  convinced,  beyond  my  control ; 
if  not,  if  the  ideas  do  not  come,  I  cannot  create  them 
nor  compel  them  to  come."  It  is  certainly  true  we\  ( 
cannot  call  on  our  ideas  to  come  at  our  bidding.  They  )  ' 
come  and  go  unasked. 

Mental  activity  in  its  rational  aspects  whether  it  be\^^ 
logical,  moral,  or  aesthetic,  is  essentially  selective  in  / 
character.  The  logical  process  can  draw  only  definite 
conclusions  from  given  premises,  the  moral  man  or  the 
ethical  thinker  can  only  regard  definite  relations  and 
behavior  as  right  or  wrong,  and  the  man  who  creates 
and  enjoys  the  beautiful  can  only  regard  certain  definite 
combinations  as  beautiful.    Even  in  ordinary  life  where 


98  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  process  of  selection  is  not  so  rigid  as  in  the  arts, 
sciences,  and  philosophy,  still  the  process  of  attention  to 
maintain  rationality  is  a  severe  judge  in  the  rejection  of 
the  unfit  ideas.  In  a  train  of  ideas  few  ideas  that  offer 
themselves  are  accepted  as  fit  and  utilized  by  the  guid- 
ing thought.  The  stream  of  consciousness  as  it  rushes 
along  picks  up  objects  that  are  intended  for  and  help 
to  reach  the  destination  set  out.  Every  idea,  every 
thought  as  it  presents  itself  to  the  guiding  process  is 
selected  with  respect  to  the  purpose  of  the  given  stream 
of  thought. 

The  thoughts  that  present  themselves  at  any  one 
moment  are  meaningless  and  purposeless,  they  are 
simply  the  accidental  chance  material  which  the  giv- 
en momentary,  purposive  thought  selects  as  fit  in  order 
to  succeed  best  in  the  achievement  of  its  purpose.  The 
ideas  themselves  as  they  present  themselves  are  mean- 
ingless, purposeless,  chance  creations  of  the  brain,  like 
the  phenomena  of  accidental  variation.  When  the  se- 
lective process  of  attention  is  rigid,  more  of  the  chance 
comers  are  rejected  as  not  adapted  for  the  purpose, 
more  of  the  ideas  rising  to  the  antechamber  of  conscious- 
ness from  the  subconscious  regions  are  found  to  be 
purposeless.  A  Kepler  rejects  a  number  of  generaliza- 
tions before  he  finds  the  formulae  of  his  laws  that  an- 
swer his  purpose  in  the  co-ordination  of  his  facts. 

At  the  same  time  different  minds,  like  different  ani- 
mals, differ  in  the  spontaneous  or  accidental  variations 
to  which  they  can  give  rise.  The  dull  mind  has  but  few 
such  variations,  while  the  man  of  genius,  like  the  en- 
dowed animal,  has  a  mass  of  accidental  variations  from 
which  to  select  in  the  adaptation  to  the  purpose  of  the 
thought.  The  man  of  genius  whether  as  artist  or  thinker 


The  Chance  Aspect  of  Life  and  Mind  99 

requires  a  mass  of  accidental  variations  to  select  from 
and  a  rigidly  selective  process  of  attention.  A  great 
wealth  of  chance  variation  of  thoughts  to  select  from 
is  the  special  endowment  of  the  man  of  genius. 

When  the  process  of  attention  relaxes  in  the  rigidity 
of  its  selective  activity,  more  chance  images  and  acci- 
dental variations  of  thoughts  are  presented  to  and  ac- 
cepted by  consciousness;  the  selective  thought  does  not 
hold  on  to  its  purpose,  the  stream  of  thought  becomes 
constituted  of  relatively  purposeless  chance  images  and 
accidental  ideas.  Such  states  occur  in  day-reveries  or  un- 
der the  influence  of  alcohol  and  various  toxins  as  well  as 
in  the  hypnoidal,  hypnagogic,  and  hypnopagogic 
states.  When  the  process  of  attention  becomes  com- 
pletely relaxed  as  In  sleep,  fever,  or  in  the  acute  forms 
of  mental  maladies,  the  chance  images  and  accidental  va- 
riations of  Ideas  come  and  go  without  aim  and  purpose. 
Purposeless  thought  is  as  much  the  rule  of  mental  life 
as  purposeless  accidental  variations  are  the  rule  of  or- 
ganic life.  Like  the  fully  developed  biological  process, 
the  fully  developed  mental  state  presents  purpose  in  Its 
selective  activity.  Purpose,  however,  arises  out  of  chaos, 
out  of  chance  variations.  Our  dreams,  our  unintentional 
errors  in  speech,  writing  and  action  are  due  to  the  many 
chance  thoughts  which  either  Intrude  themselves  on 
consciousness  In  spite  of  the  selective  rigid  process  of 
attention,  or  are  due  to  the  momentary  relaxation  of  the 
selective  process.  Chance-thoughts,  meaningless  images 
and  ideas,  like  accidental  variations,  form  one  of  the 
most  important  factors  in  the  evolution  of  purposive 
mental  activity. 

The  so-called  "psycho-analytic  science"  is  erroneous, 
not  only  because  of  Its  fallacious  "psychic  causation,"  but 


lOO  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

also  because  it  is  based  on  the  fallacy  of  regarding  each 
and  every  mental  state  as  purposive  in  character.  This 
pseudo-psychology  misses  the  fundamental  fact  that 
many  psychic  occurrences  are  like  many  biological  oc- 
currences, mere  chance  variations.  These  chance  varia- 
tions form  the  matrix  out  of  which  the  purposive  psychic 
process  arises.  Not  purpose,  hut  chance  is  at  the  heart 
of  mental  life. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ACTIVITY  OF  MENTAL  LIFE 

THE  popular  mind  regards  cause  as  a  strain- 
ing agency  which  acts  in  agony  of  labor  on 
resisting  material,  finally  fashioning  it  and 
giving  rise  to  the  effect;  such  a  relation  is 
considered  as  constituting  the  very  essence  of  activity. 
This  anthropomorphic  or  animistic  view  of  cause  and 
effect  must  be  rejected  by  the  scientist.  The  cause  does 
not  beget  the  effect  in  labor,  in  strain.  To  conceive 
causes  as  straining  agencies  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
popular  mind  has  a  tendency  to  mythological  creations, 
to  regard  natural  phenomena  as  products  fashioned  by 
living  agencies.  The  common-sense  man  in  fashioning 
his  material  works  with  his  muscles  and  experiences 
muscular  sensation  of  strain,  of  push  and  pull,  hence  in 
regarding  the  changes  in  the  course  of  natural  pro- 
cesses, he  projects  into  them  his  subjective  muscular  ex- 
periences. Science,  however,  has  succeeded  in  freeing 
itself  from  all  animism,  and  does  not  invoke  the  will  and 
labor  of  deities  and  spirits  as  the  causes  of  physical  phe- 
nomena, nor  does  it  regard  causes  themselves  as  little 
deities  and  sprites  with  will  and  strain  in  the  produc- 
tion of  effects. 

Objectively  regarded,  what  nature  presents  is  only 
sequences  of  events,  or  phenomena,  and  the  only 
relationship  observed  between  cause  and  effect  is 
simply  one  of  invariable  sequence.  If  of  two  phe- 
nomena one  antecedent  and  the  other  consequent,  the 

lOI 


I02  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

consequent  is  invariably  observed  to  depend  in  its  vari- 
ation on  the  antecedent,  such  an  antecedent  is  declared 
to  be  the  cause  of  the  consequent.  To  give  an  illustra- 
tion. If  a  stone  falls  from  a  certain  height  on  a  heap 
of  many  layers  of  thin  glass,  the  stone  in  falling  breaks 
the  glass.  We  declare  the  stone  to  be  the  cause  of 
the  breaking  of  the  glass,  why?  Because  we  observe 
the  fall  of  the  stone,  and  on  reproducing  the  same  con- 
ditions, the  same  results  follow;  fall  of  stone,  then 
breaking  of  glass.  Furthermore,  increasing  the  weight 
of  the  stone,  more  layers  of  glass  are  broken,  on  decreas- 
ing the  weight  of  the  stone  less  layers  are  broken,  vari- 
ations in  the  consequent  depend  on  the  variations  of  the 
antecedent.  We  may  similarly  change  the  distance  from 
which  the  stone  falls,  and  the  effect  will  vary  once  more. 
On  changing  the  material  of  the  stone  the  amount 
of  breakage  will  vary  once  more.  Furthermore,  on 
changing  the  consistency  of  the  glass  layer  the  effect 
will  again  vary.  In  short,  where  the  phenomena 
are  observed  to  stand  to  each  other  in  functional  rela- 
tion of  invariable  sequence,  the  antecedent  is  declared 
to  be  the  cause  of  the  consequent,  such,  as  in  our  exam- 
ple, the  fall  of  the  stone  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the 
breaking  of  the  glass.  What  is  observed  is  simply 
an  invariable  sequence,  so  much  stone  momentum, 
so  much  glass  breakage.  No  strain  or  enforcement 
are  ever  observed  between  causes  and  effects.  No 
strain  is  observed  in  the  falling  stone  to  produce 
the  effect,  nor  is  it  ever  detected  that  the  glass  re- 
sists and  is  forced  into  the  broken  state  by  the  power 
of  the  stone. 

Strain,  resistance,  enforcement,  power?  are  all  states 
drawn  from  experiences  of  our  psychic  life.     As  Mach 


Activity  of  Mental  Life         "         103 

puts  it:  "There  is  but  one  sort  of  constancy  which 
embraces  all  forms  of  constancy,  constancy  of  con- 
nection (or  of  relation).  The  majority  of  the  prop- 
ositions of  natural  science  express  such  constancies 
of  connection:  'The  tadpole  is  metamorphosed  into 
a  frog;  chlorate  of  sodium  makes  its  appearance  in 
the  form  of  cubes.  Rays  of  light  are  retilinear. 
Bodies  fall  with  an  acceleration  of  9.81.'  When  these 
constancies  are  expressed  in  concepts  we  call  them  laws. 
Force  (in  the  mechanical  significance)  is  likewise  merely 
a  constancy  of  connections.  When  I  say  that  a  body 
A  exerts  a  force  on  a  body  B,  I  mean  that  B,  on 
coming  into  contraposition  with  A,  is  immediately  af- 
fected by  a  certain  acceleration  with  respect  to  A. 
The  singular  illusion  that  the  substance  A  is  the  ab- 
solutely constant  vehicle  of  a  force  which  takes  ef- 
fect immediately  on  B's  being  contraposed  to  A  is 
easily  shaken.  .  .  .  The  phrases,  'No  matter 
without  force,  no  force  without  matter,'  which  are 
all  but  abortive  attempts  to  remove  a  self  incurred 
contradiction,  become  superfluous  on  our  recognizing 
only  constancies  of  connection." 

Similarly  Karl  Pearson  regards  the  scientific  law  "as 
a  brief  description  in  mental  short  hand  of  as  wide  a 
range  as  possible  of  the  sequences  of  our  sense-impres- 
sions" or  experiences.  "If  the  stone  from  my  hand 
break  a  window,  the  cause  of  the  broken  window  might 
very  likely  be  spoken  of  as  the  moving  stone.  But  al- 
though this  usage  is  an  approach  to  the  scientific  usage 
of  the  word  cause,  it  yet  involves  in  the  popular  esti- 
mation an  idea  of  enforcement  which  is  not  in  the  lat- 
ter. That  the  stone  moving  with  a  certain  speed  must 
bring  about  the  destruction  of  the  window  is,  I  think, 


I04  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  idea  involved  in  thus  speaking  of  the  moving  stone 
as  the  cause  of  the  breakage.  But  were  our  perceptive 
organs  sufficiently  powerful,  science  conceives  that  we 
should  see  before  the  impact  particles  of  window  and 
particles  of  stone  moving  in  a  certain  manner,  and  after 
the  impact  the  same  particles  moving  in  a  very  different 
manner.  We  might  carefully  describe  these  motions, 
but  we  should  be  unable  to  say  why  one  stage  would  fol- 
low another,  just  as  we  can  describe  hoiv  a  stone  falls  to 
the  earth,  but  not  say  why  it  does.  Thus  scientifically 
the  idea  of  necessity  in  the  stages  of  the  sequence — stone 
in  motion,  broken  window — or  the  idea  of  enforcement 
would  disappear;  we  should  have  a  routine  of  experi- 
ence. When  we  speak  however  of  the  stage  of  a  se- 
quence in  ordinary  life  as  causes,  I  do  not  think  it  is  be- 
cause we  are  approaching  the  scientific  standpoint,  but 
I  fear  it  arises  from  our  associating,  through  long 
usage  the  idea  of  force  with  the  stone.  .  .  .  Force 
as  cause  of  motion  is  exactly  on  the  same  footing  as  a 
tree  god  as  cause  of  growth — both  are  but  names  to  hide 
our  ignorance  of  the  why  in  the  routine  of  our  percep- 
tions. The  necessity  in  a  law  of  nature  has  not  the 
logical  must  of  a  geometrical  theorem,  nor  the  cate- 
gorical must  of  a  human  law-giver;  it  is  merely  our  ex- 
perience of  a  routine  whose  stages  have  neither  logical 
nor  volitional  order.  In  what  we  have  termed  second- 
ary causes  (successive  stages  of  the  sequence)  science 
finds  no  element  of  enforcement,  solely  the  routine  of 
experience." 

'  Within  certain  limits  the  psychic  process,  like  the 
physical  process,  may  be  regarded  as  an  activity,  as  a 
series  of  phenomena,  as  a  sequence  of  antecedents  and 
consequents,  or  as  Pearson  puts  it,  as  a  routine  of  experi- 


Activity  of  Mental  Life  105 

ence.  This  activity  of  course  should  not  be  regarded 
as  a  metaphysical  agency  in  the  sense  of  a  supersensuous 
soul,  but  as  a  successive  series  of  psychic  events.  From 
a  scientific  standpoint  the  physical  process  is  regarded 
as  a  series  of  successive  physical  events.  Similarly  the 
psychic  process  may  be  regarded  as  a  series  of  succes- 
sive states  consisting  of  psychic  elements,  presentative 
and  representative. 

Final,  and  finite  as  the  psychic  process  is,  it  has  a 
series  of  antecedents  and  consequents.  In  so  far  as  these 
can  be  traced,  one  can  keep  within  the  bounds  of  the 
psychic  process  only.  Furthermore,  in  so  far  as  the 
series  of  psychic  antecedents  and  consequents  persists 
we  are  fully  justified  in  speaking  of  the  whole  series  as 
a  process,  a  form  of  activity,  in  short  as  mental  activity. 

If  by  activity  is  understood  the  sequence  of  antece- 
dents and  consequents,  the  position  taken  by  some  psy- 
chologists in  declaring  the  mental  stream  as  inactive  is 
unacceptable.    There  is  activity  in  the  psychic  process,  if  f 
by  activity  is  meant  not  the  popular  belief  in  actual  bonds 
between  cause  and  effect,  but  mere  sequence  of  antece-  j 
dents  and  consequents.     The  only  difference  we  can 
find  between  them  is  the  finality  and  finiteness  as  well  as 
lack  of  invariable  or  necessary  sequence  of  antecedents 
and  consequents  characteristic  of  the  psychic  process  in 
contradistinction  to  the  infinite  series  and  invariable,  , 
necessary,  or  causal  sequence,  presented  by  the  physical  j 
process. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

WITH  all  Other  sciences  psychology  must 
postulate  the  existence  of  an  external  ma- 
terial world  of  space,  time,  and  objects. 
Psychology  does  not  inquire  into  the  nature 
of  these  objects,  as  to  what  they  are  in  themselves.  This 
as  we  pointed  out  is  the  business  of  metaphysics,  not  of 
science.  Psychology  however  does  ask  how  we  come  to 
know  the  outside  world ;  it  inquires  as  to  the  process  by 
which  external  reality  comes  to  be  presented  in  con- 
sciousness. 

The  fact  that  psychology  postulates  an  external  ma- 
terial world  and  studies  it  in  so  far  as  it  comes  to  be 
reflected  in  consciousness,  points  to  another  postulate 
which  psychology  must  assume  in  addition,  namely,  the 
existence  of  an  inner  world  consciousness.  This  postu- 
late is  peculiar  to  psychology,  no  other  of  the  descrip- 
tive and  objective  sciences  have  to  assume  it.  Although 
it  is  quite  clear  that  without  mind  there  can  possibly 
be  no  study,  no  science,  still  this  is  but  an  indirect  reflec- 
tion which  none  of  the  concrete  sciences  have  to  take 
into  consideration.  Of  course,  a  chemist  is  required 
for  chemistry,  a  physicist  for  physics,  a  physiologist 
for  physiology,  and  so  on,  but  the  chemist,  the  physicist, 
the  physiologist  do  not  introduce  themselves  into  their 
science.  In  all  concrete  sciences  the  mind  is  entirely 
projected  into  its  object,  it  is  the  external  object 
itself  that  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration.     In  con- 


The  Postulates  of  Psychology  107 

Crete  science  consciousness  is  drowned  in  the  object,  in 
psychology,  on  the  contrary,  the  object  is  drowned  in 
consciousness.  The  chemist,  the  physicist,  who  will  turn 
his  attention  to  consciousness  and  introduce  his  psychic 
states,  his  moods,  dispositions,  and  intentions  as  elements 
into  his  investigations  will  hardly  be  an  exact  scientist. 
Not  so  with  the  psychologist,  he  must  take  the  inner 
world  into  account,  he  must  deal  with  consciousness, 
with  moods,  with  feelings.  It  is  true  that  he  must  treat 
them  as  objects,  but  these  objects,  unlike  those  of  other 
positive  sciences,  are  after  all  of  the  inner  subjective 
world  of  consciousness.  For  the  very  essence  of  psy- 
chology is  the  taking  account  of  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness. 

In  our  last  statement  that  psychology  deals  with  the 
objective  external  world  as  reflected  in  consciousness 
another  postulate  is  implied.  Besides  the  external  and 
internal  worlds,  psychology  also  postulates  the  interre- 
lation of  the  two. 

This  interrelation  is  not  direct,  it  is  not  one  of  ante- 
cedent, and  consequent,  but  that  of  coexistence;  for  as 
we  have  already  pointed  out,  the  two  series  of  phe- 
nomena, the  mental  and  the  physiological,  must  be  as- 
sumed as  concomitant,  as  running  parallel  to  each 
other.  If,  however,  by  "the  external  world"  we  un- 
derstand the  universe  of  objects  exclusive  of  the  func- 
tioning psycho-physiological  processes  then  we  may  say 
that  it  stands  to  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  in  re- 
lation both  of  sequence  and  coexistence. 

The  objective  external  world  enters  into  relation  with 
consciousness  only  through  the  intermedlacy  of  physio- 
logical nervous  processes.  Only  on  this  condition  can 
the  external  world  enter  into  relation  with  conscious- 


io8  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ness,  and  under  special  conditions  become  its  direct 
object.  I  take  a  dose  of  opium,  mescal,  or  cannabis 
Indica,  and  have  different  hallucinations  and  illu- 
sions, mental  activity  is  stimulated.  The  mind  teems 
with  sensations,  images,  ideas,  feelings,  emotions, 
moods;  now  the  whole  organism  is  pierced  by  sharp 
pain,  now  it  tingles  with  indescribable  acute  pleas- 
ure; now  a  charming  vision  appears,  a  beautiful 
scenery  unrolls  before  the  mind's  eye,  a  feeling  of  per- 
fect heavenly  bliss  diffuses  itself  all  over  our  conscious 
being;  now  a  disgusting,  ugly  figure  presents  itself,  a 
horrible  scene  is  witnessed  that  plunges  the  mind  into  an 
abyss  of  misery.  The  current  of  consciousness  is  ac- 
celerated and  it  drives  its  waves  with  more  vigor  than 
ever. 

Instead  of  being  accelerated,  the  current  may  be 
depressed  and  retarded  even  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
plunge  the  mind  into  a  deep  sleep.  Such  retardation  we 
find  under  the  influence  of  bromides,  or  of  anaesthetics, 
such  as  ether,  chloroform,  of  hypnotics,  such  as  sulfonal, 
chloral  and  others.  We  have  here  the  action  of  a  drug, 
of  an  external  object  on  the  physiological  nervous  pro- 
cesses with  their  psychic  concomitants.  In  this  case, 
however,  the  drug  itself  does  not  become  the  direct  ob- 
ject of  consciousness.  Through  the  mere  absorption  of 
opium,  cannabis  or  belladonna,  we  can  know  nothing  of 
their  constitution,  we  can  know  nothing  of  their  color, 
of  their  size,  of  their  weight,  specific  gravity  and  so 
on,  we  cannot  possibly  perceive  them  as  objects.  The 
states  of  consciousness  which  cannabis,  for  instance,  gives 
rise  to  affords  no  knowledge  of  the  external  objective 
nature  of  the  drug  itself. 

A  direct  knowledge  of  an  external  object  is  acquired 


The  Postulates  of  Psychology  109 

through  the  special  senses.  Yonder  is  an  object,  an 
inkstand.  It  stimulates  the  peripheral  sense  organ,  the 
eye,  the  retina,  the  physiological  processes  aroused  in 
the  rods  and  cones  are  transmitted  by  the  optic  nerve 
and  by  the  optic  tracts  to  the  visual  centres  of  the  occi- 
pital lobes,  the  functioning  of  which  is  accompanied 
by  sensations  of  sight.  The  wave  of  stimulation 
spreads  from  the  visual  centres  to  other  centres  closely 
associated  with  them.  They  too  begin  to  function  with 
more  or  less  intensity,  accompanied  by  images,  ideas, 
thought,  which  constitute  the  perception  of  the  ink- 
stand yonder.  The  combined  activity,  or  function  of  a 
whole  system  of  centres  gives  rise  to  the  percept  ink- 
stand along  with  its  psychic  fringe,  with  the  stream  of 
consciousness  in  which  it  is  bathed.  We  see  and  know 
the  inkstand. 

From  a  psychological  standpoint  the  mode  of  action 
of  the  inkstand  differs  radically  from  that  of  the  opium. 
The  latter  may  be  characterized  as  psycho-physiological, 
or  even  purely  physiological,  the  former  may  be  termed 
psycho-physical  or  psychological,  perceptual.  The  one 
gives  rise  to  perception,  to  knowledge  of  the  external  ob- 
ject, while  the  other  does  not.  Both,  however,  agree  in 
this  that  they  can  enter  into  relations  with  consciousness 
only  through  the  intermediacy  of  physiological  nervous 
processes.  The  two  modes  of  action  and  their  rela- 
tion to  consciousness  may  be  represented  by  the  follow- 
ing diagrams: 

I.  Psycho-physical  or  perceptual  relation. 

II.  Psycho-physiological  relation. 


lio  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


Fig.  II 

In  fig.  I,  Ob.  is  the  object  stimulating  S.  the  organ  of 
special  sense,  giving  rise  to  physiological  nervous 
processes  with  their  concomitant  psychic  states  consti- 
tuting the  subjective  object  which  is  objectified  in  the 
object  yonder.  In  Fig.  II,  D.  is  the  drug  acting  directly 
on  the  nervous  centre  the  stimulated  activity  of  which 
gives  rise  to  the  perception  of  an  external  object  Ob. 
Thus  we  find  that  external  physical  and  physiological 
processes  are  causally  related,  or  stand  to  each  other  in 
relation  of  invariable  or  necessary  sequence  while  the 
physiological  and  psychic  processes  stand  in  relation  of 
coexistence.  What  the  nature  of  this  inter-relation  is 
and  how  it  is  possible  are  problems  for  epistemology 
and  metaphysics.  Psychology  must  assume  this  inter- 
relation as  its  postulate. 

If  psychology  is  to  be  a  science  at  all,  it  must  postu- 
late the  uniformity  of  the  phenomena  with  which  it 


The  Postulates  of  Psychology  III 

deals.  This  we  have  pointed  out  in  our  second  chapter 
when  we  discussed  the  subject  matter  of  psychology. 
We  turn  to  it  again  in  order  to  realize  clearly  its  full 
meaning  in  psychology.  Psychology,  as  we  know,  in 
addition  to  the  external  world  of  physical  sci- 
ences, also  postulates  consciousness.  Its  postulate  of 
uniformity  is,  therefore,  far  more  complex  than  in  other 
positive  sciences.  With  physical  science  psychology  must 
postulate  uniformity  of  the  external  world,  because  it 
presupposes  the  physical  sciences,  and  because  the  ex- 
ternal world  forms  the  content  and  object  of  conscious- 
ness. This,  however,  is  not  sufficient.  Psychology  must 
also  postulate  the  uniformity  in  the  inner  world  of  psy- 
cho-physiological, or  mental  phenomena.  Were  there 
no  uniformity  in  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  psy- 
chology, as  a  science  would  have  been  an  impossibility. 
This,  however,  is  not  all.  Psychology  must  also 
postulate  the  uniformity  of  relationship  between  the 
phenomena  of  the  external  and  inner  worlds.  Definite 
physical  processes  must  be  concomitant  with  certain  well 
defined  psychic  states.  Were  this  otherwise,  the  two 
series,  the  mental  and  the  physical,  would  be  out  of 
joint,  the  relations  of  coexistence  would  no  longer 
be  obtained,  and  the  two  series  would  stand  to 
each  other  in  no  relation  at  all;  thus  noise,  for 
instance,  would  sometimes  be  smelled,  sometimes 
tasted,  and  sometimes  seen.  Psychology  as  a  science 
that  deals  with  general  laws,  would  certainly  have 
been  impossible.  We  would  neither  have  been  able 
to  express  to  others  our  states  of  consciousness  in 
uniform  definite  movements,  nor  would  it  have  been 
possible  for  others  to  understand  us,  nor  would  it  have 
been  possible  to  call  forth  in  others  certain  desired  states 


112  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

of  consciousness;  in  short,  not  only  psychology  would 
have  been  an  impossibility,  but  also  all  human  inter- 
course. The  myth  of  the  tower  of  Babel  would  have 
been  fully  realized.  Psychology  must  postulate  uni- 
formity of  interrelation  of  physical,  physiological,  and 
psychic  processes. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


MENTAL  SYNTHESIS 


ONE  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  psy- 
chology is  mental  synthesis.  Objects  that 
appear  within  the  same  consciousness  are 
synthetized  in  a  unity,  if  they  are  taken  cog- 
nizance of.  An  object  a  may  be  presented  to  conscious- 
ness, and  another  object  b  may  be  similarly  perceived. 
They  remain  two  and  separate  as  long  as  con- 
sciousness does  not  take  cognizance  of  their  duality, 
of  their  being  two  objects,  but  as  soon  as  the 
two  appear  in  consciousness  together  and  are  perceived 
as  two,  they  are  by  this  very  fact  synthetized  into  a 
unity.  This  is  a  point  which  may  not  possibly  be  so 
clear,  and  is  also  hard  to  realize  for  those  who  have 
been  used  to  work  in  concrete  sciences.  The  reason  is 
that  the  mind  is  accustomed  to  dwell  on  the  object 
of  thought,  not  on  the  function  of  thought  itself,  and  is 
therefore  used  to  take  the  object  for  the  thought.  The 
confusion  between  the  thought  that  possesses  the  ob- 
ject, and  the  object  of  thought  is  a  fallacy  that  is  as  a 
rule  committed  by  the  intelligence  trained  to  busy  itself 
only  with  external  objects.  Our  reader  sees,  of 
course,  through  this  fallacy,  he  knows  that  the  thing 
of  the  idea  and  the  idea  of  the  thing  are  not  identical. 
The  paper  on  which  I  write  is  white  and  is  five  inches 
wide  and  eight  inches  long,  but  my  idea  of  the  paper  Is 
neither  white  nor  has  it  so  many  inches  in  width  and 
length. 

"3 


114  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

The  same  fallacy,  however,  is  not  so  very  obvious 
when  it  appears  under  a  somewhat  different  guise.  The 
object  of  thought  has  parts,  therefore  it  is  concluded 
that  the  thought  of  the  object  must  also  be  made  up  of 
corresponding  parts.  Because  the  chain  in  the  external 
world  is  made  up  of  so  many  links,  it  is  concluded  that 
the  idea  of  the  chain  is  made  up  of  so  many  ideas  of 
links,  and  that  the  total  sum  of  the  ideas  of  the  links 
forms  the  idea  of  the  chain.  The  idea  of  the  chain, 
however,  is  not  a  mere  juxtaposition  of  so  many  ideas 
of  links.  The  ideas  of  the  links  would  have  remained 
in  the  juxtaposed  disconnected  condition,  had  they  not 
been  connected  and  synthetized  in  one  new  idea,  the  idea 
of  the  chain.  The  word  is  made  up  of  so  many  letters, 
but  the  sum  of  the  letters  is  not  the  idea  of  the  word. 
The  phrase  is  made  up  of  words,  but  the  mere  sum  of 
the  words  does  not  make  sense,  does  not  form  the  idea 
of  that  sentence. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  fully  and  clearly 
realize  this  principle  of  mental  synthesis.  Many  a  mis- 
understanding In  psychology  is  cleared  up,  by  keeping 
this  principle  clearly  before  one's  mind.  We  may  say 
that  it  is  one  of  the  principal  keys  that  gives  us  an  en- 
trance into  the  science  of  psychology.  A  sum  of  sensa- 
tions, of  ideas,  of  images,  of  feelings,  etc.,  at  once 
brought  in  consciousness  as  a  sum  is  by  this  very  fact 
synthetized  by  thought  into  a  unity.  The  chair  yonder 
is  composed  of  many  parts,  it  has  four  legs,  a  seat,  a 
back,  and  each  part  in  its  turn  is  again  made  up  of  many 
parts.  Each  part,  if  represented  in  consciousness  at  all, 
has  its  corresponding  Idea,  but  the  Idea  of  these  com- 
ponent parts,  the  idea  of  the  chair  Is  a  whole,  a  unity,  no 
longer  being  a  conglomeration  of  parts.     Objectively 


Mental  Synthesis  I15 

considered,  that  man  yonder  is  made  up  of  many  parts, 
of  many  organs,  of  many  tissues,  of  millions  of  cells. 
To  my  consciousness,  however,  he  is  one,  my  friend 
John. 

An  idea  is  not  made  up  of  parts,  as  is  the  object  of  the 
idea.  Before  me  lies  a  grain  of  wheat,  I  have  a  percept 
of  it,  I  have  an  idea  of  that  grain.  The  grain  may  be  di- 
vided into  halves,  or  quarters,  and  I  can  form  an  idea 
of  a  half,  of  a  third,  or  of  a  quarter  of  a  grain.  Is  it 
possible  to  do  the  same  thing  with  the  idea  ?  Can  we  sub- 
divide the  idea  of  the  grain  in  the  same  way  as  we  did 
the  grain  itself?  Can  we  have  a  half,  a  third,  a  quar- 
ter of  an  idea  of  the  grain?  One  realizes  the 
impossibility  and  absurdity  of  subdividing  an  idea.  Wc 
can  have  an  idea  of  a  third  of  a  pound,  but  it  is  absurd 
to  talk  of  a  third  of  an  idea  of  a  pound.  A  third  of 
an  idea  is  simply  so  much  nonsense.  But  why  is  it  ab- 
surd to  subdivide  an  idea?  Why  is  it  nonsense  to 
speak  of  having  a  half,  a  third,  a  quarter  or  any  frac- 
tion or  part  of  an  idea?  Evidently  because  an  idea  is 
essentially  a  synthesis,  a  unity,  and  has  no  parts. 

This  synthesis,  or  unity  is  more  or  less  clear  when 
the  percept,  or  idea  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  syn- 
thetized  into  a  numerical  unity,  and  be  projected  into 
the  external  world,  such  for  instance,  as  the  chair,  the 
table,  the  house,  or  my  friend  John.  It  is,  however, 
far  less  clear  when  thought  includes  many  ideas,  many 
percepts  and  the  nature  of  the  synthetized  unity  is  mul- 
tiplicity. There  are  in  my  room  four  chairs.  I  per- 
ceive them  as  being  four.  Have  I  not  four  percepts, 
four  ideas  going  to  make  up  my  idea  of  the  sum  of  the 
chairs  ?  Certainly  not.  What  we  have  here  is  not  four 
ideas,  but  one  idea  of  there  being  four  chairs.    A  sum 


il6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

of  ideas  is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  idea  of  their  sum, 
just  as  in  algebra  the  sum  of  squares  is  not  the  same 
as  the  square  of  the  sum.  I  think  a  sentence  "I  took 
a  stroll  in  the  forest  yesterday  morning."  The  sentence 
forms  a  multiplicity  of  words,  but  in  spite  of  all  that 
multiplicity,  the  phrase  appears  in  consciousness  as  one 
whole,  as  a  synthetized  unity.  Synthetic  unity  is  the 
essence,  the  backbone  of  thought. 

This  synthetic  unity  of  consciousness  can  be  made 
still  clearer  by  the  following  example.  Let  the  reader 
imagine  a  row  of  men,  each  thinking  one  single  word  of 
the  sentence :  "We  are  standing  here  in  a  row."  There 
is  here  a  completely  isolated  series  of  ideas,  but  the 
words  in  the  series  will  remain  in  their  full  isolation  and 
as  such  will  make  no  meaning,  no  one  sentence,  as  long 
as  they  will  be  confined  to  different  disconnected 
thoughts,  and  not  unified  in  the  synthesis  of  one  synthetic 
thought  or  of  what  I  term  moment-consciousness. 

To  have  the  idea  of  a  conglomeration,  of  a  mul- 
tiplicity of  objects,  images  or  ideas,  a  synthetizing 
moment  consciousness  is  required,  a  moment-con- 
sciousness that  should  take  cognizance  of  all  these 
objects,  images  or  ideas  and  synthetize  them  into 
a  unity,  the  one  idea  of  the  many.  The  many  words, 
the  many  ideas  must  be  synthetized  in  one  moment-con- 
sciousness before  the  idea  of  the  sentence  can  emerge. 
This  synthesis,  in  fact,  is  that  one  idea.  Ideas,  images, 
thoughts,  feelings  do  not  come  together,  fuse  into  one, 
and  make  one  idea. 

A  book  is  a  complex  object,  it  is  a  conglomeration  of 
pages,  letters,  words,  lines,  sentences,  paragraphs,  chap- 
ters. We  can  have  an  idea  of  half  a  book,  but  it  is 
certainly   absurd   to   have   half   an   idea   of   a   book. 


Men tal  Synthesis  wj 

It  means  nothing  at  all;  the  idea  itself  has  not 
been  formed,  and  as  such,  as  an  idea,  is  totally 
absent,  A  separate  synthesis  in  consciousness  is  requisite 
in  order  to  have  an  aggregation,  or  association  of  ideas 
cognized  as  one.  Ideas  do  not  meet,  associate  and  form 
a  unity,  mental  synthesis  is  required.  Such  a  synthesis 
is  always  effected,  whenever  a  moment-consciousness  gets 
cognizance  of  many  objects;  in  other  words,  sensations, 
ideas,  feelings,  images  can  only  get  unified  in  the  syn- 
thesis of  a  moment-consciousness.  Mental  synthesis  of 
psychic  content  in  the  unity  of  a  moment-consciousness 
is  a  fundamental  principle  of  psychology. 

It  is  the  great  and  fundamental  error  of  the  asso- 
ciationists  to  overlook  this  all  important  element  of 
synthesis  in  consciousness.  They  commit  the  fal- 
lacy of  regarding  a  mechanical  combination,  or  jux- 
taposition of  ideas  as  making  a  "fusion,"  a  synthesis, 
a  unity.  There  is  an  idea  of  A,  and  there  is  an  idea  of 
B,  therefore,  it  is  tacitly  assumed  that  there  is  the  idea  of 
A  and  B.  This  as  we  have  shown  is  a  fallacy.  The 
associationists  regard  the  idea  of  a  sum  as  consisting  of 
as  many  parts,  but  only  "fused,"  as  the  sum  itself.  This 
is  erroneous.  The  neglect  of  the  element  of  mental 
synthesis  and  the  consequent  identification  of  the  idea 
of  the  sum  as  a  whole  with  the  sum  of  ideas  of  the  parts 
going  to  make  up  the  external  sum  falsified  the  other- 
wise rich  researches  of  the  association  school.  The  sig- 
nificance of  mental  synthesis  in  the  moment-consciousness 
can  hardly  be  overestimated.  We  shall  return  to  the 
theory  of  the  moment-consciousness  and  its  mental  syn- 
thesis further  on. 

The  question  as  to  the  nature  of  that  mental  syn- 
thesis does  not  fall  within  the  province  of  psychology. 


1 1 8  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

Like  all  other  problems  that  refer  to  the  ultimate  na- 
ture of  things  and  how  they  are  possible,  the  problem  of 
the  inner  nature  of  mental  synthesis  does  not  belong  to 
science,  but  to  epistemology  and  metaphysics. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THEORIES    OF    PERCEPTION 


THE  theory  of  perception  is  fundamental  both 
in  normal  and  abnormal  psychology.  All 
mental  activities  are  intimately  related  with 
the  process  of  perception.  Our  wills,  our 
thoughts  and  our  feelings  relate  to  our  experience  of  the 
outer  world  of  things.  Biologically  regarded,  the  per- 
cept is  of  the  most  vital  importance,  inasmuch  as  it 
forms  the  medium  between  the  individual  and  the  outer 
environment.  Psychologically,  the  percept  reflects  the 
external  world  and  mirrors  the  conditions  of  life  to 
which  the  given  organism  has  to  adjust  itself.  In  fact, 
the  percept  may  be  regarded  as  the  coin  possessing  the 
value  of  the  external  environment.  In  this  respect  we 
cannot  help  agreeing  with  Baldwin's  statement: 
"The  theory  of  perception  is  perhaps  the  most 
important  as  well  as  the  most  difficult  problem  in  psy- 
chology. The  interpretation  of  the  higher  processes  of 
mind  rests  upon  it  and  it  underlies  the  body  of  our  gen- 
eral philosophy.  The  great  philosophies  of  the  world 
take  their  rise  from  initial  differences  in  the  method  of 
construing  perception." 

In  abnormal  psychology  the  theory  of  perception  is 
of  the  utmost  importance,  both  from  a  theoretical  and 
practical  standpoint.  Illusions,  hallucinations,  dream 
states,  subconscious  states,  many  states  of  dissociation 
depend  for  their  explanation  on  the  analysis  of  the  pro- 
cess of  perception.     I  have  developed  a  theory  of  per- 

119 


I20  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ception  which  may  be  characterized  as  the  doctrine  of 
primary  and  secondary  sensory  elements.  This  doc- 
trine is  based  on  a  close  analysis  of  the  normal  process 
of  perception  and  is  substantiated  by  observations  and 
experiments  of  abnormal  mental  life. 

Before  however  we  state  our  view  of  perception  it 
may  be  well  to  make  a  review  of  what  the  principal 
psychological  authorities  teach  on  the  subject. 

James  Mill  in  discussing  perception  tells  us:  "The 
colors  upon  a  body  are  different,  according  to  its  figure, 
its  shape,  and  its  size.  But  the  sensations  of  color  and 
the  sensations  of  extension,  of  figure,  of  distance  have 
been  so  often  united,  felt  in  conjunction  that  the  sensa- 
tions of  the  color  are  never  experienced  without  rais- 
ing the  ideas  of  the  extension,  the  figure,  the  distance  in 
such  intimate  union  with  it,  that  they  not  only  cannot 
be  separated,  but  are  actually  supposed  to  he  seen  (ital- 
ics are  mine).  The  sight,  as  it  is  called  of  figure,  or 
distance,  appearing,  as  it  does  a  simple  sensation,  is  in 
reality  a  complex  state  of  consciousness,  a  sequence  in 
which  the  antecedent,  a  sensation  of  color,  and  the  con- 
sequent a  number  of  ideas  are  so  closely  combined  by 
association  that  they  appear  not  one  idea,  but  one  sen- 
sation." 

Sully  defines  perception  as  a  mental  act  that  'supple- 
ments a  sense  impression  by  an  accompaniment  or  escort 
of  revived  sensations,  the  whole  aggregate  of  actual 
and  revived  sensations  being  solidified  or  integrated  into 
the  form  of  a  percept.'  The  revived  sensations  are 
equivalent  to  James  Mill's  associated  ideas  and  images. 
We  shall  point  out  later  the  confusion  which  generally 
prevails  among  psychologists  and  psychiatrists,  when 
they  talk  indiscriminately  of  revived  sensations  and  ideas 


Theories  of  Perception  ill 

regarding  the  two  as  identical. 

Hoffding  describes  the  process  of  perception  "as  the 
fusing  of  a  reproduction  and  an  actual  sensation.  The 
percept  is  thus  conceived  as  compounded  out  of  a  rep- 
resentation and  a  sensation." 

Taine  tells  us  that  "Images  associated  with  the  sen- 
sations of  the  different  senses,  especially  with  those  of 
sight  and  touch  constitute  acquired  perceptions." 

Wundt  regards  the  percept  as  a  psychical  compound 
of  ideas  or  of  revived  sensations  or  images.  In  that 
respect  his  analysis  differs  but  little  from  that  of  other 
psychologists  who  regard  the  ideas,  images,  and  revived 
sensations  as  identical  elements  going  to  form  the  asso- 
ciated whole  or  psychic  compound,  the  percept. 

Kulpe  speaks  of  'centrally  excited  sensations'  regard- 
ing them  as  the  ideas  and  the  images  of  the  psycholo- 
gists and  psychiatrists,  and  tells  us  that  he  avoids  the 
use  of  'ideas.'  As  far  as  perception  is  concerned  he 
closely  follows  his  master,  Wundt,  and  talks  of  psychic 
compounds,  of  sensations  and  centrally  excited  sensa- 
tions which  really  are  identical  with  the  old  ideas  and 
images. 

Titchener  follows  closely  Wundt  and  Kiilpe,  and  re- 
gards the  'percept  as  a  compound,  or  a  complex  of  sen- 
sations,' of  peripheral  and  of  centrally  initiated  sensa- 
tions. In  order  to  be  explicit  he  hastens  to  tell  us  that 
there  is  no  fundamental  difference  between  the  percep- 
tion and  idea.  "It  is  customary  to  speak  of  perception, 
when  the  majority  of  the  simple  processes  in  the  com- 
plex are  the  result  of  stimulation  of  a  sense  organ,  /.  e., 
are  peripherally  aroused,  and  of  idea  when  the  greater 
number  are  the  result  of  an  excitation  within  the  brain 
cortex,  i.  e.,  are  centrally  aroused.     If  I  have  a  table 


122  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

before  me  and  my  eyes  open  I  am  said  to  perceive  the 
table;  if  I  close  my  eyes  and  think  of  what  I  saw,  to 
have  an  idea  of  a  table.  But  we  have  seen  that  the  sen- 
sations aroused  centrally  do  not  differ  as  psychological 
processes  from  those  aroused  peripherally."  This  state- 
ment put  in  such  an  explicit  form  brings  out  clearly  what 
may  be  designated  as  the  psychologist's  fallacy.  The 
fallacy  becomes  specially  apparent  in  the  domain  of  ab- 
normal psychology. 

Baldwin  with  his  characteristic  breadth  of  compre- 
hension puts  the  subject  of  perception  on  a  wide  basis: 
"Perception  is  the  apperceptive  or  synthetic  activity  of 
mind  whereby  the  data  of  sensation  take  on  the  forms 
of  representation  in  space  and  time;  or  it  is  the  process 
of  the  construction  of  our  representation  of  the  external 
world."  Baldwin  does  not  commit  himself  to  the  or- 
dinary fallacy  current  among  psychologists. 

Similarly  James  with  his  genius  for  psychological  in- 
sight tells  us :  "The  consciousness  of  particular  ma- 
terial things  present  to  sense  is  nowadays  called  percep- 
tion." And  again  "Perception  thus  differs  from  sensa- 
tion by  the  consciousness  of  farther  facts  associated 
with  the  object  of  the  sensation."  He  tells  us  further: 
"We  certainly  ought  not  to  say  what  usually  is  said  by 
psychologists  and  treat  the  perception  as  a  sum  of  dis- 
tinct psychic  entities,  the  present  sensation  namely,  plus 
a  lot  of  images  from  the  past,  all  integrated  together  in 
a  way  impossible  to  describe.  The  perception  is  one 
state  of  mind." 

We  thus  see  that  most  of  the  psychologists  regard  the 
percept  somewhat  in  Spencerian  terms  as  being  made 
up  of  presentations  and  representations,  or  as  Spencer 
puts  it  as  being  'partly  presentative  and  partly  represen- 


Theories  of  Perception  1 23 

tatlve.'  In  other  words,  the  percept  is  a  compound  of 
sensations  and  images,  a  synthesis  of  peripherally  in- 
duced sensations  and  of  images,  or  of  ideas  centrally 
excited.  One  principle  underlies  the  current  theory  of 
perception,  variously  phrased  by  different  psychologists, 
and  that  is  the  identification  of  ideational  and  sensory 
processes. 

The  identification  of  ideational  and  sensory  processes 
may  be  traced  to  Spinoza  when  he  tells  us  in  his  Ethics, 
Prop.  XVII.,  note,  "The  modifications  of  the  human 
body,  of  which  the  ideas  represent  external  bodies  as 
present  to  us,  we  will  call  the  images  of  things"  and  then 
in  another  place  of  Part  II.,  Prop.  XLIX.,  note,  "In 
order  to  illustrate  the  point  let  us  suppose  a  boy  imagin- 
ing a  horse  and  perceiving  nothing  else.  Inasmuch  as 
this  imagination  involves  the  existence  of  the  horse,  and 
the  boy  does  not  perceive  anything  which  would  ex- 
clude the  existence  of  the  horse  he  will  necessarily  re- 
gard the  horse  as  present;  he  will  not  be  able  to  doubt 
its  existence,  although  he  be  not  certain  thereof.  We 
have  daily  experiences  of  such  a  state  of  things  in 
dreams."  The  images,  according  to  Spinoza,  are  equiv- 
alent to  sensations  and  percepts,  unless  counteracted  by 
the  more  intense  peripheral  sensations  which  thus  be- 
come the  'reductives'  of  the  image,  a  doctrine  afterwards 
fully  developed  by  Taine.  I  may  add  that  Spinoza's 
view  of  dreams  is  repeated  almost  verbatim  by  the  great- 
est psychological  authorities,  all  uncritically  giving  their 
assent  to  the  current  fallacy  that  the  image  is  but  a 
weakened  sensation  and  that  the  sensation  is  an  intensi- 
fied image. 

This  theory  of  images  and  perception  is  perpetuated 
through  Hobbes,  Locke,  Hartley,  Hume,  James  Mill 


124  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

down  to  our  times. 

Hobbes  in  his  terse  English  puts  it:  "Imagination 
therefore  is  nothing  but  decaying  sense  and  is  found 
in  men  and  many  other  living  beings,  as  well  in  sleeping 
as  waking." 

Locke  derives  his  'ideas'  from  'experience,'  but  his 
'experience'  is  somewhat  vague  and  broad,  inasmuch  as 
it  flows  from  two  fountain  heads, — sensation  and  re- 
flection. "Let  us  then  suppose  the  mind  to  be  as  we  say 
white  paper  void  of  all  characters  without  any  ideas, 
how  comes  it  to  be  furnished?  .  .  .  To  this  I  an- 
swer in  one  word  from  experience.  .  .  .  Our  ob- 
servation employed  either  about  external  sensible  ob- 
jects or  about  the  internal  operations  of  our  minds,  per- 
ceived and  reflected  on  by  ourselves  is  that  which  sup- 
plies our  understanding  with  all  the  materials  of  think- 
ing. These  two  are  the  fountains  of  knowledge  from 
whence  all  the  ideas  we  have  or  can  naturally  have,  do 
spring."  Perception  is  used  by  Locke  in  a  broader  sense 
than  what  it  is  understood  at  present,  as  he  uses  per- 
ception for  sensory  experience  as  well  as  for  the  intro- 
spection of  higher  mental  processes.  He  tells  us,  how- 
ever, that  in  either  case  "the  mind  has  a  power  to  revive 
perceptions  which  it  has  once  had,  with  this  additional 
perception  annexed  to  them  that  it  has  had  them  be- 
fore." Locke  evidently  entertains  the  view  that  sensa- 
tions can  be  revived  as  original  sensory  experience  and 
that  the  revived  ideas  do  not  differ,  except  for  the  addi- 
tion of  pastness,  from  the  original  Ideas  derived  from 
the  great  source  of  sensation. 

When  we  pass  to  Hartley  and  Hume  the  identifica- 
tion of  sensation  and  idea  is  set  forth  with  great  ex- 
plicitness.    In  fact,  it  is   taken  as  the  fundamental  prin- 


Theories  of  Perception  1 25 

ciple  of  their  psychological  systems.  Thus  Hartley 
postulates  in  his  eighth  proposition  that  "Sensations  by 
being  often  repeated  leave  certain  vestiges,  types  or 
images  of  themselves  which  may  be  called  simple  ideas 
of  sensation,"  and  correspondingly  we  have  "sen- 
sory vibrations,  by  being  often  repeated,  beget  in  the  me- 
dullary substance  of  the  brain  a  disposition  to  diminu- 
tive vibrations  which  may  be  called  vibratiuncles  and 
miniatures  corresponding  to  themselves  respectively." 
The  vibratiuncle  is  the  physical  substratum  of  what  we 
experience  as  an  idea,  and  is  a  copy  of  the  original 
vibration.  The  vibratiuncle  is  a  weakened  vibration, 
and  the  idea  is  a  weakened  sensation. 

Hume  does  not  burden  himself  with  Hartley's  vibra- 
tions and  vibratiuncles,  but  still  at  the  basis  of  his  sys- 
tem we  find  the  same  fallacious  psychological  principle. 
"All  our  ideas"  he  says  "are  copies  of  our  lively  percep- 
tions or  impressions."  In  other  words,  our  sensations 
are  lively  impressions,  while  the  ideas  are  only  weakened 
perceptions, — the  idea  differs  from  the  sensation  only 
in  intensity.  There  is  no  qualitative  difference  between 
sensation  and  idea.  Ideas  belong  to  sensory  processes 
and  do  not  differ  as  such  from  sensations.  This  view 
has  since  become  the  heritage  of  current  psychological 
theories. 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  STRUCTURE  AND  FUNCTION  Ot  THE  PERCEPT 

AS  in  many  other  sciences,  especially  the  ones 
of  the  purely  mental  variety,  a  good  deal  in 
psychology  is  traditional  such  for  instance 
are  the  tripartite  and  bipartite  division  of  the 
mind  or  the  various  classifications  of  the  mental  activi- 
ties. Of  course,  classifications  as  well  as  theories  have 
their  important  function  in  science,  but  they  should  not 
be  permitted  to  become  a  bed  of  Procrustes  to  the 
guests  whom  they  shelter. 

It  may  sometimes  be  well  to  disregard  established 
principles,  classifications  and  time-honored  traditions 
and  study  the  facts  from  a  somewhat  different  stand- 
point. We  may  then  possibly  see  the  facts  in  a  new 
light  and  realize  aspects  and  connections  which  arc  hid- 
den from  the  customary  view  of  the  phenomena. 

Suppose  we  take  a  mental  cross-section  of  a  moment 
of  perceptual  consciousness  in  the  very  act  of  formation 
of  a  percept.  The  whole  perceptual  moment  may  be 
said  to  be  spread  out  before  our  mental  gaze.  We  find 
sensory  elements  of  a  relatively  intense  character.  Cer- 
tain sensory  elements  stand  out  first  and  foremost  in 
consciousness,  they  are  the  very  first  to  arrest  the  mental 
gaze  and  keep  it  steadily  fixed  on  themselves.  In  the 
same  view,  however,  we  can  also  discern  other  elements, 
not  so  prominent,  though  equally  sensory  which,  on  ac- 
count of  their  lack  of  prominence,  appear  to  be  of  a 
subordinate  character.     The  whole  tone  of  the  percept 

126 


The  Structure  and  Function  of  the  Percept     127 

is  given  by  the  qualitative  aspect  of  the  prominent  ele- 
ments which  seem  to  guide  and  form  the  organization 
of  the  percept. 

The  general  plan  of  the  structure  of  the  percept  may 
be  compared  to  that  of  the  cell.  A  close  examination  of 
the  cell  reveals  the  presence  of  a  central  element,  of  a 
nucleus  surrounded  by  cytoplasm  with  its  meshwork,  the 
cyto-reticulum.  The  nucleus  forms  the  central  and  im- 
portant structure  having  the  functions  of  assimilation 
and  reproduction.  The  nucleus  and  cytoplasm,  how- 
ever, are  intimately  related;  the  modification  of  one 
affects  the  other.  Both  nuclear  and  cytoplasmic  struc- 
tures form  one  organized  whole,  one  living  cell.  Sim- 
ilarly in  the  percept  we  find  a  group  of  sensory  elements 
which  constitute  the  nucleus,  and  a  mass  of  other  sensory 
elements,  possibly  the  main  mass,  forming  the  tissue 
of  the  percept.  The  nuclear  elements  are  more  intense 
and  appear  to  be  predominant  in  the  total  mental  state, 
— both  however  are  intimately  connected  and  go  to 
form  the  living  tissue  of  the  percept. 

The  nuclear  elements  of  the  percept  have  the 
lead  and  seem  to  possess  the  organizing,  the  fer- 
menting power  to  assimilate  the  mass  of  subordin- 
ate elements  and  have  them  transformed  into  one 
unified  organic  whole.  The  slightest  modification 
in  the  structure  and  function  of  the  nuclear  ele- 
ments brings  about  a  change  in  the  total  cytoplasmic 
mass  of  the  percept,  giving  rise  to  a  different  structure, 
to  a  different  percept;  and  again,  modifications  of  the 
cytoplasmic  mass,  so  to  say,  affect  the  formation  of  the 
nuclear  elements  often  resulting  in  a  different  percept. 
It  requires  however  quite  a  considerable  change  in  the 
subordinate  elements  to  bring  about  a  change  in  the  per- 


128  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

cept;  while  the  slightest  modification  of  the  nuclear 
elements,  whether  in  quality  or  intensity,  often  brings 
about  a  fundamental  transformation  of  the  percept. 
The  nuclear  elements  may  be  regarded  as  the  sen- 
sitive, as  the  vital  point  of  the  perceptual  system.  We 
cannot  displace  nor  can  we  modify  the  nucleus  of  the 
percept  without  profoundly  modifying  or  even  com- 
pletely destroying  the  life  existence  of  the  percept. 

We  may  point  out  here  an  important  aspect  of  the 
percept,  an  aspect  which  has  been  neglected  by  the 
older  psychologists,  but  which  is  now  being  more  and 
more  emphasized  by  the  younger  psychologists  who  lay 
more  stress  on  the  functional  and  biological  side  of 
mental  life.  Like  the  life  of  all  organized  beings,  the 
life  existence  of  the  psychic  state  is  for  some  reaction, 
for  some  adjustments  to  the  conditions  of  the  external 
environment.  In  the  struggle  for  existence  the  animal 
organism  must  on  pain  of  death  be  adjusted  to  the  ob- 
jects of  its  external  world.  Now  the  central,  nuclear, 
sensory  elements  awakened  by  external  excitations  give 
the  cue  for  the  reaction ;  they  form  the  sensitive  organ- 
ization for  the  release  of  motor  energy  in  definite  direc- 
tions; they  signify  a  definite  object  to  which  correspond 
definite  motor  tendencies  with  final  reactions  of  adjust- 
ment. To  the  mouse  the  cat  is  not  an  object  of  contem- 
plation or  an  object  of  observation,  on  account  of  its 
sensory  effects, — the  cat  is  an  object  to  run  away  from. 
To  the  dog  a  cat  is  not  an  object  of  beauty,  but  some- 
thing to  be  run  after.  The  sensory  stimulations  coming 
from  the  'that,'  which  is  mouse,  is  for  the  cat  something 
to  be  on  the  alert,  to  jump  after  and  to  attack. 

The  lower  we  descend  in  the  scale  of  animal  life,  the 
more  prominent  do  the  motor  reactions  become.  Where 


The  Structure  and  Function  of  the  Percept     129 

life  is  predominantly  of  the  instinctive  type,  the  motor 
side  of  consciousness  is  more  apparent.  The  fly  at- 
tracted by  the  scent  to  deposit  its  eggs  in  decomposed 
meat;  the  wasp  that  strikes  the  caterpillar  in  definite 
places  paralyzing  its  nervous  system,  thus  preparing 
food  for  the  coming  larva ;  the  newborn  infant  starting 
to  suck,  when  put  to  the  breast — are  good  examples  of 
motor  reactions  in  response  to  sensory  stimulations  com- 
ing from  external  objects.  A  definite  sensory  stimulus 
is  the  trigger  which  releases  a  definite  set  of  motor 
reactions.  The  fly,  the  bee  is  hardly  conscious  of  the 
sensory  characters  of  the  honey;  it  is  more  likely  that 
the  sensory  stimulations  of  the  honey  release  the  ap- 
propriate reaction  of  flying  towards  it. 

The  bright  colors  of  flowers  developed  in  the  course 
of  natural  selection  for  the  fertilization  of  plants  serve 
the  same  purpose;  they  awaken  definite  responses  use- 
ful both  to  plant  and  insect,  as  it  is  hardly  probable  that 
the  insects  are  primarily  attracted  by  the  beautiful  color- 
ing of  the  flowers.  The  visual  stimuli  awakening  defi- 
nite sensory  elements  may  be  regarded  as  central  and 
nuclear  which  in  turn  serve  as  a  highly  sensitive  trigger 
to  release  definite  systems  of  motor  reactions.  The  effect 
is  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  the  moth  attracted  by  the 
flame, — the  flame  acts  as  a  peripheral  stimulus  giving 
rise  to  sensory  elements  which  form  the  sensitive  trigger 
in  the  release  of  the  reaction  of  circling  around  the 
flame,  in  spite  of  the  harmful  results.  The  moth  reacts 
to  bright  objects  in  going  towards  them,  but  this  partic- 
ular bright  object,  the  flame,  has  not  been  provided  for 
in  the  motor  adjustments  of  the  moth,  hence  the  lack  of 
adaptation,  the  going  to  the  danger,  instead  of  flying 
from  it. 


130  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

So  apparently  Insignificant  is  the  sensory  side  and  so 
predominant  is  the  motor  side  with  its  almost  mechan- 
ically fatal  reactions,  that  some  physiologists  put  the 
whole  mechanism  of  excitation  and  reaction  in  the  lower 
animals  under  the  category  of  tropisms,  which  may  be 
positive  or  negative,  according  as  the  animal  goes  to  or 
from  the  particular  stimulus.  The  sensory  side  is  de- 
nied, the  whole  affair  is  regarded  as  a  delicate  chemical 
reaction,  such  as  the  chemotaxis  of  leucocytes  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  phagocytosis  observed  in  inflammations  and 
bacterial  invasions,  or  what  is  still  simpler  as  the  phe- 
nomena of  heliotropism  observed  in  the  case  of  plants. 
This  purely  mechanical  or  chemico-physiological  view 
may  be  crude  and  far  fetched  in  the  case  of  lower  ani- 
mals, but  it  brings  out  strongly  the  predominance  of  the 
motor  reaction  in  response  to  definite  sensory  excitations. 

The  motor  attitude  of  the  animal  towards  the  excita- 
tions of  the  external  environment  constitutes  the  pre- 
dominant part  of  its  objective  world.  The  reactions 
with  their  sensori-motor  effects  are  part  and  parcel  of 
the  total  percept.  Sensori-motor  life  gives  reality  to  the 
world  of  objects.  The  spatial,  the  resistant,  the  ma- 
terial character  of  objects  depends  on  our  motor  reac- 
tions which  give  content  and  reality  to  the  world  of 
things.  Activity  gives  the  sense  of  'physical'  reality, 
the  sense  of  material  actuality,  or  of  what  is  regarded 
as  'the  really  real.'  In  other  words,  sensori-motor  re- 
actions with  consequent  kinaesthetic  sensations  may  be 
regarded  as  constituting  the  very  essence  of  the  real, 
external,  material  world, — the  world  of  external,  mate- 
rial objects. 

The  percept  as  we  have  pointed  out  forms  one  or- 
ganic whole,  the  constituent  elements  are  firmly  inte- 


The  Structure  and  Function  of  the  Percept     131 

grated  into  one  living  organization.  In  other  words, 
just  as  the  organism  is  not  simply  an  integrated  com- 
pound of  cells,  tissues  and  organs,  but  all  those  lower 
units  go  to  form  the  higher  living  unit,  the  life  of  the 
organism  as  a  whole,  so  we  may  say  that  the  sensory 
elements  are  not  the  same  as  the  percept,  they  are  ana- 
tomically found,  on  the  autopsy  of  the  percept, — the  sen- 
sory elements  are  the  lower  units  that  help  to  form  the 
higher  unit,  the  living  percept.  From  a  scientific  stand- 
point, as  the  result  of  psychological  dissection,  the  sen- 
sory elements  going  to  make  up  the  psychic  compound, 
the  percept,  may  be  regarded  as  different  from  the  total 
synthesis  with  its  characteristic  living  activity  and  its 
peculiar  form  of  perceptual  consciousness. 

The  constituent  elements  of  the  percept  are  not  of 
the  same  definiteness  and  intensity.  The  central  nuclear 
elements  stand  out  more  distinct,  more  definite,  and  con- 
sciousness lights  them  up  with  more  power  and  inten- 
sity. They  are  like  the  mountain  peaks — when  glade 
and  valley  and  mountain  side  are  still  immersed  in  dark- 
ness, the  rising  sun  greets  the  mountain  tops  and  plays 
and  caresses  them  with  its  rays;  when  again  the  shades 
of  evening  begin  to  flit  and  gather  over  vale,  ravine,  and 
gulch,  the  rays  of  the  setting  sun  long  linger  on  the 
peaks  taking  of  them  their  last  farewell.  The  central 
nuclear  elements  are  in  the  focus  of  consciousness, — 
they  are  the  first  to  be  met  by  the  glance  of  the  mental 
eye  and  are  the  very  last  to  be  left  by  it.  Consciousness 
plays  with  its  searchlight  on  the  nuclear  sensory  ele- 
ments. The  central  nuclear  elements  are  intense,  dis- 
tinct, and  definite,  while  the  subordinate  elements  are 
of  far  less  intensity,  are  often  quite  indistinct,  arc,  so 
to  say,  on  the  fringe  of  consciousness;  in  f?ict,  may  even 


132  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

be  entirely  subconscious.  And  still  indefinite,  indistinct, 
and  submerged  as  those  subordinate  elements  are,  they 
form  the  main  content  of  the  percept,  giving  it  the 
fullness  of  reality. 

The  nuclear  elements  form  the  cue  of  the  total  re- 
action, thus  standing  for  the  particular  object,  forming 
the  reality  of  the  percept  for  the  organism.  No  won- 
der then  that  the  cue,  though  it  may  be  the  smallest  por- 
tion of  the  percept,  none  the  less  forms  for  the  organ- 
ism the  most  vital,  the  most  significant  as  well  as  the 
most  constant  part  of  the  percept.  The  attitude,  the 
total  reaction  of  the  organism  depends  on  the  slightest 
difference  in  the  cue,  on  the  slightest  change  of  the 
nuclear  elements,  since  the  apparently  slight  modifica- 
tion may  often  prove  of  great  significance  to  the  life 
existence  of  the  organism, — it  may  be  a  matter  of  life 
and  death.  The  nuclear  elements  constitute  the  signal, 
the  sensitive  trigger  for  the  release  of  definite  reactions 
towards  the  changes  of  external  objects.  Hence  the 
nuclear  elements  come  to  signify,  in  fact,  to  constitute 
the  essence  of  the  percept. 

A  change  of  the  subordinate  elements  of  the  percept 
does  not  matter  so  much  as  the  slightest  modification  in 
the  quality  or  even  in  the  intensity  of  the  signal.  This, 
of  course,  does  not  mean  that  the  subordinate  sensory 
elements  are  not  psychologically  and  biologically  of  the 
utmost  consequence  to  the  organism,  but  they  are  not  of 
that  immediate  importance  as  the  focal,  nuclear  ele- 
ments appear  to  the  consciousness  of  the  organism.  The 
nuclear  elements,  as  signal,  focus  the  interest  of  the  ani- 
mal. We  can  well  realize  their  vital  importance,  if  we 
consider  that  the  nuclear  elements  are  the  flag  which  in- 
dicates friend  or  enemy,  war  or  peace,  life  or  death. 


The  Structure  and  Function  of  the  Percept     133 

If  we  regard  the  percept  statically,  we  may  describe 
it  figuratively  as  a  psychic  compound,  the  union  of  the 
elements  having  somewhat  the  character  of  a  chemical 
combination.  A  new  compound  is  formed  possessing 
qualities  of  its  own,  different  from  those  of  the  con- 
stituent elements.  The  sensory  characteristics  are  pro- 
foundly modified  in  the  synthesis,  so  much  so  that  they 
cannot  be  directly  discerned  and  can  only  be  discovered 
by  patient  study.  The  elements  do  not  exist  freely, 
they  are  bound  up  in  one  indissoluble  union  of  the  per- 
cept. It  seems,  as  if  different  qualitative  states  arise  in 
the  union,  the  qualities  of  the  elements  appearing,  as  if 
transformed  by  the  effected  synthesis. 

The  percept  forms  a  new  compound  in  which  the 
component  elements  are  disguised  and  transformed  by 
the  qualitative  aspect  of  the  central  elements.  The 
subordinate  elements  become  adapted  to  the  active 
nucleus,  and  come  out  in  the  compound  with  sensory 
characteristics  foreign  to  their  nature.  In  the  process 
of  synthesis  the  subordinate  elements  become  trans- 
muted and  assume  the  sensory  characteristics  of  the 
nucleus.  To  isolate  the  various  elements  out  of  the 
synthetized  percept,  the  central  elements  must  be  shift- 
ed, — the  subordinate  elements  must  be  made  focal,  giv- 
ing rise  to  new  percepts,  but  at  the  same  time  making  it 
possible  to  pass  in  review  the  various  elements.  In 
other  words,  the  elements  become  revealed  in  propor- 
tion as  we  make  of  them  signals,  in  proportion  as  they 
become  significant  of  the  total  percept  with  its  sensori- 
motor reactions. 

The  nuclear  elements  are  the  most  pronounced,  the 
most  prominent,  as  far  as  saturation  of  sensory  quality 
is  concerned.     They  have  so  much  of  their  peculiar 


1 34  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sensory  quality  that  they  diffuse  It  Into  the  other  ele- 
ments,— the  subordinate  elements  appear  under  the 
sensory  form  of  the  nucleus;  they  become  assimilated 
by  the  nucleus,  and  are  saturated  with  its  sensory  color- 
ing. This  holds  true  not  only  In  regard  to  saturation, 
but  also  in  regard  to  sensory  brightness.  The  central 
elements  possess  a  sensory  brightness  far  in  excess  of 
other  elements,'  and  hence  they  shed  their  sensory  light 
on  the  more  obscure,  though  no  less  important  sensory 
elements.  What  however  they  Illumine  is  not  so  much 
the  peculiar  sensory  characteristics  of  those  elements, 
but  their  own  coloring  with  which  they  have  saturated 
the  total  percept. 

The  force  of  the  central  elements  lies  specially  In  the 
emotional  or  affective  tone  with  which  they  are  pervad- 
ed. They  arouse  an  attitude  towards  the  external  world 
In  general  and  to  the  special  object  In  particular;  Talne 
would  call  it  a  tendency.  The  Individual  Is  stimulated 
by  those  nuclear  elements;  his  whole  attention  is  going 
out  in  direction  to  the  object  that  has  excited  them. 
The  whole  organism  is  invaded  by  the  subtle  Influence  of 
the  nucleus  giving  rise  to  definite  scnsorl-motor  reac- 
tions, intensifying  the  affective  state  which  permeates 
the  perceptual  consciousness. 

The  affective  state  of  the  percept  Is  not  always 
obvious  in  cases  of  fleeting  percepts,  but  it  becomes 
manifest,  when  the  central  elements  become  temporarily 
fixed,  the  stress  and  strain  of  consciousness  tending  In 
one  direction.  The  very  changes  occurring  In  the  flicker- 
ing intensity  of  the  nuclear  elements  tend  to  sharpen  the 
situation,  to  enliven  the  Interest,  strain  the  attention,  and 
be  all  agog  so  to  say.  The  cat  getting  a  glimpse  of  a 
mouse,  or  the  dog  catching  sight  of  the  cat  may  be  taken 


The  Structure  and  Function  of  the  Percept     135 

as  good  illustrations  of  the  affective  states  present  in 
perceptual  consciousness.  The  nuclear  elements  are  the 
ones  that  are  specially  charged  with  affective  or  emo- 
tional states. 

Biologically  regarded,  we  can  well  see  the  Importance 
of  the  central  nuclear  elements,  the  necessity  of  their 
standing  out  In  consciousness  as  more  prominent  and 
more  Intense  than  the  rest  of  the  sensory  elements.  Con- 
stituting the  signal,  they  come  to  be  the  most  significant 
part  of  the  percept,  for  they  announce  what  'that'  Is, 
they  present  the  object,  friend  or  foe,  something  to  wel- 
come or  something  to  flee  from.  The  central  nuclear  ele- 
ments thus  come  to  present  objective  reality,  they  safe- 
guard the  individual,  they  are  the  safety  as  well  as  the 
danger  signal.  The  more  delicately  differentiated  those 
safety-danger  signals  are,  the  more  protected  the  indi- 
vidual Is  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  The  more  sen- 
sitive the  individual  becomes  to  the  least  difference  of 
the  nuclear  elements,  the  better  adjusted  will  he  be  to 
the  conditions  of  the  external  environment,  and  the  bet- 
ter will  be  his  chances  In  the  process  of  survival  of  the 
fittest. 

This  brings  us  to  the  purposiveness  of  the  percept. 
One  of  the  important  characteristics  of  the  biological 
process  is  the  final  cause,  the  purpose  formed  by  natural 
selection  out  of  chance  variations,  and  leading  to  the 
preservation  of  that  process,  to  the  preservation  of  the 
individual.  We  should  therefore  expect  that  In  the 
psychic  process  which  Is  the  most  highly  developed  bio- 
logical process,  purposiveness,  formed  out  of  psychic 
chance  variations,  will  be  one  of  the  most  important 
traits.  In  the  course  of  phylogenetic  and  ontogenetic 
evolution  some  sensory  elements,  the  ones  to  which 


136  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  organism  is  more  sensitive,  will  be  selected  and 
become  the  indicators  of  the  total  percept,  they  will 
become  the  index,  or  better  to  say  the  pain-pleasure  flag, 
the  safety-danger  signal.  The  central  elements  will 
thus  be  the  most  prominent,  the  most  intense  for  that 
particular  state  of  perceptual  consciousness.  The  na- 
ture and  character  of  the  elements  will  vary  with  the 
organization  of  the  species  and  the  individual.  The 
dog  will  become  more  sensitive  to  variations  of  his  ol- 
factory sensations,  while  man  will  show  marked  sensi- 
tivity towards  delicate  differences  of  his  visual  sensory 
elements. 

The  great  sensitivity  of  the  nuclear  elements  is  sig- 
nificant, in  so  far  as  they  lead  to  better  adaptation  and  to 
more  successful  reactions.  It  is  not  of  any  consequence 
for  the  cow  to  gaze  at  the  stars,  for  the  pig  to  observe 
the  phases  of  the  moon,  but  it  is  a  matter  of  importance 
for  them  to  perceive  any  signs  of  food,  or  the  approach 
of  a  beast  of  prey.  The  heavenly  bodies  are  non-exis- 
tent for  the  brutes,  because  of  lack  of  all  reactions  of 
adaptation,  while  food  and  predatory  beasts  are  easily 
detected,  because  of  the  vital  reactions  bound  up  in 
the  elements  of  the  percept  of  which  the  nuclear  ele- 
ments form  the  signal.  It  is  on  account  of  the  vital 
reactions  that  the  perceptual  nucleus  plays  such  a  prom- 
inent part  and  takes  the  lead  of  all  the  other  elements. 
As  I  have  pointed  out  in  a  former  work:  "The 
psychic  state  is  for  some  reaction  and  that  sensory  ele- 
ment which  gives  the  cue  for  the  formation  of  the  psy- 
chomotor elements,  leading  to  some  given  reaction  is, 
for  the  time  being,  the  center,  the  nucleus  of  the  total 
state." 


CHAPTER  XXI 

PRIMARY  AND   SECONDARY   SENSORY   ELEMENTS 

IF  we  inspect  the  percept  more  closely,  we  find  that 
there  is  some  important  difference  in  the  character 
of  the  various  constituent  sensory  elements.  The 
central  elements  forming  the  nucleus  of  the  per- 
cept are  given  directly  by  the  sense-organ  stimulated 
by  its  appropriate  sensory  stimuli,  while  the  subordinate 
sensory  elements  are  given  indirectly, — they  cannot  be 
traced  to  appropriate  sensory  stimuli  exciting  those  par- 
ticular sense-organs  on  the  activity  of  which  those  sub- 
ordinate elements  depend  for  their  manifestation.  In 
perceiving  the  lump  of  ice  I  can  see  the  color,  the  size, 
the  volume,  the  smoothness,  the  transparency,  the  dis- 
tance, and  even  the  weight  and  coldness.  Now  what 
I  can  see  directly  is  only  the  color,  transparency,  size, 
as  given  immediately  by  the  stimulated  sense-organ,  by 
the  visual  sensations  and  image  on  the  retina.  Whence 
then  come  the  rest  of  the  sensory  elements  so  distinctly 
experienced?  They  are  not  memory  elements, — they 
have  the  same  sensory  characters  as  the  elements  given 
by  the  direct  impression  of  the  sense-organs.  It  is  not 
that  on  perceiving  a  certain  transparent  object  we  re- 
member its  volume,  its  distance,  its  smoothness,  its  re- 
sistance, we  perceive  all  that  in  sensory  terms.  They 
are  not  images,  ideas,  or  representations — they  are  sen- 
sations. The  central  sensory  elements  may  be  termed 
direct  or  primary,  while  the  subordinate  elements  may 
be  termed  indirect  or  secondary.    The  percept  then  may 


138  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

be  regarded  as  consisting  of  two  classes  of  elements  of 
sensations,  the  primary  and  secondary  sensory  ele- 
ments.* 

The  secondary  sensory  elements  are  not  images,  nor 
ideas,  nor  representations,  different  terms  employed  for 
the  same  state  by  various  writers,  the  secondary  ele- 
ments of  the  percept  are  essentially  sensations.  Now 
sensations  are  qualitatively  different  from  images,  ideas 
or  representations.  The  image  of  a  light  does  not 
shine,  the  idea  of  a  voice  does  not  sound,  and  the  rep- 
resentation of  a  perfume  does  not  smell.  A  sensation, 
or  presentation  as  it  is  sometimes  termed,  differs  from 
an  image  or  representation  qualitatively,  fundamentally. 
The  sensation  or  presentation  is  given  as  immediate  ex- 
perience, while  the  image,  the  representation  is  essen- 
tially mediate,  it  is  a  mental  substitute  for  the  immedi- 
ate experience  of  the  sensation.  The  idea  or  image 
bears  the  same  relation  to  the  sensation  as  a  photograph 
bears  to  the  original,  or  rather  as  a  symbol  to  the  thing 
it  represents.  Ideas,  images,  representations  substitute, 
represent  sensations,  but  they  are  not  sensations.  A 
sensory  process  is  fundamentally  different.  A  sensation 
is  not  an  intense  idea,  nor  is  an  idea  a  weak  sensation. 
Ideas  differ  far  more  qualitatively  from  sensations  than 
visual  sensations,  for  instance,  differ  from  olfactory  sen- 
sations. There  is  not  a  particle  of  evidence  to  sub- 
stantiate the  view  that  ideas  or  images  are  copies  of  sen- 
sations in  the  sense  of  being  weak  sensations  or  'centrally 
excited  sensations.'  There  is  nothing  of  the  sensory  in  the 


*It  may  be  well  here  to  point  out  that  the  doctrine  of  primary 
and  secondary  sensory  elements  advanced  by  me  has  nothing  in 
common  with  the  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of  the  older 
psychologists, 


Primary  and  Secondary  Sensory  Elements       139 

idea.  The  weakest  sensation  cannot  compare  with  the 
most  vivid  representation. 

The  laboratory  experiments  on  that  subject 
(Miinsterberg  and  Kiilpe)  are  inconclusive  as  they 
either  deal  with  incompletely  perceived  impressions, 
or  with  minimal  sensations.  In  either  case  the  per- 
cept is  incomplete  and  uncertain.  Kiilpe  himself  is 
forced  to  admit  that  ideas  or  'centrally  excited  sensa- 
tions' as  he  terms  them  "cannot  be  regarded  as  simple 
revivals  of  peripherally  excited  contents,  if  only  for  the 
reason,  that  their  remaining  attributes  are  very  rarely 
indeed  identical  with  those  of  perception."  He  then 
goes  on  making  a  fatal  admission:  "The  most  striking 
evidence  of  disparity  is  perhaps  afforded  by  intensity. 

.  .  .  It  is  only  in  special  cases  that  centrally  ex- 
cited sensations  can  rise  from  their  accustomed  faint- 
ness  to  the  vividness  of  sense  perception.  We  then  speak 
of  them  as  hallucinations  (?) ;  and  they  enter  into  a 
disastrous  competition  with  the  real  material  of  per- 
ception, completely  transcending  the  boundary  line 
which  so  usefully  divides  it  from  the  material  of  imag- 
ination." Kiilpe  admits  that  there  is  no  intensity  to  the 
image,  that  there  is  no  variation  in  'intensity'  of  images, 
an  'attribute'  characteristic  of  percepts.  Psychologic- 
ally regarded,  this  in  itself  shows  the  qualitative  differ- 
ence between  image  and  percept. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Bergson  is  interested  in  psy- 
chology from  a  purely  metaphysical  standpoint,  he  nev- 
ertheless has  some  excellent  remarks  on  memory  and  on 
the  qualitative  difference  between  image  and  percept. 
Although  he  is  wrong  in  supposing  that  the  image  may 
be  prolonged  and  projected  into  perceptual  conscious- 
ness, he  none  the  less  emphasizes  strongly  the  qualita- 


140  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

tive  difference  of  the  two.  If  I  understand  him  aright 
he  is  opposed  to  the  view  of  identification  of  memory 
images  with  sensations.  A  memory  image  is  not  a  weak- 
ened sensation.  "The  absurdity"  says  Bergson  "be- 
comes patent  when  the  argument  is  inverted  (although 
this  ought  to  be  legitimate  on  the  hypothesis  adopted), 
that  is  to  say,  when  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  is  de- 
creased instead  of  the  intensity  of  the  pure  memory  be- 
ing increased.  For,  If  the  two  states  (memory-image 
and  sensation)  differ  merely  In  degree,  there  should  be  a 
given  moment  at  which  the  sensation  changed  into  a 
memory.  If  the  memory  of  an  acute  pain,  for  instance, 
is  but  a  weak  pain.  Inversely  an  intense  pain  which  I  feel 
will  end,  as  It  grows  less,  by  being  an  acute  pain  re- 
membered. .  .  .  Never  will  this  weak  state  ap- 
pear to  me  to  be  the  memory  of  a  strong  state.  Mem- 
ory is  something  quite  different." 

Ideational  and  perceptual  processes  cannot  be  identi- 
fied. The  two  are  qualitatively  different:  the  sensation 
has  intensity,  the  image  lacks  it.  We  may  point  out 
the  main  differences  of  sensation  and  image.  {a)  A 
sensation  has  Intensity,  an  Image  totally  lacks  it.  (b) 
An  image  is  a  reproduction  or  rather  a  representation, 
a  symbol  of  a  sensation,  but  no  sensation  represents 
another;  a  sensation,  unlike  an  image,  is  not  mediate, 
but  immediate  experience,  (c)  A  sensation  bears  the 
mark  of  externality,  an  image  lacks  it.  Finally  (d)  a 
sensation  cannot  be  called  up  at  will,  while  an  image 
is  Independent  of  peripheral  stimulations  of  external  ob- 
jects and  is  usually  under  the  control  of  the  will.  No 
sensation  differs  so  much  from  another  as  the  image  dif- 
fers from  its  corresponding  sensation. 

Sensory  elements  and  their  synthesis,  the  percept, 


Primary  and  Secondary  Sensory  Elements        141 

have  motor  tendencies,  while  the  image  or  idea  has  not 
any  motor  tendencies.  The  reason  why  every  image 
and  idea  has  been  made  ideo-motor  is  because  images  or 
representations  have  been  regarded  as  sensory  in  char- 
acter, as  weakened  sensations,  as  'sensationalettes'  so  to 
say.  Bergson  clearly  sees  the  qualitative  difference  of 
the  two;  he  insists  on  the  non-motor  character  of  the 
image  in  contradistinction  to  the  strongly  motor  char- 
acter of  the  sensation  and  the  percept.  Recently  Thorn- 
dike  laid  great  stress  on  the  psychological  fallacy  of 
regarding  images  and  ideas  as  motor  in  character.  This 
fallacy  is  essentially  due  to  the  current  identification  of 
presentative  and  representative  elements. 

To  refer  as  Kiilpe  does  to  a  hallucination  as  an  inten- 
sified image  is  to  reason  in  a  circle  and  at  the  same  time 
to  be  in  sad  contradiction  with  facts.  A  hallucination 
may  be  regarded  as  a  fallacious  percept,  but  it  is  not 
on  that  account  an  image;  a  hallucination  is  a  percept 
and  is  essentially  sensory  in  character.  The  fact  of  a  per- 
cept being  fallacious  does  not  in  the  least  imply  that  it 
is  'imaginary'  and  not  sensory. 

The  ambiguity  of  the  word  'imaginary'  has  not  a 
little  contributed  to  the  psychological  fallacy  helping 
towards  the  confusion  of  image  and  sensation.  'Imagin- 
ary' is  used  in  the  common  sense  meaning  not  corre- 
sponding to  any  external  reality,  or  in  the  psychological 
sense  of  consisting  of  those  internal  events  or  processes 
known  as  images  or  ideas.  Now  'imaginary'  used  in 
the  sense  of  lack  of  an  external  object  by  no  means  im- 
plies the  psychological  sense  of  consisting  of  images.  A 
hallucination  is  commonly  said  to  be  imaginary  in  the 
sense  of  not  having  an  objective  reality,  but  we  have  to 
prove  yet  that  it  consists  of  images. 


14^  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

The  theories  of  illusions,  hallucinations  as  well  as 
of  dream  states  and  hypnotic  hallucinations  are  viti- 
ated by  that  fundamental  psychological  fallacy.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  hallucinations  are  not  made  up 
of  images,  but  of  sensory  elements;  while  on  the 
contrary  hypnotic  hallucinations  are  not  made  up  of 
sensory  elements,  but  of  images.  Hallucinations  are  not 
due  to  'images'  but  to  actual  sensations.  Psycho- 
logically regarded,  hallucinations  do  not  differ  in  their 
make-up  from  ordinary  percepts.  Ideas  and  images  are 
not  possessed  of  magic  virtues,  and  with  all  the  fancy 
work  about  them,  they  cannot  display  sensory  quali- 
ties. The  image  or  idea  is  that  bloodless,  shadowy, 
fluttering  affair  which  can  no  more  attain  the  life  of  a 
sensation  than  a  written  letter  can  attain  the  power  of 
sound.  Had  it  been  otherwise  the  world  would  have 
been  a  large  asylum  for  images  to  play  their  pranks  in. 

We  may  quote  Stout  as  one  of  the  few  psychologists 
who  seem  not  to  accept  the  current  psychological  doc- 
trine. In  his  'Analytic  Psychology*  he  tells  us  'that 
complex  perception  does  not  consist  in  a  given  impres- 
sion reviving  a  cluster  of  faint  images  of  previous  im- 
pressions.' And  again  "impressional  revival  does  not 
in  the  least  countenance  the  theory  that  ideas  are  merely 
faint  revivals  of  impressions.  On  the  contrary,  it  tends 
strongly  in  the  opposite  direction.  It  shows  that  a 
revived  impression  is  itself  an  impression,  and  not  an 
idea."  In  his  'Manual  of  Psychology'  he  says  'that  at 
bottom  the  distinction  between  image  and  percept  is 
based  on  a  difference  of  quality.'  And  again,  "per- 
cepts and  images  possess  a  relative  independence.  This 
can  be  accounted  for,  if  we  suppose  that  the  nervous 
tracts  excited  in  perceptual  process  are  not  wholly  coin- 


Primary  and  Secondary  Sensory  Elements        143 

cident  with  those  excited  in  ideational  process." 

The  elements  of  the  percept  are  not  ideational,  not 
imaginary,  they  are  essentially  sensory.  The  perceptual 
elements  are  synthetized  into  one  percept.  To  take  our 
stock  example,  the  ice.  The  lump  of  ice  is  experienced 
as  one  object  with  many  qualities  each  of  which  fur- 
nishes respectively  its  sensory  quota  towards  the  forma- 
tion of  the  whole  of  the  perceptual  experience.  We  see, 
we  perceive  the  hard,  heavy,  smooth,  resistant  body  of 
ice, — all  the  elements  have  alike  the  intensity  of  sensa« 
tion.  The  hardness,  the  smoothness,  the  bodily  resist- 
ance are  perceived  by  the  visual  sense  and  are  visual, 
but  as  such  they,  of  course,  differ  from  the  sensations  ex- 
perienced by  their  appropriate  sense  organs,  as  when 
for  instance  the  same  sensations  are  given  by  touch  or 
by  muscular  and  kinesthetic  sensations.  Those  muscu- 
lar and  tacto-motor  sensations  appearing  as  visual  are 
not  memory-images,  but  they  are  actual  sensations,  they 
are  secondary  sensations;  they  are  secondary  sensory 
elements  which  give  the  fullness  of  content  to  the  perr 
cept,  having  visual  sensory  elements  as  its  nucleus.  Un- 
like memory-images,  secondary  perceptual  elements 
have  the  immediacy  of  sensory  experience.  Remem- 
bered sensory  qualities  are  not  immediate  experiences 
given  in  the  object  of  perception. 

If  we  turn  to  pathology,  we  find  that  cases  closely 
confirm  our  view.  In  certain  mental  diseases  the  pa- 
tient can  perceive  the  various  qualities,  although  he  can- 
not represent  them  to  himself.  In  other  cases  the  pa- 
tient can  clearly  and  vividly  represent  objects  in  all  their 
details,  but  he  cannot  perceive  the  objects,  when  direct- 
ly confronted  with  them.  Clinical  cases,  even  if  we 
exclude  all  facts  from  introspective  study,  clearly  point 


144  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

to  the  qualitative  difference  of  image  and  sensation, 
irrespective  of  the  assumption  of  localization — they 
may  be  due  to  the  function  of  different  brain  struc- 
tures, or  to  different  processes  of  the  same  brain  struc- 
tures. In  the  light  of  recent  research  it  is  more  likely 
that  the  neuron  structures  underlying  ideational  pro- 
cesses differ  from  those  subserving  sensory  processes. 
Whichever  view  however  we  entertain  in  regard  to  the 
anatomical  structures  all  the  facts  go  to  prove  that 
image  and  sensation  are  qualitatively  different  psychic 
events. 

The  percept  is  not  ideational,  but  sensory.  There 
are  no  memory-images  in  perceptual  consciousness,  al- 
though the  latter  may  be  closely  associated  with  idea- 
tional processes.  Such  ideas,  however,  arc  on  the  fringe 
of  the  perceptual  consciousness  and  do  not  constitute  the 
essence  of  the  percept.  The  percept  consists  of  sensory 
elements,  primary  and  secondary.  The  primary  ele- 
ments are  initiated  directly  by  incoming  peripheral  stim- 
ulations, while  the  secondary  sensory  elements  are 
brought  about  indirectly,  through  the  mediacy  of  the 
primary  elements,  the  secondary  elements  themselves 
being  really  derived  from  sense-organs  others  than  the 
ones  directly  stimulated  by  the  peripheral  excitation. 

If  the  percept  is  visual,  and  F  stands  for  the  visual 
physiological  processes,  A  for  the  auditory,  O  for  the 
olfactory,  M  muscular,  K  kinaesthetic,  T  for  tactual 
physiological  processes;  then  let  Ft,  Mi,  d,  K^, 
7*1  stand  for  the  primary  sensory  elements;  and  let 
F*,  0»,  M2,  K2,  T2  stand  for  the  secondary  sensory  ele- 
ments, then  the  total  percept  may  be  represented  by  the 
formula  FtO^^M^K^Ti.  Since  all  the  other  elements  ap- 
pear in  the  visual  percept  under  the  visual  aspect,  we 


Primary  and  Secondary  Sensory  Elements       145 
may  represent  the  percept  by  the  formula :    V^J^O*^ 

The  secondary  sensory  elements,  though  forming 
the  main  content  of  the  percept,  are  apparently  of 
a  visual  nature,  and  still  they  really  belong  to  qualita- 
tively different  realms  of  sensations.  This  clearly  re- 
veals their  origin  and  nature:  the  secondary  sensory 
elements  are  not  visual,  but  they  become  so  by  being 
initiated  through  the  visual  sense.  In  other  words,  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements  are  not  peripherally  initiated. 
Are  they  then  centrally  excited  sensations?  No.  They 
can  only  be  induced  by  an  external  stimulus.  But  that 
external  stimulus  must  act  indirectly,  through  another 
sense-organ. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

SECONDARY  SENSORY  ELEMENTS  AND  HALLUCINATORY 
PERCEPTION 

IN  Stimulating  a  sense-organ  we  not  only  get  sen- 
sory elements  characteristic  of  that  particular  sense, 
but  also  sensory  elements  belonging  to  other  sense- 
organs  which  have  not  been  stimulated.  What 
really  takes  place  is  this:  the  external  excitation  acting 
on  a  particular  sense-organ  produces  its  appropriate  sen- 
sations, but  the  peripheral  physiological  process  diffuses 
or  rather  to  say  gets  irradiated  along  other  neurons  of 
other  sense  structures,  awakening  their  appropriate  sen- 
sations. Such  sensations,  not  being  directly  but  indi- 
rectly peripherally  initiated  should  be  regarded  as  sec- 
ondary sensations. 

The  phenomena  of  secondary  sensations  are  well 
known  in  psychological  literature.  Some  psychologists 
following  the  general  fallacy  of  confusing  image  and 
sensation  describe  vivid  images  succeeding  sensations 
under  the  category  of  secondary  sensations.  Barring 
such  confusion  we  may  say  that  the  pure  phenomena  of 
secondary  sensations  are  essentially  sensory  in  character. 
When  a  sensation  due  to  the  stimulation  of  a  periph- 
eral sense-organ,  instead  of  being  followed  by  a  train 
of  association  of  ideas  is  followed  by  another  sensa- 
tion belonging  to  the  domain  of  another  sense-organ, 
the  phenomenon  is  known  as  that  of  synaesthesia  or  of 
secondary  sensations. 

One  image  or  representation  relating  to  a  sensation 

146 


Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Perception    147 

of  one  sense-organ  may  be  associated  and  bring  in  its 
train  of  associations  any  other  image  relating  to  any 
other  sensation  of  any  other  sense-organ.  The  series 
of  ideas  or  images  is  a  reproduction  of  stimulated 
sense-organs  with  their  accompanying  sensations,  the 
ideas  running  parallel  to  the  original  psycho-physiolog- 
ical processes,  somewhat  on  the  Spinozistic  principle 
of  *Ordo  et  connexio  idearum  idem  est  ac  ordo  et  con- 
nexio  rerum.'  And  again  in  other  cases,  when  not  re- 
producing a  previous  series  of  sensory  experience,  the 
series  of  associated  images  may  be  more  irregular  and 
apparently  capricious — a  process  usually  described  as 
the  work  of  fancy,  or  imagination.  A  sensation  or 
image  then  may  be  followed  by  any  series  of  images 
without  the  intermediacy  of  external  excitations  and 
peripheral  physiological  processes.  A  sensation,  how- 
ever, cannot  be  followed  by  a  series  of  sensations  with- 
out the  intermediacy  of  external  stimulations.  A  sen- 
sation can  only  be  initiated  by  its  own  appropriate  stim- 
ulus and  by  its  own  specialized  peripheral  physiological 
processes.  The  smell  of  a  rose  does  not  by  simple  as- 
sociation give  rise  to  a  series  of  sensations  of  touring  in 
an  automobile,  nor  does  the  eating  of  beefsteak  give  rise, 
through  association,  to  the  hearing  of  a  symphony.  In 
other  words,  there  is  an  internal  association  of  images  or 
ideas,  hut  there  is  not  an  internal  association  of  sensa- 
tions. Images  once  born  can  be  reproduced  endlessly 
and  at  will,  sensations  die  almost  immediately  after  they 
are  born  and  must  be  renewed  every  time  under  the 
same  conditions  of  external  stimulations.  Briefly  stated, 
there  is  memory  for  images,  but  not  for  sensations.  Sen- 
sations are  independent,  images  are  interconnected. 
If  we  represent  sensations  by  A,  B,  C,  D  and  sym- 


148  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

bolize  images  by  a,  b,  c,  d,  the  A,  B,  C,  D  have  no 
relations  to  one  another,  but  each  one  bears  a  definite 
relation  to  each  corresponding  image,  A  to  a,  B  to  b,  C 
to  c,  D  to  d,  and  so  with  the  rest  of  the  series.  Sensa- 
tion A  will  arouse  image  a  which  in  turn  may  arouse 
the  whole  train  of  images,  b,  c,  d,  but  A  cannot  give  rise 
to  any  of  the  sensations  B,  C,  D.  The  image  series 
a,  b,  c,  d  can  be  reproduced  at  will,  in  fact  after  a  series 
of  repetition  the  whole  chain  of  links  may  rattle  off 
against  will,  but  nothing  of  the  kind  occurs  in  the  case 
of  sensations.  Sensations  do  not  form  links  in  a  chain 
which  becomes  automatic  after  many  reproductions. 
Repetition  of  sensations  does  not  form  associated  series; 
sensations  maintain  their  independence. 

The  difference  between  image  and  sensation  in  re- 
spect to  association  is,  psychologically  regarded,  appar- 
ently flawless.  Unfortunately  as  it  is  usually  the  case 
with  flawless  generalizations  and  descriptions  of  phe- 
nomena observed  under  normal  conditions,  there  is  an 
ungracious  'abnormal'  that  refuses  to  fall  into  line. 
There  are  cases  apparently  abnormal  from  the  psycho- 
logical standpoint,  cases  which  refuse  to  be  gathered 
into  the  normal  psychological  fold;  these  cases  seem  to 
run  counter  to  all  normal  psychological  introspection. 
The  sensations  seem  to  run  riot, — instead  of  being 
linked  with  their  respective  images  they  really  call  up 
associated  sensations ;  these  are  the  so-called  sound-phot- 
isms  or  light-phonisms,  and  similar  odd  combinations. 
It  is  true  the  sensations  are  rather  awkwardly  associ- 
ated. One  sensation  always  calls  forth  only  a  particu- 
lar sensation  and  no  other  one,  and  besides  the  called 
forth  sensation  does  not  belong  qualitatively  to  the  same 
domain  with  the  one  that  has  initiated  it.     It  is  also 


Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Perception    149 

true  that  the  sensations  show  their  lack  of  sociable  char- 
acter by  not  entering  into  any  association  with  any  other 
sensation,  and  that,  unlike  images,  no  associative  series 
can  possibly  be  formed.  Still  the  fact  remains  that  a 
sensation  can  and  does  call  forth  another  sensation.  Evi- 
dently sensations  can  enter  into  associative  bonds. 

Such  psychic  states  appear  uncanny  and  are  regarded 
as  abnormal.  The  phenomena  are  regarded  as  freaks 
belonging  to  the  domain  of  pathology.  Now  curiously 
enough  our  study  reveals  the  fact  that  what  has  been  re- 
garded as  the  pathological  and  exceptional  turns  out  to 
be  the  ordinary  and  the  normal.  The  stone  which  the 
builders  neglected  has  become  the  comer  stone.  The 
exception  has  turned  out  to  be  the  rule.  Far  from  be- 
ing the  case  that  secondary  sensations  are  rare  and  ab- 
normal, they  are  quite  common,  since  they  constitute 
the  very  flesh  and  blood  of  the  percept.  Secondary  sen- 
sations constitute  the  texture  of  the  percept.  The  rea- 
son why  they  appear  so  strange  is  just  because  they  are 
so  common  and  so  familiar. 

The  secondary  sensation,  when  appearing  alone  out 
of  its  perceptual  complex,  cannot  be  recognized  as  the 
old  familiar  attendant  belonging  to  the  indissoluble 
retinue  of  the  humdrum  percept.  Dissociated  from  its 
perceptual  sphere  the  secondary  sensation  appears 
ghostly,  hallucinatory.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  second- 
ary sensation,  hallucinatory  and  spooky  as  its  manifesta- 
tions are,  constitutes  part  and  parcel  of  perceptual  ex- 
perience. In  fact,  the  main  content  of  the  percept  con- 
sists of  hallucinatory  secondary  sensations.  Percepts  and 
hallucinations  are  of  the  same  grain.  A  percept  is  a 
hallucination  with  the  primary  nuclear  sensory  elements 
present,  a  hallucination  is  a  'real'  percept  with  the  pri- 


150  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

mary  sensory  elements  absent. 

When  secondary  sensory  elements  become  dissociated 
from  the  perceptual  synthesis  with  the  primary  sensory 
elements,  the  elements,  thus  dissociated,  not  being  re- 
lated to  any  peripheral  physiological  process  of  their  ap- 
propriate sense-organ,  are  regarded  as  central  phe- 
nomena, as  secondary  sensations  which  are  described 
as  unusual,  abnormal  events  of  mental  life.  What, 
however,  is  abnormal  is  not  the  secondary  sensation 
per  se,  but  the  fact  of  its  dissociation.  A  secondary  sen- 
sory element  dissociated  from  its  perceptual  system  be- 
comes manifested  as  a  secondary  sensation. 

Secondary  sensations  are  free  secondary  sensory  ele- 
ments, dissociated  from  the  perceptual  aggregate  into 
the  synthetic  unity  of  which  they  enter  as  important 
components  forming  the  organic  whole  of  the  percept. 
When  appearing  isolated,  secondary  sensations  are  the 
simplest  form  of  hallucinations  which  become  more  and 
more  complex  as  the  secondary  sensory  elements,  dis- 
sociated from  the  primary  elements,  become  manifested 
in  complex  systems.  Hallucinations  are  systems  of  sec- 
ondary sensations  or  of  secondary  sensory  elements. 

Sensory  elements  are,  as  a  rule,  not  free,  they  usually 
appear  as  perceptual  compounds,  and  this  holds  specially 
true  of  secondary  sensory  elements.  When,  therefore, 
dissociated  from  their  perceptual  compounds,  they  ap- 
pear as  ghosts  of  the  'real'  percept,  as  hallucinations.  To 
quote  from  a  previous  work  of  mine:  "The  integra- 
tion of  the  groups  and  especially  of  the  secondary  pre- 
sentative  groups  is  not  of  that  unmodifiable  organic 
character.  Around  a  nucleus  formed  by  a  group,  or 
combinations  of  groups  of  primary  elements,  groups  of 
secondary  sensory  elements  become  aggregated,  and  the 


Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Perception    151 

total  aggregate  gives  rise  to  a  consolidated  and  unified 
system  of  groups,  resulting  in  a  percept.  In  perceiving 
the  chair  yonder  only  the  visual  sensations  constitute 
the  true  sensory  groups  that  form  the  nucleus  of  the 
percept.  The  other  psychic  groups  that  arc  crystallized 
round  the  percept,  such  as  weight,  resistance,  volume, 
size,  shape,  distance  are  really  visuo-tacto  motor  groups; 
they  are  largely  tacto-muscular  groups  tinged  by  the 
sensory  quality  of  the  nucleus;  they  are  tacto-motor 
groups  sensorlally  visualized,  seen  indirectly.  Though 
these  secondary  sensory  groups  are  firmly  integrated, 
still  their  integration  Is  not  of  such  a  character  as  not 
to  become  disintegrated  and  rearranged  into  new  sys- 
tems of  groups.  Such  a  disintegration  is  no  doubt 
effected  with  difficulty,  but  it  Is  by  no  means  im- 
possible. 

Perceptual  compounds,  unlike  sensory,  admit  of  de- 
composition into  elementary  primary  and  secondary 
sensory  groups.  The  component  elementary  sensory 
groups  can  be  experienced  separately  under  differ- 
ent conditions  and  circumstances.  We  can  close  our 
eyes  and  walk  up  to  the  object  of  perception,  say  the 
chair,  and  thus  experience  the  free  muscular  sensations 
of  distance,  or  we  may  push  our  hand  against  the  chair 
and  experience  the  sensation  of  resistance,  or  take  the 
chair  In  the  hand  and  experience  the  muscular  sensations 
of  weight  and  shape.  The  primary  and  secondary 
groups  going  to  make  up  the  percept  can  be  isolated  by 
withdrawing  the  organizing  nuclear  group  of  primary 
sensations,  thus  bringing  about  a  disintegration  of  the 
particular  aggregate. 

"If  we  Inspect  more  closely  this  process  of  isolation, 
we  find  that  the  constituent  secondary  sensory  groups 


152  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

are  not  really  isolated,  so  as  to  stand  out  all  by  them- 
selves. What  actually  happens  in  this  seeming  process 
of  isolation  is  simply  the  formation  of  a  series  of  new 
perceptual  aggregates  in  which  the  particular  sensory 
groups  that  are  isolated  and  specially  brought  out  be- 
come the  nuclei,  the  foci.  For  in  the  perceptual  aggre- 
gate it  is  always  the  character  of  the  nucleus  that  is 
specially  brought  out,  and  it  is  the  nuclear  aggregate 
that  tinges  with  its  sensory  color  all  the  other  aggre- 
gates. To  revert  to  our  previous  example,  to  the  per- 
cept chair.  In  passing  the  finger  over  the  chair,  the 
touch  may  form  the  nucleus  of  the  moment,  but  around 
this  primary  nuclear  sensory  group  other  secondary 
sensory  groups,  such  as  thermal  and  muscular  sensory 
elements  become  organized  to  form  the  synthesis  of  the 
perceptual  moment.  If  we  try  to  find  out  the  shape  of 
the  chair  by  a  series  of  touches,  we  really  form  a  series 
of  percepts,  the  sensory  nuclei  of  which  are  not  visual, 
but  tacto-muscular  in  their  nature.  A  sensory  group 
then  cannot  in  reality  appear  in  a  purely  isolated  form." 
In  other  words,  sensory  elements  appear  in  groups,* 
and  this  holds  specially  true  of  secondary  sensory  ele- 
ments or  of  secondary  sensations.  Secondary  sensations, 
though  present  in  every  percept,  rarely  appear  in  iso- 
lation. The  affinity  of  secondary  sensory  elements  to 
run  into  compounds  becoming  synthetized  with  primary 
elements  makes  it  difficult  to  observe  them,  except  in  the 
peculiar  phenomena  of  synaesthesia  and  in  the  abnormal 
states  of  hallucination. 


*James  lays  stress  on  this  fact  of  grouping  of  sensory  elements : 
"All  brain  processes  are  such  as  give  rise  to  what  we  may  call 
Figured  Consciousness.  If  parts  are  irradiated  at  all,  they  are 
Irradiated  in  consistent  systems  and  occasion  thoughts  of  definite 
objects,  not  mere  hodge-podge  of  elements." 


Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Perception    153 

If  secondary  sensations  are  simple  hallucinations, 
hallucinations  are  compound  secondary  sensations.  As 
we  have  pointed  out  a  close  examination  of  hallucina- 
tions shows  them  to  be  systems  of  secondary  sensations 
dissociated  from  their  primary  nuclear  elements.  In 
states  of  dissociation  a  peripheral  stimulation  with  its 
physiological  process  and  concomitant  primary  sensory 
elements  may  become  dissociated  from  systems  of  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements  which  alone  stand  out  In  con- 
sciousness as  hallucinations.  A  close  examination  re- 
veals the  presence  of  some  obscure  pathological  condi- 
tions which  by  irritation  and  by  irradiation  awaken  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements  giving  rise  to  full  fledged  hal- 
lucinations. 

In  the  cases  of  hallucinations  Investigated  by  me  I 
have  found  pathological  processes  which  gave  rise  to 
secondary  sensations  crystallized  Into  hallucinations. 
Thus  one  of  my  cases  suffered  from  auditory  halluci- 
nations. The  patient  heard  voices  telling  her  all  kinds 
of  disagreeable  things.  She  complained  that  the  voices 
came  not  through  the  ear,  but  through  a  spot  located 
over  the  Fallopian  tubes.  An  examination  of  the  ear 
showed  nothing  abnormal.  Physical  examination  re- 
vealed nothing  abnormal  in  any  of  the  other  sense  or- 
gans. The  Fallopian  tubes,  however,  were  very  tender 
and  painful  to  pressure.  The  patient  suffered  from 
an  old  chronic  salpingitis.  The  hallucinations,  which 
were  of  a  sexual  character,  became  more  severe  at  reg- 
ular intervals  coinciding  with  monthly  periodicities. 

One  case  of  mine  suffered  from  visual  hallucinations. 
He  saw  spirits,  ghosts  and  visions  of  saints.  When  he 
travelled  in  a  car,  he  could  see  little  men  with  benevo- 
lent faces,  and  for  some  religious  reason  he  regarded 


154  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

them  as  saints  who  came  to  his  help.  He  could  see 
them  splitting  the  rocks  and  disappearing  there,  or 
sometimes  the  rocks  split  open  and  the  saintly  little  men 
came  to  the  surface.  Occasionally  apparitions  of  the 
dead  visited  him.  The  visions  were  never  quiet,  but 
always  in  motion,  they  did  not  stay  long  and  rapidly 
disappeared,  giving  rise  to  new  visions.  An  examina- 
tion of  his  special  sense-organs  showed  nothing  abnor- 
mal. The  sense  of  touch,  pressure  and  kinaesthetic  sen- 
sibility manifested  peculiar  abnormalities.  The  skin  of 
the  body  was  very  sensitive  and  that  of  the  scalp  was 
extremely  tender  to  touch.  The  patient  could  not  bear 
any  pressure  of  the  scalp  and  was  mostly  bareheaded, 
though  he  was  very  sensitive  to  draughts  and  to  changes 
of  temperature.  Occasionally  he  experienced  a  sense 
of  formication  all  over  the  body,  especially  in  the  scalp 
and  in  the  region  of  the  neck,  the  muscles  of  which  were 
extremely  sensitive  to  pressure.  Now  when  the  head 
was  inclined  to  one  side  or  pressed  hard  or  kept  in  a 
tense  state  for  a  couple  of  minutes  at  a  stretch,  he  could 
see  spirits  floating  in  the  air,  he  could  see  the  little  men 
with  their  saintly  faces  coming  out  of  the  ground  and 
disappearing  into  it  again. 

One  case  of  functional  psychosis,  with  epileptoform 
attacks  presenting  phenomena  of  dissociated  states  with 
distinct  tendencies  toward  the  formation  of  multiple  per- 
sonality, suffered  a  good  deal  from  auditory  hallucina- 
tions. It  will  take  too  much  space  to  give  an  account  of 
the  details  of  the  different  seizures  and  of  the  various 
dissociated  states  manifested  by  the  patient.  For  our 
present  purpose  it  is  enough  to  refer  to  the  hallucina- 
tions. The  patient  complained  that  she  could  hear 
voices  talking  to  her,  her  mother  and  brothers  commu- 


Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Perception    155 

nicating  with  her  from  a  distance.  An  examination  of 
the  auditory  apparatus  proved  it  to  be  in  excellent  con- 
dition. In  this  case  the  phenomena  of  unconscious 
phonation  were  quite  well  developed,  the  patient  was 
observed  to  move  her  lips  and  whisper — the  whisper 
becoming  sometimes  quite  loud  so  that  many  words 
which  the  patient  referred  to  the  voices  of  the  mother 
and  brothers  were  really  uttered  by  the  patient.  An 
examination  of  the  eye  revealed  the  presence  of  an 
astigmatic  condition  and  a  limitation  of  the  field  of 
vision.  When  the  patient  was  made  to  count  or  to  read 
aloud  or  when  absorbed  in  a  conversation,  the  auditory 
hallucinations  ceased.  The  auditory  hallucinations  con- 
siderably diminished,  both  in  frequency  and  intensity, 
when  the  astigmatism  was  corrected  by  eye  glasses. 

Similarly  in  another  case  the  patient  suffered  from 
auditory  hallucinations.  Here  the  patient  was  observed 
talking  to  himself.  This  was  so  pronounced  that  now 
and  then  he  himself  became  conscious  of  the  fact  that 
he  was  talking  to  himself.  He  describes  this  experience 
of  automatic  talk  which  seems  to  be  uncontrollable  and 
of  which  he  is  often  unconscious  by  the  term  of  'auto- 
vocalization.'  In  this  case  the  patient  now  and  then 
can  catch  himself  telling  things  to  himself  which  he 
takes  for  the  voices  of  other  people  as  he  is  then  con- 
scious of  the  hearing,  but  not  of  the  utterance  of  the 
words  and  phrases.  This,  however,  is  not  always  the 
case;  in  fact  in  a  good  many  cases  where  unconscious 
phonation  is  present,  as,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  the 
patient  with  the  epileptiform  seizures  described  above, 
the  patient  is  entirely  unconscious  of  the  fact  of  'whis- 
pering.' When  attention  was  drawn  to  the  phenom- 
enon, the  whisper  and  the  hallucination  disappeared. 


156  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

Another  patient  of  mine  suffers  from  auditory  hal- 
lucinations. He  hears  people  abusing  him  and  calling 
him  names.  The  hallucinations  occur  when  he  is  awake, 
but  they  are  frequent  when  he  is  on  the  point  of  falling 
asleep,  or  when  he  wakes  up.  He  thinks,  in  fact  he  hears 
that  people  whisper  about  him.  The  voices  are  observed 
to  increase  in  frequency  and  intensity  with  the  presence 
of  external  noises,  such  as  noises  made  in  the  hall,  or 
sounds  made  by  cars  passing  by.  The  patient  was  ob- 
served having  subconscious  or  unconscious  move- 
ments of  lips,  tongue  and  even  of  the  jaws.  When  he 
hears  the  voices  the  subconscious  movements  increase  so 
that  they  may  be  perceived  at  a  distance.  Even  the 
nurse  could  not  help  perceiving  the  subconscious  whis- 
pering made  by  the  patient.  When  the  patient  looks 
through  a  printed  or  written  page  the  subconscious  whis- 
pering increases.  The  same  is  observed  when  the  patient 
is  very  much  interested  in  something  or  absorbed  in 
deep  thought.  During  such  times  he  complains  that  he 
hears  voices.  With  his  mouth  wide  open  and  holding 
his  tongue  stationary,  the  unconscious  whispering 
ceases  and  along  with  it  the  auditory  hallucinations  dis- 
appear. 

One  of  my  cases,  a  lady  of  about  sixty,  suffered  for 
about  fourteen  years  from  auditory  and  visual  hallu- 
cinations. She  complained  that  she  was  surrounded  by 
ghosts  of  departed  family  members  who  did  not  leave 
her  alone.  The  spirits  talk  to  her,  they  give  her  advice 
which  is  often  against  her  interests.  Her  departed  hus- 
band and  his  brother  are  the  chief  leaders,  the  'guides' 
so  to  say.  They  talk  to  her  on  all  important  occasions 
and  try  to  guide  her  in  life.  The  patient  resents  such 
interferences.      When    the  voices  became  insistent  she 


Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Perception    157 

also  had  visions  of  the  spirits  and  could  hear  them  talk 
to  her,  a  proceeding  which  she  always  attempted  to  dis- 
courage, but  she  admitted  that  the  voices  and  the  spir- 
its had  the  best  of  her,  and  she  was  forced  to  follow 
their  instructions.  An  examination  of  the  patient 
revealed  the  fact  that  the  hearing  on  the  left  side  was 
rather  defective,  the  tympanic  membrane  was  thickened 
and  there  was  present  a  chronic  pathological  process  due 
to  a  former  condition  of  middle  ear  disease.  Any  con- 
tinuous and  prolonged  irritation  of  the  diseased  ear 
started  the  voices,  increased  their  intensity,  and  caused 
the  manifestations  of  the  visions. 

I  may  also  refer  to  a  patient  under  my  care  who  suf- 
fered from  auditory  hallucinations  and  thought  herself 
possessed  by  demons.  From  her  ninth  year  she  suffered 
at  various  intervals  from  those  voices  which  sometimes 
told  her  unpleasant  things.  Along  with  the  hallu- 
cinations she  also  had  attacks  of  automatic  speech.  Now 
and  then  she  simply  heard  voices  and  was  not  conscious 
of  any  Involuntary  speech,  but  occasionally  the  involun- 
tary utterance  took  such  possession  of  her  that  she  could 
not  control  it.  She  felt  as  if  some  other  being  got  pos- 
session of  her  organs  of  speech.  This  frightened  her 
even  more  than  the  hallucinations.  She  kept  away  from 
her  friends  fearing  sudden  attacks  of  involuntary  speech. 
It  appeared  to  the  patient,  as  if  some  other  beings  made 
her  talk  against  her  will.  She  shunned  society,  because 
the  other  beings  forced  her  to  tell  aloud  what  she 
thought  of  the  people  in  whose  company  she  was  pres- 
ent. When  she  was  not  conscious  of  the  forced  speech, 
she  often  heard  voices  which  she  ascribed  to  the  same 
demons.  There  was  nothing  of  the  delusion  of  pa- 
ranoia in  it  as  she  could  not  account  for  the  involuntary 


158  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

speech  and  auditory  hallucinations.  The  patient  was 
of  Irish  descent,  uneducated,  though  very  intelligent. 
The  explanation  of  'demoniacal  possession'  was  giv- 
en and  maintained  by  her  family  in  Ireland.  She  was 
glad  to  take  my  view  of  the  phenomena  which  I  tried 
to  make  plain  to  her,  as  much  as  it  was  possible  under 
the  circumstances. 

A  quotation  from  her  written  account  may  be  of  in- 
terest: "When  I  was  nine  years  old,  one  day, 
I  remember,  I  sat  down  on  a  stone  and  sud- 
denly I  heard  a  voice:  'If  you  live  four  or  five  years 
more,  you  will  wish  you  had  never  grown  up.'  I 
thought  it  was  strange,  but  soon  forgot  it  and  went  to 
play  again.  I  had  no  trouble  until  I  was  fourteen,  when 
the  voice  changed  and  forced  me  to  talk  with  my  own 
voice.  The  voices  would  make  me  speak  of  things  that 
in  my  own  self  I  had  no  idea  of  doing  and  would  not  do 
for  anything.  About  eight  years  ago  I  had  a  terrible 
fright  after  which  I  thought  I  talked  with  saints  and 
angels  and  saw  unusual  things,  I  really  saw  them."  We 
find  here  the  presence  of  automatic  speech,  unconscious 
phonation  with  subconscious  states  resulting  in  dissocia- 
tions of  secondary  from  primary  sensory  elements  with 
the  consequent  formation  of  various  forms  of  hallu- 
cinations. 

Observations  and  experiments  incontestably  prove 
that  hallucinations  are  synthetized  compounds  of  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements,  dissociated  completely  or  in- 
completely from  their  primary  elements.  Normal  and 
abnormal  perceptive  processes  do  not  differ  psychologic- 
ally as  to  their  make-up,  except  in  the  relation  of  their 
primary  and  secondary  sensory  elements.  Hallucina- 
tions are  not  central;  they  are  essentially  of  peripheral 


Secondary  Sensory  Elements  and  Perception    159 

origin;  they  are  induced  by  peripheral  excitations  giv- 
ing rise  to  peripheral  physiological  processes,  awakening 
primary  sensory  elements  which  are  subconscious  or  fall 
out  entirely  of  the  patient's  consciousness,  leaving  the 
groups  of  secondary  sensory  elements  to  stand  out  as 
fully  developed  hallucinations.  The  hallucinatory  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements  may  be  tinged  with  the  qualita- 
tive aspect  of  the  dissociated  primary  sensory  elements ; 
thus  pathological  processes  in  the  auditory  sense  organ 
may  give  rise  to  voices;  or  morbid  processes  of  the 
visual  apparatus  may  give  rise  to  visions.  Quite  often, 
however,  the  dissociation  is  so  deep  and  extensive  that 
the  synthetized  system  of  secondary  sensory  elements 
does  not  bear  the  least  trace  of  the  qualitative  aspect 
of  the  primary  sensory  elements;  thus  a  morbid  condi- 
tion of  the  pharynx,  for  example,  may  give  rise  to  an 
auditory  and  even  to  a  visual  hallucination.  Whatever 
may  be  the  qualitative  character  of  the  sensory  com- 
pounds one  thing  stands  out  clear  and  distinct,  and  that 
is  the  fact  that  the  percept,  whether  normal  or  ab- 
normal, does  not  consist  of  images,  but  of  sensations, 
primary  and  secondary. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  SENSORY  ELEMENTS 

CONTRARY  to  the  view  maintained  by  many 
psychologists  we  have  laid  special  stress  on 
the  fundamental  qualitative  difference  between 
image  and  sensation.  We  shall  not  venture 
far  from  our  facts,  if  we  arrange  images  and  sen- 
sations in  two  qualitatively  different  psychic  series. 
Sensations  can  be  ranged  in  a  graduated  series  of 
intensities,  while  images  or  representations  can  be 
ranged  in  a  graduated  series  of  clearness  and  dis- 
tinctness, or  of  vividness,  as  it  is  sometimes  described  by 
some  psychologists.  I  use  the  term  vividness  in  the 
sense  of  clearness  and  distinctness  and  not  in  the  sense 
of  intensity  as  it  is  often  used;  even  those  psycholo- 
gists who  do  not  use  intensity  and  vividness  indiscrim- 
inately ascribe  both  of  them  equally  to  sensation  and 
image. 

Vividness  and  intensity  are  understood  by  me  to 
be  two  fundamentally  qualitatively  different  aspects, 
or  attributes.  Sensations  have  intensity,  but  no  viv- 
idness; images  or  representations  have  vividness,  but 
no  intensity.  Sensory  elements  may  vary  from  min- 
imum to  maximum  intensity.  This  variation  in  inten- 
sity holds  true  both  of  primary  and  secondary  sensory 
elements.  Similarly,  images  or  representations  may 
pass  through  all  degrees  of  vividness  from  minimum  to 
maximum.     The   image   represents  the  sensation.      In 

1 60 


The  Attributes  of  Sensory  Elements  i6i 

this  respect  we  may  somewhat  modify  the  well-known 
dictum  of  the  sensationalists  into :  'Nihil  est  in  imagine 
quod  non  antefuerit  in  sensu.'  The  sensory  element  is 
represented  by  its  respective  representative  element. 

The  representative  elements  may  refer  with  differ- 
ent degrees  of  vividness  to  the  same  sensory  elements. 
An  image  with  one  degree  of  vividness  can  be  sub- 
stituted for  another  with  a  different  degree  of  vividness 
and  still  refer  to  the  same  sensory  elements.  The  de- 
gree of  vividness  does  not  change  the  qualitative  char- 
acter of  the  representation.  Not  so  is  it  with  the 
qualitative  attribute  of  the  sensation.  The  slightest 
change  in  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  changes  its  qual- 
itative character.  A  sensation  with  one  degree  of  inten- 
sity cannot  be  substituted  for  another.  A  sound  or  a 
color  of  a  definite  intensity  cannot  be  substituted  for  a 
sound  or  color  of  a  different  intensity.  The 
two  are  different  sensations  and  no  sensation  can  sub- 
stitute another.  Sensations  falling  in  the  same  series  of 
intensity  are  really  independent  of  one  another,  but  each 
sensation  of  the  intensive  series  can  be  represented  by  a 
whole  series  of  representations  of  different  vividness, 
from  minimum  to  maximum.  Different  series  of  rep- 
resentative elements  may  also  be  regarded  as  indepen- 
dent, since  they  refer  to  independent  sensations. 

If  we  symbolize  a  series  of  sensory  elements  by  the 
letters:  A^,  At,  A»,  A*,  A^,  .  .  .  A,,;  and  if  we 
symbolize  the  corresponding  series  of  representative 
elements  by  a^,  a*,  a»,  a*,  a^,  .  .  .  a^,,  then  the 
series  of  both  sensory  and  representative  elements  may 
be  symbolized  by  the  following  formula: 


1 62 


Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


A.  A^ 

A. 

A^ 

A.     . 

.  .  A 

ai    ai 

Oi 

a*.    Oe 

^ 

1     1 
at   a^ 

1 
a* 

3     2 

ai    a2 

a3 

3             3 

ax    ai 

s 

a* 

4      « 

at   a» 

a: 

ai   a* 

^' 

tfl"    «2"      as"      ^4"      fl«" 


V 


The  characteristic  of  the  image,  or  of  the  represen- 
tative element  is  just  its  extraordinary  plasticity  and 
possibility  of  substitution.  This  function  of  substitu- 
tion was  described  by  Taine  with  all  the  power  of  his 
lucid  style.  The  great  modifiability  of  representation 
plays  an  important  role  in  psychic  life — adaptabil- 
ity to  various  conditions  of  life  increases,  reactions  cease 
to  be  rigid  and  uniform,  but  change  easily  in  response 
to  a  changing  environment.  Variations  of  sense-organs 
with  their  physiological  processes  are  rather  slow  and 
tardy,  often  requiring  generations  for  an  effective 
change,  while  the  representative  element  can  be  modified 
and  adapted  within  the  life-existence  of  the  individual 
and  often  in  a  very  short  time.  In  brief,  the  function 
of  substitution  possessed  by  the  representative  element 
in  the  processes  of  mental  selection  is  the  substitute  for 
natural  selection  in  the  highest  representatives  of  animal 
life. 

Now  under  ordinary  conditions  of  life  the  graduated 
series  of  representative  vividness  runs  parallel  to  the 
gradated  series  of  sensory  intensities.    Usually  a  more 


The  Attributes  of  Sensory  Elements  163 

intense  sensation  is  represented  with  greater  vividness. 
The  increase  or  decrease  of  intensity  of  the  sensory 
series  has  a  corresponding  change  in  the  vividness  of 
the  elements  of  the  representative  series.  Intensity  and 
vividness  vary  directly.  Such  direct  variation,  however, 
is  not  always  the  rule.  There  are  cases,  when  the  two 
part  company.  In  states  of  distraction,  in  subwaking 
states,  in  states  of  dissociation,  and  generally  in  the  con- 
ditions of  functional  psychosis,  intensity  and  vividness 
do  not  vary  directly. 

Strong  stimulations  may  give  rise  to  sensations 
of  great  intensity,  but  the  vividness  of  the  repre- 
sentative elements  may  fall  so  low  as  almost  to 
reach  the  minimum.  When  the  vividness  is  so  low 
as  to  reach  the  minimum,  the  representative  elements 
cannot  be  used  as  substitutes  and,  since  reproduction 
belongs  to  representative  elements  which  symbolically 
reproduce  the  sensations  by  the  process  of  substitution, 
reproduction  or  memory  of  the  original  experience  is 
absent  and  there  is  a  break,  a  gap  in  mental  continuity, 
dissociation  results.  The  depths  and  extent  of  disso- 
ciation of  mental  systems  may  be  regarded  as  variables 
of  vividness.  Dissociation  varies  inversely  as  vividness. 
When  vividness  is  at  its  minimum,  dissociation  is  at  its 
maximum.  The  phenomena  of  functional  psychosis 
having  their  origin  in  states  of  dissociation  may  thus  be 
regarded  psychologically  as  functions  of  vividness,  the 
most  characteristic  attribute  of  representative  elements. 
Functional  psychosis  with  all  its  protean  manifestations, 
the  great  variety  of  dissociated  and  subconscious  states 
may  thus  be  reduced  to  variations  of  one  fundamental 
attribute — vividness. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

SENSATION  AND   EXTERNAL  REALITY 

WE  must  not  omit  to  point  out  another  fun- 
damental difference  between  sensory  and 
representative  elements.  Sensations  have 
the  significance,  or  possess  the  attribute  of 
external  reality,  while  images,  ideas,  or  representations 
entirely  lack  it.  Put  in  Baldwin's  terminology — sensa- 
tions have  the  coefficient  of  external  reality,  the 
sensory  coefficient  of  reality.  No  matter  wheth- 
er the  sensation  was  produced  by  an  external  stim- 
ulus, or  by  a  pathological  process  going  on  in  the  sense- 
organ,  or  brought  about  indirectly  through  the  action 
of  another  sense-organ  by  means  of  indirect  association- 
paths;  no  matter  whether  the  sensation  is  primary  or 
secondary,  as  long  as  it  is  a  sensation  at  all,  it  possesses 
the  sensory  coefficient  of  reality.  A  sensation  whether 
'true  or  false'  possesses  rightfully  the  coefficient  of  real- 
ity as  its  necessary  and  inherent  attribute.  The  percept, 
true  or  hallucinatory,  consisting  of  sensory  elements,  has 
therefore  the  sensory  coefficient  of  reality. 

Psychologically  regarded,  the  'true'  percept  and  the 
hallucination  have  the  same  sensory  constitution  with 
the  same  attributes.  The  difference  between  the  true 
and  false  percept  may  be  regarded  from  a  biological 
standpoint  as  a  matter  of  adjustment.  The  percepts 
with  successful  adjustments  are  true,  while  those  with 
unsuccessful  motor  reactions  are  false  and  hallucina- 
tory.   Psychologically,  the  difference  between  the  'true' 

164 


Sensation  and  External  Reality  165 

percept  and  hallucination  is  in  the  shifting  of  the  pri- 
mary and  secondary  sensory  elements.  Where  the  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements  can  he  shifted  and  become  pri- 
mary, the  percept  is  regarded  as  true;  where  the  second- 
ary sensory  elements  do  not  admit  of  being  shifted  and 
becoming  primary,  the  percept  is  regarded  as  halluci- 
natory. 

If  we  turn  now  to  the  representative  elements,  we 
find  that  they  lack  the  sensory  coefficient  of  reality. 
This  lack  of  sensory  coefficient  is  only  the  negative  side 
of  the  image.  There  is  also  a  positive  side  to  it.  The 
image  is  not  felt  as  image,  because  it  is  not  sen- 
sation or  lacks  the  sensory  coefficient,  but  because  it 
possesses  a  qualitative  character  of  its  own.  A  sen- 
sation is  not  felt  as  such,  simply  because  it  lacks  the 
character  of  another  sensation.  Thus  sensation  green 
is  not  experienced  as  the  particular  color  sensation,  be- 
cause it  has  not  the  quale  of  sound  or  of  pressure,  but 
because  the  sensation  green  has  a  positive  experience 
of  its  own.  The  same  holds  good  of  the  representa- 
tion— it  possesses  its  own  characteristic  quale.  As  an 
experience  sui  generis  we  claim  for  the  representation 
a  special  psychic  mark,  an  'ideational  or  representative' 
coefficient.  The  image  has  its  own  qualitative  character 
just  as  the  sensation  possesses  its  own.  In  contrast  to  the 
sensation  which  possesses  the  coefficient  of  external  real- 
ity, the  image  or  representation  has  the  coefficient  of 
internal  reality.  Both  sensation  and  image  have  real- 
ity, each  one  has  its  own  kind  of  reality — the  sensation 
has  external  objective  reality,  the  image  has  internal 
subjective  reality.  It  is  on  account  of  the  ideational  or 
representative  coefficient  that  every  image  is  placed 
unhesitatingly  into  its  own  world  of  reality,  into  its  own 


l66  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

series  of  images  with  which  it  easily  associates  and  fuses. 

Writers  on  psychology  in  trying  to  define  further  the 
coefficient  of  reality  refer  it  to  the  will.  Some  maintain 
that  the  coefficient  of  reality  is  the  'independence  of  the 
will,'  while  others  claim  that  the  coefficient  of  reality  is 
'subjection  to  the  will.'  Baldwin  in  his  paper  'The 
Perception  of  External  Reality,'  offers  an  extreme- 
ly interesting  solution  which  reconciles  both  views. 
He  points  out  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
the  'memory  coefficient'  of  reality  and  'sensational  co- 
efficient' of  reality.  The  two  coefficients  are  opposite 
as  far  as  control  of  will  is  concerned.  The  sensational 
coefficient  is  independence  of  the  will,  while  the  memory 
coefficient  is  control  by  the  will.  A  sensation,  in  short, 
is  not  under  the  control  of  the  will,  while  an  image  is 
subject  to  the  will. 

Baldwin  makes  a  further  distinction  between  a 
simple  image  or  'memory  image'  and  a  'memory 
image  of  external  reality.'  The  memory  image  can 
be  brought  up  voluntarily  by  its  proper  associates,  but 
it  has  no  sensational  coefficient  as  a  result,  while  the 
memory  image  of  external  reality  can  be  followed  by 
sensational  coefficients,  that  is,  sensations  can  be  brought 
about  in  the  train  of  such  an  image.  To  quote 
Baldwin :  "Certainly  a  present  sensible  reality  is 
not  under  the  control  of  my  will;  it  is  independent, 
and  if  my  coefficient  is  to  be  discovered  in  the  relation 
of  the  presentation  to  my  voluntary  life,  this  must  be  its 
expression  and  I  go  over  to  the  class  of  writers  who  find 
the  psychological  basis  of  external  reality  in  sensations 
of  resistance.  But  when  we  come  to  inquire  into  the 
'memory'  coefficient — asking  the  question  what  charac- 
ter is  in  a  memory-image  which  testifies  to  its  being  ? 


Sensation  and  External  Reality  167 

memory  of  reality,  the  tables  seemed  to  be  turned. 
Without  stopping  to  examine  other  views,  I  hold  that 
that  image  is  a  true  memory  which  we  are  able  to  get 
again  as  a  sensation  (Baldwin's  italics)  by  volun- 
tarily repeating  the  series  of  muscular  sensations 
which  were  associated  with  it  in  its  first  experience.  The 
memory  coefficient  therefore  is  subjection  to  the  will  in 
the  sense  indicated.  ...  A  true  memory  in  short 
is  an  image  which  I  can  get  at  will  by  a  train  of  memory 
associates,  and  which,  when  got,  is  further  subject  to 
my  will ;  a  memory  of  external  reality,  on  the  contrary, 
is  an  image  which  I  can  get  at  will  by  a  train  of  sensa- 
tional associates  and  which,  when  got,  is  not  subject  to 
my  will." 

Now  if  I  understand  Baldwin  aright,  a  sensa- 
tion does  not  fall  under  the  control  of  the  will,  while 
a  simple  'memory  image'  and  a  'memory  image  of  ex- 
ternal reality'  are  both  under  the  control  of  the  will,  the 
difference  being  that  the  former  does  not  terminate  in 
a  sensation,  whereas  the  latter  does.  This  I  take  to 
mean  that  a  sensation  does  not  depend  on  the  subject 
(will),  but  on  the  external  objects;  in  other  words,  a 
sensation  cannot  be  produced  from  center  to  periphery 
(not  internally  initiated  by  the  will),  but  is  initiated  by 
an  external  excitation  peripherally  stimulating  the  sense- 
organ  and  giving  rise  to  sensation.  An  image,  on  the 
other  hand,  does  not  depend  for  its  initiation  on  the  ex- 
ternal object  or  excitation,  but  is  essentially  an  internal 
event  which  can  be  brought  about  from  within  by  the 
process  of  associative  activity,  so  highly  characteristic 
of  the  image.  Thus  far  my  analysis  seems  to  me  to  be 
in  full  accord  with  Baldwin's  view.  Similarly,  Baldwin's 
views  in  regard  to  'memory  images'  and  'memory  im- 


1 68  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ages  of  external  reality,'  the  former  not  ending  in  sen- 
sory experience,  the  latter  terminating  in  experience  with 
sensory  coefficient,  seem  to  me  to  be  closely  related  to 
the  views  expressed  by  me  in  this  work  and  in  my  other 
works  on  the  subject. 

In  spite  of  the  agreement  on  so  many  points  there  are 
other  points  which  do  not  appear  to  me  acceptable.  We 
may  agree  that  kinaesthetic  and  muscular  sensations  or 
sensations  of  resistance  are  at  the  core  of  things,  but 
are  they  the  be-all  of  external  reality?  Have  not  sen- 
sations of  pain,  of  hearing,  of  color,  or  of  smell  as  much 
reality  as  our  sensations  coming  from  muscle,  joint, 
synovial  membrane  and  articular  surfaces?  The  acute, 
shooting,  twinging  pains  of  rheumatism,  gout,  tabes- 
dorsalis,  the  burning  pains  of  meningitis,  the  excruci- 
ating throbs  of  megrim,  the  fine  stabbing  pains  of  tooth- 
ache, the  agony  of  angina,  the  sharp  tormenting  pains 
of  facial  neuralgia,  and  many  other  pains  coming  from 
different  organs  and  tissues,  are  not  they  real  and  ex- 
ternal? In  fact,  do  they  not  bear  on  them  more  the 
mark  of  grim,  pitiless,  external  necessity  than  any  of 
the  sensations  coming  from  active  muscle  and  joint? 
What  about  light,  color,  sound,  smell,  arc  not  they  sen- 
sations of  external  reality,  even  if  sensations  of  resist- 
ance do  not  enter  into  their  make-up? 

Muscular  and  kinaesthetic  sensations  may  be  granted 
to  play  an  important  role  in  our  knowledge  of  things, 
but  psychologically  regarded,  all  sensations  bear  on  them 
unmistakably  the  mark  of  external  reality.  It  is  not  the 
particular  form  or  kind  of  sensation,  but  it  is  the  sen- 
sory quale  as  such,  that  gives  the  coefficient  of  reality. 
As  far  as  resistance  is  concerned  Baldwin  is 
right,  if  it  be  applied  to  each  and  every  sensation.    For 


Sensation  and  External  Reality  169 

each  and  every  sensation  possesses  this  mark  of  stub- 
bornness about  it;  it  shows  opposition,  resistance,  and 
floods  the  mind.  We  may  say  that  the  stimulus  forces 
open  the  gates  of  the  sense-organs  and  invades  the  mind 
with  an  overwhelming  power.  Still,  on  the  whole, 
Baldwin  is  right  in  laying  special  stress  on  sensa- 
tions of  activity  and  resistance,  since,  biologically  re- 
garded, they  are  the  ones  that  give  the  smack  of  life 
and  the  kernel  of  things  and  help  to  bring  about  ad- 
justments to  the  external  environment. 

Thus  far  the  difference  between  Baldwin  and 
myself  seems  to  be  rather  insignificant.*  When, 
however,  we  reach  what  Baldwin  terms  the  'mem- 
ory image  of  external  reality'  the  difference  stands 
out  somewhat  more  strongly.  He  contrasts  the  two, 
image  and  sensation,  on  the  basis  of  dependence  or  in- 
dependence of  the  will.  The  sensation  is  independent 
of  the  will,  while  the  memory  image  of  external  reality 
is  subject  to  the  will  which  can  bring  about  the  sensation 
originally  experienced.  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  we 
are  just  as  sure  of  the  external  reality  of  a  sensation 
referred  to  by  the  memory  image,  even  if  we  cannot 
bring  about  the  original  experience.  We  may  perceive 
sensations  which  cannot  possibly  be  repeated,  and  still 
they  are  regarded  in  memory  as  events  that  have  taken 
place  in  the  world  of  external  reality.  We  may  have 
the  perception  of  a  comet  which  may  never  again  come 


*The  difference  is  far  less  than  I  have  originally  thought.  In  a 
letter  to  me  Professor  Baldwin  writes :  "I  am  much  interested  in 
your  views.  You  will  find  my  later  and  fuller  treatment  of  resist- 
ance and  of  the  nature  of  memory  images  in  my  Thought  and 
Things,  or  Genetic  Logic,  where  I  attempt  explicitly  to  trace  the 
genetic  development  of  knowledge  from  sense  objects  to  image 
objects  in  detail,  being  I  think  nearer  to  your  views  than  my  earlier 
article  brought  out," 


lyo  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

into  our  experience,  and  even  if  it  should  come,  its  com- 
ing is  not  due  to  our  voluntary  control;  it  is  not  we 
that  can  make  the  comet-experience  come  into  our  per- 
ceptual or  sensory  world  with  its  sensory  coefficient  of 
external  reality.  We  may  be  in  the  position  of  Plato's 
cave-dwellers  and  have  no  control  over  reality,  the 
reflection  of  which  is  displayed  before  us,  and  still  we 
may  agree  with  Plato  that  for  the  cave-dwellers  the 
memory  images  of  external  reality,  the  recurrence  of 
which  is  not  under  control,  will  still  be  discriminated 
from  a  general  memory  image,  from  an  image  of  fancy. 
The  sensation  or  percept  may  be  unique,  its  reproduc- 
tion may  not  be  possible,  and  still  its  memory  image  will 
be  that  of  external  reality. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  meet  in  psychopathology  with 
a  vast  domain  of  phenomena,  such  as  recurrent  mental 
states,  insistent  ideas  which  force  themselves  on  the 
patient's  mind  against  his  will.  The  recurrent  mental 
states  or  the  insistent  ideas  are  far  more  stubborn  and 
uncontrollable  than  any  resistant  sensory  object.  The 
idea  may  come  like  attacks  which  overcome  the  patient 
more  than  any  sensory  reality,  or  the  idea  may  be  per- 
sistent gnawing  at  the  very  vitals  of  his  mental  life.  No 
external  object  is  so  stubbornly,  so  painfully  resistant 
as  just  such  an  idea;  and  still  the  insistent  idea  is  not 
regarded  as  a  sensory  reality.  The  insistent  idea  pos- 
sesses the  coefficient  of  external  reality,  independence  of 
the  will,  painfully  so,  and  still  it  is  not  regarded  by  the 
patient  as  external  reality;  in  spite  of  its  being  inde- 
pendent of  the  will,  it  is  still  regarded  as  an  idea. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  cannot  express  the  sensational 
and  ideational  coefficients  in  terms  of  will,  of  control  or 
Dpn-control,  It  is  not  resistance  to  the  will  that  makes  qx- 


Sensation  and  External  Reality  Vpl 

perience  sensory,  nor  is  it  subjection  to  the  will  that 
makes  experience  ideational  or  representative.  Why 
not  state  the  fact  as  it  is?  External  reality  is  the  quale 
of  sensory  experience,  while  internal  reality  is  the  quale 
of  the  image  or  representation.  A  sensation  is  experi- 
enced as  sensation,  no  matter  whether  or  no  it  depends 
on  the  will,  the  independence  is  a  secondary  matter;  the 
same  holds  true  in  the  case  of  the  image,  it  is  experi- 
enced as  image,  independent  of  the  fact  of  its  subjection 
to  the  will. 

There  is  another  view  which  finds  the  fundamental 
difference  between  percept  and  image  in  what  is  and 
what  is  not  common  to  all  selves.  Perceptual  experi- 
ence is  common,  while  ideational  experience  is  not  com- 
mon to  all  fellow-beings.  I  see  the  sun  and  other  peo- 
ple can  share  it  with  me,  while  my  image  of  the  sun 
is  experienced  by  myself.  Thus  Calkins  tells  us: 
"I  perceive  lowering  heavens,  pouring  rain,  bare  trees 
and  drenched  sparrows,  but  I  imagine  wide  horizons, 
brilliant  sky,  blossoming  apple-trees  and  nestling  ori- 
oles. The  main  difference  is  this:  in  the  one  case  I  as- 
sume that  my  experience  is  shared  by  other  people  and 
that  everybody  who  looks  out  sees  the  same  dreary  land- 
scape; but  my  imagination  of  the  sunny  orchard  I  re- 
gard as  my  private  and  unshared  experience." 

The  mark  of  being  common  is  not  the  essential  coef- 
ficient of  external  reality  given  by  the  percept.  The 
percept  is  not  experienced  as  external,  because 
it  is  common  to  other  people.  We  do  not  see  the  tree 
yonder,  because  other  people  can  see  it  too;  we  would 
see  it  there,  even,  if,  like  Robinson  Crusoe,  we  had  no 
fellow-being  to  compare  notes  with.  A  hallucination 
is  as  fully  a  percept  and  is  perceived  in  the  full  garb  of 


172  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

external  reality,  although  it  may  have  no  currency  with 
my  fellow-men.  The  percept  possesses  the  coefficient 
of  external  reality,  no  matter  whether  or  no  others  can 
share  in  it. 

Moreover,  psychologically  regarded,  the  percept  is 
as  much  of  a  private  experience  as  the  image  is.  In  fact, 
every  psychic  state  has  the  privacy  ascribed  to  the 
image,  and  as  such  is  unshared  by  other  selves.  It  is 
simply  the  old  psychological  fallacy  of  confusing  the 
physical  with  the  psychic  object,  or  with  the 
psychic  state  cognizant  of  the  physical  object.* 
The  flower  as  physical  object,  as  stimulus,  is 
shared  by  all  who  perceive  it,  but  the  per- 
ception of  the  flower  varies  with  each  individual.  My 
perception  of  the  flower  cannot  be  experienced  by  any 
one  else;  like  the  image,  the  percept  is  entirely  individ- 
ual, unshared  by  other  selves.  I  perceive  the  flower  as 
having  external  reality,  not  because  my  perceptual  expe- 
rience is  the  same  as  that  of  other  people,  not  because 
it  is  shared  with  others — as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  not  the 
same,  and  from  its  very  nature  cannot  be  the  same  as 
the  experience  of  others,  as  we  cannot  possibly  share 
our  individual  psychic  experience  with  our  fellow-men. 
We  perceive  the  flower  as  an  external  reality  simply  and 
solely  because  it  is  sensory.  The  percept  consisting  of 
sensations,  primary  and  secondary,  bears  the  impress  of 
external  reality;  it  possesses  what  Baldwin  so  apt- 
ly terms  'sensational  coefficient'  giving  external 
reality.  External  reality  is  given  directly  and  imme- 
diately by  the  sensation  or  by  the  sensory  compound,  by 


*Royce  and  Miinsterberg  define  the  physical  object  in  terms  of 
'sociality,'  but  if  I  understand  them  correctly  they  do  not  regard  the 
definition  as  a  psychological  one. 


Sensation  and  External  Reality  173 

the  percept. 

To  quote  from  a  work  of  mine:  "Sensation 
carries  along  with  it  the  reality  of  its  stimulus.  It 
is  not  that  the  sense  of  reality  is  different  from  the  sen- 
sation, it  is  given  in  the  sensation  itself.  Similarly  the 
percept  and  the  sense  of  external  reality  are  not  two  dif- 
ferent things;  they  are  given  together  in  the  same  pro- 
cess of  perception  and  arc  identical.  .  .  .  The 
sensory  process  is  also  the  process  of  the  sense  of  ex- 
ternal reality.  ...  In  seeing  or  perceiving  the 
chair  yonder  we  do  not  perceive  it  as  real,  because  of  its 
social  or  common  character — the  reality  of  its  existence 
is  given  directly  in  the  sensory  processes  of  the  percept 
itself.     .     .     . 

The  sense  of  reality  of  the  external  object  is 
strengthened  by  association  of  the  original  sensory 
systems  with  other  sensory  systems,  and  the  intensity 
rises  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  systems  of  sen- 
sory elements,  brought  into  relation  with  the  function- 
ing sensory  systems.  .  .  .  The  more  systems  of 
sensory  elements  are  pressed  into  service,  the  stronger 
is  the  sense  of  external  reality  and  the  more  assured  is 
the  reaction  to  the  stimuli  of  the  external  environment. 

In  the  evolutionary  process  of  man's  adaptation  to  his 
environment  he  becomes  extended  in  being  and  grows 
more  developed,  because  of  his  social  relations.  Man 
presses  into  active  service  the  systems  of  sensory  ele- 
ments of  his  fellow-beings.  Adaptations  and  hence  suc- 
cessful reactions  to  the  external  environment  are  now 
more  assured  and  the  sense  of  external  reality  is  still 
further  emphasized  and  intensified.  Throughout  the 
course  of  intensification  of  the  sense  of  reality  the  prin- 
ciple remains  unchanged  in  nature.     The  sense  of  re- 


174  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ality  is  given  by  and  consists  in  nothing  else  but  the  sen- 
sory elements." 

From  a  philosophical  and  epistemological  stand- 
point the  social  aspect  may  perhaps  be  suflSicicnt 
to  fix  the  externality  of  the  object,  but  from  a 
psychological  standpoint  the  trade-mark  of  'shares  and 
common  stock'  has  no  currency.  The  percept  consist- 
ing, as  we  have  shown,  of  sensory  elements,  primary 
and  secondary,  possesses,  on  that  account,  the  sensory 
attribute  of  external  reality. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE   SUBCONSCIOUS  AND   UNCONSCIOUS   CEREBRATION 

PLATO  put  on  the  portals  of  his  academy  the 
inscription,  "No  one  can  enter  here  without  a 
knowledge  of  geometry."  Similarly  no  one  can 
gain  access  to  the  facts  of  abnormal  psychology 
without  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  subconscious. 
The  subconscious  may  be  briefly  defined  as  mental  pro- 
cesses of  which  the  individual  is  not  directly  conscious. 
Such  knowledge  is  all  the  more  requisite  as  psychopathic 
disturbances  with  which  psychopathology  proper  deals 
are  essentially  afections  of  subconscious  life  activity. 
The  general  drift  of  my  Psychology  of  Suggestion  is  the 
description  of  the  subconscious  as  a  diffused  conscious- 
ness below  the  margin  of  personal  consciousness.  I 
sometimes  use  the  term  "subconscious  self."  I  designate 
by  "self"  not  personal  consciousness,  but  mere  con- 
sciousness. In  Multiple  Personality,  in  which  I  develop 
the  theory  of  thresholds  in  regard  to  the  phenomena  of 
normal  and  abnormal  mental  life,  I  define  the  sub- 
conscious as  consciousness  below  the  threshold  of  at- 
tentive personal  consciousness.  I  find  that  my  clinical 
and  psychological  investigations  more  and  more  con- 
firm me  in  the  view  of  the  subconscious  advanced  by 
me  in  The  Psychology  of  Suggestion.  I  am  pleased  to 
find  that  Prof.  James,  in  a  recent  article,  accepts  the 
same  view,  and  advances  the  same  theory  of  threshold 
in  regard  to  the  subconscious.  "Nobody  knows,"  he 
writes,  "how  far  we  are  'marginally'  conscious  of  these 

175 


176  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

memories,  concepts  and  conational  states  at  ordinary 
times,  or  how  far  beyond  the  'margin'  of  our  present 
thought  trans-marginal  consciousness  of  them  may 
exist." 

In  my  Psychology  of  Suggestion  I  pointed  out  the 
difficulties  of  the  purely  physiological  interpretation  of 
the  subconscious.  Since  this  view  still  lingers  among 
some  psychologists,  I  cannot  do  better  than  reproduce 
the  passage : 

"The  facts  of  hypnotic  memory  alone  strongly  indi- 
cate the  intelligent  nature  of  the  subconscious.  Can  the 
theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  explain,  for  instance, 
the  fact  of  suggested  amnesia  during  hypnosis?  I  hyp- 
notize Mr.  V.  F.  and  make  him  pass  through  many 
lively  scenes  and  actions.  I  give  him  hypnotic  and  post- 
hypnotic suggestions.  The  subject  is  wakened  and  hyp- 
notized time  and  again.  At  last  he  is  put  into  a  hyp- 
notic state,  and  it  is  suggested  that  on  awakening  he 
shall  not  remember  anything  of  what  had  happened 
in  the  state  of  hypnosis.  The  subject,  on  emerging 
from  his  trance,  remembers  nothing  of  what  he  has 
passed  through.  I  then  put  my  hand  on  his  forehead 
and  tell  him  in  a  commanding  voice,  'You  remember 
now  everything.'  As  if  touched  by  the  wand  of  a 
magician,  the  suppressed  memories  become  endowed 
with  life  and  movement,  and  invade  the  consciousness 
of  the  subject.  Everything  is  now  clearly  remembered, 
and  the  subject  is  able  to  relate  the  tale  of  his  ad- 
ventures without  the  omission  of  the  least  incident.  So 
detailed  is  the  account  that  one  cannot  help  wondering 
at  the  extraordinary  memory  displayed  by  the  subject. 
How  is  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  to  ac- 
".ount  for  this  strange  fact  ?    Prof.  Ziehen,  in  his  Phys- 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Cerebration     177 

io logical  Psychology  tells  us  that  it  is  still  a  matter 
of  doubt  whether,  despite  their  complication,  all  the 
acts  of  the  hynotized  individual  are  not  motions  ac- 
complished without  any  concomitant  psychical  pro- 
cesses," and  that  "even  the  recollection  of  the  hypnotic 
psychical  processes  do  not  necessarily  argue  in  favor 
of  their  existence  during  the  hypnotic  trance."  This 
extreme  view  is  certainly  wrong,  for  the  subject  during 
hypnosis  not  only  acts,  moves,  but  he  also  speaks,  an- 
swers questions  intelligently,  reasons,  discusses;  and  if 
such  an  individual  may  be  regarded  as  a  mere  machine, 
on  the  same  grounds  we  may  consider  any  rational  man 
as  a  mere  unconscious  automaton. 

The  advocates  of  unconscious  cerebration  must  ad- 
mit at  least  this  much,  that  hypnosis  is  a  conscious  state. 
Now,  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration,  it  is 
truly  inconceivable  how  psychical  states  can  be  sup- 
pressed, the  accompanying  physiological  processes  alone 
being  left,  and  all  that  done  by  a  mere  word  of  the  ex- 
perimenter. The  restoration  of  memory  is  still  more 
incomprehensible  than  the  suggested  amnesia.  A  com- 
mand by  the  experimenter,  "Now  you  can  remember," 
brings  into  consciousness  a  flood  of  ideas  and  images. 
It  is  not  that  the  experimenter  gives  the  subject  a  clue 
which  starts  the  train  of  particular  images  and  ideas; 
but  the  mere  general,  abstract  suggestion,  "You  can  re- 
member," is  sufficient  to  restore  memories  which  to  all 
appearances  have  completely  vanished  from  the  mind 
of  the  subject.  Are  the  unconscious  physiological  ner- 
vous modifications  so  intelligent  as  to  understand  sug- 
gestions and  follow  them?  Does  unconscious  cerebra- 
tion understand  the  command  of  the  experimenter,  and 
does  it  oblige  him  to  become  conscious? 


1 78  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

On  closer  examination,  we  find  the  term  uncon- 
scious cerebration  to  be  of  so  loose  a  nature  that 
under  its  head  are  often  recorded  facts  that  clearly 
indicate  the  working  of  an  intelligence.  Thus,  Mr. 
Charles  M.  Child  brings  the  following  fact  as  a 
specimen  of  unconscious  cerebration:  "I  had  earnestly 
been  trying,"  a  gentleman  writes  to  Mr.  Child, 
"to  make  a  trial  balance,  and  at  last  left  off 
working,  the  summary  of  the  Dr.  and  Cr.  sides  of 
the  account  showing  a  difference  of  £2  los.,  the  Dr. 
side  being  so  much  smaller.  The  error  I  had  not  found 
on  Saturday  night  when  I  left  the  counting-house.  On 
this  same  Saturday  night  I  retired  feeling  nervous  and 
angry  with  myself.  Some  time  in  the  night  I  dreamed 
thus:  I  was  seated  at  my  desk  in  the  counting-house 
and  in  a  good  light;  everything  was  orderly  and  nat- 
ural, the  ledger  lying  before  me.  I  was  looking  over 
the  balance  of  the  accounts  and  comparing  them  with 
the  sums  in  the  trial-balance  sheet.  Soon  I  came  to  a 
debit  balance  of  £2  los.  I  looked  at  it,  called  myself 
sundry  names,  spoke  to  myself  in  a  deprecating  manner 
of  my  own  eyes,  and  at  last  put  the  £2  los.  to  its  proper 
side  of  the  trial-balance  sheet  and  went  home.  I  arose 
at  the  usual  Sunday  time,  dressed  carefully,  breakfasted, 
went  to  call  on  some  .  .  .  friends  to  go  to  church. 
Suddenly  the  dream  flashed  on  my  memory.  I  went  for 
the  keys,  opened  the  office,  also  the  safe,  got  the  ledger, 
and  turned  to  the  folio  my  dream  had  indicated.  There 
was  the  account  whose  balance  was  the  sum  wanted 
which  I  had  omitted  to  put  in  the  balance-sheet,  where 
it  was  put  now,  and  my  year's  posting  proved  correct." 

The  adherents  of  unconscious  cerebration  tacitly  in- 
clude under  this  term  not  only  unconscious  physiological 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Cerebration     179 

processes,  or  nerve  modifications,  but  also  psychical 
states.  Keeping  clearly  in  mind  the  real  meaning  of  un- 
conscious cerebration  as  referring  to  physiological  pro- 
cesses, or  nerve  modifications  with  no  psychical  accom- 
paniment, the  difficulties  of  unconscious  cerebration  to 
account  for  the  phenomena  of  hypnotic  memory  be- 
come truly  insurmountable.  For  if  the  physiological 
processes  subsumed  under  the  category  of  unconscious 
cerebration  are  completely  lacking  in  all  psychical  ele- 
ments whatever,  how  can  a  general  abstract  negative 
phrase,  "You  cannot  remember,"  suppress  particular 
psychical  states,  and  how  can  a  similar  positive  phrase, 
"You  can  remember,"  bring  the  forgotten  memories 
back  to  consciousness?    It  is  simply  incomprehensible. 

Furthermore,  while  the  subject  is  in  a  hypnotic  con- 
dition, we  can  suggest  to  him  that  on  awakening  he 
shall  not  remember  anything,  but  when  put  to  the  au- 
tomatic recorder  he  shall  be  able  to  write  everything 
that  has  taken  place  in  the  state  of  hypnosis.  The 
subject  is  then  awakened:  he  remembers  nothing  at  all 
of  what  he  has  passed  through  while  in  the  state  of  hyp- 
notic trance.  As  soon,  however,  as  he  is  put  to  the 
automatic  recorder  the  hand  gives  a  full  rational  ac- 
count of  all  the  events.  If  now  you  ask  the  subject  what 
it  is  he  has  written,  he  stares  at  you  in  confusion;  he 
knows  nothing  at  all  of  the  writing.  How  shall  we  ac- 
count for  this  fact  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  cere- 
bration ?  Can  unconscious  physiological  processes  write 
rational  discourses?  It  is  simply  miraculous,  incom- 
prehensible. 

These,  however,  are  not  the  only  difficulties  which 
the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  has  to  encounter. 
Take  th?  following  experiment:     I  gave  Mr.  V,  F, 


l8o  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  suggestion  that  on  awakening  he  should  put  my 
coat  on  three  times,  take  it  off,  and  put  it  on  again; 
that  he  should  do  it  when  he  heard  a  signal  which 
should  be  a  knock;  amnesia  was  suggested  and  also  the 
possibility  of  writing  the  suggestion.  The  subject  was 
then  roused  from  his  trance.  There  was  not  the  slight- 
est recollection  of  what  had  been  suggested,  but  when 
he  was  put  to  the  automatic  recorder  the  hand  at  once 
proceeded  to  write  everything.  In  the  middle  of  the 
writing,  "when  a  signal  will  be  given  .  .  .,"  I 
stopped  the  subject  and  asked  him  what  he  was  writing 
about.  "I  do  not  know,"  he  answered.  "How  is  it," 
I  asked  again,  "you  write  and  do  not  know  what  you 
write?"  "I  do  not  know,  I  think  it  was  something 
about  a  coat."  "What  was  it  you  were  writing  about  a 
coat?"  "I  do  not  know,  maybe  it  was  about  the  make 
of  a  coat."  Then  when  the  signal  came,  he  rose  and 
put  on  the  coat  three  times. 

To  take  another  experiment  of  the  same  kind: 
I  give  the  subject  the  suggestion  that  he  should 
bow  to  the  gas  whenever  the  door  should  be  opened; 
again  amnesia  is  suggested,  with  the  possibility  of 
writing.  The  subject  is  stopped  when  he  finished 
his  account.  "What  was  it  you  wrote?"  I  asked. 
The  subject  looked  surprised.  I  repeated  my  ques- 
tion. "I  do  not  know,  I  think  something  about  a 
door."  "What  was  it  about  a  door?"  "I  do  not 
know."  I  have  made  many  similar  experiments,  and 
all  of  them  with  the  same  results.  It  is  evident  that  the 
writing  is  not  an  unconscious  automatic  process,  for  the 
subject  possesses  a  general  knowledge  of  what  he  has 
written,  or  even  of  what  he  is  going  to  write. 

Now,  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  this 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Cerebration     i8i 

general  knowledge  ought  to  be  entirely  lacking,  since  the 
physiological  processes  of  the  suppressed  memory  have 
no  psychical  accompaniment.  It  would  not  do  to  say 
that  the  subject  knows  each  word  as  he  writes  it,  but  be- 
comes unconscious  of  it,  forgets  it  as  soon  as  it  is  written 
down,  because  the  subject  is  able  to  tell  the  central  idea ; 
that  is,  he  has  a  general  knowledge  of  it;  and,  what  is 
more,  he  is  able  to  tell  us  this  general  central  idea  even 
before  he  finishes  the  writing, — in  fact,  he  can  do  it 
when  stopped  in  the  middle  of  the  phrase.  On  the 
theory  of  secondary  consciousness,  however,  the  ex- 
periments could  not  possibly  give  other  results.  The 
secondary  consciousness  understands  the  suggestion 
given  by  the  experimenter,  accepts  them,  obeys  the 
commands,  keeps  the  suppressed  memories,  and  sends 
up  a  general  knowledge  of  them  to  the  upper  conscious- 
ness, and  if  commanded,  communicates  the  suppressed 
particular  suggestions  in  all  their  details. 

The  advocates  of  unconscious  cerebration  assume 
too  much:  they  assume  that  normal  memory,  or  recol- 
lection in  the  normal  state,  can  be  fully  accounted  for 
by  unconscious  physiological  processes,  and  the  only 
thing  required  is  to  apply  this  theory  to  the  phenomena 
of  hypnotic  memory.  It  would  be  well  to  examine  this 
theory  and  see  how  strong  its  claims  are  in  the  case  of 
normal  memory. 

Many  a  modem  psycho-physiologist  no  doubt  smiles 
at  the  crude,  ancient  psycho-physiological  theory  of  per- 
ception. Images  or  copies  of  objects  emanate  from  ob- 
jects, get  deposited  in  the  mind,  hence  perception,  cog- 
nition, memory.  The  modern  psycho-physiological 
speculations,  however,  the  speculations  of  Maudsley, 
Carpenter,  Ziehen,  Ribot,  etc.,  are  no  less  crude.    Thus, 


i82  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

Ziehen,  for  instance,  conceives  that  each  sensation  de- 
posits a  copy  of  itself, — an  image,  an  idea,  in  some 
one  of  the  memory  ganglion  cells,  and  memory  consists 
in  the  reproduction  of  this  copy, — the  hen  lays  an  egg 
from  which  another  hen  may  come  out.  Maudsley 
expresses  the  same  thing  in  slightly  different  terms;  in- 
stead of  "deposits  of  images  in  memory  ganglion  cells," 
he  uses  "modifications  of  nerve  elements."  "It  may  be 
supposed,"  says  Maudsley,  "that  the  first  activity  did 
leave  behind  it,  when  it  subsided,  some  after-effect,  some 
modification  of  the  nerve  element,  whereby  the  nerve 
circuit  was  disposed  to  fall  again  readily  into  the  same 
action,  such  disposition  (unconscious)  appearing  in  con- 
sciousness as  recognition  or  memory."  Ribot  and  many 
other  psychologists,  with  slight  variations  in  minor 
points,  follow  the  same  beaten  track.  All  of  them  agree 
that  it  is  the  nerve  modifications  produced  by  the  physi- 
ological processes  of  sensations,  emotions,  etc.,  that  con- 
stitute the  basis,  nay,  the  very  essence,  of  memory  itself. 
It  does  not  require  a  close  examination  to  find  the  de- 
ficiencies of  this  theory.  A  mere  modification  left  be- 
hind as  a  trace  cannot  possibly  explain  memory,  recol- 
lection, the  fact  of  referring  a  particular  bit  of  experi- 
ence to  an  experience  felt  before.  The  retention  of  a 
trace  or  of  a  nervous  modification,  and  the  reproduc- 
tion of  that  trace  or  modification,  cannot  in  the  least 
account  for  the  fact  that  a  series  of  sensations,  ideas, 
images,  emotions  felt  at  different  times,  should  become 
combined,  brought  into  a  unity,  felt  like  being  similar, 
like  being  repetitions,  copies  of  an  original  experience. 
//  is  not  retention  or  reproduction,  hut  it  is  the  recogni- 
tion element  that  constitutes  the  essence  of  memory. 
The  rose  of  to-day  reminds  me  of  the  rose  of  yesterday, 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Cerebration     183 

of  the  same  rose  seen  the  day  before  yesterday.  Now 
the  image  of  the  rose  may  be  retained,  may  even  be 
reproduced,  but  if  it  is  not  recognized  as  having  hap- 
pened in  my  past,  there  can  be  no  recollection.  In  short, 
without  personal  recognition  there  is  no  memory.  As 
James  strongly  puts  it,  "the  gutter  is  worn  deeper 
by  each  successive  shower,  but  not  for  that  reason 
brought  into  contact  with  previous  showers."  Does  the 
theory  of  unconscious  physiological  processes,  of  mate- 
rial brain  traces,  of  nerve  modifications,  does  the  theory 
take  into  account  this  element  of  personal  recognition? 
Can  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  offer  the 
faintest  suggestion  as  to  how  that  element  of  recognition 
is  brought  about?  What  is  that  something  added  to  the 
unconscious  physiological  trace  or  nerve  modification 
that  effects  a  conscious  recognition? 

Furthermore,  first  impressions  can  be  localized  in  the 
past,  but  so  can  also  each  subsequent  revival.  How 
shall  we  explain  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  physio- 
logical nerve  registration  that  the  original,  the  primi- 
tive sense  experience,  as  well  as  each  subsequent  re- 
vival, can  be  referred  to  as  distinct  psychical  facts.  For 
if  the  structural  nerve  elements  are  slightly  modified 
with  each  revival,  how  shall  we  account  for  this  psy- 
chical distinction  of  the  original  sense  experience  as  well 
as  of  the  modified  revivals?  The  remembered  experi- 
ence leaves  its  own  individual  trace,  then  a  trace  of  its 
being  a  copy  of  a  former  original  impression,  and  also 
a  trace  of  its  being  a  member  in  a  series  of  similar 
traces,  each  trace  being  a  copy  of  another  and  a  copy  of 
the  original  impression.  How  all  that  is  done  is  a 
mystery." 

These  objections  advanced  by  mc  many  years  ago 


184  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

hold  true  of  recent  theories  which  fall  back  on  the  old 
views  of  Mill  and  Carpenter,  namely,  unconscious  cere- 
bration. The  modern  upholders  of  unconscious  cere- 
bration think  that  they  have  discovered  new  facts 
and  arguments  in  favor  of  unconscious  mental  activ- 
ity, and  are  thus  justified  in  denying  subconscious  men- 
tal life.  The  arguments,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  are 
not  new,  nor  are  the  facts  advanced  in  support  of  these 
arguments  true.  The  same  objections  hold  true  in  the 
case  of  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebratioh  offered  us 
in  the  garb  of  nerve  currents  and  nerve  paths,  well  worn 
nerve  tracks,  opening  and  closing  of  nerve  currents  and 
tracks,  and  formation  of  all  shapes  and  forms  of  neu- 
rograms.  Why  be  misled  by  figments  and  by  sounds? 
The  subconscious  stands  for  a  number  of  facts,  reac- 
tions, and  behavior  which  are  accompanied  by  psychic 
life,  by  mental  activities,  by  consciousness. 

The  physiological  unconscious  registration  theories  of 
nerve  currents,  nerve-paths,  and  neurograms  are  not 
only  figments,  arbitrary  fanciful  weavings  of  the  imag- 
ination, they  cannot  even  hypothetically  explain  the 
simplest  act  of  memory,  and  especially  of  recognitive 
memory. 

Since  the  theories  of  unconscious  registration  fail  us 
in  the  most  elementary  mental  processes,  how  can  we 
possibly  rely  on  cerebration-fancies  in  the  case  of  such 
complex  phenomena  as  hypnotic  conditions  and  various 
mental  states  of  trance  and  dissociation?  The  physio- 
logical theories,  such  as  unconscious  cerebration  and 
its  modifications,  failing,  we  must  use  for  all  those 
phenomena  the  psychological  interpretation.  The  sub- 
conscious must  be  taken  as  a  necessary  theory  in  psy- 
chopathology,  as  atoms,  molecules,  electrons  and  ether 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Cerebration     185 

are  in  chemistry  and  physics.  The  subconscious  is  not 
an  "unconscious,"  it  is  not  a  physiological  automatism. 
The  subconscious  is  a  consciousness,  a  secondary  con- 
sciousness, a  sort  of  secondary  self,  the  self  being  un- 
derstood by  me  as  a  disused  consciousness. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE    SUBCONSCIOUS    AND    AUTOMATISM 

THE  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  dies 
hard.  Recently  a  few  psychologists  made  an 
attempt  to  revive  it.  The  arguments  ad- 
vanced are  rather  philosophical  than  psycho- 
logical. It  may  be  well  to  test  the  validity  of  these  ar- 
guments. If  we  clear  the  ground  of  all  superfluous 
speculations,  we  find  two  main  contentions.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  assumed  that  many  hypnotic  and  hysterical 
manifestations  are  solely  the  result  of  physiological  ac- 
tivities. It  is  claimed  by  some,  such  as  Miinsterberg, 
that  physiological  processes  without  any  psychic  accom- 
paniments, may  reach  such  a  high  state  of  complexity 
as  to  account  fully  for  all  the  observed  manifestations  in 
the  different  forms  of  mental  dissociations.  In  the  sec- 
ond place,  it  is  claimed,  from  a  purely  philosophical 
standpoint,  that  even  in  the  case  of  dissociation  when 
consciousness  may  be  granted  to  be  present,  there  is  no 
dissociation  in  consciousness  itself,  since  consciousness  is 
but  a  passive  onlooker  while  the  active  changes  go  on  in 
I  the  content  of  consciousness;  in  other  words,  in  states 
I  of  dissociation  it  is  not  consciousness  that  is  changed, 
but  only  the  content  of  consciousness. 

Let  us  examine  these  contentions  and  see  whether 
they  can  stand  the  test  of  critical  analysis.  The  view 
of  regarding  mental  activity  from  a  purely  physiological 
standpoint  is  not  new,  it  dates  as  far  back  as  Descartes, 
who  regards  all  the  animals,  with  the  exception  of  man, 

i86 


The  Subconscious  and  Automatism  187 

as  mechanical  automata.  The  philosopher,  Maimon, 
in  his  "Autobiography"  tells  an  anecdote  on  himself. 
In  his  youth  Maimon  was  an  ardent  adherent  of  Car- 
tesian automatism.  During  one  of  his  strolls  with  a 
friend  Maimon  struck  a  goat.  The  animal  bleated. 
The  friend  rebuked  Maimon  for  his  cruelty.  Maimon 
laughed  at  the  simplicity  of  his  friend. — "The  goat  is 
like  a  drum  which  sounds  when  it  is  beaten." 

Huxley  carried  this  view  further,  regarding  con- 
sciousness as  an  epiphenomenon.  The  physiological 
mechanism  is  the  engine,  consciousness  is  but  the  whis- 
tle accompanying  it. 

Of  course,  it  goes  without  saying  that  psychologists 
and  physiologists  at  present  assume  that  all  states 
of  consciousness  are  accompanied  by  physiological 
processes.  Every  thou^it,  every  feeling,  even  the  most 
complicated  poetical  inspiration,  or  the  most  abstruse 
mathematical,  logical,  and  metaphysical  speculations, 
have  physiological  processes  as  their  accompaniments. 
We  are,  however,  hardly  justified  in  carrying  this  postu- 
late to  the  absurdity  of  the  total  denial  of  consciousness, 
and  regarding  all  adjustments  and  adaptations  as  so 
many  chemical  and  mechanical  reactions — "tropisms," 
as  some  modern  biologists,  such  as  Loeb  and  others,  are 
apt  to  put  it  in  the  case  of  many  animals,  a  reversion  to 
the  Cartesian  hypothesis  of  mechanical  automatism.  Mo- 
tor reactions  can  be  regarded  solely  from  the  physiolog- 
ical standpoint,  but  consciousness  cannot  be  entirely 
ruled  out.  What  probability  is  there  that  a  play  of 
atoms  and  electrons  would  produce  the  Iliad,  Hamlet, 
the  Principia  of  Newton,  the  Celestial  Mechanics  of  La- 
place, or  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species  f 

Even  if  we  descend  to  such  motor  reactions  as  are 


1 88  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

expressed  in  the  compositions  of  a  schoolboy,  we  still  un- 
hesitatingly assume  a  conscious  activity.  We  cannot  re- 
fute the  philosopher  who  would  regard  all  such  mani- 
festations as  so  many  physiological  processes  without 
any  conscious  accompaniment.  For  though  every  one 
is  directly  conscious  of  his  own  mental  life,  no  one  can 
experience  directly  the  mental  life  of  another.  We  can- 
not inspect  directly  the  psychic  processes  that  go  on  in 
other  living  beings,  or  in  our  fellow  men.  Mind  is  in- 
ferred from  action,  from  behavior.  Reactions,  ad- 
justments to  environment,  accompanied  by  conscious- 
ness, by  intelligence  in  us,  are  rightly  judged  to  have  the 
same  accompaniment  in  other  beings,  in  our  neighbours. 
To  deny  consciousness  to  our  neighbour,  and  to  regard 
him  as  a  physiological  automaton,  is  to  put  oneself  in 
the  absurd  position  of  denying  the  existence  of  states 
which  are  observed  in  ourselves  under  similar  condi- 
tions. In  fact,  the  burden  of  proof  falls  on  those  who 
make  such  a  denial. 

Now,  in  the  case  of  hypnosis  or  various  states  of  dis- 
sociation, we  meet  with  intelligent  adjustments  often 
expressed  in  gestures,  writing,  and  speech.  We  can,  by 
means  of  various  methods,  enter  into  active  relation- 
ship with  those  dissociated  activities,  unknown  to  the  in- 
dividual himself.  We  can  obtain  intelligent  replies  to 
our  questions  either  by  writing,  or  by  speaking,  or  by 
other  arranged  means  of  communication.  What  right 
have  we  to  deny  consciousness  in  one  case  while  we 
affirm  it  in  another  case  under  similar  circumstances? 
When  I  receive  a  letter  from  my  friend  I  regard  the  let- 
ter as  having  been  written  by  a  being  who  possesses 
consciousness,  but  when  a  similar  letter  is  written  by  a 
friend  in  a  hypnotic  or  post-hypnotic  state,  we  regard 


The  Subconscious  and  Automatism  189 

it  as  the  result  of  physiological  automatism,  with  no 
conscious  accompaniment.  It  is  clear  that  the  denial  of 
consciousness  to  the  hypnotic  individuality  is  purely  ar- 
bitrary. It  is  certainly  arbitrary  in  the  case  of  double 
or  multiple  personality  to  regard  one  personality  as  con- 
scious and  the  other  personalities  as  purely  automatic, 
with  no  consciousness  in  them.  It  would  have  been 
more  consistent,  if  the  psychologist  were  to  take  the 
solipsistic  point  of  view  and  deny  consciousness  to  all 
else  except  himself. 

The  arbitrary  standpoint  of  the  psychologist  who  de- 
nies secondary  and  multiple  consciousness  can  be  still 
further  made  clear  in  the  case  of  coexistent,  dissociated 
mental  activity.  Thus  one  hand  of  the  subject  or  of 
the  patient  may  write  a  letter,  while  the  other  hand  may 
be  engaged  in  drawing  or  writing  a  composition,  of 
which  the  individual  is  not  cognizant.  Both  hands 
enter  independently  of  each  other  into  communication 
with  the  external  observer.  The  communications  are 
independent  and  equally  intelligent.  In  each  case  we 
get  intelligent  replies  and  reactions  to  our  questions 
and  stimulations.  Which  of  the  two  is  supposed  to  be 
conscious?  To  take  a  concrete  experiment.  Mr.  M. 
presents  phenomena  of  dissociation.  When  in  one  of 
those  states  of  dissociation  Mr.  M.  is  made  to  write  a 
letter  with  one  hand,  while  the  other  hand,  being  an- 
aesthetic, is  put  under  a  screen  and  made  to  carry  out  a 
calculation.  One  hand  replies  to  questions,  while  the 
other  solves  problems.  Both  hands  give  intelligent  re- 
plies. To  which  of  them  is  consciousness  to  be  ascribed? 
If  we  deny  it  in  one  case,  we  should  also  deny  it  in  the 
other.  But,  then,  why  not  be  consistent,  and  deny  it 
in  every  case  of  intelligent  adjustment?     We  realize 


190  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

how  arbitrary  and  illogical  is  the  position  of  those  psy- 
chologists who  coquet  with  physiology  under  the  de- 
lusion that  they  are  more  scientific.  They  are  led  to 
take  arbitrary  positions  which  lead  into  the  pitfalls 
of  solipsism,  with  all  its  contradictions  and  absurdities. 

Besides,  physiological  processes  are,  after  all,  but  hy- 
pothetical concepts;  physiological  currents  are  con- 
ceived after  the  model  of  electrical  currents,  and  are  by 
no  means  theoretically  proven.  While  they  should  be 
used  for  the  sake  of  a  better  elucidation  of  the  facts,  it 
is  not  good  scientific  sense  to  sacrifice  to  them  the  very 
material  of  the  science  of  psychology.  Sensations,  ideas, 
feelings,  emotions,  are  after  all  the  direct  data  of  the 
psychologist,  while  physiological  processes  and  currents 
are  purely  hypothetical.  When,  therefore,  these  hy- 
pothetical entities  lead  not  to  a  better  understanding 
of  the  facts  of  mental  life,  but  to  their  denial,  the  very 
purpose  of  the  hypothetical  creations  is  completely  de- 
feated. 

Physiological  processes  are  framed  to  explain  states 
of  consciousness  with  their  motor  reactions.  When, 
therefore,  these  hypothetical  creations  threaten  to  sweep 
away  the  actual  living  facts,  it  is  time  to  halt  and  ex- 
amine closely  the  sterile  character  of  the  hypothesis. 
The  central  fallacy  lies  in  the  tacit  assumption  that  un- 
known and  possibly  unknowable,  highly  problematical 
brain  currents,  with  their  "opening  and  closing  valves," 
with  "well  worn  or  blocked  paths,"  all  of  a  purely  conjec- 
tural character,  have,  by  their  ingenious  complexity,  be- 
come, likes  marionettes,  so  marvellously  endowed  with 
sense-like  activities  as  to  dispense  completely  with  the 
mental  states  which  these  conceptual  entities  were 
called  in  to  explain. 


The  Subconscious  and  Automatism  i^l 

Clinical  cases  and  experimental  facts  go  further  to 
invalidate  the  theory  of  the  purely  physical  interpreta- 
tion of  the  subconscious,  or  what  may  be  described  as 
automatism-psychology.  If  anything  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  in  mental  life,  it  is  surely  memory.  Mem- 
ory forms  a  unity  of  our  life,  brings,  so  to  speak,  to  a 
focus  our  life-experiences,  which  would  have  otherwise 
been  disconnected,  confused,  and  chaotic.  I  remem- 
ber just  now  what  I  did  an  hour  ago,  a  day  ago,  what 
I  lived  through  many  years  ago.  I  remember  the  ex- 
periences of  my  childhood,  boyhood,  and  youth.  I  re- 
member my  struggles  and  disappointments,  my  loves, 
my  friendships,  my  enmities,  my  feelings,  sentiments, 
emotions,  ideas,  and  sensations.  All  these  inter-con- 
nected, interlocked  links  of  memories  form  the  solid 
chain  of  my  conscious  personality. 

In  my  memory  of  the  past  experiences  there  is 
the  present  consciousness  that  all  that  I  had  gone 
through  at  the  time  of  the  experience — any  change, 
any  modification,  that  had  taken  place — occurred 
in  my  mind,  in  my  consciousness.  Unless  under 
delusion  or  illusion  of  memory  we  cannot  remem- 
ber what  did  not  occur  in  consciousness.  We  can- 
not remember  what  we  were  not  conscious  of.  The 
past  mental  state  which  the  present  memory  refers  to  is 
a  state  of  consciousness;  otherwise  memory  is  impossi- 
ble and  meaningless.  Memory,  recollection,  reminis- 
cence, can  only  refer  to  a  previous  state  of  consciousness. 
Surely  no  one  else  can  have  a  better  and  more  direct 
knowledge  than  I  myself  have  of  the  ideas,  emotions, 
and  moods  that  I  remember,  as  experienced  by  me. 

The  memory  factor  is  all  the  more  important  in 
psychology,  since  we  have  to  take  account  of  the  sub- 


192  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ject's  inner  experiences.  In  each  case  of  memory  the 
burden  of  proof  falls  on  those  who  deny  the  validity  of 
that  memory,  as  referring  to  a  past  state  of  conscious- 
ness. Suppose  I  have  a  memory  in  a  full  state  of  con- 
sciousness that  I  lighted  a  lamp  an  hour  ago,  the  burden 
of  proof  would  fall  on  those  who  deny  the  existence  of 
such  a  state.  It  would  be  an  arbitrary,  if  not  a  prepos- 
terous position  for  an  outside  observer  to  claim  that  the 
lighting  of  the  lamp  was  carried  out  mechanically,  by 
a  physiological  automatism,  and  that  the  subsequent 
memory  was  but  an  illusion.  The  onus  of  proof  that 
the  original  act  had  no  conscious  accompaniment  is  en- 
tirely on  those  who  take  such  a  position  in  opposition 
to  the  direct  introspective  account.  Where  such  a  proof 
is  not  forthcoming,  the  position  taken  is  arbitrary.  Were 
we  to  take  such  a  position,  the  very  science  of 
psychology  would  become  an  impossibility,  since  all 
memory  would  have  to  be  declared  a  snare  and  a  delu- 
sion. All  psychological  studies  based  on  introspection 
and  memory  would  have  to  be  abandoned,  and  we 
should  have  to  follow  Comt6,  and  declare  psychology 
an  impossibility.  A  psychologist  maintaining  such  a 
point  of  view  is,  from  the  very  nature  of  his  attitude, 
disqualified  to  give  his  opinion;  he  must  fall  back  on 
physiology,  and  rule  out  all  psychology. 

If,  however,  memory  and  introspection  are  not  re- 
jected, then  the  recollection  of  a  conscious  state  should 
not  be  arbitrarily  dismissed,  unless  there  are  good  rea- 
sons for  such  a  dismissal.  Now,  the  hypnotic  subject, 
or  the  patient,  in  the  case  of  functional  psychosis,  un- 
dergoes an  experience  of  which  he  is  apparently  uncon- 
scious. In  a  subsequent  state,  in  a  hypnotic  or  trance 
state,  he  actually  recollects  that  the  experience  was  a 


The  Subconscious  and  Automatism  193 

conscious  one;  we  cannot  possibly  reject  this  recollec- 
tion as  an  illusion  of  memory.  The  burden  of  proof 
that  the  former  state  was  not  a  conscious  one  falls  on 
him  who  denies  the  person's  mental  experience.  Such  a 
proof  is  all  the  more  requisite,  since  it  can  be  demon- 
strated that  in  subconscious  states  there  is  really  pres- 
ent a  subconscious  consciousness. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

THE  SUBCONSCIOUS  AND  THE  PASSIVE  CONSCIOUSNESS 

DRIVEN  out  of  the  psychological  fortress, 
some  psychologists  of  the  philosophical  type 
(Miinsterberg)  still  take  refuge  in  the  meta- 
physical citadel.  It  is  claimed  that,  psycho- 
logically, mental  life  is  analyzed  into  consciousness  and 
its  content.  Now,  it  is  further  assumed  that  all  mental 
modifications  occur  in  mental  contents,  but  not  in  con- 
sciousness. Consciousness,  itself,  is  supposed  to  be  a 
passive,  immutable  looker-on,  a  sort  of  psychic  deity. 
We  thus  have  a  mental  content  which  is  not  conscious 
and  a  consciousness,  the  blessed  Buddha  in  his  blissful 
state  of  Nirvana.  Consciousness  is  regarded  in  the  light 
of  a  substance  which  contains  the  mental  content  some- 
what after  the  fashion  of  a  material  substance  underly- 
ing physical  qualities.  This  view  of  an  underlying,  im- 
mutable substance,  with  a  changing  qualitative  content, 
was  long  ago  criticized  by  Hume,  both  in  the  case  of 
mind  and  body.  The  assumption  of  an  entity  under- 
lying observed  phenomena,  whether  physical  or  mental, 
has  since  become  so  weakened  that  it  is  no  longer  re- 
garded as  a  living  hypothesis  among  thinking  men  of 
science. 

We  can  see  at  a  glance  that  the  substance-conscious- 
ness with  its  changing  qualitative  content  is  but  a  piece 
of  metaphysical  speculation,  it  is  a  revival  of  the  old 
soul-hypothesis,  long  ago  buried  by  modern  psycholo- 
gists.    The  soul-consciousness  hypothesis  must  be  re- 

194 


Subconscious  and  the  Passive  Consciousness     195 

jectcd,  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  complicates 
matters,  and  explains  nothing.  In  fact,  the  hypo- 
thesis of  an  imperturbable  soul-consciousness  from  the 
very  nature  of  its  hypothetical  being,  itself  requires  an 
explanation,  while  it  does  not  in  the  least  explain  the 
mental  content,  which  is  the  material  of  the  psycholo- 
gist. Such  a  passive,  changeless  soul-consciousness  is 
a  sort  of  box  in  which  the  content  of  soul-consciousness 
resides  and  has  its  being.  This  soul-consciousness  is  but 
a  survival  from  a  past  metaphysical  period. 

In  the  case  of  double  and  multiple  personalities  it  is 
claimed  that  while  the  personalites  are  different,  their 
consciousness  is  not  different,  but  one  and  the  same.  In 
the  different  personalities  found  in  the  case  of  multiple 
personality,  there  is  among  them  but  one  consciousness, 
somewhat  like  the  Greek  myth  of  the  three  old  women 
with  one  eye  among  them.  By  a  parity  of  reasoning  we 
may  say  that  the  minds  of  different  individuals,  such  as 
John's  and  Peter's,  are  really  identical.  John  and  Pe- 
ter are  different  personalities  with  different  contents, 
but  with  the  same  consciousness.  In  fact,  we  may  gen- 
eralize further  and  say  that  the  whole  human  race  and 
the  beasts  of  the  field  and  the  birds  of  the  air  share 
in  one  and  the  same  indivisible,  passive,  immutable  con- 
sciousness, a  sort  of  world-soul.  This  may  be  a  grand 
metaphysical  speculation,  but  it  is  neither  psychological 
nor  scientific. 

There  is  another  objection  to  the  subconscious,  an 
objection  based  on  an  artificial  fast  and  hard  line  drawn 
between  the  purpose  of  science  on  the  one  hand,  and 
that  of  will  on  the  other.  Science,  it  is  claimed,  deals 
with  artificial  concepts,  while  personal  will  is  concerned 
with  the  real  values  of  life,    Jt  is  claimed  th^t  the  con- 


196  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

cept  of  the  subconscious  is  illegitimate,  because  it  in- 
volves a  confusion  of  this  metaphysical  double  book- 
keeping. 

The  world  of  description  and  the  world  of  appre- 
ciation were  brought  out  and  contrasted  by  Professor 
Royce  in  his  early  works,  and  afterwards  elaborated  by 
a  few  psychologists  of  the  Schopenhauerian  tinge.  The 
division  is  not  new,  and  dates  back  to  the  Middle  Ages, 
with  its  split  of  science  and  philosophy  on  the  one  hand, 
and  religion  on  the  other.  It  is  the  doctrine  of  the  two- 
fold truth  (Die  Lehre  von  der  zweifachen  Wahrheit). 
According  to  mediaeval  thought,  there  are  two  realms, 
the  realm  of  knowledge  and  the  realm  of  faith;  the 
realm  of  intellect  and  the  realm  of  will.  What  is  true 
in  the  one  may  not  be  true  in  the  other.  From  Maimo- 
nides,  Ibn  Gabirol,  Albertus  Magnus,  Thomas  Aquinas 
to  Duns  Scotus  and  Occam  the  same  doctrine  of  the  two- 
fold truth  and  the  two  realms  prevailed.  The  scholastic 
could  say  anything  he  wished  provided  he  was  cautious 
to  claim  that  what  was  true  secundum  rationem  was  not 
true  secundum  fidem. 

This  double  view  still  survives  in  some  philosophical 
quarters.  Instead  of  finding  fault  with  the  subcon- 
scious for  ignoring  this  time-honored  double  truth,  it 
should  rather  be  regarded  as  a  special  merit.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  the  subconscious,  unless  interpreted  in  meta- 
physical terms  of  a  cosmic  self,  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  heirloom  of  metaphysical  mediaeval  thought.  The 
subconscious  is  based  on  experience  and  facts  to  which 
philosophical  and  metaphysical  distinctions  should  adapt 
themselves. 

We  thus  find  that  the  objections  to  the  subconscious 
arc  based  on  insufficient  grounds.    We  also  find  that  the 


Subconscious  and  the  Passive  Consciousness     197 

abandonment  of  the  subconscious  leads  to  a  tangle  of 
difficulties  and  to  the  quagmire  of  mediaeval  metaphys- 
ics. .  If  the  metaphysical  interpretation  of  the  sub- 
conscious in  the  sense  of  a  cosmic  self  lands  one  in  the 
misty  regions  of  religious  mysticism,  the  opposite  view 
of  the  total  negation  of  the  subconscious,  apparently  in 
the  interests  of  science,  lands  one  in  regions  no  less 
shadowy,  regions  of  naturalistic  mysticism. 

So  fundamental,  however,  is  the  concept  of  the  sub- 
conscious that  even  its  opponents  have  to  admit  it  under 
different  names.  They  admit  the  fact  of  dissociation, 
of  dissociated  mental  systems,  and  of  dissociated  person- 
alities. But  they  put  forth  the  hypothetical  claim  that 
it  is  one  and  the  same  consciousness  present  in  all  the 
different  forms  of  dissociation.  Now,  if  we  omit  that 
speculative  metaphysical  consciousness  which,  being  in- 
active and  unchangeable,  is  of  no  use  in  scientific  work, 
we  are  really  left  with  the  mutations  and  permutations 
of  mental  systems  which,  from  their  very  nature,  must 
be  conscious.  The  psychopathologist  must  postulate 
the  subconscious  just  as  the  geometrician  postulates  space 
and  position,  or  as  the  physicist  postulates  matter  and 
force. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

SUBCONSCIOUS  AND  UNCONSCIOUS  IDEAS 

THERE  is  a  school  which  regards  the  sub- 
conscious as  formed  of  "suppressed  mental 
complexes."  The  views  of  this  school  are 
not  psychologically  clear.  It  seems,  however, 
that  the  subconscious  is  viewed  in  the  light  of  "un- 
conscious ideas."  "Unconscious  Ideas"  were  discussed 
by  me  in  my  Psychology  of  Suggestion,  and  I  cannot 
do  better  than  to  quote  from  that  volume,  "For  the 
mechanism  of  consciousness  is  hidden  deep  down  in  the 
depths  of  the  subconscious,  and  it  is  thither  we  have  to 
descend  in  order  to  get  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
phenomena  that  appear  in  the  broad  daylight  of  con- 
sciousness. 

The  German  school,  with  Wundt  at  its  head,  at  first 
started  out  on  similar  lines,  but  they  could  not  make  any 
use  of  the  subconscious,  and  their  speculations  ran  wild 
in  the  fancies  of  Hartmann.  The  reason  of  this  failure 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  the  subconscious 
as  conceived  by  the  German  school  was  extremely  vague, 
and  had  rather  the  character  of  a  mechanical  than  that 
of  a  psychical  process.  An  unconscious  consciousness 
— that  was  their  concept  of  the  subconscious.  In  such 
a  form  as  this  the  subconscious  was  certainly  meaning- 
less— mere  nonsense — and  had  to  be  given  up.  The 
German  psychological  investigations  are  now  confined  to 
the  content  of  consciousness  in  so  far  as  the  individual 
is  immediately  conscious  of  it.    But  as  this  form  of  con- 

198 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Ideas  199 

sciousness  is  extremely  narrow  and  circumscribed,  the 
results  arrived  at,  though  remarkable  for  their  thor- 
oughness, are,  after  all,  of  a  rather  trivial  nature.  It  is 
what  James  aptly  characterizes  as  "the  elaboration  of 
the  obvious." 

This  criticism  applies  well  to  Freud  and  his  adher- 
ents. Das  Unhewusste  is  conceived  as  "Suppressed  un- 
conscious idea-complexes."  Of  course,  the  claims  of 
that  school  to  originality  and  to  the  apparent  unveiling 
of  the  causation  of  psychoneurosis  are  entirely  unjusti- 
fied. A  "suppressed  complex"  is  but  another  term  for 
a  dissociated  system,  commonly  accepted  in  psychopath- 
ology.  The  special  theories  developed  by  that  school  in 
regard  to  desire,  to  sexuality,  and  to  voluntary  suppres- 
sion of  unpleasant  or  painful  ideas  are  entirely  gratuit- 
ous and  false  in  the  light  of  modern  psychology  and  clin- 
ical experience. 

This  psycho-analytic  school  has  unfortunately  fallen 
back  on  the  Herbartian  psychology  with  its  metaphysical 
Reals  or  ideas  which  by  their  mutual  tension  keep 
suppressing  one  another,  thus  determining  the  dis- 
play of  the  contents  of  consciousness.  As  Her- 
bart  tells  us:  "Concepts  become  forces  when  they  resist 
one  another.  This  resistance  occurs  when  two  or  more 
opposed  concepts  encounter  one  another."  This  proposi- 
tion or  principle  proclaimed  by  Herbart  is  at  the  basis 
of  Freud's  mythical  speculations.  "A  concept  is  in  con- 
sciousness in  so  far  as  it  is  not  suppressed,"  Herbart  tells 
us,  "but  is  in  actual  representation.  When  it  rises  out  of 
complete  suppression,  it  enters  into  consciousness."  Ac- 
cording to  Herbart  and  his  modern  followers,  sup- 
pressed ideas  become  forces  and  impulses.  Concepts 
which  are  not  opposed  or  contrasted  with  one  another, 


too  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

so  far  as  they  meet  unhindered,  form  a  "complex,"  a 
favourite  term  used  by  the  psycho-analytic  school  and 
its  followers. 

It  may  possibly  be  of  interest  to  remark  that  Herbart 
is  closely  followed  by  the  psycho-analytic  school 
in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  desire.  Desire  with 
Herbart  is  fundamental.  "The  faculty  of  desire 
must  include  wishes,  instincts,  and  every  species  of  long- 
ing." "The  expression  'desire'  must  not  be  so  limited 
as  to  exclude  those  wishes  which  remain,  though  they 
may  be  vain,  or  so-called  pious  wishes,  and  which,  for 
the  very  reason  that  they  do  remain,  constantly  incite 
men  to  new  efforts,  because  through  them  the  thought  of 
a  possibility  is  ever  anew  suggested,  in  spite  of  all  rea- 
sons which  appear  to  prove  the  impossibility  of  attain- 
ment. It  is  very  important  to  give  the  concept  of  the 
unattainability  of  the  wished-for  object  strength  enough 
so  that  a  peaceful  renunciation  may  take  place  of  the 
desire.  A  man  dreams  of  a  desirable  future  for  him- 
self, even  when  he  knows  it  will  never  come."  These 
Herbartian  doctrines,  long  ago  abandoned  by  psychol- 
ogy, are  now  being  revived  by  the  marvellous,  "scien- 
tific" psycho-analytic  technique  as  a  new  discovery  in  the 
science  of  normal  and  abnormal  psychology.  No  better 
criticism  can  be  passed  on  this  revival  of  Herbartian 
psychology  in  the  domain  of  psychopathology  than  the 
one  made  by  James:  "I  must  confess  that  to  my 
mind  there  is  something  almost  hideous  in  the  glib  Her- 
bartian jargon  about  V orstellungmassen  and  their  Hem- 
mungen  (suppressions)  and  sinken  and  erhehen  and 
schwehen  and  Verschmelzungen  and  Complexionen 
(complexes.)" 

It  is  claimed  by  some  of  Freud's  younger  adherents 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Ideas         201 

that  the  mechanism  of  "unconscious  ideas,"  though  a 
contradiction,  is  nevertheless  justified,  because  of  its 
being  a  conceptual  construct,  as  Karl  Pearson  puts  it, 
in  order  to  aid  the  explanation  of  mental  phenomena. 
This  is  a  new  epistemological  argument  in  defence  of  a 
tottering  system.  It  is  truly  amazing  that  science  has 
nowadays  become  so  philosophical  that  when  a  theory 
is  unstable,  it  is  unhesitatingly  supported  by  epistemo- 
logical considerations. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  well  to  point  out  that  self-contra- 
dictory hypotheses  are  not  quite  acceptable  in  science. 
A  scientific  hypothesis  should  at  least  have  the  merit  of 
being  rational,  logical,  and  not  conceived  in  a  wild 
harum-scarum  fashion.  A  good  scientific  hypothesis 
must  have  restrictions  and  definite  conditions.  I  think 
it  is  Huxley  who  says  that  in  the  case  of  stolen  goods 
two  hypotheses  are  at  hand:  one  hypothesis  is  that  an 
angel  is  responsible  for  it,  and  the  other  that  a  thief  has 
carried  off  the  goods.  The  angel-hypothesis  is  hardly 
considered  by  science.  In  other  words,  the  hypothetical 
causative  agency  must  be  conceived  in  terms  of  ex- 
perience. 

The  hypothetical  agency  must  either  be  a  fact  di- 
rectly observed  in  nature,  or  a  fact  which  can  be  verified 
later  on.  Thus  the  theory  of  gravitation  is  based  on 
the  facts  of  falling  bodies;  the  theory  of  natural  selec- 
tion is  based  on  the  facts  of  the  struggle  for  existence 
observed  in  the  organic  world.  In  short,  a  good  scien- 
tific hypothesis  must  take  as  its  causative  agency  a  vera 
causa,  a  fact  observable  in  experience,  or  a  fact  which 
can  be  verified  by  further  experience.  Atoms,  electrons, 
ether,  are  not  haphazard  constructs;  they  are  not  re- 
garded by  the  physicist  as  unreal  fancies,  unreal  abstract 


202  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

notions  to  explain  the  real  facts;  but  each  of  these  hy- 
pothetical agents  is  regarded  as  real,  as  a  vera  causa. 
We  cannot  help  agreeing  with  J.  S.  Mill  on  the  subject 
of  hypothesis:  "I  conceive  it  to  be  necessary,  when  the 
hypothesis  relates  to  causation,  that  the  supposed  cause 
should  not  only  be  a  real  phenomenon,  something  actu- 
ally existing  in  nature,  but  should  be  already  known  to 
exercise,  or  at  least  to  be  capable  of  exercising,  an  influ- 
ence of  some  sort  over  the  effect.  In  any  other  case  it  is 
no  sufficient  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the  hypothesis  that 
we  are  able  to  deduce  the  real  phenomenon  from  it." 
Again,  "What  is  true  in  [Newton's]  maxim  is  that  the 
cause,  though  not  known  previously,  should  be  capable 
of  being  known  thereafter;  that  its  existence  should  be 
capable  of  being  detected,  and  its  connection  with  the 
effect  ascribed  to  it  should  be  susceptible  of  being  proved 
by  independent  evidence." 

If  we  apply  this  very  simple  rule  of  logic  to  the  theory 
of  "unconscious  ideas,"  we  at  once  realize  the  illegiti- 
mate character  of  such  a  hypothesis.  An  idea  is  essen- 
tially of  a  conscious  nature.  To  speak,  therefore,  of 
unconscious  ideas,  is  to  introduce  into  psychology  the 
self-contradictory  impossible  concept  of  unconscious 
conscious  ideas.  This  is  equivalent  to  the  assumption  of 
an  unconscious  consciousness.  An  unconscious  idea  is 
neither  a  vera  causa  nor  a  fact  ultimately  to  be  verified. 
The  conception  of  an  unconscious  idea  is  like  the  con- 
ception of  a  round  square. 

Moreover,  it  is  not  true,  psychologically,  that  ideas 
can  be  "suppressed"  so  that  they  become  dissociated  or 
"unconscious."  It  is  not  true  that  we  suppress  painful 
ideas  into  the  "unconscious."  We  do  not  forget  our 
painful  ideas.    On  the  contrary,  painful  ideas  stand  out 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Ideas         203 

all  the  more  prominent  In  our  consciousness.  Pain  ham- 
mers experience  into  the  mind.  In  fact  we  may  say  with 
more  right  that  it  is  the  pleasurable  ideas  that  are  for- 
gotten, while  the  painful  ideas  are  remembered.  An 
experience  associated  with  pain  is  never  forgotten.  Like 
a  splinter  in  the  flesh,  it  remains  in  consciousness.  It  is 
due  to  other  causes  that  a  painful  experience  becomes 
subconscious. 

Teleologically,  we  can  well  see  the  importance  of  this 
fact.  It  would  have  been  suicidal  to  the  individual  and 
ultimately  to  the  species,  if  painful  experiences  were  for- 
gotten. The  individual  must  learn  to  avoid  harmful  ob- 
jects and  hurtful  stimuli.  This  can  only  be  accom- 
plished by  actually  remembering  painful  experiences. 
That  individual  would  survive  who  remembered  best 
his  painful  experiences.  Were  it  otherwise,  the  indi- 
vidual would  be  very  much  in  the  condition  of  the  pro- 
verbial silly  bird  that  hides  its  head  at  the  sight  of  the 
hunter.  The  subjective  painful  experiences  must  be  re- 
membered;  a  painful  experience  fixes  the  attention. 

On  this  fact  of  strengthening  memory  by  pain  was 
based  the  once  universally  recognized  method  of  train- 
ing and  education.  What  is  fixed  by  pain  is  never  forgot- 
ten. What  may  bring  about  forgetfulness  is  either 
a  constitutionally  bad  memory,  or  a  state  of  indif- 
ference, or  an  intense,  paralyzing  emotion  of  fear, 
especially  in  early  childhood.  The  whole  theory  of 
"suppression"  of  painful  "complexes"  is  based  on 
false  clinical  and  psychological  assumptions.  Neither 
is  there  such  a  process  as  "suppression  of  complexes," 
nor  is  there  such  a  mental  state  as  an  "unconscious 
idea." 

Bergson,  who  as  usual  has  his  hand  everywhere,  takes 


204  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

up  cudgels  in  defense  of  the  unconscious.  In  his  work 
"Matter  and  Memory"  he  argues  that  common  sense 
assumes  the  presence  of  external  objects,  although  it 
may  not  be  directly  cognizant  of  them.  Being  an  ideal- 
ist and  pan-psychist  Bergson  regards  the  nature  of  things 
as  made  up  of  images.  If,  then,  he  reasons,  common 
sense  believes  in  the  existence  of  objects  'passed  out  of 
sight  and  sense,'  if  it  affirms  unhesitatingly  the  actual 
existence  of  not  directly  experienced  objective  images, 
there  should  be  no  difficulty  in  assuming  the  existence  of 
subjective  images,  or  of  psychic  states  of  which  there  is 
no  consciousness.  The  argument  is  essentially  meta- 
physical and  will  hardly  have  any  weight  with  the  psy- 
chologist or  psychopathologist. 

Bergson's  psychology  is  unfortunately  so  much  satu- 
rated with  metaphysics  that  many  a  valuable  sug- 
gestion becomes  lost  in  the  haze  and  tangle  of 
his  speculations.  The  psychologist  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  constitution  of  matter  as  it  is 
in  itself.  This  belongs  to  metaphysical  ontology.  The 
psychologist  assumes  matter  as  an  external  existence, 
and  separates  it  from  his  own  subject  matter, — psychic 
states,  mental  processes,  their  elements  and  relations.  A 
psychic  state  made  up  of  'images'  after  the  fashion  of 
'material  images'  with  no  consciousness  to  them  ceases 
to  be  psychic  in  the  psychological  sense.  From  a  psy- 
chological standpoint  the  term  'psychic'  can  only  mean 
some  form  of  consciousness,  however  vague  and  mar- 
ginal. Bergson's  view  would  have  probably  been  near- 
er the  truth,  if  he  had  assumed  the  existence  of  a  subcon- 
scious consciousness. 

An  "unconscious  idea"  in  the  sense  that  the  idea  has 
no  consciousness  can  have  no  meaning.  If,  however,  by 


Subconscious  and  Unconscious  Ideas         205 

an  "unconscious  idea"  is  understood  a  consciousness  of 
which  the  individual  or  personal  self  is  not  conscious, 
then  we  come  around  to  a  subconscious  consciousness,  as 
developed  by  me  in  my  various  works.  A  quotation 
from  Hoffding  may  bring  out  my  point  in  a  clearer  and 
stronger  light: 

"The  question  before  us  is,  whether  the  unconscious 
can  be  other  than  a  purely  negative  concept.  In  daily 
speech  ( and  more  than  is  proper  even  in  the  scientific  use 
of  the  language)  we  use  such  expressions  as  unconscious 
sensations,  unconscious  ideas,  unconscious  feeling.  As, 
however,  sensations,  ideas  and  feelings  are  conscious 
elements,  the  expression  is  in  reality  absurd.  If  by  an 
unconscious  idea  is  meant  the  idea  which  I  have,  then 
the  predicate  "unconscious"  signifies  only  that  I  do  not 
think  of  or  pay  heed  to  the  fact  that  I  have  it.  This  use 
of  the  word  unconsciousness  is  connected  with  a  twofold 
use  of  the  word  consciousness.  It  is  used  to  denote  not 
only  the  inner  presentation  of  our  sensations,  ideas  and 
feelings,  but  also  self-consciousness,  the  attention  espe- 
cially directed  to  our  sensations,  ideas,  and  feelings. 
We  have,  of  course,  many  sensations  and  ideas 
without  being  conscious  that  we  have  them, 
that  is,  without  self-consciousness:  many  feelings 
and  impulses  stir  within  us,  without  our  clearly 
apprehending  their  nature  and  direction.  In  this  sense 
we  speak,  for  example,  of  unconscious  love.  A  man 
who  has  this  feeling  does  not  know  what  is  astir  in  him ; 
perhaps  others  see  it,  or  he  himself  gradually  discovers 
it;  but  he  has  the  feeling,  his  conscious  life  is  determined 
in  a  particular  way." 

In  other  words,  what  Hoffding  practically  claims  here 
it  that  there  is  no  such  mental  state,  no  idea  that  li 


2o6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

"unconscious,"  but  that  there  are  mental  states,  ideas, 
feelings,  which,  though  conscious,  do  not  reach  self- 
consciousness.  In  other  words,  there  are  in  us  mental 
processes  which  have  consciousness,  but  no  self-con- 
sciousness. This  is  precisely  what  I  mean  by  the  sub- 
conscious,— mental  states  which  have  consciousness,  but 
do  not  reach  the  personal  consciousness.  In  short,  the 
only  possible  psychological  assumption  is  a  subconscious 
consciousness. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

THE  SUBCONSCIOUS,  CONSCIOUS,  AND  UNCONSCIOUS 

THOSE  who  accept  the  division  of  the  sub- 
conscious into  co-existing  consciousness,  or  the 
co-conscious  and  the  unconscious  really  as- 
sume the  doctrine  of  the  subconscious.  They 
claim  that  it  would  be  better  and  more  precise  to  indi- 
cate whenever  possible  the  conscious  or  unconscious, 
that  is,  the  strictly  physiological  character  of  the  ob- 
served manifestations.  This,  however,  is  more  easily 
said  than  done.  We  know  next  to  nothing  of  the  physi- 
ological brain  processes,  which  are  mainly  hypothetical, 
and  we  do  not  know  the  limits  of  the  subconscious  con- 
sciousness. In  many  cases  it  is  not  easy  to  determine 
what  the  exact  character  of  the  subconscious  manifesta- 
tion is,  how  far  it  is  conscious,  dimly  conscious,  how  far 
it  has  gone  toward  the  development  of  an  independent 
personality,  and  how  far  it  shades  in  the  direction  of 
the  purely  physiological.  In  the  absence  of  any  exact 
determination,  the  term  'subconscious'  indicates  the  char- 
acter of  the  mental  state  without  any  definite  commit- 
tal to  any  of  the  possible  hypotheses. 

The  term  "unconscious"  is  all  the  more  objectionable, 
as  Hoffding  has  already  pointed  out,  it  is  essentially 
an  ambiguous,  negative  concept.  The  "unconscious" 
may  mean  absence  of  self-consciousness,  or  lack  of  con- 
sciousness, that  is,  purely  physiological  processes  with 
no  conscious  concomitant.  He  who  uses  the  term  "un- 
conscious" must  in  each  case  indicate  in  what  sense  he 

207 


208  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

uses  the  term.  Is  the  manifestation  entirely  physiolog- 
ical, or  is  it  conscious  in  the  sense  of  consciousness  with 
no  self-consciousness?  The  two  meanings  are  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  each  other.  The  unconscious  in 
the  sense  of  the  purely  physiological  assumes  the  theory 
of  unconscious  cerebration ;  the  other  use  of  the  uncon- 
scious in  the  sense  of  mere  consciousness  with  no  self- 
consciousness  recognizes  the  view  of  the  subconscious- 
ness as  advanced  in  my  works. 

It  is  claimed  again  that  in  many  cases  of  psychopathic 
maladies  there  is  no  need  to  have  recourse  to  sub- 
conscious systems.  It  is  quite  probable  that  the  associa- 
tion between  the  stimulus  and  the  emotion  called  forth 
is  a  direct  one.  The  patient  who  is  afraid  of  dogs  has 
the  fear  called  forth  by  the  sight  of  a  dog.  There  is 
no  need  to  assume  that  there  are  here  any  intermediate 
links  in  the  chain  of  association.  Even  physiological 
links  may  be  totally  absent  here.  It  may  be  that  by 
investigation  it  can  be  shown  that  this  association  has 
a  history  based  on  some  former  experience.  There  is  no 
reason  to  assume  that  the  experience  is  functioning  sub- 
consciously, whether  consciously  or  "unconsciously,"  that 
is,  physiologically.  The  dog  and  the  fear  have  formed 
an  indissoluble  association,  so  that,  as  soon  as  the  dog 
is  perceived  the  fear  is  awakened. 

This,  however,  is  rather  a  debatable  subject,  since  it 
is  impossible  to  tell  in  the  case  of  purely  physiological 
links,  whether  such  are  present  or  not.  Thus,  Hoflf- 
ding  says,  "Not  only  may  conscious  results  come  from 
unconscious  (subconscious)  working  up,  but  there  may 
also  be  unconscious  intermediate  links  in  the  midst  of 
conscious  work.  Supposing  the  idea  a  to  be  linked  with 
the  idea  b,  and  b  again  with  c,  then  a  will  finally  pro- 


The  Subconscious,  Conscious,  and  Unconscious  209 

duce  c  directly  without  the  intervention  of  b.  The  inter- 
mediate links  are  often  so  numerous  that  they  cannot 
be  recovered  at  all  or  with  great  difficulty.  Many  psy- 
chological paradoxes  and  sudden  suggestions  have  their 
explanation  in  this  unconscious  determining  of  conscious 
ideas." 

Wundt  seems  to  maintain  the  same  view:  "The 
memory-process  is  especially  predominant  in  those  cases 
where  the  element  of  the  new  impression  that  gave  rise 
to  the  assimilation  is  entirely  suppressed  by  the  other 
components  of  the  image,  so  that  the  associative  rela- 
tion between  the  memory-idea  and  the  impression  may 
remain  completely  unnoticed.  Such  cases  have  been 
spoken  of  as  'mediate  memories'  or  'mediate  associa- 
tions.' Still,  just  as  with  'mediate  recognitions,'  we 
are  here,  too,  dealing  with  processes  that  are  funda- 
mentally the  same  as  ordinary  associations.  Take,  for 
example,  the  case  of  a  person  who,  sitting  in  his  room 
at  evening,  suddenly  remembers,  without  any  apparent 
reason,  a  landscape  that  he  passed  through  many  years 
before;  examination  shows  that  there  happened  to  be 
in  the  room  a  fragrant  flower  which  he  saw  for  the  first 
time  in  the  landscape.  The  difference  between  this  and 
an  ordinary  memory-process  in  which  the  connection 
of  the  new  impression  with  an  earlier  experience  is 
clearly  recognized,  obviously  consisted  in  the  fact  that 
here  the  elements  which  recall  the  idea  are  pushed  into 
the  obscure  background  of  consciousness.  The  not 
infrequent  experience,  commonly  known  as  the  'spon- 
taneous rise'  of  ideas,  in  which  a  memory-image  sud- 
denly appears  in  our  mind  without  any  assignable  cause, 
is  in  all  probability  reducible  in  every  case  to  such  latent 
association."    It  appears,  then,  that  both  Hoffding  and 


2IO  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

Wundt  acknowledge  the  presence  of  intermediate  links 
in  what  appears  to  be  a  case  of  purely  "immediate"  as- 
sociation. 

In  cases  where  the  intermediate  links  are  "un- 
conscious," in  the  sense  of  a  purely  physiological  pro- 
cess, there  is  no  criterion  to  prove  the  presence  of  such 
intermediate  physiological  links,  and  one  may  as  well, 
from  a  purely  psychological  introspective  standpoint, 
deny  their  very  existence.  On  the  other  hand,  if  with 
Wundt,  Hoffding  and  others  we  assume  the  presence 
of  intermediate  psychic  links,  there  is  no  way  of  dis- 
proving them.  It  is  quite  probable  that  such  inter- 
mediate links  are  present  in  every  single  case.  The 
very  fact  that  "unconscious"  systems  can  be  revived 
as  memories  or  hallucinatory  hypnoidic  states  would  in- 
dicate their  functioning  when  one  of  their  components 
becomes  awakened  to  activity. 

As  an  objection  to  the  presence  of  intermediate  psy- 
chic links  Pavlow's  experiments  are  brought  forward 
to  show  that  associations  can  be  formed  between  re- 
mote stimuli  and  glandular  secretions,  for  instance. 
Thus,  a  dog  with  a  fistula  in  the  parotid  gland  can  be 
made  to  react  with  secretions  to  light  or  sound  stimuli. 

This  objection  may  be  easily  obviated  by  the  consider- 
ation that  we  do  not  know  whether  there  are  or  are 
not  intermediate  mental  links  between  the  artificial 
stimuli  and  the  discharge  of  the  glandular  secretion. 
This  consideration  is  all  the  more  cogent  as  the  remote 
stimuli  can  only  give  results,  if  persistently  associated 
with  food  stimuli.  If  such  association  with  food  stimuli 
is  absent,  and  new  stimuli  are  associated  with  remote 
stimuli  which  give  reactions  through  their  associations 
with  food  stimuli,  the  result  is  inhibition  of  secretion. 


The  Subconscious,  Conscious,  and  Unconscious  21 1 

In  other  words,  each  new  stimulus  must  be  directly  as- 
sociated with  the  original  food  stimulus. 

To  quote  from  Savadsky's  work  carried  out  in  Pav- 
low's  laboratory:  "Wasiliev  and  Mishtovt  were  the 
first  to  investigate  conditions  of  inhibitions.  At  first 
the  authors  had  in  mind  to  develop  conditional  reflexes, 
not  on  the  basis  of  the  unconditional  reflex  {i.  e.  food) 
but  on  the  basis  of  another  conditional  reflex  (such  as 
a  sound  or  light  stimulus  giving  secretion.)  Their  ex- 
periments were  as  follows:  From  time  to  time  they  as- 
sociated with  the  usual  conditional  stimulus  another 
stimulus  which  had  no  relation  whatever  to  salivary 
secretion,  and  this  combination  was  not  accompanied 
by  the  presence  of  the  unconditional  stimulus  (food). 
By  means  of  a  great  number  of  repetitions  of  such  a 
combination,  it  was  supposed  to  associate  with  the 
quality  of  the  extraneous  stimulus  the  quality  of  bring- 
ing about  salivary  secretion.  It  turned  out,  however, 
that  such  an  arrangement  of  experimentation  could  by  no 
means  transform  the  extraneous  agent  into  a  conditional 
stimulus.  In  that  way  it  became  clear  that  the  condi- 
tional stimulus,  contrary  to  the  unconditional,  is  not 
capable  of  communicating  its  property  of  bringing  about 
salivary  secretion.  The  fact  is  that  the  associative  ex- 
ternal stimulus,  when  accompanied  by  the  unconditional 
stimulus  alone,  becomes  after  a  few  repetitions  a  power- 
ful inhibiting  agent." 

This  clearly  shows  that  the  conditional  reflex  in  the 
dog  can  bring  about  salivary  secretions  only  when 
associated  with  the  unconditional  reflex.  What  it  means 
is,  that  the  dog  on  seeing  a  light  or  hearing  the  sound 
expects  food,  and  hence  the  psychic  stimulation  of  his 
salivary  glands  resulting  in  secretion.     Pavlow's  experi- 


212  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ments  and  also  the  experiments  carried  out  under  his 
directions  by  his  pupils  clearly  prove  that  there  is  no 
direct  association  between  secretion  and  an  external 
stimulus,  such  as  light  or  sound,  but  that  the  secretion 
is  brought  about  by  an  intermediate  psychic  link,  namely 
the  expectation  of  food.  Thus  we  find  that  the  work 
of  Pavlow  and  his  pupils,  far  from  showing  the  possi- 
bility of  formation  of  direct  associations,  really  goes  to 
substantiate  the  view  of  the  presence  of  intermediate 
mental  links  in  cases  of  apparently  immediate  associa- 
tions. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  is  no  need  for  us  to  estab- 
lish hypothetical,  intermediate,  unconscious  or  physio- 
logical links.  The  "unconscious"  brain-processes  are 
problematic  entities  and  there  is  no  way  of  getting  at 
them.  What  we  need  to  discover  in  cases  of  mediate 
association,  and  especially  in  cases  of  psychopathic  dis- 
eases, is  whether  the  intermediate  links,  or  the  original 
experience  that  brought  about  the  trauma,  or  the  state 
of  dissociation  is  present,  consciously,  or  subconsciously, 
or  coconsciously.  This  is  possible  to  test  by  hypnosis 
or  by  means  of  the  hypnoidal  state.  In  many  such  cases 
we  actually  find  that  the  patient  lives  through  the  orig- 
inal experience  either  consciously  in  a  hypnoidal  state, 
or  in  a  hypnoidic  state,  thus  undergoing  a  mental  experi- 
ence which  is  immediately  forgotten  or  dissociated;  or 
what  is  more  commonly  the  case,  the  patient  lives 
through  the  original  experience  subconsciously.  But, 
whether  conscious  or  subconscious,  the  mental  state  is 
not  "unconscious,"  but  is  essentially  of  a  conscious  char- 
acter. In  short,  we  deal  here  either  with  the  personal 
consciousness  or  with  the  subconscious  consciousness. 
Thus,  all  the  facts  of  mental  life,  normal  or  abnormal, 
substantiate  the  presence  of  a  subconscious  consciousness. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THE  THRESHOLD  AND  MENTAL  SYSTEMS 

IT  may  be  well  to  point  out  some  principles,  im- 
portant in  many  respects,  but  which  at  the  present 
moment  are  of  interest  from  a  psychopathological 
standpoint. 
Living  tissue  can  only  be  set  into  activity  by  stimuli 
of  certain  minimal  intensity;  should  the  stimulus  fall 
below  that  minimal  intensity,  the  living  protoplasm  does 
not  react.  This  holds  true  of  all  cells,  from  the  lowest 
to  the  highest, — from  the  bacterium  and  infusorium  to 
the  highly  differentiated  cell,  such  as  muscle  cell,  or 
neuron.  The  reaction  of  the  living  protoplasm  to  the 
stimulus  shows  the  irritability  or  sensitivity  of  the  cell. 
This  sensitivity  has  its  physiological  threshold,  so  that 
a  stimulus  falling  below  a  certain  intensity  cannot  call 
forth  any  reaction  in  the  cell.  The  rise  or  fall  of  the 
threshold  would  mean  an  increase  or  decrease  of  the 
minimal  intensity  of  the  stimulus  requisite  to  bring  about 
a  cellular  reaction.  By  varying  the  conditions  of  sensi- 
tivity, such  as  mechanical,  thermal,  electrical,  chemical 
and  nutritional,  the  physiological  threshold  can  be 
raised  or  lowered. 

The  same  holds  true  of  a  whole  psycho-physiolog- 
ical system, — there  is  a  threshold  of  sensitivity  be- 
low which  the  minimal  stimulus  cannot  fall,  the 
latter  does  not  awaken  any  reaction  in  the  system. 
All  the  senses  reveal  the  presence  of  such  thresholds 
which  are  also  present  in  the  case  of  all  the  higher  psy- 

213 


214  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

cho-physiological  systems.  If  we  term  the  stimulus 
which  can  just  bring  about  a  reaction  in  the  system  the 
stimulus  threshold,  we  can  say  that  a  given  system  can 
only  be  thrown  into  activity  by  a  stimulus  rising  in  in- 
tensity above  the  stimulus  threshold.  Intensity  of  stim- 
ulus, then,  is  an  indispensable  condition  of  the  function- 
ing of  a  psycho-physiological  system. 

In  highly  differentiated  cells,  however,  it  is  not  only 
the  quantity,  or  intensity  of  the  stimulus  that  is  to  be 
considered,  but  also  the  quality.  The  visual  sense  or- 
gan is  not  affected  by  auditory  stimuli  nor  can  the  audi- 
tory sense  organ  be  affected  by  visual  stimulations.  Sim- 
ilarly, in  the  functioning  of  the  higher  psycho-physio- 
logical systems  the  quality  of  the  stimulus  should  not 
be  overlooked.  Systems  that  remain  inactive  under 
one  set  of  stimuli,  however  intense,  will  respond  to 
another  set  of  a  different  quality. 

The  same  holds  true  of  that  synthesis  of  mental  sys- 
tems which  we  term  moment  consciousness,  and  which 
we  shall  treat  in  detail  further  on.  To  set  the  moment 
into  activity,  the  moment  threshold  must  be  passed,  and 
not  only  the  intensity  of  the  stimulations  should  be  taken 
into  consideration,  but  also  the  qualitative  aspect  of  the 
stimuli.  Ideas,  emotion  and  feelings  which  apparently 
remain  dormant  at  the  action  of  one  set  of  excitations 
will  respond  readily  to  the  action  of  excitations  of  a 
different  nature.  Habits,  habitual  movements,  habitual 
thought,  depend  entirely  on  the  qualitative  character  of 
the  excitations,  on  the  combinations  of  special  objects, 
circumstances  and  times.  The  quality  of  the  stimulus 
is  one  of  the  important  factors  in  the  activity  of  a  psy- 
chophysiological system,  or  of  a  moment  consciousness. 

Besides  those  two  factors  of  intensity  and  quality, 


Th^  Threshold  and  Mental  Systems  215 

another  factor,  that  of  inhibition,  plays  quite  a  role  in 
the  variations  of  the  threshold.  We  are  acquainted  with 
inhibitions  in  physiology,  such,  for  instance,  as  the  inhi- 
bitions exercised  by  the  pneumogastric  nerve  on  the 
heart,  or  the  arresting  of  the  activity  of  glands  or  of 
the  peristalsis  by  the  stimulation  of  afferent  nerves.  We 
know  also  of  central  inhibitions,  such  as  fear,  distress, 
pain,  acting  as  so  many  inhibitions  on  the  peripheral 
organs  and  serving  to  arrest  functioning  activity.  Sim- 
ilarly in  mental  life,  complex  as  it  is,  the  highly  organ- 
ized psycho-physiological  systems,  with  their  concomi- 
tant moments  consciousness,  still  fall  under  the  same  gen- 
eral physiological  laws  of  inhibition.  In  the  course  of 
associative  activity  systems  become  organized  into  com- 
plex groups,  into  complicated  systems  or  constellations 
of  systems  which,  to  maintain  their  functioning  equilib- 
rium, keep  one  another  in  check  or  under  inhibition. 

Such  a  formation  of  checks  and  inhibitions  is 
just  what  takes  place  in  the  training  and  the  edu- 
cation of  the  individual  and  the  race.  Every  psy- 
cho-physiological system  or  moment  entering  into  re- 
lations with  other  systems  and  moments  is  bound  in  the 
course  of  its  associative  activity  to  form  inhibitions  to 
its  function  by  the  direct  influence  of  external  or  in- 
ternal excitations.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  rise  of 
threshold  due  to  inhibitory  associations. 

Inhibition  and  rise  of  threshold  may  also  result  in  a 
different  way  in  the  process  of  association.  We  may 
possibly  lay  it  down  as  a  law,  which  plays  no  small  role 
in  the  interaction  of  systems  and  moments,  that  in  a 
series  of  aggregation  of  various  systems  or  moments, 
forming  a  more  complex  organized  whole,  due  to  as- 
sociation and  synthesis  of  the  component  systems,  hav- 


2i6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ing  various  thresholds,  the  ones  having  the  higher 
thresholds  will  raise  the  thresholds  of  the  moments  hav- 
ing a  greater  sensitivity.  This,  however,  may  be  coun- 
terbalanced by  the  lowering  of  the  moment  threshold 
by  associations  with  moments  of  great  sensitivity,  that 
is,  with  low  moment  thresholds. 

While  on  the  one  hand  the  inhibitions  and  the  conse- 
quent rise  of  threshold  go  along  with  the  complexity  of 
systemic  structure  as  well  as  with  the  increase  of  asso- 
ciative activity,  both  in  extension  and  intension,  there 
is  at  the  same  time  an  advantage  gained  for  the  sys- 
tem, inasmuch  as  it  really  has  now  more  chances  to  be- 
come active,  on  account  of  the  greater  number  of  sys- 
tems with  which  it  has  become  associated.  The  thresh- 
old of  the  associated  system  rises,  but  on  the  other  hand, 
the  chances  for  activity  increase,  while  the  liberation  or 
discharge  of  energy  with  the  consequent  evil  effects  of 
extreme  fatigue,  exhaustion  and  ill  nutrition  is  checked 
and  guarded  against  by  the  inhibitions  and  the  rise  of 
threshold. 

What  happens  now  when  a  psycho-physiological  sys- 
tem becomes  dissociated?  The  inhibitions  become  re- 
moved and  the  threshold  falls.  The  system  is  no  longer 
checked  by  inhibitions  or  by  other  systems,  and  hence, 
with  a  lowering  of  the  threshold,  becomes  sensitive,  re- 
acting to  any  slight,  passing  stimulus,  manifesting  or 
liberating  all  the  energy  it  possesses  until  fatigue  and 
complete  exhaustion  set  in.  From  this  vantage  ground 
we  can  understand  the  fact  of  the  extraordinary  en- 
ergy which  the  dissociated  subconscious  systems  mani- 
fest, so  much  so  that  the  unusual  energy  appears  almost 
supernatural,  and  has  on  that  account  been  ascribed  by 
the  superstitious  to  diabolical  possession. 


The  Threshold  and  Mental  Systems  217 

To  quote  from  a  former  work  of  mine : 

"When  a  system  present  in  the  upper  personal  con- 
sciousness is  to  be  disintegrated,  the  suggestion  given 
should  be  kept  out  of  the  patient's  personal  memory. 
One  can  observe  this  fact  clearly  in  post-hypnotic  sug- 
gestions. If  a  post-hypnotic  suggestion  is  fully  remem- 
bered, it  usually  miscarries, — the  suggestion  loses  its 
efficacy,  and  often  comes  up  as  a  word-memory  without 
the  stringency  of  realization.  When,  however,  am- 
nesia is  enforced,  the  post-hypnotic  suggestion  is  fully 
realized.  A  dissociated  system  present  in  the  sub- 
conscious, when  coming  to  the  surface  of  the  upper 
strata  of  consciousness,  becomes  manifested  with  intense 
sensori-motor  energy.  Dissociation  gives  rise  to  greater 
dynamo  genesis.  This  principle  of  dynamogenesis  is 
important;  cases  of  so-called  impulsive  insanities  and 
*psychic  epilepsy'  are  really  due  to  this  cause. 

"A  system  entering  into  association  with  other  sys- 
tems is  set  into  activity,  not  only  directly  by  its  own 
appropriate  stimuli,  but  also  indirectly  through  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  various  systems  associated  with  it.  These 
associative  interrelations  bring  about  an  equable  and 
normal  functioning  activity,  controlled  and  regulated 
by  the  whole  mass  of  associated  systems.  The  mass 
of  associated  systems  forms  the  'reductives'  of  each  in- 
dividual system.  In  dissociated  systems  the  controlling 
influence  of  the  'reductive  mass'  is  lost  and  the  result  is 
an  over-activity,  unchecked  by  any  counteracting  ten- 
dencies. 

"This  relation  of  dissociation  and  dynamogenesis  is 
closely  related  to  periodicity  of  function,  with  its  con- 
comitant manifestation  of  psychomotor  activity  charac- 
teristic of  all  passions  and  periodically  appearing  in- 


2i8  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

stincts.  Dissociated  systems  present  impulsiveness,  be- 
cause of  lack  of  associated  counteracting  systems.  The 
only  way  to  diminish  the  overpowering  impulsiveness 
with  which  the  dissociated  subconscious  systems  make 
an  onset  in  their  rush  into  the  personal  consciousness  is 
to  bring  about  an  association  with  counterbalancing  or 
inhibitory,  controlling,  conscious  systems,  to  work  the 
dissociate  systems  into  the  tissue  of  the  personal,  con- 
trolling consciousness  which  has  to  be  fortified  and  de- 
veloped. 

"Physiologically,  it  may  be  said  that  a  neuron  ag- 
gregate, entering  into  association  with  other  aggregates 
and  being  called  into  activity  from  as  many  different  di- 
rections as  there  are  aggregates  in  the  associated  cluster, 
has  its  neuron  energy  kept  within  the  limits  of  the  phys- 
iological level.  A  dissociated  neuron  aggregate,  on 
the  contrary,  is  not  affected  by  the  activity  of  other 
aggregates;  it  is  rarely  called  upon  to  function  and 
stores  up  a  great  amount  of  neuron  energy.  When  now 
an  appropriate  stimulus  liberates  the  accustomed  en- 
ergy, the  activity  is  overwhelming,  and  is  very  much  like 
the  eruption  of  an  underground  volcano,  giving  rise  to 
temporary  attacks,  to  'seizures'  by  subconscious  states 
of  the  whole  field  of  the  upper  consciousness, — 'seiz- 
ures' which,  being  really  of  the  nature  of  post-hypnotic 
automatisms,  are  generally  mistaken  for  epilepsy,  the 
attacks  being  regarded  as  epileptic  manifestations,  as 
'larval  epilepsy,'  as  'epileptic  equivalents,'  as  'psychic 
epilepsy.'  With  the  restoration  of  the  equilibrium  of 
the  neuron  aggregate,  with  the  synthesis  of  the  associ- 
ated systems,  a  synthesis  which  can  be  brought  about  by 
different  methods,  the  subconscious  eruptions,  the  at- 
tacks, or  'seizures'  vanish,  never  to  return." 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

THE   PRINCIPLE  OF  RESERVE   ENERGY 

WE  have  pointed  out  the  significance  of  inhi- 
bitions in  keeping  back  the  systemic  neuron 
energy  from  fully  being  discharged  under 
normal  conditions  of  life,  and  we  have  also 
shown  that  the  removal  of  inhibitions  results  in  the  full 
liberation  of  the  accumulated  neuron  energy.  This  fact, 
so  striking  in  the  domain  of  recurrent  psychomotor 
states,  almost  forces  itself  on  the  attention  of  the  stu- 
dent of  abnormal  psychology.  From  such  a  funda- 
mental fact  of  abnormal  mental  phenomena,  we  may 
draw  some  conclusions  in  regard  to  mental  life  in  gen- 
eral. For,  after  all,  the  laws  of  pathology  do  not  dif- 
fer from  those  of  physiology  in  general,  the  patholog- 
ical really  being  the  physiological  under  special  condi- 
tions. The  normal  is  either  the  usual,  the  habitual, 
the  customary,  or  is,  at  best,  an  ideal  construction  of  the 
variations  of  life  more  or  less  successfully  adjusted  to 
the  conditions  of  the  external  environment. 

This  adjustment,  however,  keeps  on  constantly  shift- 
ing ground,  continually  changing  the  relative  position 
of  the  normal  and  the  abnormal.  From  this  standpoint 
pathology  is  of  the  utmost  importance  in  the  study 
of  organic  life.  The  pathological  being  the  normal 
out  of  place,  the  abnormal  being  the  normal  un- 
der special  conditions,  pathology  that  deals  with 
the  abnormal  gives  us  a  deep  insight  into  the  gen- 
eral  laws   of  normal   physiological   activity.     All  the 

219 


220  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

experiments  in  physiology  consist  practically  in  the 
production  of  so  many  pathological  conditions  and 
states.  When  the  physiologist  makes  injections,  sections 
and  stimulations  by  various  agencies,  what  else  does  he 
effect  if  not  the  production  of  the  pathological,  in  order 
to  learn  the  physiological  action  of  the  various  tissues 
and  organs?  In  psychopathological  studies  we  fol- 
low the  interrelations  of  mental  phenomena  under 
special  conditions;  it  is  the  physiological  method 
of  experimentation  by  production  of  pathological 
variations ;  the  conclusion  arrived  at  in  psychopathology 
should  apply  to  mental  life  in  general.  What  is  this 
conclusion  ?  It  is  the  principle  of  potential  subconscious 
energy  or,  more  briefly  stated,  the  principle  of  reserve 
energy  * 

The  moment  thresholds  of  our  moment  conscious- 
ness, or,  put  in  physiological  terms,  the  thresholds  of 
our  psycho-physiological  systems,  are  usually  raised, 
mental  activity  working  in  the  course  of  its  development 
and  growth  of  associative  processes  under  ever-increas- 
ing inhibitions  with  ever-higher  thresholds.  It  is  enough 
to  compare  the  educated,  the  civilized,  with  the  unedu- 
cated or  with  the  barbarian  and  the  savage,  to  realize 
the  truth  of  our  statement.  On  account  of  the  threshold 
and  inhibitions,  not  the  whole  of  the  psycho-physiolog- 
ical energy  possessed  by  the  system  or  moment  is  mani- 
fested; in  fact,  but  a  very  small  portion  is  displayed  in 
response  to  stimuli  coming  from  the  habitual  environ- 


*When  this  principle  was  formulated  by  me  in  a  series  of  articles 
published  in  The  Boston  Medical  and  Surgical  Journal  for  March 
and  April,  1907,  James  sent  me  his  article,  "The  Energies  of  Men," 
in  which  he  developed  a  similar  point  of  view,  though  on  widely 
different  lines.  Nothing  gives  me  more  pleasure  than  to  find  myself 
in  accord  with  the  great  American  psychologist  and  philosopher. 


The  Principle  of  Reserve  Energy  221 

ment.  What  becomes  of  the  rest  of  unused  energy?  // 
is  stored,  reserve  energy. 

Biologically  regarded,  we  can  well  see  the  import- 
ance of  such  stored  or  reserve  energy.  In  the  strug- 
gle for  existence,  the  organism  whose  energies  are  eco- 
nomically used  and  well  guarded  against  waste  will 
meet  with  better  success  in  the  process  of  survival  of 
the  fittest,  or  will  have  better  chances  in  the  process  of 
natural  selection.  The  high  thresholds  and  inhibitions 
will  prevent  hasty  and  harmful  reactions  as  well  as  use- 
less waste  of  energy,  unnecessary  fatigue,  and  states  of 
helpless  exhaustion.  Moreover,  natural  selection  will 
favor  organisms  with  ever  greater  stores  of  reserve  en- 
ergy which  could  be  put  forth  under  critical  conditions 
of  life.  In  fact,  the  higher  the  organization  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  more  varied  and  complex  the  external  envi- 
ronment, the  more  valuable  and  even  indispensable  will 
such  a  store  of  reserve  energy  prove  to  be. 

The  course  of  civilization  and  education,  by  con- 
tinuously raising  the  thresholds  and  inhibitions,  follows 
the  line  of  natural  selection,  and  keeps  on  increasing  the 
disposable  store  of  potential  subconscious  or  reserve 
energy,  both  in  the  individual  and  the  race.  It  is  In  this 
formation  of  an  ever-greater  and  richer  store  of  dis- 
posable, but  well-guarded,  reserve  energy,  that  lies  the 
superiority  of  the  educated  over  the  uneducated,  and 
the  supremacy  of  the  higher  over  the  lower  races. 

Civilization  and  education  are  processes  of  economy 
of  psycho-neural  force,  savings  of  mental  energy.  But 
what  society  is  doing  in  a  feeble  way,  natural  selection 
has  done  far  more  effectively.  What  education  and 
civilization  are  doing  now  on  a  small  scale  and  for  a 
brief  period  of  time  the  process  of  survival  of  the  fit- 


ill  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

test  in  the  ever-raging  struggle  for  existence  has  done 
for  ages  on  a  large  scale.  We  should,  therefore,  ex- 
pect that  the  natural  reserve  energy  would  far  exceed 
that  of  the  cultivated  one.  The  brain  and  mind  of  the 
ancient  German  differed  in  nothing  from  his  modern 
descendant,  the  German  philosopher,  and  still  what  a 
difference  in  the  manifestation  of  mental  energy  1  The 
savage  brain  and  mind  do  not  differ  from  those  of  their 
civilized  descendants,  and  still  what  an  ocean  of  mental 
life  separates  the  civilized  man  from  his  savage  pro- 
genitor I 

It  is  against  the  evidence  of  biological  sciences  to 
suppose  that  the  acquisitions  of  the  cultivated  brains 
have  actually  been  transmitted  from  generation  to  gen- 
eration. It  is  not  likely  that  acquired  characteristics 
brought  about  by  social  life  will  change  so  radically  the 
brain  in  the  course  of  some  forty  or  fifty  generations 
that  separate  the  civilized  man  from  his  savage  progeni- 
tor; and  the  trend  of  biological  evidence  hardly  favors 
the  transmission  of  such  acquired  characteristics. 

"There  sits  the  savage,"  once  exclaimed  a  friend  of 
mine,  an  eminent  neuro-pathologist,  "with  three  quar- 
ters of  his  brain  unused."  Yes,  there  sits  the  savage 
with  a  brain  far  surpassing  the  needs  of  his  environ- 
ment, harboring  powers  of  a  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle, 
of  a  Shakespeare,  Goethe,  Darwin,  and  Newton.  The 
ancient  German  and  Briton  hardly  differed  in  their 
mental  powers  from  their  contemporaries,  the  civilized 
Egyptian  and  Babylonian.  What,  then  did  those 
Aryan  savages  do  with  their  richly  endowed  mental 
energies?  Nothing.  The  mental  energy  was  lying 
fallow, — it  was  reserve  energy, — energy  for  future  use, 
for  the  use  of  future  ages  of  coming  civilization. 


The  Principle  of  Reserve  Energy  223 

But  what  about  the  cultivated  man?  Does  he  suf- 
fer from  neurasthenia,  from  nervous  impotence,  be- 
cause, as  some  would  have  it,  on  account  of  the  strain 
of  civilized  life  he  has  exhausted  his  store  of  nervous 
energy?  One  may  well  ponder  over  the  significant  fact 
that  it  is  the  neurasthenic,  the  "psychasthenic"  who  is 
doing  the  world's  work.  We  must  remember  that  civi- 
lization is  but  of  yesterday,  and  that  the  reserve  energy 
is  hardly  touched  upon. 

In  the  treatment  of  the  phenomena  of  psycho-physio- 
logical dissociation,  in  the  protean  symptoms  of  ner- 
vous and  mental  exhaustion,  we  should  not  forget  this 
biological  principle  of  reserve  energy,  and  should  make 
attempts  to  use  it.  In  many  cases  the  inhibitions  become 
too  heavy  and  the  thresholds  too  high.  fFe  must  loosen 
the  grip  of  some  of  the  inhibitions  and  lower  the  thresh- 
olds, thus  utilizing  a  fresh  supply  of  reserve  energy. 

The  treatment  of  psychopathic  diseases  should  be 
based  on  this  biological  principle  of  dormant  reserve 
energy.  In  many  cases  the  inhibitions  become  too  heavy 
and  the  threshold  too  high.  We  must  loosen  the  grip 
of  the  inhibitions  and  lower  the  thresholds,  utilizing 
a  fresh  supply  of  dormant  reserve  energy.* 

A  similar  train  of  thought  was  developed  by  Dr.  S. 
J.  Meltzer,  in  his  excellent  paper  on  "The  Factors  of 
Safety  in  Animal  Structure  and  Animal  Economy."  By 
a  striking  series  of  instructive  facts,  Dr.  Meltzer  points 
out  that  "all  organs  of  the  body  are  built  on  the  plan 
of  superabundance  of  structure  and  energy."  I  cannot 
resist  the  temptation  of  quoting  Dr.  Meltzer's  conclu- 


*The  principle  of  reserve  energy  is  of  great  importance  in  educa- 
tion. I  hope  to  work  out  this  subject  elsewhere.  I  have  also  shown 
the  importance  of  the  principle  of  reserve  energy  in  my  work  The 
Psychology  of  Laughter. 


224  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sions  at  some  length,  because  they  so  clearly  elucidate 
our  principle  of  reserve  energy,  which  is  all  the  more 
valuable,  as  Dr.  Meltzer  has  formulated  it  indepen- 
dently on  widely  different  grounds.  "Of  the  supplies 
of  energy  to  the  animal,  we  see  that  oxygen  is  luxuri- 
ously supplied.  The  supply  of  carbohydrates  and  fats 
is  apparently  large  enough  to  keep  up  a  steady  luxurious 
surplus.  .  .  .  The  liberal  ingestion  of  proteid 
might  be  another  instance  of  the  principle  of  abundance 
ruling  the  structure  and  energies  of  the  animal  body. 
There  is,  however,  a  theory  that  in  just  this  single  in- 
stance the  minimum  is  meant  by  nature  to  be  also  the 
optimum.  But  it  is  a  theory  for  the  support  of  which 
there  is  not  a  single  fact.  On  the  contrary,  some  facts 
seem  to  indicate  that  Nature  meant  differently.  Such 
facts  are,  for  instance,  the  abundance  of  proteolytic  en- 
zymes in  the  digestive  canal  and  the  great  capacity  of 
the  canal  for  absorption  of  proteids.  Then  there  is 
the  fact  that  proteid  material  is  stored  away  for  use  in 
emergencies  just  as  carbohydrates  and  fats  are  stored 
away.  In  starvation,  nitrogenous  products  continue  to 
be  eliminated  in  the  urine,  which,  according  to  Folin, 
are  derived  from  exogenous  sources,  that  is,  from  in- 
gested proteid  and  not  from  broken-down  organ  tis- 
sues. An  interesting  example  of  storing  away  of  pro- 
teid for  future  use  is  seen  in  the  muscles  of  the  salmon 
before  they  leave  the  sea  for  the  river  to  spawn.  Ac- 
cording to  Mescher  the  muscles  are  then  large  and  the 
reproductive  organs  are  small.  In  the  river  where  the 
animals  have  to  starve,  the  reproductive  organs  become 
large,  while  the  muscles  waste  away.  Here,  in  time  of 
affluence,  the  muscles  store  up  nutritive  material  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  life  of  the  animal  during 


The  Principle  of  Reserve  Energy  225 

starvation  and  of  assisting  in  the  function  of  reproduc- 
tion. This  instance  seems  to  be  quite  a  good  illustration 
of  the  role  which  the  factor  of  safety  plays  also  in  the 
function  of  the  supply  of  the  body  with  proteid  food. 
The  storing  away  of  proteid,  like  the  storing  away  of 
glycogen  and  fat,  for  the  use  in  expected  and  unex- 
pected exceptional  conditions,  is  exactly  like  the  super- 
abundance of  tissue  in  an  organ  of  animal  or  like  an 
extra  beam  in  the  support  of  a  building  or  a  bridge — 
a  factor  of  safety. 

"It  seems  to  me  that  the  factors  of  safety  have  an 
important  place  in  the  process  of  natural  selection. 
Those  species  which  are  provided  with  an  abundance  of 
useful  structure  and  energy,  and  are  prepared  to  meet 
many  emergencies,  are  best  fitted  to  survive  in  the  strug- 
gle for  existence." 

Unusual  combinations  of  circumstances,  great  radi- 
cal changes  of  the  environment,  often  unloosen  the  inhi- 
bitions, and,  overstepping,  or  lowering  the  thresholds, 
release  some  of  the  reserve  energy.  Critical  periods, 
great  dangers,  wars,  revolutions,  often  make  man  rise 
to  the  occasion,  so  that  apparently  insignificant  and 
worthless  individuals  display  an  energy  unforeseen  and 
unsuspected,  and  which  makes  of  them  heroes  and 
heroines.  There  is  a  rise  in  intensity  and  a  qualitative 
change  in  the  stimuli,  an  unloosening  of  some  of  the 
inhibitions  with  a  consequent  release  of  some  of  the 
bound-up  reserve  energy. 

In  this  respect  wars  and  revolutions  may  be  regarded 
as  important  factors  in  the  manifestation  of  human  po- 
tential energy.  The  Persian  and  Peloponnesian  wars 
unloosened  some  of  the  energies  of  Greece,  giving  rise 
to  great  thinkers,  scientists,  and  artists,  having  a  lasting 


226  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

influence  on  the  destiny  of  humanity.  The  constant 
Wars  and  national  misfortunes  of  the  Jews  released 
their  reserve  energy  making  of  them  a  race  of  proph- 
ets, apostles  and  martyrs,  deeply  affecting  the  course 
of  human  civilization.  The  wars  of  the  Reforma- 
tion open  a  new  era  of  free  development  of 
modern  European  civilization.  The  English,  Ameri- 
can, and  French  revolutions  have  released  new  supplies 
of  energies  and  have  opened  a  new  arena  for  the  free 
development  of  political,  social,  and  industrial  forces. 
In  our  own  times  we  meet  with  the  example  of  the 
Japanese,  who,  under  the  strain  of  great  national  dan- 
ger, have  released  a  reserve  energy  unsuspected  in  races 
of  the  Mongolian  stock. 

Reserve  energy  becomes  manifested  under  the  influ- 
ence of  radical  changes  in  the  environment,  just  as  we 
have  found  that  psycho-physiological  systems  react  and 
start  into  function  under  the  influence  of  special  condi- 
tions and  special  appropriate  qualitative  stimuli.  In 
the  study  of  functional  nervous  and  mental  diseases,  in 
the  study  of  neurasthenia,  or  psychasthenia,  hysteria, 
and  insistent  or  recurrent  mental  states,  one  becomes 
more  and  more  impressed  with  the  fact  that  beyond  the 
psycho-physiological  limits  of  energy,  available  for  the 
habitual  adjustments  to  the  ordinary  external  condi- 
tions of  life,  there  is  a  vast  store  of  reserve  energy 
whose  depths  one  cannot  gauge. 

A  us  dem  Kelche  dieses  Geisterreiches 
I  Schdumt  ihm  seine  Unendlichkeit. 


PART  II 

THE  THEORY  OF 

THE  MOMENT  CONSCIOUSNESS 


CHAPTER  1 

THE  MOMENT  CONSCIOUSNESS 

WE  must  try  to  realize  the  precise  meaning 
of  the  "moment  consciousness,"  as  a  clear 
comprehension  of  it  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  psychology  in  general  and  to 
psychopathology  in  particular. 

In  a  former  work  I  pointed  out  that  "consciousness 
is  not  uniform,  that  of  the  infant  differs  from  that  of 
the  adult;  the  consciousness  of  the  brute  differs  from 
that  of  the  man,  and  still  they  all  belong  to  the  genus 
consciousness."  I  also  insisted  on  the  fact  that  there 
is  a  confusion  in  the  use  of  the  term  "consciousness,"  a 
confusion  which  almost  amounts  to  what  I  may  term 
as  "the  psychologist's  fallacy."  The  fully  developed  type 
of  consciousness  characteristic  of  the  adult  human  mind, 
namely,  self-consciousness,  is  substituted  for  the  lower 
forms,  or  for  types  of  consciousness  characteristic  of  the 
lower  animals.  The  psychologist,  and,  especially  the 
physiologist,  when  writing  on  psychological  matters  is 
apt,  to  substitute,  either  on  account  of  the  introspective 
method  used  or  on  account  of  lack  of  discrimination,  the 
type  of  consciousness  of  the  observer,  namely,  self-con- 
sciousness. 

No  biologist,  not  even  Loeb,  will  accept  unrestrictedly 
the  Cartesian  view  that  consciousness,  or  the  soul,  or 
mind  is  the  privilege  of  man  alone,  while  all  other  ani- 
mnls  have  no  soul,  no  mind,  no  consciousness,  they  are 
complex  reflex  mechanisms,  highly  developed  automata 

229 


230  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

with  no  psychic  life  to  them.  We  must  allow  the  fact 
that  other  animals  lower  than  man  in  the  rungs  of  devel- 
opment possess  some  form  of  psychic  life.  The  horse, 
the  dog,  the  cat,  the  cow,  the  ant,  the  bee,  and  other 
animals  have  some  form,  however  varied,  of  psycho- 
physiological activity,  some  form  of  mental  life,  how- 
ever different  in  type  from  that  of  man.  Abnormal  psy- 
chology discloses  to  us  dissolving  views  of  human  con- 
sciousness, such  as  found  in  the  various  forms  of  insan- 
ity and  in  the  various  manifestations  of  psychopathic 
states,  presenting  conditions  of  all  stages  of  dissocia- 
tion and  disaggregation  of  consciousness.  Psychic  life 
is  by  no  means  uniform,  there  are  many  types  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Wc  have  pointed  out  above  that  synthetic  unity  is 
the  essence  of  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  not  an 
association  of  independently  existing  ideas,  images,  feel- 
ings, and  sensations.  Mental  events  must  form  a  unity, 
a  synthesis  in  the  total  psychic  life  of  some  psycho-biolog- 
ical organization.  Disconnected  words  of  a  sentence 
thought  by  a  series  of  thinkers  do  not  give  rise  to  that 
unified  mental  process  which  goes  to  form  the  psychic 
experience  of  the  meaning  of  the  sentence.  The  words 
must  be  cognized  by  the  consciousness  of  one  psycho- 
biological  organism.  Ideas,  images,  feelings,  emotions, 
volitions  do  not  meet  on  independent  ground,  associ- 
ate, fuse  and  go  to  to  form  a  unity,  a  new  idea  or  feel- 
ing. Experiences  in  different  minds  do  not  combine 
and  associate  to  form  a  new  synthesis.  Even  the  as- 
sociationist  tacitly  implies  that  the  various  associations 
of  ideas  and  feelings  take  place  in  some  one  mind. 

Ill  order  to  get  some  form  of  cognizance  or  some 
form  of  experience  of  sensations  and  ideas  there  must 


The  Moment  Consciousness  231 

be  some  one  organic  consciousness  that  experiences  or 
lives  through  the  psychic  events.  Thoughts,  feelings, 
ideas,  images,  and  sensations  are  occurrences  in  some 
one  psychic  individuality,  a  psycho-biological  or  psycho- 
physiological organism,  an  organism  which  possesses 
the  living  synthetic  unity  of  consciousness.  From  t 
purely  psychological  standpoint  we  may  term  this  living 
organic  unity  of  consciousness — a  subject.  I  use  the 
term  "moment-consciousness,"  or  simply  "moment"  to 
indicate  this  synthetic  unity  of  consciousness  which  con- 
stitutes the  characteristic  of  the  subject  having  the  syn- 
thesis of  mental  experiences.  This  holds  true  of  all 
psychic  life,  from  the  very  lowest  representative  of  men- 
tal life  to  the  very  highest,  such  as  the  self-consciousness 
of  man. 

The  subject,  or  the  unity  of  the  psycho-physio- 
logical individuality  cannot  be  represented  by  a  series, 
whether  temporal  or  spatial,  as  a  series  ceases  to  be  a 
unity,  or  a  synthesis.  For  a  series  of  independent  events 
remains  a  series,  while  the  synthesis  or  unity  of  the 
series  is  a  superadded  event.  A  series  of  psychic  events 
must  exist  in  and  for  some  psychic  unity  or  individuality 
which  stands  for  the  organic  unity  of  consciousness,  or 
for  the  synthesis  of  consciousness,  no  matter  what  the 
type  of  consciousness  is,  low  or  high,  animal  or  human. 
This  synthetic  unity  of  consciounsess,  no  longer  a  series, 
is  indicated  by  the  term  "moment"  or  "moment  con- 
sciousness." There  are  various  types  of  moment  con- 
sciousness, according  as  there  are  various  forms  or  types 
of  synthesis. 

Psychic  contents  or  states  of  consciousness  are  always 
found  in  connection  with  some  individuality.  That  piece 
of  bread  lying  yonder  may  awaken  hundreds  of  mental 


232  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

states  under  different  conditions  and  in  various  organi- 
zations. My  friend  sitting  by  my  side  sees  it,  so  do  I, 
and  so  does  the  child,  so  does  the  bird  in  the  cage,  so 
does  the  dog,  and  so  possibly  does  the  fly  flitting  around 
the  table.  The  states  awakened  are  no  doubt  different, 
but  they  are  of  a  psychic  character  none  the  less.  My 
friend  and  I  may  be  conscious  of  the  personal  element 
along  with  it.  We  may  think  it  in  the  form  of  owner- 
ship; "It  is  who  thinks,  who  has  the  thought  of 
the  bread;"  but  this  is  only  one  of  the  many  forms  un- 
der which  the  perception  or  thought  of  the  bread  may 
appear.  One  thing,  however,  is  essential  to  all  the 
states,  different  as  they  may  be  in  their  con- 
tent, and  that  is  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  some  one 
individuality  which  under  certain  special  conditions  may 
also  be  of  the  nature  of  a  personality.  The  individuality 
may  be  of  a  high  or  of  a  very  low  type,  it  may  be  that 
of  a  man  or  it  may  be  that  of  a  fly,  but  it  must  be  some 
one  conscious  being  that  synthetizes  the  psychic  state.  It 
is  this  one  synthetizing  consciousness  that  constitutes  the 
essence  of  what  we  term  "moment  consciousness." 

The  moment  consciousness  is  the  subject,  the  psycho- 
biological  individuality,  requisite  in  all  psychic  activ- 
ity. The  psychic  individuality  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
series  of  independent  physical  events.  For  it  may  be 
asked,  for  whom  does  that  series  exist  and  to  whom  is  it 
presented?  A  synthetizing  moment  consciousness,  both 
subject  and  content,  is  a  fundamental  assumption  of 
psychology,  just  as  space  is  that  of  geometry,  and  mat- 
ter and  force  that  of  physics  and  chemistry.  This  neces- 
sity of  assuming  a  synthetizing  moment  consciousness 
becomes  clearly  manifested  in  the  highest  form  of  psy- 
chic activity,  such  as  self-consciousness.     For  if  self- 


The  Moment  Consciousness  233 

consciousness  be  reduced  to  a  series,  it  may  be  per- 
tinently asked  with  John  Stuart  Mill,  "How  can  a  series 
be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series?" 

A  moment  consciousness  must  not  be  considered 
as  something  apart  from  its  content;  it  does  not  exist 
by  itself;  it  exists  wherever  and  whenever  psychic  states 
are  synthetized;  it  is  the  synthetized  psychic  material; 
mere  synthesis  without  material  is  meaningless.  On  the 
whole,  we  may  say  that  the  moment  consciousness  is  like 
an  organism,  it  forms  a  whole  of  many  constituent  parts. 

In  the  moment  consciousness  we  find  psychic  material 
synthetized  round  one  inmost  central  event  which  in  its 
turn  may  have  a  central  point.  It  reminds  one  strongly 
of  the  cell ;  although  it  branches  out  in  all  directions,  it 
has  always  its  inmost  central  point,  its  nucleus,  nucleolus, 
and  nucleolinus.  While  I  am  sitting  here  writing,  I 
take  in  the  many  impressions  coming  to  me :  The  sun- 
shine pouring  through  the  window,  the  table,  the  tick- 
ing of  the  clock,  the  chair,  the  bookcase,  and  many 
other  things  in  the  room;  all  of  them  are  formed  and 
synthetized  into  one,  and  as  such  they  form  a  moment 
consciousness. 

They  are  not,  however,  indifferently  grouped; 
their  unity  is  an  organized  whole  with  a  cen- 
ter, with  a  vital  point,  so  to  say.  At  the  heart  of  the 
synthetized  whole  there  is  a  central  point,  the  grouping 
around  which  constitutes  the  individuality  of  the  partic- 
ular moment  consciousness.  In  my  own  case,  the  cen- 
tral interesting  point  is  the  paper  on  which  I  write  the 
sentence  just  formulated,  and  is  the  inmost  point,  the 
principal  idea  under  discussion  which  forms  the  nucleo- 
linus, so  to  say,  of  the  whole  moment  consciousness.  The 
most  interesting  or  the  most  important  experience  forms 


234  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  center  of  the  moment. 

The  same  object  which  seemingly  gives  the  same  ex- 
perience assumes  different  meanings  and  is  therefore 
really  quite  a  different  experience,  according  to  the 
moment  consciousness  in  which  the  perception  or  knowl- 
edge of  that  object  is  synthetized.  These  presently  ex- 
perienced states,  synthetized  within  the  moment,  form 
the  matter,  or  what  we  may  term  the  content  of  the  mo- 
ment consciousness.  The  moment  of  consciousness  will 
change  with  the  changes  of  the  synthetized  content.  As 
an  official,  I  am  now  in  my  office  doing  my  work,  and 
the  different  experiences  form  one  whole,  an  association 
of  experiences,  systematized  and  synthetized  into  an 
organic  unity.  As  a  family  man,  I  am  at  home  enjoy- 
ing the  company  of  my  wife,  children,  and  friends,  and 
once  more  the  experiences  are  organized  into  the  unity 
of  a  moment  consciousness.  Now  I  am  climbing  moun- 
tains and  stand  on  the  slippery  edge  of  a  precipice,  now 
I  enjoy  a  conversation  with  the  child  I  love,  now  I 
take  part  in  the  excitement  of  the  political  arena,  now  I 
sit  on  the  bench  of  the  jury  listening  gravely  to  the  cross- 
examination  of  witnesses  in  a  murder  case;  all  these 
are  nuclei  for  the  formation  of  different  moments.  All 
of  these  depend  on  the  different  central  experiences  that 
form  the  kernel  for  the  moment  consciousness. 

The  central  experience,  round  which  all  other 
experiences  are  grouped  and  synthetized,  forms,  so 
to  say,  the  very  essence  of  the  given  moment  con- 
sciousness, and  as  long  as  this  central  experience  remains 
unchanged  in  its  position  the  new  experiences  are 
assimilated  within  the  same  moment  consciousness. 
The  moment  consciousness,  therefore,  does  not  vary 
with  the  change  of  the  content,  if  only  the  assimilating 


The  Moment  Consciousness  235 

nucleus  remains  invariable.  Should,  however,  the  con- 
tent vary  so  that  the  central  experience  is  transposed  and 
some  other  one  occupies  its  place,  then  the  moment 
consciousness  itself  is  changed.  In  fact,  we  may  have 
the  content  of  the  moment  consciousness  entirely  un- 
changed; but  if  the  central  experience  alone  is  displaced 
from  its  position,  then  the  moment  consciousness  itself 
becomes  changed  in  its  nature.  Thus,  if  as  a  traveller 
I  climb  the  mountains  chiefly  for  the  sake  of  pleasure, 
and  keep  the  scientific  and  aesthetic  aspects  in  the  back- 
ground, the  moment  consciousness  will  be  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  the  one  where  the  scientific  or  aesthetic  as- 
pects are  in  the  foreground,  and  all  other  considerations 
in  the  background.  The  moment  consciousness,  we  may 
say,  is  entirely  determined  by  the  leading  central  ex- 
perience. 

The  content  of  the  moment  consciousness,  however, 
is  not  confined  to  the  presently  experienced  psychic  states 
only;  it  embraces  the  past,  it  includes  memory,  that 
is,  it  synthetizes  outlived  moments.  In  my  present  ca- 
pacity of  physician  and  working  in  the  office,  I  may  also 
include  the  experiences  as  traveller,  as  juror,  as  teacher, 
as  companion,  and  as  lover,  but  still  the  tone  of  this  par- 
ticular moment  consciousness  is  given  by  the  duties 
)f  my  present  occupation.  The  most  vivid,  inter- 
esting, and  leading  experiences  form  in  this  synthesis 
the  nucleus  round  which  all  other  experiences  are  crys- 
tallized and  synthetized  into  one  organic  whole.  We 
have  here  a  series  of  moments,  all  of  them  being  coor- 
dinated and  contained  in  one  S3mthesis  of  one  moment 
consciousness. 

The  members  of  this  synthetized  series  are  not 
of  equal  value   nor  are   they  qualitatively  the   same. 


236  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

The  leading  experience  that  constitutes  the  as- 
similating element  of  the  given  moment  has  reality,  in- 
terest, and  value,  while  others  are  only  so  much  mater- 
ial support  for  the  principal  central  experience.  This  cen- 
tral experience  differs  also  from  the  other  experiences 
synthetized  in  the  moment  consciousness  by  the  fact  that 
it  alone,  that  is,  the  nucleus  only,  has  the  most  vivid 
psychic  states,  sensational  and  perceptual  elements, 
while  the  others  may  totally  lack  them.  Other  subsidu- 
ary  synthetized  moments  are  rather  of  an  ideational 
character;  they  are  what  is  called  "reproductions,"  ideal 
representatives  of  formerly  experienced,  outlived  mo- 
ments. 

The  moment  consciousness  may  contain  moments  that 
happened  to  emerge  by  the  dynamic  process  of  associa- 
tion, such  as  contiguity,  similarity,  or  contrast.  Each 
moment  consciousness  may  become  content  for  the  next. 
Each  successive  moment  consciousness  may  synthetize 
the  preceding  ones,  contain  them  in  an  abridged  idea- 
tional form,  and  may,  moreover,  recognize  and  claim 
them  as  belonging  to  itself,  and  as  being  one  with  them. 
There  may,  in  short,  be  various  forms  of  mental  unifi- 
cation, but  one  thing  stands  out  clear  and  that  is  the 
nature  of  the  moment  consciousness.  The  essence  of 
the  moment  consciousness  is  mental  synthesis. 

If  we  take  a  cross  section  of  the  moment  conscious- 
ness, and  try  to  fixate  it  with  our  mental  eye,  we  find  a 
central  psychic  element  round  which  other  psychic  ele- 
ments are  crystallized.  This  central  psychic  element  is 
prominent,  vivid,  forms,  so  to  say,  the  vital  point  of 
all  the  states  and  gives  the  tone  to  the  rest,  forming  a 
whole,  one  organized  experience.  The  psychic  matter 
that  surrounds  the  luminous  central  point  does  not  stand 


The  Moment  Consciousness  237 

in  a  free,  more  or  less  disconnected  relation  to  the  lat- 
ter, it  is  intimately  related  to  the  centre,  and  cannot  be 
separated  without  destroying  the  moment  as  a  whole 
and  even  the  life  existence  of  each  particular  constituent. 
The  whole  moment  seems  to  form  an  organic  network 
in  which  the  other  elements  take  their  place,  according 
to  a  plan. 

The  structure  of  the  moment  may  in  this  respect 
be  compared  to  that  of  the  cell.  In  the  cell  we 
discriminate  the  nucleus  round  which  the  protoplasm 
is  grouped.  The  protoplasm  is  connected  with  the 
nucleus  by  a  network,  a  cytoreticulum.  The  destruction 
of  the  nucleus  affects  the  protoplasm  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  protoplasm  affects  the  nucleus.  The  two 
are  intimately,  organically  interrelated  by  the  common 
network,  the  general  plan  of  their  organization. 

A  concrete  example  will  perhaps  best  answer  our  pur- 
pose. Suppose  the  moment  is  perceptual  and  consists 
only  of  one  percept.  Now  in  the  percept  we  find  a  cen- 
tral sensory  element  surrounded  by  other  elements.  This 
central  element  stands  out  prominently  in  the  given 
psychic  state,  while  the  other  elements  are  subordinate. 
Not  that  those  elements  are  unimportant  for  the  percept, 
on  the  contrary  they  are  of  the  highest  consequence  and 
moment,  they  only  lie  outside  the  focus  of  the  psychosis. 
Along  with  the  focus  those  elements  form  one  organ- 
ized whole.  The  intensity  of  the  psychic  state  pro- 
ceeds from  the  periphery  to  the  centre.  The  elements 
can  as  little  be  separated  from  the  central  element  as 
the  area  of  the  circle  from  its  centre.  By  removing  the 
centre  the  circle  will  be  destroyed  and  the  centre  will 
cease  to  be  what  it  is.  All  the  elements  of  the  percept 
form  one  texture  having  the  central  sensory  element  as 


138  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

its  nucleus. 

Integrated  as  all  those  elements  are  they  are  not,  how- 
ever, of  equal  value  and  importance  for  the  life  exist- 
ence of  the  whole.  The  central  sensory  element  is  of 
the  utmost  consequence,  it  is  the  vital  point  of  the  whole 
experience.  While  the  change  or  destruction  of  one  or 
some  of  the  subordinate  elements  may  still  leave  the 
total  moment  unchanged,  or  but  slightly  modified,  a 
change  of  the  central  sensory  element  or  of  the  nucleus 
will  profoundly  modify  all  the  other  elements  and  their 
interrelation;  and  a  destruction  of  the  nucleus  will  des- 
troy the  total  moment.  Like  their  neuron  counter- 
parts, the  moments  may  be  regarded  as  being  organized 
into  groups,  systems,  communities  and  constellations, 
aggregates  of  greater  and  greater  complexity. 


CHAPTER  U 

TYPES  OF  MOMENTS  AND  MOMENT-THRESHOLD 

WE  may  discriminate  the  following  types  of 
moment-consciousness : 
I.  The  Desultory  Moment, 
(a)   The  Absolute, 
(b)   The  Relative,  or  Reflex  Moment. 

II.  The  Synthetic  Moment. 

(a)  The  Simple  Accumulative, 

(b)  The  Compound  Accumulative. 

III.  The  Recognitive  Moment. 

(a)  The  Synthetic,  or  Generic  Recognitive, 

(b)  The  Specific,  the  Reflective,  or  the  Synthet- 

ic Moment  of  Self-consciousness. 
The  chief  characteristic  of  the  desultory  moment  is 
the  lack  of  interconnection  of  the  links  of  the  psychic 
series.  Each  pulse  of  psychosis  stands  out  as  an  isolated 
fact  without  "before"  and  "after."  A  moment  of  such 
a  character  has  no  reproduction,  no  recognition,  no 
memory,  and  certainly  no  personality.  The  lower  stages 
of  this  moment,  the  absolute  desultory  moment-con- 
sciousness are  mere  moment-content  devoid  of  all  or- 
ganization and  substance.  The  higher  forms  of  the  des- 
ultory moment,  those  of  the  reflex  moment-conscious- 
ness, have  an  elementary  organization,  but  of  such  a 
fixed  character  that  the  series  of  manifestations,  or  of 
functioning  remain  completely  isolated.  Reproductions 
appear  here  for  the  first  time  in  an  elementary  form, 
inasmuch  as  the  recurrences  of  the  moment  leave  the 

239 


240  Normal  and  Ahnormal  Psychology 

latter  unmodified;  it  is  reproduction  only  on  ac- 
count of  the  modifications  produced  in  a  higher 
observing  moment. 

This  moment  has  the  germs  of  reproduction,  but  no 
recognition  and  hence  no  memory,  no  self-con- 
sciousness. The  moment  of  the  absolute  desultory 
type  may  possibly  be  found  in  unorganized  proto- 
plasm and  in  the  lowest  forms  of  the  pro- 
tozoa. The  higher  forms  of  moment  of  the  desultory 
type,  the  reflex  moment,  may  be  found  in  the  lower 
forms  of  lowly  organized  life  and  in  the  lower  struc- 
tures of  the  higher  metazoa. 

The  moment-consciousness  of  the  synthetic  type  has 
its  series  of  links  interconnected.  In  each  link  the  pre- 
ceding ones  are  synthetized.  The  recurrence  of  this 
type  of  moment,  unlike  the  moment  of  relative  desultory 
consciousness,  is  embodied  in  the  structure  and  func- 
tion of  the  moment.  It  is  in  this  type  of  moment  that 
reproduction  is  for  the  first  time  clearly  and  fully  man- 
ifested. The  moment  is  modified  with  each  reproduc- 
tion; it  accumulates  more  content  with  each  recurrence 
and,  as  such,  the  synthetic  moment  may  also  be  char- 
acterized as  accumulative. 

This  type  of  moment  has  reproduction,  and  the  re- 
production is  not  only  for  the  external  observer,  but  is 
present  and  inherent  through  changes  in  the  organiza- 
tion, structure  and  function  of  the  moment  itself.  Mem- 
ory first  appears  in  this  type,  but  it  is  rather  organic,  not 
recognitive  in  nature. 

The  more  elementary  form  of  this  type  of  moment 
shows  accumulations  only  along  single  lines  of  develop- 
ment. The  lines  remain  disconnected.  Sensory  nuclei 
surrounded    by    secondary    sensory    elements    do    not 


Types  of  Moments  and  Moment-Threshold   241 

occur,  and  perceptual  psychosis  characteristic  of  the 
higher  forms  is  absent  in  this  stage  of  the  synthetic  mo- 
ment, which  is  therefore  termed  the  simple  accumu- 
lative moment  of  synthetic  consciousness.  It  is  only  in 
the  higher  forms  of  synthetic  consciousness,  in  the  com- 
pound synthetic  moment  that  perceptual  life  may 
be  said  to  arise. 

In  the  compound  synthetic  moment,  series  along  di- 
verse lines  become  severally  compounded  and  sensory 
nuclei  with  secondary  sensory  elements  make  their 
appearance.  But  even  here  recognition  is  not  pres- 
ent and  hence  memory  may  from  a  subjective 
standpoint  be  regarded  as  absent.  The  synthetic 
moment  even  in  its  highest  phase  of  development 
lacks  ideational  life  and  is  entirely  devoid  of  self-con- 
sciousness. The  higher  invertebrates  and  the  lower 
vertebrates  probably  do  not  rise  in  their  psychological 
development  above  the  higher  form  of  synthetic  con- 
sciousness, the  compound  synthetic  moment. 

In  the  recognitive  moment  the  series  of  reproductions 
are  intimately  connected  as  we  find  the  case  to  be  in  the 
synthetic  moment.  The  moment  becomes  modified  with 
each  occurring  reproduction,  containing  in  an  abridged 
form  the  history  of  previous  modifications.  The 
mode  of  reproduction  of  the  recognitive  moment,  how- 
ever, differs  widely  from  that  of  the  synthetic  mo- 
ment. The  content  of  the  previous  occurrence  need  not 
be  actually  reproduced,  but  only  represented  and  any 
psychic  element  may  fulfill  this  function  of  representa- 
tion. It  is  through  such  representation  that  the  repro- 
duction of  this  type  of  moment  is  effected.  Through 
representation  the  moment  reproduces  form  and  content, 
and  cognizes  over  again  immediately  what  it  has  just 


242  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

experienced,  in  short,  it  re-cognizes. 

Recognition  is  the  function  of  representation  and  is 
the  essential  characteristic  of  this  type  of  moment-con- 
sciousness. Ideational  psychosis  germinates  and  devel- 
ops with  the  growth  of  the  recognitive  moment.  For 
the  very  function  of  the  idea  is  the  cognition  over  again 
of  what  has  been  cognized  in  perception,  in  short,  rec- 
ognition is  the  essence  of  the  idea. 

In  generic  recognition  the  time  element  is  absent  or 
but  vaguely  present.  In  perceiving  the  table  yonder 
we  also  recognize  it  as  table  by  classing  the  percept  ta- 
ble with  representations  derived  from  previously  per- 
ceived tables,  but  hardly  does  any  time-element  enter 
into  this  form  of  recognition,  the  idea  of  having  gen- 
eric recognition  does  not  refer  to  any  percept  experi- 
enced at  some  definite  point  of  time.  The  recognitive 
moment  uses  the  idea  as  a  means  to  reproduce  its  form- 
er experience  without  actually  living  them  over  again. 
The  representation  in  the  lower  form  of  moment  is  so 
bound  up  with  the  percept  that  the  function  of  recog- 
nition is  but  implicit,  and  becomes  explicit  in  the  higher 
forms,  when  the  ideational  or  representative  elements 
become  completely  free  and  appear  in  mental  trains,  or 
in  series  of  associated  ideas. 

In  its  specific  form,  however,  the  recognitive  moment 
also  includes  the  time  element.  The  moment-content 
or  object  generically  recognized  is  classed  or  combined 
with  a  definite  representation  generically  referring  to 
perceptual  experience;  specifically  recognized,  the  con- 
tent or  object  is  placed  in  a  definite  point  of  the  objec- 
tive schema  of  the  flowing  time  series.  The 
particular  rose  thought  of  now  is  the  particular  rose 
seen  beforei  say  yesterday.     The    idea    of    the    rose 


Types  of  Moments  and  Moment-Threshold   243 

substitutes  and  represents  the  percept  and  has  the 
function  of  the  percept  as  reproduced,  thus  referring  to 
the  same  object.  That  is  why  the  qualitatively  different 
representation  is  identified  with  the  actual  perception. 
What  is  common  to  the  two  is  their  reference  to  the 
same  object,  in  all  else  they  really  differ  widely.  The 
recognitive  moment  that  lacks  the  time-element  is  termed 
generic,  while  the  moment  that  has  time  element  in- 
cluded in  the  process  of  its  recognition  is  termed  spe- 
cific  recognitive  moment-consciousness. 

In  the  lower  and  simpler  stages  of  the  recognitive 
moment  the  generic  form  predominates,  in  the  higher 
and  more  complex  stages  the  specific  form  of  recogni- 
tion arises  and  attains  its  full  development.  From  a 
biological  standpoint  one  can  understand  the  import- 
ance and  immense  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence of  those  organisms  whose  moment-consciousness 
has  varied  in  the  direction  of  representation  and  has 
begun  to  reproduce  after  the  mode  of  the  recognitive 
type.  To  effect  a  modification  and  new  adaptation  to 
changes  in  the  environment  the  moments  of  the  desul- 
tory type  have  no  other  mode  of  modification  but  by  the 
slowly  working  factors  of  spontaneous  variations  and 
natural  selection,  a  process  of  adaptation  and  useful 
modification  prolonged  throughout  the  course  of  gener- 
ations. The  adaptations  of  the  different  forms  of  the 
synthetic  type  are  greatly  facilitated,  and  the  course  of 
the  process  is  so  much  foreshortened  that  it  becomes  re- 
duced to  the  life-existence  of  the  given  individual  or- 
ganisms. The  adaptations  are  brought  about  by  the 
slow  process  of  chance  success  and  error,  and  the  whole 
series  of  modifications  must  be  fully  and  directly  under- 
gone by  the  organism. 


244  Normal  and  Ahnormal  Psychology 

The  recognitive  moments  have  reduced  the  time- 
elements  of  adaptations  to  changes  of  conditions 
in  the  external  environment  almost  to  a  minimum, 
the  series  of  reactions  in  the  growth  to  most  per- 
fect adaptations  is  effected  in  representation,  saving 
itself  the  necessity  of  actually  undergoing  a  series  of 
intervening  modifications.  Representative  elements,  be- 
ing free,  can  enter  into  different  modes  of  combinations, 
and  thus  form  adjustments  and  adaptations  with  an  ease 
of  which  the  primary  and  secondary  sensory  elements  of 
the  lower  moments  do  not  admit.  This  freedom  of 
movement  in  the  formation  of  new  representative  com- 
binations is  an  important  factor  in  organic  life,  as  it 
gives  the  organism  that  possesses  this  variation  an  ad- 
vantage in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Adaptation  can 
be  made  for  the  future  from  the  experiences  of  the  past. 

In  those  forms  of  the  recognitive  moment  in  which 
the  time-element  plays  a  part  in  the  determination  of  the 
whole  there  is  always  present  a  specific  time-localization 
of  the  given  psychic  or  moment  content.  Where  the 
form  of  recognition  is  specific  the  representation  or  idea 
is  regarded  as  actual  and  localized  in  some  definite  point 
in  the  stream  of  past  time,  where  the  recognition  is  gen- 
eric the  representation  or  idea  is  referred  to  no  definite 
point  in  the  stream  of  objective  time,  and  when  present 
in  the  highest  types  of  moments,  is  regarded  as  belong- 
ing to  what  is  termed  imagination.  Recognition  de- 
termines the  place  of  the  given  experience  in  the  series 
of  events. 

In  the  lower  stages  of  the  recognitive  moment  no  time 
element  is  present,  in  the  higher  stages  some  vague  ref- 
erence to  time  may  be  present  in  the  forms  of  specific 
recognition,  but  definite  localization  appears  only  with 


Types  of  Moments  and  M oment-Threshold   245 

the  rise  of  the  recognitive  moment  of  self-consciousness. 
With  the  appearance  of  the  conceptual  schema  of  objec- 
tive time  the  specific  form  of  recognition  refers  not  only 
to  a  definite  point  on  the  scale  of  objective  time,  but  to  a 
definite  mental  synthesis  localized  on  that  objective  time- 
schema;  in  other  words,  the  self-concept  is  involved  in 
specific  recognition,  which  therefore  belongs  to  the  high- 
est form  of  the  recognitive  moment,  namely,  the  mo- 
ment of  self-consciousness  or  of  personality. 

In  specific  recognition  the  present  self  projects 
the  bit  of  representative  experience  into  the  past 
self  which  is  felt  to  be  identical  with  the  former  in  the 
series  of  selves  to  which  the  reproduction  of  the 
moment  gives  rise.  The  highest  recognitive  mo- 
ment, or  moment  of  self-consciousness  may  be  rep- 
resented as  a  series  of  selves  projected  in  the  time 
schema  the  preceding  selves  being  synthetized  by  each 
succeeding  self.  From  this  standpoint  we  may  regard 
such  a  moment  as  synthetic  and  term  it  the  synthetic 
moment  of  self -consciousness. 

Should  this  series  of  reproductions  constituting  the 
history  of  the  moment  become  dissociated  and  isolated 
through  mental  degradation  and  degeneration,  then  the 
form  of  consciousness  becomes  analogous  to  the  desul- 
tory consciousness  and  may  therefore  be  termed  the 
desultory  moment  of  self -consciousness. 

The  functioning  moments  of  a  highly  organized 
psychic  being,  at  any  point  of  time,  present  a  hierarchy 
of  moments  differing  not  only  in  degree  of  con- 
sciousness, but  also  in  the  type  of  structure  and 
function.  Moments-consciousness  from  the  lowest 
to  the  highest,  from  the  simplest  to  the  most  com- 
plex, from  the  desultory  type  to  the  recognitive  type 


246  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

of  self-consciousness  all  are  present  in  the  adult  stage  of 
the  most  highly  organized  psychic  life.  Now  in  the 
series  of  moments  going  to  form  such  a  highly  complex 
being,  those  that  are  of  the  recognitive  type  can  become 
focal,  while  those  that  belong  to  the  lower  types  can 
never  enter  the  focus.  The  lower  types  of  moment- 
consciousness,  belonging  to  the  groups  and  systems  of 
reflex  and  instinctive  activity,  cannot,  from  their  very 
nature,  reach  that  level  of  consciousness  and  that  degree 
of  psychosis  as  to  become  qualified  to  enter  into  the 
focus  of  the  moment  of  self-consciousness. 

From  this  standpoint,  then,  the  subconscious  may  be 
divided  into  two  regions,  the  one  including  all  the  mo- 
ments belonging  to  that  of  the  recognitive  type,  the  oth- 
er comprising  all  the  moments  belonging  to  the  lower 
types.  Within  the  subconscious,  then,  there  is  a  thres- 
hold which  the  lower  types  of  moments  cannot  pass. 
This  threshold  may  be  termed  the  threshold  of  recogni- 
tive consciousness. 

The  moments  lying  above-  the  threshold  of  recogni- 
tive consciousness  may  change  in  psychic  intensity,  may 
pass  through  all  degrees  of  sensory  intensity  and  repre- 
sentative vividness  ranging  from  minimum  to  maximum; 
they  may  sink  and  rise  gradually  or  suddenly,  but  they 
do  not  and  cannot  fall,  without  becoming  degenerated, 
below  the  recognitive  threshold.  Those  moments  that  lie 
below  the  recognitive  threshold  cannot  rise  above  it,  they 
are  condemned  to  remain  in  the  obscure  regions  of  the 
subconscious;  their  fate  is  never  to  enter  the  strong  light 
of  the  upper  world  of  consciousness.  At  the  same  time 
their  psychic  intensity  does  not  suffer  any  change,  they 
do  not  shift  forwards  and  backwards  in  the  field  of  con- 
sciousness like  the  moments  of  the  recognitive  type  ly- 


Types  of  Moments  and  Moment-Threshold   247 

ing  above  the  threshold,  they  remain  unalterable,  they 
are  fixed. 

In  a  certain  sense  the  moments  lying  below  the  thresh- 
old of  recognitive  consciousness  may  be  considered  as 
dissociated  from  the  upper  regions,  inasmuch  as  they 
lie  outside  the  field  of  the  upper  consciousness.  From 
the  standpoint  of  activity,  however,  they  stand  in  inti- 
mate relation  to  the  upper  level  of  consciousness.  The 
highly  organized  moment  uses  the  lower  ones  as  instru- 
ments to  carry  out  its  purpose,  and  through  them  it  also 
enters  into  relation  with  the  external  environment. 
Stimuli  are  received  by  the  lower  moments,  and  motor 
responses  are  once  more  given  by  these  moments.  In 
other  words,  the  lower  types  of  moments  are  in  service 
of  the  higher  moments. 

From  a  teleological  standpoint  one  can  understand 
the  importance  of  it  for  the  life-existence  of  the  individ- 
ual. In  order  to  save  time  and  energy  any  activity  that 
can  be  carried  out  by  the  lower  aggregates  is  directly 
responded  to  by  the  less  complex  and  more  fixed  mo- 
ments. The  lowermost  moments  are  the  easiest  to 
gain  access  to  by  the  external  stimuli,  and  in  case  the 
adaptation  is  simple  the  response  immediately  follows 
without  any  reference  to  higher  aggregates.  Should, 
however,  the  stimulus  be  under  conditions  where  more 
complex  adaptations  are  requisite  then  the  next  higher 
aggregate  is  set  into  activity.  The  ascending  degree 
of  complexity  of  aggregates  set  into  activity  grows  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  need  of  complexity  of  adaptation,  un- 
til the  most  complex  of  all  aggregates  is  reached,  the 
one  representing  the  complete  organization  of  sensori- 
motor adaptations  of  the  organism  as  a  whole. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  there 


248  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

is  a  series  of  moments  almost  independent  of  this  organ- 
ized hierarchy  of  moments,  never  falling  under  the 
sway,  or  but  indirectly  and  casually  being  affected  by  the 
principal  complex  moment-consciousness;  such  are  the 
moments  that  go  along  with  functions,  directly  subservi- 
ent to  the  internal  needs  of  the  organism.  This  complex 
aggregate  of  moments  from  its  very  nature  is  withdrawn 
from  the  general  control  of  the  other  aggregates,  inas- 
much as  it  need  not  adapt  itself  to  the  varying  condi- 
tions and  different  stimulations  of  the  external  environ- 
ment. The  set  of  stimuli  this  aggregate  responds  to 
remains  almost  unchanged,  hence  their  activity  is  of  a 
low  order,  belonging  to  the  character  of  the  reflex  mo- 
ments. 


CHAPTER  III 

MODIFICATIONS  OF  MOMENTS  IN  THE  ORGANIZED 
AGGREGATE 

IN  pointing  out  the  parallel  in  the  series  of  mo- 
ments as  they  appear  in  ontogenesis  and  phylo- 
genesis, we  must  make  some  restrictions.  The 
series  of  the  subordinate-moments  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  a  highly  evolved  and  complex  moment  may  be 
homologous  to  the  phylogenetic  series,  but  still  the 
two  greatly  differ  in  character.  Each  moment  in  the 
series  subordinate  to  the  principal  moment  is  greatly 
modified  in  its  activity  and,  as  such,  differs  in  nature 
from  the  moment  of  the  corresponding  stage  in  the  phy- 
logenetic series.  A  complicated  act  after  a  series  of  rep- 
etitions sinks  into  the  subconscious,  becomes  degraded 
in  character  and  falls  to  the  level  of  the  so-called  "sec- 
ondary automatic"  acts.  This  does  not  mean  that  in  the 
phylogenetic  or  even  in  the  ontogenetic  evolution  the 
moment  occupying  a  parallel  stage  is  of  a  secondary  au- 
tomatic character,  as  it  appears  in  the  moment  of  higher 
organization. 

When  the  sensori-motor  series  going  to  con- 
stitute the  secondary  automatic  act  becomes  well  or- 
ganized, the  links  in  the  series  fall  to  a  minimum  of  psy- 
chic intensity,  but  the  moment  consciousness  occupying  a 
corresponding  position  in  the  scale  of  evolution  has  a 
higher  psychic  intensity  than  the  one  characteristic  of 
the  secondary  automatic  stage.  The  psychosis  of  a  dog, 
horse,  mouse,  rabbit  is  hardly  of  the  same  order  of 

249 


250  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

intensity  characteristic,  for  instance,  of  the  act  with 
which  one  buttons  his  coat,  opens  his  door,  walks  in  the 
street,  or  simply  maintains  his  equilibrium.  The  con- 
sciousness of  the  dog,  rabbit  or  mouse  may  be  and  surely 
is  of  a  lower  order  than  that  of  a  man,  but  its  intensity 
is  not  necessarily  of  the  same  level  with  the  automatic 
activity  of  man. 

The  greater  differentiation  of  elements  in  the  highly 
constituted  being  is  also  their  greater  simplification.  The 
lower  a  moment  is  in  the  scale  of  a  highly  organized 
being,  the  more  differentiated  it  is,  and  the  more  simpli- 
fied is  its  function  in  the  organic  whole.  Quite  different 
is  it  in  the  case  of  the  lower  type  of  moment  in  the  phylo- 
genetic  series,  there  the  differentiation  has  not  proceeded 
far,  and  although  it  may  be  low  in  type  and  structure, 
the  very  lack  of  differentiation  of  function  makes  that 
lowly  moment  more  complex  as  to  function.  A  low 
moment  of  a  high  type  of  organization  is  lower  than  a 
high  moment  in  a  lower  type  of  organization.  A  mo- 
ment occupying  a  low  stage  in  a  statically  established 
hierarchy  is  really  lower  than  a  corresponding  stage  in 
either  the  phylogenetic  or  ontogenetic  series.  The  high- 
est moment-consciousness  of  a  fish  is  homologous  with 
a  very  low  moment  in  man,  but  the  latter  lacks  the  in- 
tensity to  which  the  former  attains. 

The  moment  by  entering  as  a  unit  in  an  organized 
hierarchy  becomes  degraded  and  loses  much  of  its 
psychic  activity  by  becoming  differentiated  and  con- 
fined to  one  mode  of  reaction,  though  reaching  its  acme 
of  perfection  in  that  direction.  The  number  of  func- 
tions present,  though  in  an  imperfect,  undeveloped, 
sketchy  way,  in  the  representatives  of  the  low  type  of 
moment  becomes  narrowed  down,  even  limited  to  one 


Moments  tn  Organized  Aggregate  25 1 

function,  highly  developed  and  intensified  in  the  lower 
representatives  of  moments  belonging  to  a  hierarchy 
organized  on  the  plan  of  a  higher  type. 

\i  a,  b,  c,  d,  e  .  .  .  etc.,  represent  the  functioning 
modes  of  a  low  type  of  moment,  then  the  total  of  func- 
tioning modes  of  the  moment  may  be  represented  by  the 
sum  {a^+h^-\-c^-\-d}-\-e^-\-  .  .  .  ),  each  function  is  in  its 
first  degree,  that  is,  it  is  present  in  a  primitive  undevel- 
oped form.  The  low  moment,  however,  forming  a  part 
of  a  highly  developed  organic  hierarchy,  becomes  highly 
differentiated  in  the  process  of  evolution  of  the  whole 
and  is  finally  reduced  to  the  exercise  of  one  function 
only,  fully  developed  and  intensified  to  its  highest  pitch. 
The  number  of  functions  then  present  in  a  primitive 
form  in  the  moment  of  low  type  is  in  the  course  of  evo- 
lution gradually  sundered  into  its  units,  each  unit  reach- 
ing a  high  stage  of  perfection  in  the  low  moment  be- 
longing to  a  high  type  of  moment  hierarchy. 

If  a  function  in  its  primitive  form  is  represented 
by  a  quantity,  then  the  same  or  analogous  function 
highly  developed  may  be  represented  by  the  same 
or  similar  quantity  raised  to  («*^)  degree.  Now 
let  a^  stand  for  the  primitive  function,  then  a"  will  stand 
for  the  fully  developed  function.  The  number  of  the 
moment's  functions  is  limited,  but  highly  developed. 
The  moment's  functioning  activities  may  be  represented 
by  the  formula:  a°+^°.  The  highest  moment  of 
the  low  type  has  a  richer  and  more  variable  content 
than  the  lower  moment  belonging  to  the  higher  type. 
This  truth  can  be  still  further  realized  by  having  re- 
course to  the  higher  guiding  moment-consciousness,  the 
lower  moments  are  shown  there  to  work  with  an  almost 
mechanical-like  activity.     Man,  dog,  or  monkey  with 


251  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

their  spinal  or  medullary  ganglia  only  fall  lower  than 
a  fully  developed  fish  or  a  full  grown  lobster. 

If  we  come  to  consider  the  moment  of  corresponding 
stages  in  the  ontogenetic  and  phylogenetic  series,  we 
once  more  meet  with  resemblance,  but  at  the  same  time 
with  one  of  fundamental  difference.  The  moment  of 
high  type  that  passes  ontogenetically  the  stages  of  phylo- 
genetic evolution  does  it  in  a  general,  and,  so  to  say, 
sketchy  form,  each  stage  of  ontogenesis  in  reality  funda- 
mentally differing  from  that  of  the  parallel  stage  in 
phylogenesis.  Just  as  the  human  embryo  in  the  course 
of  its  growth  and  passing  the  stages  that  re- 
flect phylogenesis  is  not  necessarily  once  a  worm,  then 
a  fish,  then  a  bird,  but  only  approaches  these  types  in  a 
most  general  form,  so  also  is  it  in  the  case  of  the  moment 
in  the  different  stages  of  its  growth;  it  approaches  the 
lower  types  of  activity  in  a  most  general  and  sketchy 
form. 

The  moment  in  phylogenesis  is  independent  and  is  fully 
developed,  while  the  corresponding  stage  in  ontogenesis 
is  but  a  stage  in  the  growth  of  another  and  higher  mo- 
ment, and  as  such  is  certainly  different  in  nature  from 
the  phylogenetic  moment.  The  embryo  in  the  first 
state,  though  provided  with  gills,  is  still  not  a  fish  and 
could  not  live  in  water.  The  consciousness  of  the  infant 
in  passing  through  stages  running  parallel  to  the  lower 
moments-consciousness  does  not  temporarily  become  that 
particular  low  moment-consciousness.  It  is  simply  a  gen- 
eral outline  of  the  type  of  moment-consciousness  that  the 
higher  moment  is  passing  or  a  stage  in  the  course  of  its 
ontogenetic  development. 

The  infant  in  the  growth  of  its  psychic  life 
does  not  actually  turn  butterfly,   flsh,  bird,   monkey, 


Moments  in  Organized  Aggregate  253 

savage,  he  does  not  really  pass  those  modes  of  psychic 
states,  but  he  passes  through  stages  which  in  a  general 
outline  remotely  resemble  the  lower  grades  of  animal 
psychosis.  All  the  stages  are  determined  by  the  principal 
type  of  moment-consciousness,  and,  in  reality,  are  not  a 
series  of  low  moments  ending  in  a  high  type,  but  stages 
of  growth  of  one  high  type  of  moment-consciousness. 
The  stages  through  which  the  infant  and  child  pass  are 
the  evolution  of  man.    The  moments  of  the  low  form 

develop  on  the  type  of  ^°+^°+c°+    ,  while  the 

moments  of  the  highest  forms  develop  on  the  type  of 
(a+^+c+c+, .  .  .  . )°,  a  far  more  complex  organization. 


CHAPTER  IV 


MENTAL    ORGANIZATION 


MOMENTS  of  the  same  type  form  aggre- 
gations in  an  ascending  series  of  complex- 
ity, groups,  systems,  communities,  clusters, 
constellations.  Isolated  moments  are  or- 
ganized into  groups,  groups  into  systems,  systems  into 
communities  and  communities  into  constellations. 
Groups  are  the  simplest,  while  constellations  are  the 
highest  and  most  complex  of  the  aggregates.  The  firm- 
ness, the  stability  of  organization  stands  in  direct  rela- 
tion to  complexity,  the  more  complex  an  aggregation  the 
less  stable  it  is. 

The  order  of  complexity  also  represents  the  order 
of  development,  so  that  the  more  complex  is  also 
the  latest  to  appear  in  the  course  of  evolution.  Evo- 
lution and  stability  stand  thus  in  inverse  relation.  What 
appears  early  in  the  course  of  development  is  less  firmly 
organized  than  what  appears  later  on.  The  whole  ten- 
dency of  evolution  is  from  stability  to  instability.  The 
order  of  growth  and  instability  is  in  the  ascending  scale 
I — from  groups,  through  systems,  communities,  to  clus- 
ters, and  constellations.  The  simpler  sensori-motor  re- 
actions are,  both  ontogenetically  and  phylogenetically, 
the  first  to  appear  in  the  course  of  evolution  and  they  are 
also  more  stable  than  the  more  complex  sensori-motor 
reactions.  We  can  possibly  best  realize  the  relation  of 
instability  to  complexity  of  structure,  if  we  regard  life, 
including  both  physiological  and  psychic  processes,  as  an 

254  ^ 


Mental  Organization  255 

ascending  organization  of  sensori-motor  reactions  to 
the  influences  of  the  external  environment. 

The  sensori-motor  reactions  represent  a  hierarchy  of 
organized  aggregations  beginning  in  the  lowest  re- 
flexes and  culminating  in  the  highest  activity. 

An  illustration  of  the  lower  reflexes  may  be  taken, 
such  as  the  knee-jerk,  the  action  of  the  bladder,  persistal- 
tic  movements  of  the  intestines,  respiratory  movements, 
heart-beats,  and  other  organic  activities.  Association 
among  these  various  reflexes  may  be  taken  as  high- 
er aggregates.  The  complex  coordination  of  ori- 
entation and  space  adjustment,  such  as  the  maintenance 
of  equilibrium,  walking,  running,  jumping,  flying,  swim- 
ming, etc.,  represent  more  complex  activity.  A  still 
higher  aggregate  is  to  be  found  in  the  association  of 
groups  and  systems  of  sensori-motor  reactions  within  the 
sphere  of  a  sense-organ  with  the  complex  coordination 
of  motor  adjustment  of  the  whole  body.  The  highest 
aggregates  are  to  be  found  in  the  association  of  all  the 
motor  reactions  organized  within  the  different  spheres 
of  sense-organs  with  the  complex  motor  coordination  of 
body-adjustments. 

Simple  sensori-motor  reflexes,  complex  reflexes,  sen- 
sori-motor coordinations,  instinctive  adaptations  and  in- 
telligent adjustments,  statically  regarded,  correspond  to 
the  classification  of  psycho-motor  aggregates  into  groups, 
systems,  communities,  clusters,  and  constellations.  In 
other  words,  the  study  of  the  sensori-motor  constitu- 
tion of  the  higher  organized  beings  in  their  adult  stages, 
reveals  the  presence  and  interrelation  of  moments.  We 
find  that  the  history  of  the  use  and  growth  of 
aggregates  is  in  the  order  of  their  complexity. 
In  ontogenesis  we  find  that  the  simple  reflexes   ap- 


2^6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

pear  first,  then  the  association,  the  more  complex 
sensori-motor  coordination,  later  on  the  so-called  in- 
stinctive adaptations  begin  to  appear,  while  the  intelli- 
gent adaptations  appear  late  in  the  course  of  develop- 
ment. 

The  child  at  its  birth  is  a  purely  reflex  being; 
the  different  reflexes  are  not  even  associated,  it  is  the 
medulla  and  the  spinal  cord  that  are  principally  active; 
the  pupils  react  to  light,  the  legs  and  hands  react  to 
more  or  less  intense  sensory  stimuli,  such  as  tickling,  and 
sensori-motor  reflexes  to  taste-stimuli  are  present.  All 
of  those  reactions  are  isolated,  incoordinated ;  they  are 
so  many  simple  groups  of  sensori-motor  reflexes,  even 
the  sucking  activity  of  the  infant  is  largely  of  the  sen- 
sori-motor reflex  type;  the  child  at  its  birth  is  a  spinal 
being,  and  its  moment  consciousness  is  desultory,  con- 
sisting of  the  desultory  activities  of  isolated  function- 
ing sensori-motor  groups. 

Later  on  the  reflex  activity  such  as  of  the  hands, 
legs,  eyes  become  associated  through  the  develop- 
ment of  sight  and  kinaesthetic  sensations;  the  eyes 
can  follow  an  object,  the  hands  become  adapted 
to  the  seizing  movements.  Movements  and  body- 
coordination  then  begin  to  appear,  such  as  turn- 
ing the  body  to  right  or  left,  then  sitting  up,  then 
creeping,  standing,  then  walking,  then  talking,  all 
involving  more  and  more  coordination  of  muscles  and 
kinaesthetic  sensations,  aided  by  the  association  of  sensa- 
tions and  sensori-motor  reactions  from  different  sense- 
organs.  It  is  late  in  its  history  of  development  that 
the  child  begins  to  gain  full  control  of  its  actions  and 
adjustment  to  the  stimuli  coming  from  the  external  en- 
vironment. 


Mental  Organization  257 

The  history  of  phylogenesis  runs  a  parallel  course. 
The  lower  organisms  are  purely  reflex  in  their  sensori- 
motor reactions,  and  as  such,  they  belong  to  the  type  of 
the  desultory  moment-consciousness,  such  for  instance 
as  may  be  found  in  the  lower  form  of  the  MoUusca 
as  the  class  Tunicata.  In  the  higher  forms  of  Mol- 
lusca  association  of  sensori-motor  reflexes  begins  to 
appear.  These  associations  become  more  and  more 
complex  with  the  rise  and  growth  of  differentiation  of 
sense-organs  in  the  higher  forms  of  MoUusca  and  the 
lower  Arthropodes,  giving  rise  to  groups,  systems,  com- 
munities, reaching  the  cluster-stage,  in  the  higher  Arth- 
ropodes and  the  lower  Mammalia,  finally  culminating 
in  the  complex  functions  characteristic  of  the  constella- 
tion-stage, such  as  found  in  the  sensori-motor  reactions 
of  man  in  his  adaptation  to  physical  and  social  surround- 
ings. 

Each  highly  organized  moment  represents  a  hier- 
archy of  many  moments,  but  of  lower  types.  The  high- 
est constellation  has  at  its  command  lower  types  of  psy- 
chic aggregates,  and  had  it  not  been  for  these  lower 
moments,  the  higher  type  would  have  lacked  matter 
and  activity  for  carrying  on  its  own  work. 

The  lower  forms  of  moments,  however,  are  subordi- 
nate to  the  higher  type  which  constitutes  the  centre,  the 
nucleus  of  the  total  psychosis.  The  other  constituent 
moments,  from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex,  are  in 
the  service  of  the  highest  type  of  moments,  though  the 
former  lie  outside  the  central  focus  of  the  principal  con- 
trolling moment-consciousness.  These  lower  forms  are  by 
no  means  to  be  ignored,  since  they  form  the  main  fac- 
tors that  determine  indirectly  the  moment's  activity;  they 
constitute  the  storehouse  from  which  the  central  mo- 


258  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ment  draws  its  material.  Without  the  lower  moments 
the  principal,  controlling  moment  could  not  have  re- 
ceived stimulations  from  the  external  environment,  nor 
would  it  have  been  enabled  to  make  proper  motor  re- 
sponses. In  fact  we  may  say  that  without  the  lower 
forms  of  moments,  the  moment-nucleus  would  have  lost 
its  vitality  and  even  its  meaning. 

The  perception  of  an  object  and  the  proper  adjust- 
ments to  it  depend  not  so  much  on  what  is  directly  pres- 
ent in  the  focus  of  consciousness,  but  on  the  wealth 
of  accumulated  material  lying  outside  the  moment  focus. 
In  reading  a  book,  for  instance,  the  handling  of  it,  the 
motor  adjustments  in  keeping  it,  the  perception  of  the 
letters,  of  the  words,  of  the  phrases  lie  outside  the  focus 
of  consciousness,  and  still  it  is  this  mass  of  perceptions 
that  forms  the  matter  of  the  controlling  moment.  The 
inventor  in  working  on  his  particular  invention  has  a 
mass  of  accumulated  material  and  experience  indispen- 
sable for  the  development  of  the  invention,  subconscious 
material  lying  in  the  background  of  his  consciousness. 
Similarly  the  mathematician  in  solving  his  problem 
which  forms  the  focus  of  his  consciousness  possesses  a 
body  of  knowledge  or  a  mass  of  material  which,  though 
it  lies  on  the  margin  of  his  consciousness,  forms  the  main 
stay  of  his  particular  investigation. 

There  is  more  in  consciousness  than  is  actually  di- 
rectly present  in  the  focus  of  the  moment.  While  I  am 
writing  these  last  phrases  my  consciousness  is  occupied 
with  them  alone,  but  they  are  supported  by  a  body  of 
subconscious  thought.  All  our  perception  is  largely  de- 
termined by  the  results  of  our  previous  experience  which 
falls  outside  the  central  point  of  consciousness.  Many 
perceptual  illusions  find  their  explanation  in  habit.    An 


Mental  Organization  259 

otherwise  novel  experience  surrounds  itself  with  famil- 
iar experience  which  disguises  the  novelty  and  trans- 
forms the  percept  by  substituting  what  is  otherwise  fa- 
miliar and  habitual. 

This  mass  of  familiar  experience  is  not  present 
in  the  focus  of  the  moment-consciousness,  it  lies 
outside  the  centre  and  is  often  submerged  in  re- 
gard to  the  direct  introspectiv^e  scrutiny;  it  has, 
however,  a  powerful  influence  on  the  activity  of 
the  moment.  The  submerged  moments,  though  lying 
outside  the  direct  group  of  the  main  focus,  still  exercise 
a  great  influence  on  the  course  of  the  moment's  growth 
and  development.  The  conscious  controls  the  material 
supplied  by  the  subconscious,  while  the  subconscious 
by  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  mass  of  its  material, 
in  its  turn  modifies  and  determines  the  course  of  con- 
scious activity. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   GROWTH   AND   FUNCTION   OF  THE   MOMENT 

WE  may  turn  now  to  the  study  of  the  mo- 
ment's functions.  This  can  be  best  investi- 
gated in  following  up  its  history,  in  watch- 
ing the  growth  and  development  of  the 
most  elementary  moment-consciousness.  In  its  perceptual 
stage  the  moment-consciousness  may  become  modified  in 
its  subordinate  psychic  elements  only,  indirectly  reacting 
on  the  nuclear  sensory  elements,  giving  a  further  determ- 
ination of  the  total  moment  without  changing  its  funda- 
mental character.  The  moment  may  express  then  only 
more  distinctly  the  final  aim  to  which  it  is  striving.  The 
changes  brought  about  in  the  moment  are  of  such  a 
nature  that  the  latter  in  its  whole  tendency  becomes 
adapted  for  reaction  to  the  external  environment,  a  re- 
action for  which  it  primarily  maintains  itself  in  being. 
The  moment  as  percept  may  have  at  first  an  inade- 
quate content  which  brings  about  a  reaction  inadequate 
for  the  purpose  of  the  given  psychic  moment.  The  reac- 
tion brings  more  content,  both  primary  and  secondary. 
The  new  content  enriches  the  moment  and  gives  rise  to  a 
modification  resulting  in  a  reaction  which  in  its  turn 
further  enriches  the  content,  until  a  reaction  results  fully 
adequate  to  the  purpose  of  the  moment.  The  moment 
reaches  for  the  time  being  its  full  maturity.  To  give  a 
concrete  example.  A  small  puff-fish  is  thrown  into  a 
tank  containing  a  hungry  tautog.  The  tautog  perceives 
the  puff-fish  and  comes  up  to  seize  it;   the  puff-fish  be- 

260 


The  Growth  and  Function  of  the  Moment    261 

gins  to  swell.  The  sudden  swelling  of  the  little  fish 
frightens  the  tautog  away.  The  tautog's  reaction  has 
proved  unsuccessful.  Some  modification  is  being  pro- 
duced in  the  tautog's  state  relating  to  the  puff-fish  yon- 
der. Another  reaction  may  then  follow,  a  sudden 
pounce  and  bite,  the  puff-fish  swelling  in  the  tautog's 
mouth.  The  tautog's  reaction  is  once  more  a  fail- 
ure, the  puff  fish  is  dropped,  but  considerably  hurt.  A 
series  of  similar  reactions  with  a  series  of  similar  mod- 
ifications finally  result  in  a  totally  different  reaction. 
The  fish  by  a  series  of  sudden  pounces  and  bites  succeeds 
in  debilitating  the  puff-fish,  paralyzing  its  power  of 
swelling  and  finally  devouring  it.  A  series  of  such  repe- 
titions of  experiences  determine  the  general  procedure  of 
the  tautog  to  the  puff-fish.  The  tendency  to  a  series 
of  sensori-motor  reactions  may  thus  become  organized. 

The  chick  emerging  from  the  egg  sees  an  object,  say 
a  caterpillar,  and  attacking  the  caterpillar  misses  it  at 
first.  This  procedure  enriches  the  chick's  psycho-motor 
life  and  modifies  its  next  reactions  in  relation  to  the  cat- 
erpillar, until  the  whole  moment  of  pecking  at  edible 
objects  when  presented  to  the  eye  consists  of  success- 
ful reactions,  as  the  result  of  their  repetition,  finally 
ending  in  perfect  organization.  The  infant  in  seeing 
an  object  makes  at  first  fruitless  attempts  at  seizing  it. 
These  futile  attempts  further  determine  his  activity  and 
finally  he  reaches  a  state  when  the  adaptation  is  complete. 
The  psycho-motor  reaction  becomes  adequate  to  the 
stimulus. 

In  all  these  cases  there  is  no  need  that  the  growth  and 
improvement  of  adaptation  should  be  brought  by  ex- 
plicit processes  of  judgments  and  associations  of  free 
ideas.    The  fish,  the  chick,  the  infant  have  no  distinct 


262  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

consciousness  of  what  sort  of  psychic  process  is  going 
on,  nor  do  they  deliberately  after  weighing  the  pros  and 
cons  of  their  actions,  finally  decide  on  one  which  is 
consciously  to  be  rejected  on  trial  and  so  on,  at  length 
hitting  on  the  right  solution  of  the  problem.  Such 
is  not  the  state  of  their  mind.  To  ascribe  to  them  con- 
scious thought,  cunning,  knowledge,  is  to  ascribe  modes 
and  forms  of  adult  human  consciousness  to  a  lower  stage 
where  all  this  is  absent.  Their  psychic  processes  are  far 
simpler.  The  growth  of  the  moment-consciousness  in 
the  stage  under  consideration  is  altogether  different  in 
nature  from  that  of  the  adult  stage. 

In  the  moment-consciousness  under  consideration  each 
sensory  response  to  a  given  stimulus  along  with  its  re- 
sulting motor  reaction  brings  about  a  modification  of 
the  total  moment.  Each  new  modification  brings  the 
moment  nearer  in  its  sensory  and  motor  elements, 
to  a  more  perfect  adaptation  to  the  specific  conditions 
of  the  external  environment;  this  modification  is  repro- 
duced on  the  recurrence  of  the  moment. 

Let  a  be  the  moment  and  b,  ^1,  b^^  bg,  the  successive 
modifications,  then  the  modified  moment  at  each  stage 
of  its  growth  may  be  represented  as  follows :  a,  ab,  abbi, 
abb-ibz,  abbtb.^br.,  etc.  The  reproduced  successive  mod- 
ifications do  not  emerge  singly.  The  reactions  of  the 
moment  do  not  occur  in  repetition  of  the  order  in  which 
they  have  primarily  followed  each  other.  In  other 
words,  the  reactions  are  not  gone  through  in  the  order  in 
which  they  have  taken  place.  The  series  is  not  literally 
repeated.  Each  subsequent  modification  is  super-imposed 
on  the  previous  ones  and  modifying  them  becomes 
synthetized  in  a  single  complex  reaction.  The  last  suc- 
cessful reaction  is  the  only  one  that  emerges  in  the  oc- 


The  Growth  and  Function  of  the  Moment    263 

currence  of  the  particular  stimulus  under  a  given  set 
of  conditions. 

All  the  intermediate,  unsuccessful  reactions,  al- 
though they  have  gone  to  determine  the  last  state 
of  the  moment  with  its  particular  reactions  and  arc 
Implicitly  contained  in  It,  gradually  drop  out,  and  only 
the  last  forms  of  reaction  occur.  The  last  moment-con- 
sciousness at  each  birth  generated  by  a  given  stimulus  un- 
der appropriate  conditions  possesses  in  a  vague  outline 
the  history  of  its  previous  stages.  Most  of  the  stages 
seem  to  drop  out,  only  the  ones  that  arc  indispensa- 
ble remain. 

The  moment-consciousness  in  its  growth  and  develop- 
ment expands  into  a  series  of  moments,  each  subsequent 
moment  being  an  expansion  of  the  preceding  one.  In 
this  expanded  series  each  succeeding  moment  is  richer 
In  content  than  the  one  that  has  passed  away,  and  is 
more  adapted  to  the  original  end  for  which  the  moment 
as  a  whole  subsists  and  maintains  itself  in  the  struggle 
for  life.  The  last  moment  is  an  epitome  of  the  preceding 
series,  an  epitome  in  which  by  adaptive  selection  many 
links  have  dropped  out,  and  in  which  the  ones  that  sur- 
vive appear  not  in  their  bare  isolation,  but  in  a  synthesis 
of  organic  unity. 

In  respect  to  synthesis  the  moment  may  be  compared 
to  the  percept  In  which  the  moment-elements  are  not  in 
a  free  state  and  cannot  be  separately  reinstated.  In  the 
moment  as  in  the  percept  the  elements  are  firmly  bound 
together,  and  in  this  bondage  they  are  reproduced.  In 
the  psychic  moment  Itself  the  previous  stages  are  not 
discriminated,  since  the  whole  moment  emerges  as  one 
compound  in  which  the  elements  are  firmly  held  together 
in  a  form  of  "mental-chemistry"  by  a  process  of  cumu- 


264  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

lation,  a  process  which,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  is  es- 
sentially different  from  the  process  of  association  of 
ideas  in  which  the  ideal  elements  are  free. 

A  moment-consciousness  lacking  free  elements  in  its 
constituents  cannot  know  its  own  history;  in  other 
words,  it  cannot  recognize  the  identity  or  similarity  of  its 
elements  with  the  ones  that  have  been  present  in  a  pre- 
vious state.  The  recognitive  element  is  entirely  wanting 
in  such  a  type  of  moment-consciousness.  A  moment- 
consciousness  of  such  a  nature  may  be  termed  reproduc- 
tive. A  reproductive  moment-consciousness  reproduces 
its  contents,  hut  lacks  the  element  of  recognition. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  RELATION  OF  THE  MOMENT  TO  THE  ENVIRONMENT 

IF  we  inspect  closely  the  reproductive  moment- 
consciousness,  we  can  discover  in  it  definite  traits 
specially  characteristic  of  it.  From  the  very  char- 
acter of  its  organization  the  moment-consciousness 
is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  accessible  to  and  at  the  same 
time  affected  by  definite  stimuli  of  the  external  environ- 
ment. The  moment-consciousness  itself  is  formed 
through  the  influence  of  stimuli  coming  from  its  en- 
vironment. The  psychic  states  that  go  to  make  up  the 
nucleus-content  of  the  moment-consciousness  are  pri- 
marily sensory  in  character,  due  entirely  to  incoming 
stimulations  proceeding  from  some  external  source.  This 
is  fundamentally  true  not  only  of  the  lowest  and  simplest, 
but  also  of  the  highest  psychic  moment.  The  infinite 
wealth  of  our  experiences  is  of  an  incoming  character 
derived  entirely  from  stimulations  coming  from  the 
periphery,  or  from  the  outside  world.  Even  where  the 
moment  is  ideal  in  character  it  is  still  originally  derived 
from  sensation. 

The  nature  and  primary  function  of  the  moment 
is  to  be  sensitive  to  stimuli.  The  origin  of  the  mo- 
ment takes  its  rise  in  sensory  responsiveness,  and  its 
growth  is  due  to  the  formation  of  successive  layers  of 
sensory  elements.  The  sensory  characteristic  is  still 
further  brought  out  in  the  fact  of  adaptation  and  pos- 
sibility of  further  modification  of  the  moment.  Psychic 
modification  under  the  influence  of  external  stimuli 
clearly  demonstrates   the   important  characteristics  of 

365 


266  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sensitivity.  We  may  say  that  sensitivity,  meaning  by 
it  psychic  processes  aroused  by  stimuli,  is  a  fundamental 
character  of  the  moment-consciousness,  however  ele- 
mentary. 

The  moment-consciousness  is  not  only  sensory,  but 
also  motor  In  character.  The  whole  purpose  of  the  mo- 
ment's being  Is  adaptation  to  external  conditions.  These 
adaptations,  however,  are  brought  about  not  by  the  mere 
sensitivity,  but  by  motor  reactions.  If  the  moment  shows 
sensitivity  towards  the  play  of  definite  external  stimuli, 
it  shows  Itself  still  more  ready  to  give  vent  to  Its  activity 
in  definite  sets  of  motor  reactions.  In  fact  we  may  say 
that  primarily  sensitivity  Is  readiness  for  reaction.  The 
stimulus  that  Irritates  the  naked  protoplasm  of  the 
amoeba  results  in  movement  of  Its  pseudopodlum.  The 
irritation  of  the  nerve  endings  of  the  ascidlan  or  of  the 
medusa  results  In  the  contractions  of  the  muscular  coat. 
In  the  more  highly  organized  animals  the  excitation  of 
the  peripheral  sense-organ  results  in  contraction  and  re- 
laxation of  muscles  or  secretions  of  glands. 

This  is  clearly  manifested  In  the  life-phenomena  of 
invertebrates  and  lower  vertebrates.  The  fly,  the 
bee,  the  ant,  the  butterfly,  the  fish,  the  frog  react 
Immediately  as  soon  as  they  are  acted  upon  by 
influences  of  their  external  medium.  In  this  respect 
they  almost  resemble  highly  complicated  mechanisms 
that  manifest  definite  sets  of  movements  when  acted 
on  different  parts  of  structure.  Especially  Is  this  mani- 
fested In  the  lower  centres. 

The  fly,  the  ant,  the  bee,  the  butterfly,  without  their 
higher  central  ganglia  are  pure  automata.  Thus  If  the 
fly  Is  deprived  of  Its  frontal  ganglia,  or  head,  it  remains 
quiet  as  if  dead,  until  it  is  stimulated,  when  a  motor 
reaction  immediately  follows.    If  such  a  "headless"  fly 


Relation  of  the  Moment  to  the  Environment  267 

is  turned  on  its  back,  it  rights  itself,  or  flies  some  dis- 
tance, alighting  on  its  legs,  and  again  remaining  in  the 
same  state  until  a  new  stimulus  brings  it  out  of  its  tor- 
por. If  the  thorax  is  stimulated,  the  front  legs  pass 
through  the  wiping  movement.  If  the  delicate  hair  on 
the  lower  part  of  the  abdomen  are  irritated,  the  hind 
legs  react.  If  the  side  hair  are  stimulated,  the  side  legs 
respond,  and  so  on.  In  short,  the  stimulus  is  followed 
by  immediate  reaction  of  the  stimulated  organ. 

With  the  central  ganglion  present,  the  fly  differs  but 
little  as  a  reactive  being,  only  the  reactions  are  more 
complicated,  more  co-ordinate,  more  adaptive;  they  do 
not  occur  in  a  uniform  and  automatic  fashion  in  the  di- 
rectly stimulated  organ,  but  in  some  other  organs  dis- 
tant from  the  stimulus  directly  applied  and  in  a  series  of 
co-ordinate  movements,  responding  to  the  stimulus  in  a 
form  advantageous  to  its  needs,  or  preservative  of  its 
life. 

In  the  frog  we  meet  once  more  with  the  same  state  of 
things.  Without  its  brain  the  frog  is  an  auto- 
maton responding  to  external  stimuli  immediately  with 
some  simple  set  of  movements.  With  its  brain  present 
the  response  differs  only  in  the  fact  that  it  is  more  com- 
plex and  more  adaptive.  The  same  holds  true  in  the 
case  of  the  higher  vertebrates,  in  the  bird,  in  the  rabbit, 
in  the  dog,  in  the  monkey,  and  also  in  man.  When  de- 
prived of  the  brain  they  are  automata  immediately  re- 
sponding to  stimuli  with  simple  movements  of  but  little 
adaptation.  With  their  brain  in  full  and  healthy  func- 
tion they  are,  biologically  regarded,  highly  organized 
beings  responding  to  external  stimulations  with  com- 
plex movements  of  more  or  less  perfect  adaptation. 

Should  we  like  further  illustration  and  evidence  we  can 


268  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

find  it  not  only  in  phylogenesis,  but  also  in  ontogenesis. 
Young  animals  react  to  any  passing  stimulus;  their  life 
is  full  of  movement  and  activity.  The  movements  are 
not  adaptive  to  the  special  conditions  of  the  environ- 
ment; in  fact  these  reactions  may  often  be  of  such  a  na- 
ture as  to  hurt  and  even  endanger  the  life  of  the  young 
animal.  External  stimuli  simply  liberate  pent-up  en- 
ergy in  centres  which  are  but  little  co-ordinated.  In 
this  respect  of  lack  of  co-ordination  and  adaptation 
young  animals  resemble  vertebrates  or  invetebrates  de- 
prived of  their  frontal  ganglia. 

The  restlessness  of  children  and  of  infants  is  notori- 
ous ;  in  an  infant  under  my  observation,  I  have  observed 
kicking  of  legs  as  many  as  25-35  P^^"  niinute,  and  this 
was  kept  up  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  sometimes  for 
half  an  hour  at  a  time;  each  kick  of  the  leg  served  as 
a  stimulus  for  another  one,  until  fatigue  was  induced. 
An  external  stimulus  at  once  calls  forth  a  reaction  in 
the  child  or  the  infant.  The  reaction  is  usually  not 
adaptive,  purposeless,  and  frequently  hurtful. 

There  are  also  purposeful  reactions,  reactions  that 
are  of  a  purely  instinctive  character,  useful  for  the  life 
and  growth  of  the  animal.  These  reactions,  however, 
are,  physiologically  regarded,  of  a  more  complex  re- 
flex character.  Given  a  definite  stimulus  and  a  certain 
set  of  conditions,  a  series  of  reactions  immediately  fol- 
lows in  a  certain  order  and  succession.  Thus  the  aphis 
secretes  its  limpid  drops  of  sweet  juice,  when  its  abdo- 
men is  tickled  by  the  antennae  of  the  ant  only.  No  other 
delicate  tickling  stimulations  can  bring  about  the  reac- 
tion of  secretion.  The  ant  on  seeing  the  aphis  runs  at 
once  up  to  it  and  begins  to  play  with  its  antennae  on  the 
abdomen  of  the  aphis,  and  the  latter  on  feeling  the  par- 


Relation  of  the  Moment  to  the  Environment  269 

ticular  stimulations  reacts  in  lifting  up  its  abdomen  and 
secreting  the  viscid  juice. 

The  white  butterfly  lays  her  eggs  as  soon  as  it 
comes  in  contact  with  stimuli  coming  from  cabbage 
leaves.  As  soon  as  the  change  of  temperature 
occurs,  the  migration  instinct  of  birds  is  awak- 
ened. Young  pointers  are  sometimes  known  to  point  the 
first  time  they  are  taken  out.  Young  chicks  disperse  and 
show  fright  as  soon  as  they  hear  an  intense  sound.  In 
an  infant  of  two  days  old  I  have  observed  protective 
grasping  movements ;  the  infant  when  immersed  in  the 
bath  tub  for  the  first  time  got  hold  and  clasped  firmly 
with  his  little  finger  the  hand  of  the  person  that 
bathed  him.  Furthermore,  the  whole  body  assumed 
strained  and  rounded  positions,  lifting  itself  out  of  the 
water  with  which  it  came  in  contact;  the  infant  was 
clinging  with  all  its  little  strength  to  the  hand  that 
bathed  him. 

The  character  of  instinctive  reaction  is  perhaps  more 
closely  manifested  in  the  following  interesting  experi- 
ment performed  by  me  on  a  very  young  infant.  The 
infant  was  not  more  than  three  hours  old,  he  was  put  to 
the  breast  and  the  nipple  put  to  the  mouth.  The  stim- 
ulus of  the  nipple  in  the  mouth  at  once  excited  the  physi- 
ological arrangement  for  sucking  movement,  an  arrange- 
ment which  the  infant  brings  with  him  in  a  more  or  less 
ready  state,  on  his  coming  into  the  world.  When  the 
infant  had  enough,  the  sucking  movements  ceased.  The 
nipple  was  then  withdrawn,  and  then  put  again  into  his 
mouth,  the  sudden  fresh  stimulus  once  more  awakened 
the  mechanism  to  activity,  and  the  sucking  movements 
began  only  to  stop  soon.  This  was  repeated  a  few 
timet,  every  time  as  soon  as  the  stimulus  was  supplied 


I'jo  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  sucking  movement  began. 

The  experiment  was  then  slightly  modified,  the 
baby  after  ceasing  its  sucking  movements  was  left 
keeping  the  nipple  in  its  mouth,  and  instead  of 
taking  away  the  nipple  and  putting  it  back,  thus 
enforcing  the  stimulus  directly,  some  other  stimuli 
were  employed.  The  infant's  legs  were  tickled,  the 
skin  of  the  body  was  rubbed,  pricked  in  different  places, 
and  every  time  as  the  stimulus  was  applied  the  sucking 
movements  were  started. 

A  few  hours  later  when  the  baby  became  sensitive  to 
sound,  I  tried  the  same  experiments  with  sound  stimuli, 
and  obtained  the  same  results.  Sensory  stimulations  fol- 
lowed by  motor  reactions  are  the  elements  out  of  which 
moment-consciousness  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  is 
formed.  If  one  aspect  of  the  moment-consciousness  is 
sensory,  the  other  aspect  is  motor.  The  two  aspects  are 
inseparable,  correlative. 

The  sensori-motor  relation  is  observed  not  only  in  the 
lowest  forms  of  psychic  life,  but  also  in  the  highest. 
In  the  highest  form  of  mental  life  we  still  meet  with  the 
same  factor  of  motor  reactions.  Mental  activity  tends 
to  pass  into  action.  Psychic  processes,  motor  and 
glandular  reactions  are  interrelated.  All  along  the  course 
of  mental  activity  reaction  is  present  as  its  invalriable 
concomitant.  Some  muscles  are  in  a  state  of  tension, 
others  in  a  condition  of  relaxation.  According  to  the  flow 
and  content  of  ideas,  representation  is  now  retarded, 
now  accelerated.  The  functioning  activity  of  the  glands, 
of  the  vaso-motor  system  is  influenced,  the  circulation 
of  blood  is  affected,  more  blood  rushing  to  the  brain. 

This  reaction  aspect  of  mental  life,  and  especially 
of  affective,  emotional  life,  can  easily  be  demonstrated 


Relation  of  the  Moment  to  the  Environment  27 1 

by  appropriate  instruments.  By  aid  of  the  sphygmo- 
graph,  the  tromograph,  the  pneumograph,  the  plcthys- 
mograph,  the  automatograph,  the  galvanometer,  and 
other  instruments  registering  physiological  results,  it  can 
clearly  be  shown  that  mental  activity  with  its  affective 
tone  results  in  some  end  effect,  muscular  or  glandular 
reaction.  With  a  very  delicate  automatograph,  or  swing- 
ing pendulum,  it  can  even  be  shown  that  the  movements 
manifested  often  express  the  content  of  consciousness. 

This  is  especially  striking  in  case  of  different 
forms  of  automatisms — in  people  who  are  of  the  mo- 
tor type.  When  the  subject's  hand  is  put  on  the 
automatograph,  and  the  subject  begins  to  think,  the 
pen  of  the  automatograph  begins  to  move  and  write. 
When  the  person  thinks  of  the  left  side  of  the 
room  the  movements  swing  to  the  left;  when  the  sub- 
ject thinks  of  a  series  of  definite  movements,  movements 
of  a  similar  order  and  character  are  followed  out  by  the 
pen  of  the  automatograph.  Subjects  who  are  of  a  pro- 
nounced motor  type  when  their  attention  is  distracted 
write  with  the  automatographic  pen  the  ideas  of  which 
they  happen  to  think  at  that  moment.  The  remarkable 
experiments  made  by  Pavlow  and  his  pupils  are  here  to 
the  point.  The  experiments  clearly  prove  the  close 
interrelation  of  mental  activity  and  glandular  function. 

The  reaction  character  of  mental  life  is  still  more  dis- 
tinctly manifested  in  the  various  forms  of  mental  disso- 
ciation, such  as  are  to  be  found  in  the  psychopathic  and 
neuropathic  diseases  and  in  the  states  of  hypnosis,  and  in 
fact  in  all  the  phenomena  belonging  to  the  order  known 
as  the  subconscious.  Many  of  the  most  important  meth- 
ods in  psychology  and  psychopathology  are  based  on 
this  reaction  aspect  of  the  moment-consciousness. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  ASSIMILATION  OF  THE  MOMENT  IN  NORMAL 
STATES 

THE  fact  that  the  moment-consciousness  ex- 
pands, grows,  and  develops  in  its  organization 
until  it  reaches  a  point  of  perfect  adaptation 
to  external  conditions  clearly  shows  that  the 
moment  is  capable  of  working  new  psychic  material 
into  its  constitution.  The  material  which  it  gets  is  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  help  to  perpetuate  the  psychic 
life  of  the  moment.  The  moment  cannot  possibly  go 
on  growing  without  having  such  material  at  hand.  If 
the  moment  comes  in  contact  with  any  psychic  element 
or  experience  that  can  further  its  content,  the  experience 
is  at  once  seized  on  and  synthetized  in  the  moment.  The 
psychic  element  is  not  simply  taken  in  and  associated  or 
annexed  to  the  rest  of  the  content,  it  is  actually  trans- 
formed in  this  process. 

When  the  moment  is  stimulated  to  activity  by  an  ex- 
ternal object,  the  sensory  stimulations  of  the  present 
time-moment  are  new.  Just  these  particular  stimulations 
and  sensory  processes  awakened  have  not  occurred  as 
yet  in  the  life  history  of  the  animal,  and  still  the  object 
meets  with  its  appropriate  sensory  response  and  motor 
reaction.  The  moment  that  has  more  or  less  like  con- 
tent to  the  given  new  psychic  experience  aroused  appro- 
priates the  new  states,  works  them  into  its  own  psychic 
content,  and  sends  out  its  characteristic  reaction  in  re- 
sponse to  the  stimuli.    The  moment  that  gets  hold  of 

272 


Assimilation  of  the  Moment  in  Normal  States  273 

new  psychic  material  is  ordinarily  the  one  which  is  in  the 
process  of  activity  at  the  given  time  when  the  stim- 
ulations occur.  The  new  material  is  absorbed  by  the 
moment  as  a  whole,  and  is  then  assimilated  by  the  func- 
tioning nucleus.  The  primary  sensory  elements  of  the 
nucleus  become  strengthened. 

At  the  same  time  the  new  sensory  material  ab- 
sorbed awakens  some  new  secondary  sensory  ele- 
ments which  are  assimilated  by  the  secondary  sen- 
sory elements  constituting  the  so-called  protoplasm 
of  the  moment.  In  this  absorption  of  new  mate- 
rial the  moment  does  not  and  cannot  possibly  remain  ex- 
actly the  same,  it  is  modified  in  a  degree,  although  the 
internal  relations  of  its  constituents  may  practically  re- 
main unaltered.  Readjustments  may  occur  and  usually 
do  so,  but  they  are  made  as  nearly  as  possible  to  the  old 
plan,  and  are  assimilated  to  the  old  content. 

In  the  perceptual  moment  of  the  tautog  that  which 
constitutes  its  content  may  be  the  perception,  say  of  a 
little  fish  yonder ;  soon,  however,  a  new  feature  may  arise 
in  the  course  of  experience,  namely,  change  in  color  for 
instance  in  the  case  of  the  squid,  or  swelling  in  the  case 
of  the  puff-fish.  If  the  fish  usually  reacts  in  making  at- 
tacks when  receiving  perceptive  stimuli  coming  from 
small  fish,  and  if  the  new  experience  is  somewhat  unusual 
in  its  ordinary  life  experience,  and  at  the  same  time  not 
so  striking  as  to  call  forth  the  reaction  of  fear,  the  fish 
will  still  carry  out  its  ordinary  reaction  of  aggressive 
movement,  slightly  modified  by  the  new  incoming  ex- 
perience. 

The  chick  in  seeing  a  cinnabar  caterpillar  has  the  new 
experience  of  the  different  color  from  that  of  the  cater- 
pillar on  which  it  usually  feeds,  but  the  reaction  is  still 


274  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  same  which  caterpillars  call  out  in  chicks,  namely, 
seizing  and  pecking.  The  new  experience  of  taste  got 
through  the  reaction  may  further  modify  the  reaction 
of  the  chicks  when  confronted  with  cinnabar  caterpillar. 

The  young  infant  pushes  indiscriminately  everything 
in  its  mouth,  everything  is  for  sucking,  and  only  by  ex- 
perience it  learns  gradually  to  modify  its  reaction  to- 
wards objects.  On  seeing  a  lemon,  a  child  that  is  only 
acquainted  with  oranges  will  take  it  as  an  orange.  The 
child  will  perceive  the  new  visual  experiences  given  by 
the  lemon,  as  different  from  orange,  but  they  will  be 
assimilated  to  his  sensory  orange  experience.  The  spec- 
ial visual  experiences  will  give  rise  in  the  child's  mind  to 
some  qualification  of  the  percept  "orange,"  the  object 
being  a  kind  of  orange,  a  bad  orange.  The  reaction  in 
relation  to  the  lemon  will  then  be  of  the  kind  relating  to 
orange  in  general.  This  reaction  will  be  of  course  mod- 
ified by  repeated  experiences  resulting  from  a  series  of 
reactions  in  relation  to  the  lemon. 

Savages  confronted  for  the  first  time  with  the  horse 
or  the  ox,  consider  them  a  species  of  pig,  an  animal  with 
which  they  are  well  acquainted,  and  they  expect  from 
the  horse,  or  the  ox  similar  manifestations.  Their  re- 
actions towards  those  new  species  of  animals  will  be  of 
the  same  kind,  as  if  those  animals  were  pigs. 

The  same  relation  is  still  better  illustrated  in  cases  of 
young  children  with  a  definite  moment-consciousness, 
which  for  convenience  sake  may  be  characterized  as  the 
family-moment.  The  child's  moment-content  of  life- 
relationship  consists  of  his  experience  gotten  from  his 
relation  with  his  papa  and  mamma.  Baby,  papa,  and 
mamma  and  their  various  relations  go  to  make  up  the 
total  moment  of  the  child's  family  life  experiences. 


Assimilation  of  the  Moment  in  Normal  States  275 

When  the  child  is  confronted  with  young  animals,  the 
latter  are  regarded  in  the  light  of  "babies,"  they  are 
also  babies,  they  have  their  papas  and  mammas  who 
give  them  cookies,  tea,  and  oatmeal,  undress  them, 
and  put  them  to  bed. 

A  young  child  of  about  three  years  and  a  half 
asked  me  whether  the  baby-calf's  mamma  gave  it 
pie  to  eat.  Another  time  the  same  child  on  see- 
ing a  young  kitten  inquired  after  its  mamma  and 
papa,  and  when  the  baby  kitty  was  going  to  have  its 
tea  and  put  to  bed.  In  one  child  of  less  than  three 
years  old,  young  animals,  plants,  such  as  young  trees 
and  flowers,  and  even  little  stars  were  so  many  "baby 
Willies."  Their  lives  were  fully  assimilated  to  his 
own,  they  were  eating  oatmeal,  drinking  milk  and 
were  having  tea,  sugar,  and  biscuits  for  their  supper. 
The  same  child  was  greatly  surprised  and  partly  even 
horrified  at  finding  that  baby-Willie-flowers  had  no 
papa  and  no  mamma.  The  moment-consciousness  is 
awakened  by  definite  specific  traits  in  the  object,  by 
familiar  experience  sense-data  constituting  the  content 
of  the  moment;  the  rest  and  differential  traits  of  the 
object  are  worked  into  the  general  plan  and  character 
of  the  functioning  moment. 

The  assimilative  power  of  the  mtoment  is  clearly  re- 
vealed in  the  very  character  of  perception.  That 
pitted  object  yonder  is  perceived  as  an  orange  with  all 
its  attributes  of  color,  shape,  size,  weight,  fragrance, 
and  taste.  The  synthesis  of  so  many  sensory  elements 
corresponding  to  such  a  complex  of  stimuli  was  grad- 
ually effected  in  the  course  of  ontogenetic  development, 
and  no  doubt  determined  by  inherited  disposition  of 
phylogenetic  evolution. 


276  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

Suppose  the  orange  turns  out  to  be  a  new  species 
never  met  before  by  the  individual ;  it  feels  differently 
when  touched,  it  has  different  weight,  special  taste,  and 
fragrance.  When  such  sense  data  are  experienced  re- 
peatedly, the  percept  orange  is  modified  by  assimila- 
tion of  the  new  sense  data.  On  seeing  another  time 
such  a  sort  of  an  orange  all  the  previously  separately 
experienced  sense-data  appear  together  in  one  synthe- 
tized  percept.  The  moment-consciousness  which  we, 
for  illustration  sake,  have  assumed  as  consisting  only 
of  experiences  relating  to  oranges  and  with  corres- 
ponding psycho-physiological  reactions,  has  enlarged 
its  content,  has  increased,  and  modified  its  adaptation 
to  external  conditions. 

The  assimilative  power  of  the  moment-conscious- 
ness is  well  brought  out  in  the  activity  of  the  higher 
form  of  consciousness.  The  desire  to  go  to  the  post-of- 
fice to  get  my  mail  forms  the  central  point  of  my  present 
moment-consciousness.  Round  it  as  a  focus  are  grouped 
ideas,  feelings,  and  sensations,  all  more  or  less  tending 
In  the  same  direction.  The  actual  walking  to  the  post- 
office  gives  a  series  of  new  motor  sensations  which  are 
subconsciously  assimilated  by  the  moment  as  a  whole. 
The  tactual  and  motor  sensations  coming  from  each 
step  are  assimilated  by  the  moment,  leading  in  their 
turn  to  new  series  of  reactions.  Each  new  step  is  fol- 
lowed by  new  sensations  that  give  rise  to  new  reac- 
tions and  so  on,  until  the  end  of  the  moment  is  reached 
and  the  purpose  accomplished. 

The  whole  sensori-motor  series  is  guided  bv  the 
nuclear  elements  of  the  moment,  although  the  succes- 
sive stages  of  the  series  are  assimilated  subconsciously. 
In  reading  a  book  the  successive  stages  are  guided  by 


Assimilation  of  the  Moment  in  Normal  States  277 

the  central  general  idea.  The  perception  of  the  letters, 
words,  and  their  isolated  meaning  is  assimilated  sub- 
consciously, all  of  them  being  incorporated  into  the 
guiding  moment-consciousness  which  is  growing  and 
developing,  becoming  enriched  with  more  and  more 
content.  In  writing  a  letter  or  an  article  on  a  certain  sub- 
ject we  find  the  same  fact  of  assimilation  by  the  moment- 
consciousness  of  the  sense-data  coming  in  the  succes- 
sive steps  of  the  whole  experience.  The  handling  of 
the  pen,  the  dipping  it  into  ink,  its  guiding  by  the  hand, 
its  gliding  over  the  paper,  the  drawing  of  the  letters, 
the  formation  of  letters  into  words,  and  of  the  words 
into  lines  and  sentences,  all  follow  in  successive  stages 
and  are  assimilated  partly  subconsciously  and  partly 
consciously.  All  are  guided  by  the  principal  moment 
which  grows  richer  in  content  with  each  successive  step 
made,  with  each  succeeding  link  of  the  series.  In  fact 
we  may  say  that  all  those  successive  steps  are  stages  in 
the  growth  and  development  of  the  one  moment-con- 
sciousness. 

The  growth  and  development  of  the  moment-con- 
sciousness IS  through  its  assimilation  of  fresh  psychic 
material.  In  the  man  of  science  a  favorite  theory  ex- 
ercises such  an  assimilative  power  over  facts  other- 
wise disconnected.  The  moment-consciousness  having 
the  given  theory  as  its  nucleus  absorbs  more  and  more 
material,  and  with  the  assimilation  of  new  material  the 
content  and  strength  of  the  internal  organization  grows 
in  a  corresponding  degree.  The  assimilation  is  guided 
by  the  intense  interest  aroused  by  the  nucleus  of  the  to- 
tal moment,  and  is  in  its  turn  aided  by  the  active  pro- 
cess of  assimilation,  especially  by  the  Influence  of  sub- 
merged,  subconscious  moments  which  have  reached 


278  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  minimum  of  consciousness,  or  lie  on  the  margin  of 
the  sphere  of  waking  consciousness. 

The  influence  of  the  subconscious  is  in  proportion  to 
the  duration  and  intensity  of  the  activity  of  the  mental 
process.  We  are  well  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  an 
action  requiring  at  first  great  stress  of  attention,  finally, 
with  its  repetition,  drops  out  of  the  focus  of  conscious- 
ness and  becomes,  as  it  is  called,  automatic  or  uncon- 
scious. They  who  have  observed  a  child  striving  to 
stand  by  himself  or  beginning  to  walk  realize  how  such 
seemingly  automatic  acts  as  standing  or  walking  are 
at  first  accompanied  with  intense  attention.  The 
child,  when  standing  up  all  by  himself,  does  it  hesitat- 
ingly; he  shakes  and  trembles,  as  if  occupying  unsafe 
ground,  or  doing  a  difficult  act;  he  looks  around  for 
support,  stretches  out  his  hands,  asking  the  help  of  his 
parents  or  nurse,  and  if  he  does  not  get  aid  in  time, 
begins  to  cry  from  fear  and  drops  on  all-fours.  It  is 
a  difficult  feat  for  him.  Withdraw  his  attention  from 
his  performance,  and  in  the  first  stages  of  his  series  of 
trials  he  drops  helplessly  to  the  ground. 

The  same  holds  true  in  the  case  of  walking.  The  child 
in  beginning  to  walk,  does  it  with  great  hesitation  and 
fear.  It  can  only  be  compared  to  the  attempt  of  an 
adult  in  learning  to  walk  a  rope,  or  a  narrow  board  on 
a  high  place.  Each  step  requires  intense  attention.  The 
least  distraction  of  attention  and  the  baby  falls  down 
in  a  heap.  The  least  change  in  the  touch,  muscular 
and  kinaesthetic  sensations  arrests  the  successful  at- 
tempt at  standing  or  walking.  Thus  in  the  case  of  my 
baby  of  fourteen  months  after  the  first  two  days  of  more 
or  less  successful  trials  at  walking,  a  new  pair  of  shoes 
was  put  on.     This  arrested  the  walking.     When  the 


/Assimilation  of  the  Moment  in  Normal  States  279 

baby  became  accustomed  to  the  new  sensations  which 
fell  in  the  background  of  his  consciousness,  he  once 
more  started  a  series  of  trials,  and  with  such  success  that 
after  two  days'  practice  he  walked  almost  a  whole  mile. 

After  a  period  of  long  practice  the  complex  muscular 
adjustments,  required  in  the  acts  of  standing  and  walk- 
ing, gradually  retreat  to  the  background  of  conscious- 
ness and  become  automatic.  Not  that  consciousness  in 
those  acts  is  lost:  it  has  simply  reached  its  necessary 
minimum,  leaving  the  focus  of  consciousness  free  for 
other  new  and  unaccustomed  adjustments,  which  in 
their  turn  retreat  from  the  centre  to  the  periphery  and 
fall  into  the  subconscious.  The  usual  movement  of 
mental  processes  is  from  the  conscious  to  the  subcon- 
scious. 

Experiences,  however,  may  first  be  perceived  by  sub- 
merged subconscious  moments  and  then  transmitted 
to  the  focus  of  consciousness,  the  movement  of  the 
process  thus  taking  a  direction  opposite  to  the  usual  one, 
from  the  subconscious  to  the  conscious.  Experiences, 
for  instance,  lived  through  in  hypnotic  states,  in  trance 
states  or  in  dreams,  may  come  to  the  surface  as  hyp>- 
noidal  states  and  then  become  synthetized  in  the  upper 
waking  consciousness,  or  they  may  be  lighted  up  in 
hypnosis,  and  then  permanently  synthetized  in  the  cen- 
tre of  attentive  consciousness. 

Similarly  experiences  first  lived  through  in  the  sub- 
conscious states  induced  by  alcoholic  intoxication  or  by 
anaesthetics  may  be  brought  by  hypnoidal  states  or 
by  hypnosis  into  the  focus  of  consciousness.  Hypnoi- 
dal states  are  uprushcs  of  the  subconscious,  and  by 
means  of  them  many  a  hidden  and  obscure  region  of 
the  subconscious  may  be  discovered.    Thus  the  Hanni 


28o  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

case  was  largely  marked  by  hypnoidal  states.  In  many 
of  my  cases  hypnoidal  states  are  the  means  by  which 
subconscious  experiences  become  completely  revealed. 
In  cases  of  amnesia  the  hypnoidal  states  give  glimpses 
into  subconscious  regions  which  even  deep  hypnosi** 
can  not  reveal. 

The  method  of  guesses  is  valuable  in  showing  the 
reverse  process  of  mental  activity,  the  passage  of  r 
subconscious  state  into  the  focus  of  consciousness. 

If  the  anaesthetic  spot  of  a  psychopathic  case  is  stim- 
ulated, the  patient  is  unaware  of  such  stimulation; 
should  he,  however,  be  asked  to  guess,  or  to  tell  any- 
thing that  happens  to  come  into  his  mind,  he  is  often 
found  to  give  correct  answers.  The  patient  perceives 
subconsciously .  This  perception,  often  in  a  slightly 
modified  form,  is  transmitted  to  the  upper  conscious- 
ness, or  to  what  for  the  present  constitutes  the  patient's 
principal  moment  consciousness,  or  personality. 

If,  for  instance,  the  anaesthetic  spot  of  the  patient  is 
pricked  a  number  of  times,  the  patient  remains  quiet  and 
is  seemingly  insensible.  Should  we  now  ask  the  patient 
to  tell  anything  that  comes  into  his  mind,  he  will  say, 
"pricking"  and  will  be  unable  to  tell  why  he  happened 
to  think  of  "pricking"  at  all.  Should  we  now  ask  him 
to  give  any  number  that  may  enter  his  mind,  he  will 
give  the  correct  number,  once  more  not  being  able  to 
give  the  reason  why  this  particular  number  happened 
to  enter  his  mind,  considering  it  a  mere  "chance  num- 
ber." The  subconscious  sensations  experienced  are 
transmitted  as  abstract  ideas  to  the  focus  of  conscious- 
ness. 

Often  instead  of  the  particular  idea  being  trans- 
mitted, only  the  general  aspect  of  it  reaches  the  focus. 


Assimilation  of  the  Moment  in  Normal  States  281 

Thus  the  patient  is  not  able  to  guess  the  particular  na- 
ture of  the  stimulus,  but  he  may  give  the  character  of 
the  unfelt  stimuli.  This  reveals  the  reverse  movement 
from  the  subconscious  to  the  conscious. 

This  reverse  movement  of  the  psychic  state,  from 
the  originally  subconscious  to  the  upper  consciousness, 
is  well  manifested  in  psychopathic  cases  of  visual 
anaesthesia  as  well  as  hypnotically  induced  anaesthe- 
sia. The  patient's  field  of  vision  is  limited.  If  objects 
are  inserted  in  any  place  of  the  zone  extending  from 
the  periphery  of  the  narrowed  field  to  the  utmost 
boundary  of  the  normal  field,  the  patient  can  guess 
correctly  the  names  of  the  inserted  objects  invisible  to 
him.  General  guesses  are  correct  on  the  periphery 
of  that  "subconscious"  zone.  Some  of  the  phenomena 
of  paramnesia  can  be  explained  by  this  principle  of 
reverse  movement,  when  subconscious  experiences 
transmitted  to  central  consciousness  appear  under  the 
form  of  "familiar"  memories. 

A  lighting  up  of  the  subconscious  regions  bringing 
about  a  reverse  movement  from  the  subconscious  to 
the  conscious  can  also  be  brought  about  by  the  use  of 
toxic  drugs.  Pent-up  neuron  energies  become  liber- 
ated from  lower  and  lower-most  moment  consciousness, 
long  forgotten  experiences  well  up  to  the  centre  of  con- 
sciousness ;  outlived  moments  are  resurrected  and  come 
to  the  focus  of  consciousness  with  all  the  vividness  of 
a  present  perceptual  experience.  Thus  De  Quincey,  in 
his  "Confessions  of  an  English  Opium-Eater,"  tells  us 
that  "the  minutest  incidents  of  childhood  or  forgotten 
scenes  of  later  years  were  often  revived.  I  could  not 
be  said  to  recollect  them,  for  if  I  had  been  told  of  them 
when  waking,  I  should  not  have  been  able  to  acknowl- 


282  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

edge  them  as  my  past  experience.  But  placed  as  they  were 
before  me  in  dreams  like  intuitions  and  clothed  in  all 
their  evanescent  circumstances  and  accompanying  feel- 
ings, I  recognized  them  instantaneously." 

Hypnoidic  states  reveal  the  wealth  and  extent  of 
psychic  experience  hidden  in  the  subconscious  regions. 
Glimpses  into  the  subconscious  are  also  given  in  hyp- 
noidal  states  which  are  induced  by  the  process  of  hyp- 
noidization.  The  patient  is  asked  to  close  his  eyes  and 
keep  as  quiet  as  possible  without,  however,  making 
any  special  effort  to  put  himself  into  such  a  state.  He 
is  then  asked  to  tell  anything  that  comes  into  his  mind. 
The  patient  may  also  be  asked  to  attend  to  some  stimuli, 
such  as  reading  or  writing  or  the  buzzing  of  an  electri- 
cal current,  and  he  is  then  to  tell  the  ideas,  thoughts, 
images,  phrases,  no  matter  how  disconnected,  that 
happen  to  flitter  through  his  mind. 

This  same  condition  of  hypnoidization  is  sometimes 
better  accomplished  through  mental  relaxation  with  con- 
centration of  attention  in  a  definite  direction.  The  pa- 
tient is  put  into  a  quiet  condition,  and  with  his  eyes 
closed  and  the  experimenter's  hand  on  the  patient's  fore- 
head, the  latter  is  urged  to  mental  effort  and  strain,  and, 
if  necessary,  given  some  hints.  Experiences  seemingly 
inaccessible  flash  lightning-like  on  the  upper  regions  of 
self-consciousness.  In  all  such  cases  the  active  mo- 
ment-consciousness seizes  on  and  assimilates  any  cog- 
nate experience,  conscious  or  subconscious. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ABNORMAL  MOMENTS 

THE  power  of  the  moment's  assimilation  is 
well  brought  in  the  activity  of  abnormal  mo- 
ments. Distressing  thoughts,  gloomy  ideas, 
painful  sensations,  and  feelings  of  depres- 
sion form  a  nucleus  round  which  other  mental  states 
become  firmly  organized.  A  delusion  arises  which 
constitutes  the  moment-consciousness  of  the  melanchol- 
iac.  This  moment  assimilates  all  other  cognate  experi- 
ences. Everything  that  takes  place  is  seized  on  by  the 
moment  and  assimilated.  The  patient  who  believes  that 
he  has  no  intestines,  or  that  he  is  made  of  glass  and  is 
transparent  and  hence  hides  himself  from  people,  as  his 
functions  are  open  to  the  sight  of  outsiders,  such  a 
patient  will  make  all  experiences  confirm  and  strength- 
en the  delusion.  The  delusion  constituting  the  predom- 
inant moment-consciousness  in  the  patient's  life  absorbs 
and  assimilates  most,  if  not  all  of  the  material  that 
gains  access  to  the  patient's  psychic  life.  The  moment 
like  a  cancerous  growth  expands,  grows,  and  develops  at 
the  expense  of  other  moments,  starves  them  by  cutting 
oft  their  mental  food  supply.  What  cannot  be  used  by 
the  moment  is  rejected  as  waste  material. 

A  similar  state  of  affairs  we  meet  with  in  paranoia, 
as  v/ell  as  in  many  paranoldal  states  of  a  purely  psycho- 
pathic character.  A  moment-consciousness  is  formed  of 
high  organizing  and  assimilating  power.  Any  experience 
relevant  and  irrelevant  entering  consciousness  is  grced- 

283 


284  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ily  absorbed  and  assimilated.  Any  flitting  thought,  any 
passing  impression  is  worked  in  and  organized  into  the 
moment.  All  other  moments  fall  a  prey  to  this  domi- 
nant all-absorbing  moment. 

In  some  cases  the  assimilating  capacity  of  the  mo- 
ment seems  to  be  limitless.  In  fact,  the  more  it  assim- 
ilates, the  greater  grows  its  craving  and  capacity  for 
getting  more  material.  The  most  trivial  facts,  the 
slightest  sense-impressions  all  are  pressed  into  the  ser- 
vice of  the  despotically  ruling  moment.  The  insignifi- 
cant becomes  significant  and  points  to  the  central  delu- 
sion. 

In  other  cases  the  limit  of  the  process  of  assimilation 
soon  reaches  its  maximum  point,  more  psychic  material 
is  rejected  by  the  moment.  Such  conditions  are  to  be 
found  in  various  states  of  dissociation  manifested  in 
different  forms  of  psychopathic  diseases.  The  mo- 
ment's capacity  for  assimilating  new  material  is  of 
limited  range,  soon  reaches  its  utmost  bounds  and  loses 
for  the  time  being  all  capacity  for  further  assimilation. 
Such  states  may  be  found  in  amnesia.  The  moment  is 
then  said  to  be  dissociated  from  the  main  current  of 
psychic  life-activity.  Specific  stimuli  under  definite  con- 
ditions are  requisite  to  resuscitate  the  moment  and 
arouse  its  power  of  assimilation. 

It  is  certainly  interesting  and  instructive  to  study  the 
fluctuations  of  the  moment's  power  of  assimilation  in 
abnormal  mental  states.  In  some  forms  of  mental  dis- 
eases and  general  psychic  derangements  the  moment 
may  be  of  ephemeral  and  unstable  character;  it  may 
dissolve  soon  after  its  birth.  Such  conditions  are 
to  be  found  in  various  forms  of  maniacal  states 
and  in  the  initial  stages  of  many  cases  of  general 


Abnormal  Moments  285 

paresis. 

In  psychomotor  manifestations  of  a  psychopathic 
character  moments-consciousness  are  often  formed 
and  dissolved  like  soap-bubbles.  The  investigation  of 
them  is  of  the  utmost  interest  and  value.  In  hypnosis 
moments  of  such  a  nature  may  be  experimentally  in- 
duced and  studied.  The  whole  process  can  thus  be 
followed  through  all  the  stages  of  evolution  and  disso- 
lution. 

A  greater  condition  of  stability  is  to  be  found  in  the 
various  automatisms  preceding  or  following  epileptic 
seizures,  or  in  the  so-called  "psychic  equivalents  of  epi- 
lepsy." The  pure  "psychic  epilepsies"  are  essentially 
hypnoidic  states,  moments  of  stable  character.  This 
can  be  demonstrated  both  by  observation  and  experi- 
ment. 

The  principle  of  selection  is  fundamental  in  the  life- 
history  of  the  moment.  The  whole  tendency  of  the 
moment  is  to  select  material  conducive  to  the  further- 
ance of  its  activity  and  to  reject  all  material  that 
thwarts  its  functions  and  growth.  This  process  of  se- 
lection is  from  a  biological  standpoint  essential  for  the 
survival  and  development  of  the  moment. 

The  development  of  the  moment  may  become  ar- 
rested on  some  one  stage  of  ontogenesis,  and  then  the 
moment,  belonging  to  a  higher  type  resembles  in  its  psy- 
chic activity  that  of  a  lower  type;  although  it  has 
many  vestiges  of  the  higher  type,  it  is  greatly  modi- 
fied in  nature  and  as  such  really  differs  from  the 
healthy  normal  representative  of  the  corresponding 
low  type.  Still  we  may  affirm  that  the  arrested  high 
type  has  virtually  become  a  moment  of  low  type.  The 
state  of  psychosis  of  the  imbecile,  or  idiot,  may  be  tak- 


2^6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

en  as  a  good  illustration.  The  mental  activity  of  the 
idiot  resembles  the  lower  types  of  animal  psychosis. 
Although  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  idiot  and  that  of  the  animal  are  by 
no  means  identical,  still  both  belong  to  a  low  type  of 
moment,  and  as  such,  they  may  be  put  on  the  same  level. 
In  pathological  cases  where  mental  degeneration  sets 
in  we  also  have  a  similar  course.  The  moment  of  the 
higher  type  becomes  degraded  and  falls  to  the  level  of 
lower  and  lowermost  types,  according  to  the  advance  of 
the  process  of  degeneration.  Such  states  are  to  be 
found  in  the  degenerative  psychosis  characteristic  of 
secondary  dementia.  When  the  pathological  process 
is  wide,  intense,  persistent,  and  lasting,  then  secondary 
dementia  results  in  most  cases  of  mental  degeneration. 
Should,  however,  the  process  become  arrested  then  the 
moment  simply  falls  to  the  level  of  a  relatively  lower 
type. 


CHAPTER  IX 

MENTAL   CONTINUITY  AND   THE   PSYCHIC   SAP 

THE  activity  of  the  moment-consciousness  is 
continuous,  without  break  and  interruption. 
Should  the  activity  become  arrested  and  the 
break  be  seemingly  absolute,  continuity  is 
still  present  with  the  resumption  of  activity.  The 
thread  is  taken  up  where  it  was  dropped,  the  moment 
appears  as  a  whole  without  any  break.  There  is  no  le- 
sion in  the  moment  consciousness,  at  least  as  far  as 
the  moment  itself  is  concerned.  In  going  to  sleep  and 
waking  up  again  we  may  be  indirectly  conscious  of  the 
interruption,  but  the  activity  of  the  moment  is  still 
continuous,  the  moment  begins  its  activity  at  the  point 
where  it  has  left  off.  In  fainting,  in  coma,  in  hypnosis, 
or  somnambulism  the  periods  of  unconsciousness  are 
immediately  bridged  over  by  the  awakening  activity  of 
the  moment. 

Objectively  considered,  we  have  the  moment's  ac- 
tivity, then  break,  or  absence  of  that  activity,  and 
then  the  resumption;  subjectively,  however,  the  mo- 
ment's activity  is  felt  as  one  and  continuous  with- 
out a  break  and  gap.  In  consciousness  the  psychic  con- 
tent and  activity  preceding  the  break  along  with  pres- 
ent cognizance  of  the  break  arc  synthetized  into  a 
unified  continuity;  the  present  consciousness  of  the 
break  is  taken  into  the  synthesis,  the  very  gap  thus 
forming  the  bridge  for  unity. 

The  cognizance  of  the  break  may,  however,  be  com- 

287 


288  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

pletely  absent,  and  the  edges  of  the  mental  wound 
may  become  closed,  healed,  and  united  with  the 
functioning  activity  of  the  moment,  the  moment, 
without  even  the  least  consciousness  of  the  in- 
tervennig  gap,  resuming  its  line  of  work  precisely 
at  the  place  where  it  had  been  arrested.  From  the  mo- 
ment's own  standpoint,  the  gap  is  as  if  non-existent, 
there  is  no  break,  in  the  moment's  psychic  life-activity. 

The  break  formed  by  the  interruption  of  the  mo- 
ment's functioning  activity,  objectively  regarded,  may 
present  an  actual  gap  in  which,  for  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, it  may  be  supposed  that  no  mental  activity  is 
taking  place.  Such  cases  are  found  in  the  state  of 
deep  sleep>  undisturbed  by  dreams,  or  in  the  states  of 
unconsciousness  produced  by  toxic  and  narcotic  agen- 
cies, in  states  of  deep  com'a,  in  the  attacks  of  typical 
epilepsy,  petit  or  grand  mat,  in  status  epilepticus,  in  the 
states  of  unconsciousness  produced  by  intense  mechani- 
cal stimuli,  such  as  a  blow,  or  a  fall,  or  a  strong 
electrical  current.  In  all  such  cases  we  often  find 
a  state  that  may,  for  all  intents  and  purposes,  be 
characterized  as  unconsciousness.  No  other  moment 
comes  to  the  surface,  even  temporarily,  to  fill  the 
mental  gap  caused  by  the  interruption  of  the  moment's 
functional  activity.    The  gap  presents  a  mental  blank. 

To  the  important  question:  "How,  then  are  we  to 
explain  amnesia  where  consciousness  is  indicated?" 
Ribot  answers  "By  the  extreme  weakness  of  the  con- 
scious state."  This  explanation  is  inadequate.  For 
first  of  all,  what  is  the  meaning  of  a  weak  state  of  con- 
sciousness? Is  it  a  state  felt  as  being  weak?  If  so,  the 
explanation  is  obviously  wrong.  We  may  far  better  re- 
tain in  memory  the  whisper    of  a    dear    friend    than 


Mental  Continuity  and  the  Psychic  Gap       289 

the  striking  of  the  tower  clock  or  the  explosion  of  a 
gun.  Does  he  mean  by  a  weak  state  of  consciousness 
a  confused  indistinct  state?  Once  more  he  is  wrong. 
A  confused  and  indistinct  state  of  mind  is  often  clearly 
remembered.  I  am  dizzy,  everything  is  confused  and 
indistinct,  I  am  unable  to  tell  in  detail  what  I  have 
seen  and  heard,  but  I  can  clearly  and  distinctly  remem- 
ber the  state  of  dizziness  and  confusion,  and  very  often 
far  better  than  any  other  less  confused  mental  state. 
This,  however,  is  not  the  case  in  the  states  of  amnesia 
under  discussion. 

In  amnesia  there  is  no  memory  at  all  of  the  experi- 
enced mental  states  and  what  the  subject  or  the 
patient  remembers  is  the  last  link  of  the  state  pre- 
ceding the  amnesia.  The  state  preceding  the  am- 
nesia and  the  one  succeeding  it  are  joined  together, 
the  intermediary  is  left  out,  as  if  it  had  never  been  in 
existence.  Evidently  the  theory  is  that  the  state  of 
consciousness  is  so  weak  that  it  leaves  no  "trace,"  no 
memory  behind.  But  if  this  be  the  case,  then  the  ex- 
planation is  a  tautology.  The  problem  is,  why  is  there 
no  memory  in  certain  states  of  consciousness?  To  this 
the  reply  is  that  the  states  of  consciousness  leave  no 
memory  behind.  It  is  obvious  that  this  explanation  is 
vague  and  when  one  tries  to  give  to  it  a  definite  mean- 
ing, it  is  either  wrong  or  turns  out  to  be  a  reasoning  in 
a  circle. 

Granted,  however,  that  a  weak  state  of  conscious- 
ness is  something  definite,  that  by  it  is  meant  to  indi- 
cate confusion,  indistinctness  of  consciousness,  and 
granted  furthermore,  that  such  a  state  leaves  no  mem- 
ory behind,  how  then  shall  we  explain  amnesia  of  men- 
tal states  when  consciousness  was   intense,   clear   and 


290  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

distinct,  as  in  die  case  of  hypnosis  or  of  artificial  som- 
nambulism ?  In  these  states  the  senses  are  almost  hyp- 
eraesthetic,  the  sense  of  discrimination  is  extremely 
acute  and  memory  is  in  a  state  of  exaltation.  Why  is 
it  then  that  amnesia  can  be  enforced  in  the  case  of  al- 
most any  experience  immediately  after  the  trance  is 
over,  or  even  during  the  very  state  of  hypnosis  ?  The 
state  of  consciousness  is  intense  and  still  there  is  am- 
nesia. 

How  is  it  in  cases  of  double  consciousness  or 
of  multiple  personality?  Surely  the  explanation  of 
"weakness"  of  the  states  of  consciousness  cannot  be 
advanced  by  any  one  who  has  a  personal  knowledge 
of  these  phenomena.  How  is  it  in  psychopathic  cases 
where  the  amnesia  is  brought  about  by  an  intense  pain- 
ful state  of  consciousness,  such  as  fright,  fear  or  great 
grief?  On  the  theory  of  weakness  of  consciousness  all 
these  phenomena  are  mysterious,  incomprehensible. 
On  our  theory  of  moment-consciousness,  however,  the 
phenomena  presented  could  not  possibly  be  otherwise, 
in  fact,  we  should  expect  them  a  priori,  if  our  theory  be 
correct. 

A  psychic  blank,  however,  is  not  the  only  possible 
consequence  of  the  moment's  lapse  of  function.  The 
moment's  activity  is  interrupted,  but  only,  what  is  more 
often  the  case,  to  give  rise  to  activity  of  another  mo- 
ment. The  break  produced  in  the  moment's  life  is 
not  a  real  gap ;  for  the  gap  is  filled  in  with  the  function- 
ing activity  of  another  moment  which  is  usually  of  a 
lower,  though  sometimes  it  may  even  be  of  a  higher 
type.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  arrested  moment, 
however,  there  is  a  distinct  gap,  not  that  the  moment 
itself  is  cognizant  of  the  gap,  but  it  is  so  for  the  ex- 


Mental  Continuity  and  the  Psychic  Gap       291 

ternal  observer  that  takes  that  moment  for  his  stand- 
point. The  gap  exists  in  the  moment,  though  not  for 
the  moment. 

Such  states  may  be  found  in  hypnosis  especially 
in  that  stage  of  it  known  as  somnambulism.  When 
the  subject  falls  into  a  deep  hypnotic  state,  it  is 
possible  to  make  him  pass  through  a  series  of  compli- 
cated actions,  changes  of  personalities  without  the  least 
awareness  on  awakening.  The  whole  series  of  his 
waking  consciousness  it  is  as  non-existent,  in  short,  it  is 
a  gap. 

This  gap  however,  is  far  from  being  a  mere  men- 
tal blank.  On  the  contrary  there  may  have  been 
intense  psychic  activity,  but  only  that  of  another  mo- 
ment which  in  the  waking  state  has  become  submerged. 
This  submerged  moment  may  be  brought  up  in  the 
waking  state  by  suggestions  or  by  means  of  hypnoidiza- 
tion  and  be  synthetized  in  the  upper  consciousness. 
Sometimes  glimpses  of  the  submerged  moment  may 
come  up  in  dreams,  in  reveries,  in  sudden  flashes  dur- 
ing the  waking  state,  or  in  spontaneous  hypnoidal 
states,  the  subject  doubting  whether  they  refer  to  some- 
thing actual  or  are  simply  mere  whims  and  fancies. 

In  the  cases  of  the  so-called  "psychic  epilepsy"  which 
are  really  amnesia  of  a  psychopathic  character,  one 
meets  with  psychic  states  in  which  the  gap  is  not  abso- 
lute, but  relative,  being  filled  with  the  activity  of  an- 
other moment.  Thus,  M.  carried  on  conversations, 
arguments,  and  discussions  while  in  the  abnormal  sub- 
conscious state  and  could  not  remember  anything  of  it 
when  emerging  from  it  and  returning  to  the  normal 
condition.  Similarly  F.  in  his  subconscious  state  trav- 
elled a  distance,  sold  horses  and  returned,  but  knew 
nothing  of  what  had  taken  place  from  the  beginning  to 


292  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

the  end  of  his  journey.  ' 

In  the  H.  case  the  gaps  formed  in  the  second- 
ary state  by  the  manifestations  of  the  primary  state 
were  as  if  non  existent  for  this  secondary  conscious- 
ness. The  same  held  good  of  the  primary  con- 
sciousness :  the  two  were  working  independently  of 
each  other,  each  synthetizing  its  own  experience,  each 
beginning  at  the  place  where  it  had  left  off.  Neither 
of  them  knew  of  and  felt  subjectively  the  gap.  There 
was  a  gap,  only  it  was  filled  in  by  another  moment 
consciousness  of  which  the  present  functioning  moment 
was  not  aware. 

In  cases  of  typical  epilepsy  subconscious  states  are 
sometimes  found,  states  that  constitute  gaps  in  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  normally  working  moment-consciousness. 
Thus  in  some  cases  of  idiopathic  epilepsy  under  my 
observation,  the  patients  in  the  stuporous  states  suc- 
ceeding the  epileptic  attack  answer  questions,  but  do 
not  recognize  me,  nor  do  they  know  the  nurse  who  takes 
care  of  them,  although  they  can  remember  and  recog- 
nize other  names  mentioned  to  them.  In  their  nor- 
mal state,  however,  they  neither  know  of  their  attacks 
nor  do  they  remember  anything  of  the  conversations 
and  experimentations  during  the  stuporous  post-epilep- 
tic state.  In  other  severe  cases  of  epilepsy  with  fre- 
quent attacks  of  grand  mal  and  petit  mal,  the  patients 
during  the  periods  of  their  stuporous  post-epileptic 
states  answer  questions  often  mistaking  persons  and 
environment,  referring  to  events  and  incidents  of  their 
early  childhood.  On  emerging  frwn  their  abnormal 
states,  the  patients  are  completely  unaware  of  what 
had  taken  place,  the  epileptic  attack  with  stuporous 
post-epileptic  state   forming  a   gap   in  the   functional 


Mental  Continuity  and  the  Psychic  Gap       293 

activity  of  his  principal  or  upper  moment-conscious- 
ness. 

If  we  look  at  the  moment  from  its  subjective  stand- 
point there  may  be  consciousness  of  the  gap  bridging 
over  the  edges  of  the  mental  lesion,  or  such  conscious- 
ness may  be  altogether  lacking,  the  psychic  edges  of 
the  mental  lesion  being  closely  unified  in  the  synthetic 
activity  of  the  temporarily  arrested,  but  now  once  more 
functioning  moment-consciousness.  If  we  look  at  the 
objective  side  of  the  gap,  we  find  that  there  may  be 
total  absence  of  all  mental  activity,  no  other  moment 
coming  up  to  fill  the  place  of  the  one  that  has  ceased 
functioning,  or  another  moment  may  take  the  place  of 
the  one  arrested  in  function,  seemingly  fill  up  the  men- 
tal gap,  and  become  submerged  with  the  restitution  of 
the  arrested  moment's  activity.  Not  that  the  gap  is 
really  filled  up  objectively  or  subjectively;  it  is  like  the 
close  successive  manifestations  of  different  individuali- 
ties. The  close  observer  can  easily  detect  the  arrest, 
the  gap,  the  filling  up  of  the  gap  with  another  moment's 
activity,  and  finally  the  restitution  of  the  original  tem- 
porarily arrested  moment-consciousness.  What  is  pre- 
sented to  cursory  observation  is  apparent  continuity 
of  mental  activity. 

Mental  gaps  may  be  classified  as  follows : 


Mental  gfap 


f  Subjective    (with  consciousness  of  mental  gap. 
Standpoint  (without  consciousness  of  mental  gap. 

I   Objective    /Absence  of  moment,    (pr-  v 
L  Standpoint  I  Presence  of  moment  ■<  t  ^ 


\  Lower. 


When  the  principal  moment  becomes  arrested  in  its 
activity  and  a  new  dominating  moment  takes  it  place 
in  the  formed  gap,  the  type  of  the  new  moment  is  us- 


494  Normal  ttnd  Abnormal  Psychology 

ually  of  a  lower  grade.  The  conditions  that  bring 
about  an  aggregation  of  moments  are  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  allow  of  the  activity  of  a  high  type  of  moment.  Not 
appearing  in  the  mental  synthesis  of  the  organization 
of  moments  characteristic  of  consciousness  in  the  nor- 
mal state,  the  moment  is  poor  in  content  and  simple  in 
nature.  Falling  as  it  does  outside  the  complex  normal 
aggregate  of  moments,  the  moment  lacks  the  harmony 
and  balance  in  its  psychomotor  and  psycho-physiological 
reactions,  since  the  counteracting  balancing  and  hence 
regulative  psychomotor  tendencies  of  other  systems  of 
moments  are  wanting. 

A  moment  that  enters  into  a  highly  complex  aggrega- 
tion of  moments,  when  stimulated  to  activity,  sets  also 
other  moments  into  functioning,  moments  that  are  closely 
associated  with  it  and  often  of  different  and  even  con- 
trary psychomotor  and  psycho-physiological  reactions. 
Strengthening  other  systems  against  the  lines  of  its  own 
activity  the  moment  is  thus  controlled,  inhibited,  and 
regulated  In  the  very  act  of  awakening  to  functioning  ac- 
tivity. For  It  must  be  clearly  understood  that  there  Is  no 
special  controlling  agency  somewhere  In  the  mind  send- 
ing out  orders,  mandates,  Inhibitions,  like  a  despotically 
ruling  autocrat,  like  a  psycho-analytic  censor,  or  like 
an  omniscient,  omnipotent,  omnipresent.  Invisible  deity. 
The  regulative,  inhibiting  control  to  which  a  moment 
is  subject  is  in  the  mutual  interrelation,  balance,  and 
harmony  of  the  systems  and  constellations  of  moments, 
entering  into  an  aggregate,  and  forming  the  organized 
activity  of   a    highly    complex    moment-consciousness. 

When  a  moment  becomes  dissociated  and  isolated 
from  other  systems  of  moments.  It  loses  Its  balance  and 
being  freed  from  control,  manifests  its  psychomotor  re- 


Mental  Continuity  and  the  Psychic  Gap       295 

actions  in  the  full  force  of  its  original  powers.  The  lack 
of  control  and  the  moment's  energy  of  manifestations 
are  just  in  proportion  to  the  depth  and  extent  of  disso- 
ciation or  of  disaggregation  of  moments.  Dissociation 
and  over-action  are  co-related. 

The  intimate  relation  of  dissociation  and  over-action 
is  clearly  seen  in  cases  of  so-called  "psychic  epilepsy." 
The  dissociated  subconscious  states  manifest  themselves 
with  an  over-powering  activity,  with  an  energy  that  can 
neither  be  resisted  nor  controlled,  they  come  like  irre- 
sistible, uncontrollable,  imperative  impulses,  which  are 
closely  related  to  them  in  nature.  If,  however,  these 
states  are  brought  out  from  the  hidden  subconscious 
depth  from  which  they  make  invasions;  if  they  arc 
brought  to  light  before  the  court  of  the  upper  conscious- 
ness one  by  one  in  hypnoidal  states,  and  are  forced  to 
become  associated  with  and  synthetizcd  into  the  princi- 
pal moment-consciousness,  the  impetuosity  and  energy  of 
their  manifestations  are  gone.  A\\  my  cases  of  dissocia- 
tion give  experimental  confirmation  of  this  law  of  dyna- 
magenesis  of  dissociation. 

The  dissociated  cluster,  although  inaccessible 
through  the  ordinary  channels  of  intercommunications, 
on  account  of  the  disaggregation  of  the  aggregate  into 
which  it  enters  as  a  constituent  part,  may  still  be 
reached  through  other  channels,  coming  from  other 
moment-aggregates.  For  a  moment,  or  a  combination 
of  them  forms  a  constituent  part  not  only  of  one  ag- 
gregate, but  of  many  other  aggregates.  Loss  of  com- 
munication through  a  certain  channel  does  not  neces- 
sarily exclude  loss  of  all  communications.  If  the  lost 
channel  is  habitual,  the  activity  of  the  seemingly  lost 
moments  may  be  awakened  through  unhabitual  chan- 


296  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

nels. 

If  the  moment  cannot  be  set  into  activity  by  the 
organization  of  constellations  constituting  the  con- 
scious personality,  on  account  of  disaggregating  pro- 
cesses, the  moment  may  still  be  set  into  fuctioning  ac- 
tivity through  aggregates  falling  outside  the  focus  of 
personality,  but  which  work  with  that  focus  in  close 
co-operation,  namely  the  subconscious.  In  other  words, 
in  the  process  of  disaggregation,  conscious,  or  rather 
self-conscious  experiences  fall  into  the  region  of  sub- 
conscious life;  what  is  absent  in  personal  thought  may 
be  present  in  Impersonal,  subconscious  states.  All  psy- 
chopathic functional  disturbances  consist  just  in  such 
an  interrelation  of  mental  aggregates;  in  the  process 
of  disaggregation  of  the  self-conscious  personality  ag- 
gregates of  moments  drop  out  and  fall  into  the  domain 
of  the  subconscious.  What  disappears  from  attentive 
consciousness  may  fall  into  subconsciousness.  The  dis- 
aggregated moment,  ceasing  to  enter  Into  relations  with 
the  upper  personal  consciousness  of  the  highly  com- 
plex constellation,  may  still  form  a  component  of  the 
lower  aggregates  of  the  subconscious. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  MOMENT-THRESHOLD 


TAKING  an  initial  stimulus  with  its  concom- 
itant sensory  effect  as  the  starting  point  we 
add  by  degrees  small  unperceived  stimuli  un- 
til a  point  is  reached  when  a  barely  percepti- 
ble change  of  the  external  stimulation  is  effected  in 
consciousness.  The  sum  of  the  differential  stimuli  up 
to  the  point  where  the  perceptible  change  is  produced 
is  found  out,  and  brought  into  relation  with  the  quanti- 
ty of  the  initial  stimulus.  Working  with  this  method 
of  least  observable  differences  Weber  succeeded  in  ex- 
pressing the  relation  of  the  differential  stimulus  to  sen- 
sation in  the  formula  known  as  "Weber's  law."  With- 
in certain  limits,  no  matter  what  the  absolute  value  of 
the  stimulus  be,  the  differential  stimulus,  or  what  is 
the  same  the  barely  sensible  addition  to  the  initial  to- 
tal stimulus,  must  bear  the  same  proportion  to  the 
total  stimulus.  By  many  experiments  Weber  found 
that  in  the  case  of  weight,  for  instance,  the  relation  is 
one-third.  Thus  if  the  first  weight  be  nine  pounds  the 
barely  sensible  addition  will  be  one-third  of  nine,  or 
three  pounds;  in  twelve  pounds  the  increment  is  one- 
third  of  twelve,  or  four  pounds;  in  fifteen  pounds  the 
barely  sensible  increment  is  again  one-third  of  the  total 
stimulus  that  is  one-third  of  fifteen,  or  five  pounds,  and 
so  on. 

Further  investigations  have  shown  that,  within  cer- 

297 


298  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

tain  limits,  there  is  for  all  the  senses  which  admit  of  ex- 
act measurement  a  constantly  uniform  quantitative  re- 
lation between  the  stimulus  and  the  just  noticeable  stim- 
ulus-difference. Experimentation  by  different  investi- 
gators have  confirmed  "Weber's  law"  for  the  different 
senses  by  showing  that,  within  a  certain  range  of  in- 
tensities of  stimuli,  there  is  a  more  or  less  constant  ra- 
tio between  the  increase  of  the  stimulus  necessary  to 
produce  a  just  noticeable  difference  of  sensation  and 
the  total  stimulus  intensity.  Thus,  it  has  been  shown 
that  noise  stimuli  must  increase  by  one-third;  pressure 
stimuli  by  one-fortieth;  stimuli  of  muscular  sensations, 
such  as  lifting  weights,  by  one-fortieth;  achromatic 
light  stimuli  by  one-hundredth.  Weber  in  his  paper 
De  Tactu  expressed  his  law  as  follows :  "In  observan- 
do  discrimine  rerum  inter  se  comparatarum  non  dif- 
ferentiam  rerum,  sed  rationem  differentiae  ad  magni- 
tudinem  rerum  inter  se  comparatarum  percipimus." 

Gustav  Theodor  Fechner,  the  founder  of  psycho- 
physics  and  its  methods,  starting  with  Weber's  law 
worked  out  a  general  formula  for  the  quantitative  re- 
lation between  physical  stimuli  and  sensations.  As- 
suming that  the  just  noticeable  differences  of  sensation 
given  by  ascending  or  descending  series  of  different 
stimuli  to  be  equal  units,  he  finds  by  means  of  different 
psycho-physical  methods,  first  elaborated  by  him,  the 
threshold  of  sensations  or  that  stimulus  which  is  just 
near  the  limit  of  giving  rise  to  a  sensory  effect,  but 
which  is  still  not  sufficient  to  awaken  a  sensation;  in 
short,  he  finds  the  stimulus  the  correlating  sensation  of 
which  is  zero. 

The  minimum  perceptible  or  stimulus-threshold  is 
found  by  measurements  of  the  different  senses.  Thus 


The  Moment-Threshold  299 

two  parallel  lines  are  for  most  people  barely  dis- 
tinguishable when  the  distance  between  them  sub- 
tends an  angle  of  less  than  60  seconds.  In  the 
sense  of  hearing  the  vibrations  recurring  between  30-35 
per  second  are  barely  distinguishable.  Below  16  vibra- 
tions per  second  no  sensation  of  sound  can  be  produced. 

Thresholds  have  been  similarly  determined  for  all 
other  sensations.  Thus  the  sense  of  touch,  when  tested  by 
the  aesthesiometer,  an  unsatisfactory  instrument,  gives 
the  average  for  the  tip  of  the  forefinger  about  1.65  mm., 
on  the  back  of  the  hand  about  16.0  mm.,  Sensibility  to 
pain  as  tested  by  the  algeometer  varies  from  10  to  15 
degrees.  Sensitivity  to  smell  varies  with  different  sub- 
stances; thus  for  smell  of  garlic  sensitivity  varies  in 
detecting  i  part  in  44,000  parts  of  water  to  one  part  in 
57,000  parts  of  water;  for  oil  of  lemon  from  i  to 
116,000  to  I  to  280,000.  Taste  can  detect  the  bitter- 
ness of  quinine  in  a  solution  of  i  part  quinine  to  about 
400,000  to  459,000  of  water;  the  sweetness  of  sugar 
can  be  detected  in  a  solution  of  i  part  sugar  to  200  of 
water;  the  taste  of  salt  can  be  detected  in  a  solution  of 
I  part  salt  to  about  2,000  parts  of  water. 

After  discovering  the  zero  point  of  sensation  and 
the  minimum  perceptible  he  finds  the  constant  ratio  for 
the  just  noticeable  difference.  The  minimum  percepti- 
ble forms  the  unit  of  sensation.  Each  increase  of  the 
stimulus  giving  a  just  noticeable  difference  is  counted 
as  an  additional  sensation-unit  to  the  total  sum  of  sen- 
sations. 

Let  A  be  the  threshold  giving  sensation  zero,  and  let 
r  be  the  constant  ratio  of  increase  then  we  have  the 
following  series  of  stimuli  and  their  corresponding 
sensations : 


300  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


Sensation  o  is 

given 

by 

Stimulus  A 

I 

2 

3 

3 

n 

(i+r)i 
(i+r)« 
(i+r)» 
(i+r)» 
(i+r)° 

Thus  we  find  that  while  the  stimulus  increases  in  a 
geometrical  ratio,  the  sensation  grows  in  an  arithmeti- 
cal ratio.  The  sensations  stand  therefore  in  the  same 
relation  as  the  logarithms  to  their  numbers.  Hence 
we  may  say  that  sensation  increases  as  the  logarithm, 
of  the  stimulus.  If  S  be  the  sensation,  R  the  stimulus 
and  C  the  magnitude  of  the  constant  ratio,  then  we 
have  the  following  formulae : 

S-C  log.  R. 

This  formula  is  known  as  "Fechner's  law." 

Fechner's  expression  of  Weber's  law  is  rather  ques- 
tionable. Fechner  assumes  that  the  just  noticeable  dif- 
ference of  different  stimuli  are  qualitatively  and  quanti- 
tatively equal, — a  dubious  assumption.  A  third  of  an 
ounce  added  to  an  ounce  does  not  feel  the  same  as  a 
third  of  eighteen  pounds  added  to  the  same  number  of 
pounds,  or  as  nine  pounds  added  to  twenty-seven 
pounds.  These  units  even,  if  they  have  a  quantitative 
expression,  do  not  stand  in  a  simple  quantitative  rela- 
tion and  are  rather  incommensurable. 

Furthermore,  it  may  even  be  considered  that  Fech- 
ner's assumption  is  fundamentally  wrong  and  unpsycho- 
logical.  In  opposition  to  the  first  elementary  principle  of 
psychology  Fechner  tacitly  postulates  that  sensations  can 
be  measured  and  that  one  sensation  or  a  complex  sensa- 
tion is  a  multiple  of  another.  Now  the  peculiar  trait  of 
the  phenomena  of  mental  life  is  essentially  their  qualita- 


The  Moment-Threshold  301 

tivc  character.  Sensations  are  not  quantities  to  be  meas- 
ured, but  are  essentially  qualities.  A  strong  sensa- 
tion is  not  a  weak  sensation  many  times  over,  but  its 
very  strength,  its  intensity  is  its  own  separate  individ- 
ual quality  constituting  the  essence  of  that  particular 
sensation.  An  intense  sensation  of  pure  white  is  not  a 
multiple  of  a  weak  sensation  of  grey  just  as  the  thought 
"nation"  is  not  the  thought  "man"  raised  to  the  n^ 
degree. 

In  psychological  investigations  one  must  be  care- 
ful not  to  confound  the  nature  of  the  physical  stim- 
ulus with  that  of  the  sensation.  A  physical  stimulus 
can  be  measured  quantitatively,  but  a  sensation  does 
not  consist  of  quantitative  units,  and  hence,  is  not 
measurable.  The  only  relation  that  can  be  measured 
and  expressed  quantitatively  is  that  between  stimulus 
and  physiological  process,  the  physical  concomitant  of 
psychic  states. 

Whether  or  no  we  accept  Fechner's  statement  of 
Weber's  law  we  may  safely  assume  that  the  threshold 
rises  with  successive  stimulations.  This  law  holds  true 
of  all  life  processes,  from  the  life  of  an  ameba  to  the 
life  activity  of  a  highly  organized  moment-conscious- 
ness. In  the  sphere  of  sensation  we  find  such  a  rise  of 
threshold.  We  are  all  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  an 
additional  candle  or  lamp,  for  instance,  in  a  well  light- 
ed room  does  not  produce  the  same  sensory  effect  as 
when  brought  into  a  more  or  less  dark  room.  An  elec- 
tric light  in  the  sun  is  scarcely  perceptible.  An  addi- 
tional ounce  to  a  lifted  pound  does  not  feel  as  heavy  as 
when  raised  by  itself.  A  sound  added  to  another  sound 
or  noise,  sounds  less  loud  than  when  appearing  iso- 
lated, or  when  the  same  sound  is  breaking  upon  silence. 


502  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

The  same  relation  holds  true  in  the  case  of  other  senses. 

This  same  truth  is  still  more  clearly  brought  out  in 
the  fact  that,  if  we  take  a  certain  stimulus  as  a  unit,  giv- 
ing rise  to  a  definite  sensation,  then  as  we  progressively 
ascend  and  add  more  and  more  units  of  the  same  stim- 
ulus, the  intensity  of  stimulation  is  far  from  rising  pro- 
portionately. If  we  take,  for  instance,  the  weight  of 
an  ounce  as  our  unit  of  stimulation,  then  the  successive 
moments  of  unit  stimulations,  that  is,  of  ounces,  will 
not  give  rise  to  as  distinct  and  similar  sensations  as  the 
initial  sensation.  The  second  ounce  will  give  a  sensa- 
tion fainter  than  the  first  one,  and  the  third  fainter 
than  the  second,  and  so  on  until  a  point  is  reached 
when  the  sensation  of  an  additional  ounce  will  not  at 
all  be  appreciated,  will  dwindle  away  and  almost  reach 
the  zero  point. 

In  the  same  way,  if  the  pressure  of  a  gramme 
is  excited  in  the  hand,  successive  increments  of 
grammes  will  not  in  equal  degree  increase  the  sensory 
effect;  the  additional  increments  of  grammes,  though 
they  are  equal  units  of  stimulation,  give  rise  to  fainter 
and  fainter  sensations,  until  finally  all  sensory  appre- 
ciation of  the  added  unit  fades  away  and  disappears. 
If  the  hand  is  immersed  in  water,  say  at  the  freezing 
point,  an  addition  of  ten  degrees  will  be  perceptibly 
appreciated,  while  successive  increments  of  ten  degrees 
each  will  be  felt  less  and  less,  and  finally  will  not  be 
noticed  and  will  be  difficult  to  detect.  In  short,  the 
threshold  rises  with  the  process  stimulation. 

To  bring  about  a  sensory  response  of  an  already  stim- 
ulated sense-organ  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus  must  be 
relatively  increased.  This  is  what  constitutes  Weber's 
law.    The  continuous  progressive  sensory  response  of  a 


The  MomeHt-Tkreshold  303 

sense-organ  requires  a  constant  increase  of  stimulations 
which,  within  certain  limits,  bears  a  constant  ratio  to 
the  total  stimulus.  This  law  is  sometimes  summed  up 
by  psychologists  in  the  statement  that  "the  increase 
of  the  stimulus  necessary  to  produce  an  increase  of  the 
sensation  bears  a  constant  ratio  to  the  total  stimulus." 
Activity  raises  the  threshold;  it  is  the  beginning  of  fa- 
tigue. 

The  rise  of  threshold  after  stimulation  holds  true  in 
the  whole  domain  of  biological  activity.  If  the  gas- 
trocnemius muscle  of  a  frog,  for  instance,  is  stimu- 
lated by  an  electric  current,  the  muscle,  with  each  suc- 
cessive stimulation,  responds  less  readily  with  a  con- 
traction, and  this  becomes  more  evident  with  the  on- 
set of  fatigue.  Pflfefer,  in  a  series  of  extremely  inter- 
esting experiments,  has  shown  that  spermatozoids  of 
ferns  are  attracted  by  malic  acid,  the  progressive  re- 
sponse of  attraction  of  the  cell  requiring  a  constant  in- 
crease of  the  degree  of  concentration  of  the  acid,  the 
increment  of  stimulations,  as  in  the  case  of  sensation, 
bearing,  within  certain  limits,  a  constant  ratio  to  the 
total  stimulus.  The  threshold  rises  with  each  succes- 
sive stimulation. 

The  rise  of  thresholds  increases  with  intensity  and 
duration  of  stimulation  as  we  approach  the  state  of 
fatigue.  Through  the  influence  of  exhaustion,  fatigue, 
or  the  influence  of  toxic,  autotoxic,  emotional,  and 
other  stimulations,  the  thresholds  of  certain  moments 
have  been  raised  so  that  ordinary  or  even  maximal 
stimuli  can  no  longer  call  out  any  response.  When 
such  a  rise  of  thresholds  is  present  the  moments  with 
raised  thresholds  can  no  longer  enter  into  association 
with  systems  of  moments  with  which  they  are  usually 


304  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

associated,  and  the  result  is  dissociation,  giving  rise  to 
the  great  multitude  of  phenomena  of  functional  psy- 
chosis with  a  subconscious  background,  the  extent  of 
which  depends  on  the  number  of  raised  thresholds,  on 
the  extent  of  the  dissociation  effected. 

When  a  moment  or  aggregate  of  moments  begins  to 
function,  it  radiates  stimulation  to  other  moments  or 
aggregates  of  moments.  All  the  aggregates  which 
these  radiated  stimulations  reach  do  not  equally  be- 
gin to  function.  It  will  depend  largely  on  the  state  of 
the  aggregate  and  its  threshold.  If  the  radiated  stim- 
uli be  minimal,  the  many  aggregates  that  have  a  high 
threshold  will  not  be  effected  at  all.  Furthermore, 
many  aggregates  whose  arousal  could  otherwise  be 
easily  effected  by  the  given  stimulus  may  temporarily 
be  in  a  condition  in  which  their  thresholds  have  become 
raised  and  thus  fall  outside  the  sphere  of  activity  of 
the  functioning  aggregate.  On  the  other  hand,  aggre- 
gates that  are  usually  inaccessible  to  those  minimal 
stimuli  may  under  certain  conditions  be  set  into  activity 
by  minimal  stimuli,  if  there  is  a  lowering  of  the  thres- 
hold of  the  total  aggregate.  Thus  the  aggregates  set 
into  activity  by  the  functioning  aggregate  are  condi- 
tioned by  the  rise  and  fall  of  their  thresholds. 

In  case  where  the  threshold  of  an  aggregate  is  raised 
the  radiated  minimal  stimuli  coming  from  a  particular 
functioning  aggregate  may  become  efficient  and  reach 
the  threshold,  when  another  aggregate  begins  to  func- 
tion simultaneously.  This  holds  true  even  in  the  case 
when  the  minimal  stimuli,  coming  from  two  different 
aggregates  are  just  below  the  threshold-stimulus.  Thus, 
under  certain  conditions,  when  visual  stimuli  are  bare- 
ly or  not  at  all  discernible,  they  can  become  intensified 


The  Moment-Threshold  305 

by  re-enforcing  them  with  auditory  stimuli.  This  is 
commonly  found  in  the  mode  of  recovery  of  some  for- 
gotten name,  or  of  some  lapsed  experience.  We  try 
to  find  the  name  and  seek  to  come  to  it  in  one  line  of 
thought,  but  of  no  avail ;  new  lines  are  attempted,  and 
finally  the  combined  activity  of  the  systems  reaches  the 
lapsed  aggregate  whose  threshold  has  become  tem- 
porarily raised. 

We  find  the  same  law  further  exemplified  in  the  case 
of  the  infant  under  my  observation.  When  with  the 
nipple  in  his  mouth  the  infant  ceased  nursing,  the  suck- 
ing movements  could  be  induced  again  by  stimulating 
some  other  sense-organ.  The  tactile,  pressure,  tempera- 
ture, and  taste  stimuli  coming  from  the  nipple  in  the 
infant's  mouth  became  insufficient  to  stimulate  to  ac- 
tivity the  functioning  aggregate  of  sucking  movements, 
on  account  of  its  raised  threshold ;  only  additional  stim- 
ulation could  bring  about  a  further  functioning  of  the 
lapsed  aggregate.  This,  of  course,  could  also  be  effect- 
ed by  making  the  tactual  and  pressure  stimuli  more  in- 
tense, such,  for  instance,  as  shaking  the  nipple  while  the 
infant  kept  it  in  its  mouth.  This  increase  of  intensity, 
however,  mainly  indicates  that  the  stimuli  were  no  long- 
er effective,  and  an  additional  stimulus  was  requisite,  a 
stimulus  that  might  come  either  from  the  same  aggre- 
gate or  from  a  totally  different  aggregate. 

In  the  many  cases  of  post-hypnotic  amnesia,  we  find 
the  same  truth  further  illustrated.  In  the  deeper  stages 
of  hypnosis,  from  which  the  subject  awakens  with  no 
remembrance  of  what  had  occurred  during  the  state 
the  lapsed  memories  can  be  brought  into  the  upper 
consciousness  by  plying  the  subject  with  many  ques- 
tions.     During  the  trance  or  during  the  intermediate 


3o6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

stages,  with  subsequent  trance  and  suggested  amnesia, 
the  subject  is  made  to  perform  a  certain  action, — to  light 
and  extinguish  the  gas  four  times  in  succession,  or  to 
open  and  close  the  door  a  certain  number  of  times.  The 
subject  is  then  awakened  from  his  trance;  he  remem- 
bers nothing  of  what  has  taken  place.  If  he  is  asked 
point-blank  whether  he  remembers  any  incidents  of  his 
hypnotic  state,  he  answers  with  an  emphatic  negative. 
If  now  the  subject  is  asked  whether  he  knows  how  much 
two  times  two  are  or  his  attention  is  incidentally  direct- 
ed to  the  gas  or  to  the  door,  he  at  once  becomes  reflec- 
tive, the  subconscious  memories  are  on  the  way  to  surge 
up,  and  a  few  further  indirect  questions,  the  number 
depending  on  the  depth  of  hypnosis,  finally  bring  out  the 
lost  memories.  The  threshold  that  has  risen  at  the  end 
of  the  trance  is  stepped  over  by  the  combined  effect  of 
the  many  stimulations  coming  from  different  directions, 
and  the  subconsciously  submerged  moment  or  aggre- 
gate of  moments  surges  up  to  the  focus  or  nucleus  of  the 
upper  consciousness. 

Once  a  particular  moment  is  stimulated  in  its  appro- 
priate way,  it  may  go  on  developing,  and  usually  does 
so  by  stimulating  and  setting  into  activity  aggregates  of 
moments  associated  with  it,  or  may  form  new  combina- 
tions of  aggregates.  The  solution  of  a  problem  may 
present  great  difficulties,  but  once  started  on  the  ap- 
propriate line,  the  whole  series  of  combination  goes  on 
unfolding,  stimulating  other  moments  and  aggregates 
and  forming  more  and  more  complex  combinations. 
Thus,  Archimedes,  as  the  story  runs,  while  In  the  bath, 
made  the  discovery  of  the  law  of  specific  gravity.  Ac- 
cording to  the  popular  account  Newton  was  led  to  his 
discovery  of  universal  gravitation  by  the  accidental  fall 


The  Moment-Threshold  307 

of  an  apple.  Hughes  was  started  by  the  idea  of  sym- 
metry in  his  discovery  of  the  laws  of  crystallography. 
Goethe  was  led  to  his  conception  of  metamorphosis  and 
evolution  by  a  skull  on  the  plains  of  Italy.  Darwin  by 
reading  Malthus'  economical  treatise  on  population  was 
inspired  to  work  out  the  great  principles  of  the  strug- 
gle for  existence  and  natural  selection.  Myers  was  led 
by  the  greater  redness  of  blood  in  the  blood-vessels  of 
tropical  patients  to  his  grand  conceptions  of  transforma- 
tion, equivalence,  and  conservation  of  energy.  All  these 
examples  illustrate  the  fact  that  once  a  moment  has 
been  started  it  goes  on  developing  by  stimulating  other 
cognate  moments  and  aggregates  to  functioning  activity. 

The  same  condition  is  also  found  in  psychopathic 
borderland  states,  such  as  dreams.  In  dreams  a  peri- 
pheral stimulus  gives  rise  to  sensations  that  start  the 
activities  of  moments,  which  in  turn  give  rise  to 
phantastic  combinations  of  different  aggregates.  This 
phantastic  combination  of  aggregates,  giving  rise  to 
the  functioning  of  otherwise  unusual,  or  what  may  be 
termed  abnormal  constellations,  is  largely  due  to  the 
fact,  of  redistribution  of  thresholds  in  the  dream  state. 

The  dream  state  is  characterized  by  a  rise  of 
the  thresholds  of  moments  and  their  aggregates 
that  have  been  functioning  during  the  waking  states,  the 
thresholds  of  these  aggregates  having  been  raised 
through  activity.  In  the  sleep  state  moments  that  have 
their  thresholds  relatively  or  absolutely  lowered  through 
inactivity,  moments  or  aggregates  that  are  unusual  or 
have  not  been  in  use  during  the  waking  state,  become 
aroused,  and  begin  to  function.  Hence  the  arousal  of 
hypnotic  dream  states  reproducing  long  lapsed  mo- 
ments of  child-life,  hence  the  phantasms  of  the  world 
of  dreams. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  PROCESS  OF  MOMENT  DISAGGREGATION 

EACH  Stimulation  leaves  after  it  some  mo- 
ment-disaggregation,  a  condition  that  makes 
further  disaggregation  more  difficult.  The 
more  intense  the  stimulation  is,  the  more  ex- 
tensive and  deeper  is  the  disaggregation,  and  hence, 
the  more  difficult  further  disaggregation  becomes.  If 
the  stimulation  is  continued  or  made  highly  intense,  a 
point  is  soon  reached  beyond  which  no  stimulation  can 
pass  without  giving  rise  to  disaggregation  having  as 
its  manifestation  the  different  forms  of  pathological 
mental  dissociation.  The  pathological  process  under- 
lying the  phenomena  of  abnormal  mental  life  is  not 
essentially  different  from  the  one  taking  place  in  nor- 
mal states.  If  difference  there  be,  it  is  not  certainly 
one  of  a  quality,  but  of  degree. 

The  more  intense  a  stimulation  is,  the  more  ex- 
tensive is  the  process  of  disaggregation,  the  higher 
mounts  the  moment-threshold  giving  rise  to  the  dif- 
ferent phenomenon  of  psycho-physiological  and  psycho- 
motor dissociation.  As  expressed  in  a  former  work: 
"The  process  of  disaggregation  setting  in  under  the 
action  of  strong  and  hurtful  stimuli  is  not  some- 
thing new  and  different  in  kind  from  the  usual; 
it  is  a  continuation  of  the  process  of  association 
and  dissociation  normally  going  on  within  the  function 
and  structure  of  higher  constellations.  The  one  pro- 
cess gradually  passes  into  the  other  with  the  intensity 

308 


The  Process  of  Moment  Disaggregation      309 

of  duration  of  the  stimulus." 

The  process  of  disaggregation  is  a  descending  one, 
it  proceeds  from  constellations  to  groups.  Under  the 
influence  of  strong  stimulation  such  as  mechanical  and 
chemical  agencies,  and  psychic  affections,  such  as  in- 
tense emotions  of  fear,  anger,  grief,  anxiety,  or  worry, 
the  degenerative  process  of  disaggregation  sets  in,  af- 
fecting first  the  higher  aggregates  and  then  with  the 
continuity  and  intensity  of  the  stimulations  the  process 
descends  deeper  and  deeper  affecting  less  complex  ag- 
gregates, finally  reaching  the  simplest  aggregates  of 
moments.  The  higher  types  of  moments  degenerate 
and  fall  to  lower  and  lower  stages  of  consciousness. 

The  law  of  disaggregation  as  that  of  degeneration 
in  general  is  from  the  complex  to  the  simple.  The  low- 
er moments,  on  account  of  the  simplicity  of  their  organ- 
ization, are  more  stable,  and  are  in  a  better  condition  to 
resist  the  disaggregating  action  of  hurtful  stimulations. 
Furthermore,  the  lower  and  simpler  an  aggregate  of  mo- 
ments is,  the  older  it  is,  either  phylogenetically  or  onto- 
genetically,  and  its  stability  is  therefore  more  firmly  as- 
sured by  selection  and  adaptation.  In  the  course  of  the 
life-existence  of  the  individual  and  the  species  lower 
types  of  moments  have  come  more  often  into  activity, 
since  the  higher  an  aggregate  is  the  later  does  it  rise  in 
the  history  of  evolution.  Hence  moments  that  are  not 
working  smoothly  and  with  little  friction  are  continually 
weeded  out. 

This  same  process  is  going  on  not  only  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  species  by  the  eliminating  action  of  natural 
selection,  but  also  by  the  special  adaptations  brought 
about  in  the  life  experience  of  the  individual.  In  phylo- 
genesis the  best  and  most  firmly  organized  instincts  sur- 


310  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

vivc,  while  in  ontogenesis  those  habits  are  consciously  or 
unconsciously  selected  which  are  most  firmly  established 
and  are  best  adapted  to  the  given  end.  At  the  same  time 
the  older  an  instinct  is,  the  more  thoroughly  organized 
it  becomes,  the  more  is  it  enabled  to  withstand  the  on- 
slaught of  external  hurtful  stimuli.  The  same  holds 
true  in  the  case  of  habits.  A  habit  of  long  standing  is 
well  organized,  and  it  is  often  extremely  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  control. 

Food  instincts,  sex  instincts,  social  instincts,  and  per- 
sonal moral  life  from  an  ascending  series  both  as  to  time 
of  appearance  in  the  history  of  the  species  as  well  as  com- 
plexity of  structure  and  function.  Food  instincts  in 
time  and  simplicity  precede  sex  instincts,  and  sex  in- 
stincts in  their  turn  precede  social  instincts  which  ante- 
cede  personal,  moral  life.  Now  we  find  that  the  instabil- 
ity is  in  the  same  ascending  line.  Food  instincts  are  more 
stable  than  sex  instincts,  sex  instincts  are  more  stable 
than  social  instincts  which  are  more  firmly  organized 
than  a  highly  unified  personal  life,  guided  by  a  moral 
ideal.  The  structure  and  functions  of  the  system  of 
alimentation  remain  unchanged  for  ages ;  the  sex  instincts 
may  become  slightly  modified  for  some  period  of  time ; 
the  functions  relating  to  social  life  vary  from  generation 
to  generation,  while  the  moral  life  guided  by  the  moral 
ideal  is  highly  individualized  and  personal. 

In  the  downward  course  of  mental  disease-processes 
the  degeneration  is  from  the  complex  to  the  simple, 
from  the  stable  to  the  unstable,  from  the  highly  organ- 
ized to  the  lowly  organized.  In  the  different  forms  of 
mental  diseases  first  the  moral  life,  then  the  social  in- 
stincts become  affected,  the  patient  becomes  selfish,  in- 
trospective, morally  selfish,  then  loses  all  regard  for 


The  Process  of  Moment  Disaggregation      311 

others,  becomes  careless,  wasteful  and  negligent  of  his 
vocations,  life-work,  and  duties;  his  whole  thought  be- 
comes concentrated  on  himself.  In  certain  forms  of 
mental  alienation,  such  as  melancholia  and  paranoia, 
the  patient  becomes  suspicious  of  others,  of  his  near  and 
dear  ones,  becomes  cruel  and  revengeful,  sometimes 
ending  by  attacking  his  own  friends  and  near  relatives, 
and  committing  homicide.  When  the  deterioration  of 
personal  moral  life  and  social  instincts  is  well  under  way, 
degeneration  of  other  functions  sets  in, — ^the  patient 
gives  himself  over  to  excesses,  to  all  kinds  of  debauches, 
and  indulges  in  the  different  forms  of  abnormal  sexual 
practices.  Only  very  late  in  the  course  of  the  disease 
are  the  food  instincts  in  any  way  affected. 

Even  in  the  lighter  forms  of  psychic  degenerative 
forms  that  lie  on  the  borderland  of  mental  alienation, 
such,  for  instance,  as  are  present  in  the  various  forms 
of  psychopathic  maladies  we  still  find  that  the  same 
relation  holds  good.  Moral  life  is  the  first  to  be  af- 
fected. Social  instincts,  follow,  while  disturbances  of 
sex  and  food  instincts  set  in  very  late  in  the  course  of  the 
pathological  process  of  disaggregation  and  degenera- 
tion. 

In  the  mentally  defective,  such  as  in  imbeciles,  idiots, 
and  cretins  we  once  more  find  that  our  law  holds  good. 
The  depth  of  the  congenital  mental  degeneration  is 
from  moral  to  social,  then  to  sex,  and  last  to  food  in- 
stincts. In  the  imbecile,  only  the  moral,  social,  and  In- 
tellectual activities  are  affected,  the  imbecility  being  ac- 
cording to  the  depth  of  the  degeneration,  the  other  in- 
stincts are  more  or  less  normal.  In  the  idiot  and  cre- 
tin the  process  of  degeneration  has  gone  still  deeper 
and  sex  and  food  instincts  with  their  psycho-physiologi- 


312  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

cal  functions  and  psychomotor  adjustments  become  af- 
fected, the  idiocy  being  in  proportion  to  the  gravity  of 
the  affection. 

The  phenomena  manifested  under  the  action  of  nar- 
cosis go  further  to  confirm  the  same  point  of  view. 
Moral,  personal  life  is  the  first  to  succumb,  other  activi- 
ties follow  in  the  order  of  their  complexity  and  duration 
of  function.  In  other  words,  the  law  of  disaggregation 
or  that  of  degeneration  is  from  the  complex  to  the  sim- 
ple, from  the  highly  organized  to  the  lowly  organized, 
from  the  least  stable  to  the  most  stable.  This  stability 
is  proportionate  to  the  complexity  of  moment  aggre- 
gates, and  the  frequency  and  duration  of  their  associa- 
tive activity. 

In  habits,  formed  within  the  life  time  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  same  law  holds  true.  Old  habits  become  in- 
veterate, habits  formed  in  childhood  and  perpetuated 
can  hardly  be  eradicated,  while  those  that  are  formed 
later  in  life  become  more  easily  dissolved.  Complex  hab- 
its formed  in  late  life,  relating  to  moral  life  and  social 
intercourse,  become  dissolved  at  the  first  onset  of  the 
process  of  mental  degeneration,  while  habits  formed 
early  in  life,  such  as  handling  spoons,  fork,  and  plate 
or  dressing  and  buttoning  the  coat  long  resist  the  de- 
generative process.  Paretics  and  patients  of  second- 
ary dem.entia  in  general,  though  far  advanced  on  the 
downward  path  of  degeneration,  are  still  for  some 
time  able  to  attend  to  the  simpler  functions  of  life  ac- 
tivity, such  as  dressing  and  feeding.  Once  more  we 
are  confronted  with  facts  pointing  to  the  same  law 
that  the  process  of  degeneration  of  which  disaggrega- 
tion constitutes  a  stage  is  from  the  highly  to  the  lowly 
organized,  from  the  complex  to  the  simple. 


The  Process  of  Moment  Disaggregation       313 

If  we  observe  more  closely  the  history  and  stages  of 
disaggregation,  we  find  that,  although  the  process  it- 
self is  going  on  within  the  centre  or  nucleus  of  the  ag- 
gregate, the  course  of  the  process  is  inverse,  from  the 
periphery  to  the  centre.  This  law  is  really  a  corrolary 
of  the  first  law  of  degeneration.  For  the  nucleus  of 
the  moment  aggregate  usually  consists  of  moments  that 
have  early  become  organized,  and  round  which  more 
moments  gather  from  all  sides,  the  aggregate  finally 
attaining  a  high  grade  of  organization.  The  further 
away  from  the  centre  or  from  the  nucleus,  the  newer 
is  the  formation  of  the  strata  of  moments,  and  the  more 
unstable  is  their  structural  and  functional  relationship 
within  the  total  aggregate.  Hence,  when  the  process 
of  degeneration  sets  in  affecting  the  controlling  nucleus, 
the  associative  ties  of  moments  within  the  aggregate 
become  lowered,  and  the  newest  strata,  the  most  re- 
mote from  the  nucleus  are  the  first  to  be  affected,  the 
process  passing  from  newer  to  older  strata.  In  other 
words,  the  process  of  degeneration  is  from  periphery 
to  centre. 

In  the  building  up  of  a  moment-aggregate  the  early 
deposits  are  less  complex  than  the  later  deposits  which 
are  not  as  yet  well  organized  by  use  and  adaptation. 
The  child  under  my  observation  learned  early  that  the 
shining  point  yonder  in  the  "ky"  (sky)  is  "venu(s) 
the  (s)  tar,"  and  when  absent  it  is  "hidden  by  a 
c(l)oud."  This  knowledge  is  certainly  extremely 
meagre,  but  still  it  forms  the  nucleus  round  which  grad- 
ually more  knowledge  will  become  formed  and  organ- 
ized. The  child  will  learn  the  dimensions  of  the  plan- 
et, its  distance  from  the  earth,  its  orbit,  its  relation  as 
a  member  within  the  solar  system,  relations  that  may 


314  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

be  extended  endlessly,  making  the  whole  moment-ag- 
gregate more  and  more  highly  complex  and  unstable. 

If  we  turn  to  motor  adaptations,  we  find  a  similar 
course  of  development.  It  took  the  infant  time  before 
out  of  the  aimless  series  of  spontaneous  motor  reactions 
some  definite  adaptations  emerged  relative  to  external 
visual  stimuli,  so  that  he  learned  to  grasp  the  object 
yonder.  These  grasping  motor  reactions  are  at  first 
crude  and  inexact.  The  distance  of  objects  is  often  mis- 
taken, and  the  child  stretches  his  hand  to  fetch  distant 
objects,  while  small  objects  cannot  be  picked  up;  the 
hand  often  goes  in  the  wrong  direction  and  objects  arc 
often  dropped,  because  the  reactions  are  not  exact  and 
steady.  Still  these  grasping  movements  form  the  nu- 
cleus for  the  formation  of  new  and  more  complex  strata 
of  motor  reactions.  He  learns  the  delicate  adaptations 
of  grasping  small  objects  and  the  fine  adjustments  of 
producing  a  series  of  highly  complex  and  extremely  del- 
icate motor  reactions,  such  for  instance  as  one  finds  in 
the  handling  of  instruments,  reading,  writing  in  the 
execution  of  musical  pieces,  in  singing,  and  piano  play- 
ing. All  these  motor  reactions  as  they  become  more 
complex  and  delicate  are  further  and  further  removed 
from  the  organized  nucleus. 

What  happens  now  in  the  descending  process  of  dis- 
solution? The  reverse  process  takes  place.  The  more 
complex  the  psycho-motor  structure  is,  and  the  further 
it  is  removed  from  the  original  nucleus,  the  more  easily 
does  it  become  disintegrated  in  the  downward  course 
of  the  process  of  degeneration.  In  the  different  forms 
of  mental  diseases,  such  as  the  various  types  of  mania 
melancholia,  paranoia,  general  paresis,  primary  demen- 
tia, dementia  praecox,  senile  dementia,  and  in  all  those 


The  Process  of  Moment  Disaggregation      315 

chronic  forms  that  end  in  secondary  dementia,  adapta- 
tions and  acquisitions  further  removed  from  the  orig- 
inal nucleus,  constituting  the  simple  relations  of  things 
acquired  in  early  youth  and  childhood,  gradually  become 
disintegrated.  The  more  remote  the  stratum  is  from 
the  central  nucleus  the  earlier  does  dissolution  set  in. 

With  the  setting  in  of  the  process  of  dissolution  the 
scientist,  the  professor,  the  student  loses  by  degrees  the 
lately  acquired  wealth  of  knowledge,  the  complex 
and  delicately  balanced  conceptual  structure  of 
scientific  relationship ;  the  more  remotely  related  to  the 
original  nucleus  of  sense  experience  is  the  first  to  be- 
come shaken  and  tumble  down.  When  the  degenera- 
tive process  has  gone  far  enough,  the  original  meagre 
nucleus  of  sense-experience  becomes  disintegrated  in  its 
turn. 

With  the  onset  of  the  process  of  degeneration 
the  banker,  the  business  man,  the  speculator,  grad- 
ually begin  to  lose  the  understanding  of  those 
speculative  aspects  of  business  adaptations  and  adjust- 
ments that  are  remotely  related  to  the  original  nucleus 
of  self-preservation.  With  the  further  advance  of  the 
process  of  disintegration,  more  stable  strata,  more  near- 
ly related  to  the  original  nucleus  become  affected,  until 
finally  the  nucleus  itself  is  reached  and  its  constituents 
are  affected,  the  patient  is  unable  to  take  care  of  himself. 

In  motor  reactions  we  find  that  the  same  law  holds 
true.  The  finer,  the  more  complex  a  given  activity  is, 
the  more  remote  it  is  from  the  primary  nucleus  of  mo- 
tor adaptations,  the  easier  and  sooner  does  it  become 
disintegrated  in  the  course  of  the  pathological  process. 
The  musician,  the  virtuoso  loses  the  power  of  infus- 
ing harmony,   life,   and  emotion   into  the  play;    the 


3l6  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

painter  loses  control  over  his  brush,  the  singer  over  his 
voice;  the  watchmaker,  or  the  mechanician  is  unable  to 
regulate  the  fine  movements  of  the  spring,  the  wheels  of 
the  delicate  mechanism,  and  the  mechanic  is  unable  to 
handle  his  instruments.  Drawing  deteriorates,  writing  is 
impaired  and  defective.  The  liquid  "r"  a  sound  which 
children  acquire  late  becomes  difficult,  if  not  impossible 
to  pronounce.  The  speech  test  of  general  paralysis  is 
well  known.  The  patient  is  unable  to  repeat  such  a  sim- 
ple formula  as  "round  about  the  rugged  rock  the  rag- 
ged rascal  ran,"  or  "truly  rural." 

With  the  further  advance  of  the  process,  such  simple 
actions  as  picking  up  a  pin,  or  threading  a  needle  are  ex- 
ecuted with  great  difficulty,  and  much  hesitation.  To 
produce  a  straight  line  or  to  draw  a  circle  becomes  im- 
possible. Involuntary  tremor  is  predominant,  a  tremor, 
the  rhythmical  regularity  of  which  becomes  fully  mani- 
fested in  senile  degeneration,  and  which  is  also  observed, 
though  without  its  rhythmical  regularity,  on  the  very 
eve  of  mental  life,  in  infancy. 


CHAPTER  XII 

REPRODUCTION   AND   THE    REFLEX   MOMENT 

WE  have  described  the  moment-conscious- 
ness as  being  stimulated  to  activity,  as 
emerging,  as  assimilating  new  material, 
as  growing  and  developing,  as  passing 
through  many  stages  in  the  history  of  its  individual 
evolution  and  dissolution.  All  this  tacitly  implies  anoth- 
er characteristic  besides  the  ones  found  as  belonging 
to  the  nature  of  the  moment.  The  moment-conscious- 
ness has  the  function  of  reproduction.  We  have  inci- 
dentally discussed  reproduction  of  the  moment-con- 
sciousness, but  we  have  not  studied  this  character  more 
closely  from  the  standpoint  of  the  moment's  general 
nature. 

A  close  inspection  of  the  moment-consciousness  re- 
veals the  fact  that  every  moment-consciousness  can  be 
reproduced  as  long  as  it  is  not  destroyed,  as  long  as  it 
is  not  dissolved  into  its  constituent  elements.  For  as 
long  as  the  moment  exists,  each  time  when  it  is  stimu- 
lated to  activity  the  manifestation  of  its  content,  both 
sensory  and  motor,  is  ipso  facto  the  moment's  repro- 
duction. What  remains  for  us  to  investigate  is  the 
various  modes  and  forms  of  reproduction,  and  also 
the  conditions  under  which  they  occur. 

The  simplest  case  we  may  suppose  is  a  moment- 
consciousness  set  into  activity  by  an  appropriate  stimu- 
lus. This  activity  runs  a  certain  course  and  comes  to 
an  end;  it  ceases  when  the  purpose  of  the  moment  is 

317 


3i8  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

accomplished.  A  second  stimulus  will  call  forth  a  rep- 
etition of  the  activity,  a  recurrence  of  the  phenomena ; 
a  third,  a  fourth,  a  fifth  stimulus  of  the  same  kind  will 
each  time  call  to  life  the  moment-consciousness;  the 
moment  will  be  produced  again,  will  be  reproduced.  A 
repetition  of  the  specific  appropriate  stimulus  will  be 
followed  by  a  reproduction  of  the  moment. 

The  reappearance  of  the  moment  presents  a  series 
of  moments  situated  at  a  distance  of  different  time  in- 
tervals. The  members  of  this  series  are  disconnected, 
inasmuch  as  each  member  does  not  contain  the  fact  of 
its  previous  appearance.  The  present  functioning  ac- 
tivity is  not  felt  in  the  moment  by  some  modification 
effected  in  the  content,  it  is  not  cognized  as  a  reappear- 
ance. This  is  impossible  from  the  very  character  of 
this  form  of  reproduction,  since  the  emerging  moment 
is  supposed  to  appear  with  an  unchanged  content, 
while  modifications,  feeling,  and  cognition  of  previous 
appearances  require  something  added  to  the  moment 
which  makes  it  different  in  content.  The  members  in 
such  a  series  are  disconnected  and  do  not  enter  into  re- 
lation. Each  moment  presents  a  separate  beat  of  con- 
sciousness. The  previous  appearances  of  the  moment 
are  not  represented  in  its  subsequent  appearances; 
each  one  stands  by  itself.  No  modification  is  pro- 
duced in  the  organization  of  the  moment  by  the 
previous  history  of  its  life  activity,  no  "trace"  is  left 
by  and  of  former  experience.  On  each  occasion  the 
same  psychic  content  is  reproduced. 

Since  the  form  of  consciousness,  now  under  considera- 
tion, is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  have  no  modification  left  by 
each  separate  beat  of  the  moment,  no  connections  are 
formed  by  the  fact  of  functioning.    Only  that  conncc- 


Reproduction  and  the  Reflex  Moment        319 

tion  exists  which  is  given  in  the  organic  constitution. 
In  other  words,  we  may  say  that  a  being  with  such  a 
type  of  moment-consciousness  does  not  profit  by  indi- 
vidual experience;  it  does  not,  and  cannot  get  any  ac- 
quired characters  during  its  individual  life  existence.  It 
lives  only  by  what  has  been  obtained  by  the  process  of 
natural  selection,  during  the  life  history  of  the  species. 

Primary  sensory  elements  are  certainly  present,  but 
secondary  sensory  elements  may  be  absent  as  it  de- 
pends entirely  as  to  whether  such  connections  requisite 
for  secondary  sensory  elements  have  been  established 
by  variation  and  natural  selection  in  the  phylogenetic 
history  of  the  moment.  We  may  possibly  say  that 
while  such  connections  are  absent  in  a  lower  stage  of 
the  moment,  they  are  present  in  a  higher  stage.  Both 
stages,  however,  lack  the  formation  of  acquired  char- 
acters during  their  individual  history. 

Such  states  of  the  moment  consciousness  may  be  large- 
ly hypothetical,  but  they  are  probably  present  in  the  very 
lowest  representatives  in  the  scale  of  evolution.  The 
throwing  out  of  pseudopodia  in  the  amoeba  are  as  per- 
fect in  the  daughter  amoeba  as  in  the  mother  before 
fusion  has  taken  place.  The  young  vorticella  is 
just  as  efficient  as  its  parent  in  its  sudden  spring-like  re- 
actions of  contracture  and  expansion,  both  of  its  body 
and  of  its  long  attached  thread-like  fibre.  What  is  pres- 
ent is  in  all  probability  some  primitive  primary 
psycho-biological  element,  a  germ  out  of  which  the  ele- 
ments of  the  higher  forms  of  psychic  life  have  differ- 
entiated. 

The  structure  and  functions  of  the  higher  forms 
of  life  have  become  differentiated  out  of  the  homo- 
geneous activity  of  lower  forms.     The  sensory  nerve 


320  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

cell,  the  recipient  of  the  stimulation,  like  the 
muscle  cell,  the  reagent  to  stimuli,  has  evolved 
from  the  primitive  cell  by  greater  and  greater  differ- 
entiation, both  of  structure  and  function.  In  the  crus- 
taceans, invertebrates,  and  lower  vertebrates  where  mo- 
tor reactions  to  stimuli  arc  more  or  less  complex  and 
varied,  the  sensory  aspect  of  the  moment  is  probably  cor- 
respondingly complicated, — organic  connections  are 
present  giving  rise  to  secondary  sensory  elements,  con- 
stituting the  material   of   perceptual  life. 

The  soft-bodied  hermit  crab  as  soon  as  he  hatches  out 
from  the  egg  looks  for  a  shell  to  fit  his  body  in,  to  pro- 
tect it  from  danger,  and  does  the  fitting  and  measuring 
of  the  shell  with  as  delicate  a  nicety  and  circumspection 
as  his  seemingly  more  experienced  older  relatives.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  experience  does  not  count  here, — a 
baby  hermit-crab  is  as  learned  as  its  parent.  Not  even 
organic  modifications  are  acquired,  the  organization  or 
mechanism  is  ready,  and  the  first  appropriate  stimulus 
sets  into  activity  reactions  to  external  conditions  in  the 
most  perfect  way  of  which  this  organization  is  capable. 
The  butterfly,  the  ant,  the  bee  on  emerging  from  their 
chrysalis  are  as  perfect  in  their  reactions  as  any  of  the 
adult  individuals.  Acquired  characters  count  for  noth- 
ing, inherited  organization  is  everything. 

In  the  lower  vertebrates  such  as  fishes,  acquired  char- 
acters, modifications  formed  during  the  life  time 
of  the  individual  begin  to  appear,  but  this  is  only  in  its 
germ;  here  too  inherited  organization  is  everything. 
The  mechanism  is  ready  and  perfect  as  soon  as  it  comes 
into  life,  and  enters  into  relation  with  the  condition  of 
the  external  environment.  The  moment-consciousness 
concomitant  with  such  a  type  of  organization  is  perfect 


Reproduction  and  the  Reflex  Moment        321 

from  the  start  and  has  reached  its  maturity  at  birth. 
The  contents  of  the  moment  cannot  be  enriched,  the  in- 
ternal relations  cannot  be  improved, — no  modifications 
can  be  brought  about  in  its  sensory  response  and  motor 
reactions.  External  stimuli  set  the  organization  into 
activity  with  an  unvaried  psychic  content,  with  an  unal- 
terable psycho-physiological  structure  and  motor  mani- 
festations. The  content  of  such  a  moment  is  fixed  and 
unalterable.  This  low  stage  differs  but  little  from  reflex 
activity;  in  fact,  such  a  type  of  psychosis  may  be  termed 
reflex  moment-consciousness. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

DESULTORY  CONSCIOUSNESS 

THE  characteristic  feature  of  the  reflex  mo- 
ment-consciousness is  its  activity  on  single 
lines  of  sensori-motor  reaction.  This  is  well 
seen  in  the  more  differentiated  form  of  this 
stage  of  psycho-physiological  organization.  In  the  as- 
cidian,  for  instance,  we  meet  with  one  sensory  nerve 
cell  connected  with  the  muscular  reacting  apparatus. 
This  is  of  the  nature  of  reflex  action  found  also  in  the 
higher  representatives  of  the  life  series.  In  the  high- 
er forms  of  the  fixed  moment  some  connections  are 
formed,  several  sensory  ganglia  are  connected;  the  ac- 
tion may  then  become  more  varied.  In  the  still  higher 
stages  of  the  same  form  many  systems  of  ganglia  of 
several  organs  become  connected,  thus  giving  rise  to 
a  highly  differentiated  sensori-motor  apparatus. 

At  this  stage  secondary  sensory  elements  enter  into 
the  content  synthetized  by  the  moment-consciousness. 
What,  however,  characterizes  all  these  forms  as  be- 
longing to  the  same  type  of  moment-consciousness,  is 
the  fact  of  their  being  unmodifiable,  fixed  in  their  or- 
ganization. The  moment  does  not  get  modified  by  its 
recurrent  manifestations.  The  organization  does  not 
get  improved  by  repetition.  Things  are  in  statu  quo 
since  the  time  of  birth.  The  moment,  not  being  modi- 
fiable by  its  previous  occurrence,  when  stimulated, 
emerges  each  time  with  an  unchangeable  content.  Each 
time  the  moment  recurs,  it  shows  not  the  slightest  trace 

322 


Desultory  Consciousness  323 

of  its  former  life  activity. 

The  various  reproductions  of  this  type  of  moment- 
consciousness  presents  a  disconnected  series.  The  mo- 
ment at  each  time  of  its  occurrence  may,  psychologi- 
cally, be  regarded  as  an  entirely  new  moment,  inas- 
much as  it  bears  no  trace  of  its  having  been  in  activity 
once  before.  To  an  objective  observer  confronted  for 
the  first  time  with  this  type  of  moment,  the  latter  ap- 
pears, and  rightly  so,  as  if  it  were  just  come  into  the 
world.  The  moment  is  regarded  as  reproduced,  not 
by  a  mark  inherent  in  its  constitution,  due  to  the  fact 
of  its  recurrence,  but  by  modifications  in  the  observer. 
In  short,  the  moment  in  its  recurrent  manifestations 
presents  a  disconnected  series. 

If  we  look  at  consciousness  from  the  standpoint  of 
serial  relationship,  then  the  disconnected  moments  in 
the  series  appear  as  separate,  as  isolated.  This  isola- 
tion of  the  members  in  the  series  is  the  chief  character- 
istic of  this  type  of  moment-consciousness  which  may 
then  be  termed  desultory  consciousness. 

The  moment  consciousness  of  the  desultory  type 
may  also  be  represented  in  a  more  hypothetical  form. 
There  may  be  a  type  of  consciousness  in  which  the  mo- 
ment does  not  recur  at  all.  Each  moment  appears  and 
vanishes,  never  to  come  again,  and  is  followed  by  an- 
other moment  of  a  totally  different  content.  The  mo- 
ments have  no  relation  to  one  another.  The  antece- 
dent moment  is  totally,  and  we  may  say  absolutely  dis- 
connected from  the  subsequent  moment.  The  series  of 
moments  appearing  are  unrelated  and  are  also  different 
in  content.  The  moments  appear  like  a  series  of  suc- 
cessive bubbles,  each  bubble  bursting,  vanishing,  giving 
place  to  a  new  bubble,  and  sp  on,    There  is  no  connec- 


324  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

tion  between  the  successive  moments,  neither  in  rela- 
tion nor  in  matter.  Such  a  moment  is  a  purely  desul- 
tory form  of  consciousness  and  may  possibly  be  pres- 
ent in  the  completely  unorganized,  non-nucleated  proto- 
plasm. 

The  lack  of  a  definite  stable  organization  may  result 
in  an  indefinite  mass  of  sensory  responses  and  motor  re- 
actions, hence  with  a  changeable,  indefinite  psychic  con- 
tent. When  life  becomes  more  differentiated  and  or- 
ganization appears,  then  the  psychic  content  becomes  or- 
ganized in  a  recurrent  desultory  moment-consciousness, 
with  a  more  or  less  definite  content.  Amorphous  life 
has  as  its  concomitant  amorphous  psychosis. 

Reproduction  probably  begins  with  the  more  or  less 
definite  formation  of  the  moment  and  its  nuclear  ele- 
ment. When  the  moment-consciousness  appears  to  be 
definitely  organized  then  reproduction  is  present.  In 
other  words,  reproduction  is  a  fundamental  characteris- 
tic of  the  formed  moment-consciousness.  The  reproduc- 
tion of  the  moment,  the  type  of  which  we  have  just  an- 
alysed, is  fixed  in  its  activity,  unmodifiable  in  its  func- 
tion from  the  very  start  of  its  entering  into  relations 
with  the  external  environment.  This  type  of  moment 
is  of  such  a  nature  as  not  to  admit  of  further  growth 
after  it  has  come  into  the  world  and  has  begun  to  func- 
tion; it  admits  of  no  improvement,  of  no  modification. 

It  is  interesting  to  find  that  such  a  type  of  moment- 
consciousness  is  not  altogether  absent  In  the  very  highest 
forms  of  psychic  life.  Under  certain  conditions  we 
meet  in  the  higher  mental  types  with  a  form  of 
moment-consciousness  closely  resembling  the  fixed 
moments  of  the  lower  forms  of  psychic  life.  In 
the  degenerative  states  of  idiocy,  we  find  the  moment 
to  be  of  tkp  (Jpsultprv  type.    The  moment  is  fixed,  admits 


Desultory  Consciousness  325 

of  no  further  growth;  the  moment  recurring  at  more 
or  less  regular  intervals.  Such  are  the  rhythmical  move- 
ments often  observed  in  low  types  of  idiots,  movements 
that  arc  closely  allied  to  those  of  the  vorticella  type. 

In  the  pathological  states  known  as  hypnoidic,  found 
in  many  forms  of  amnesia,  in  somnambulistic  states,  in 
the  so-called  "psychic  equivalents"  of  epilepsy  and  in  the 
pure  "psychic  epilepsies,"  the  moment  possesses  a  definite 
content,  highly  organized,  of  course,  considering  the 
stage  in  which  it  occurs,  but  essentially  fixed  in  its  char- 
acter, not  capable,  not  admitting  of  any  changes,  of  any 
improvements.  The  hypnoidic  state  resembles  more  the 
desultory  reproductive  movement  of  the  second  stage 
with  a  highly  varied  and  differentiated  content,  but  oth- 
erwise fixed  in  character.  The  hypnoidic  state,  when- 
ever it  appears,  recurs  with  a  content  unchangeable,  un- 
modified by  the  previous  repetitions;  it  acquires  no 
new,  no  modified  characters  in  the  course  of  its  repro- 
ductions. Previous  reproductions  leave  no  trace  behind. 
The  hypnoidic  state  always  appears  fresh  and  new,  as  if 
coming  into  the  world  for  the  first  time,  not  bearing  the 
starnp  of  its  life  history. 

An  inspection  of  the  hypnoidic  state,  when  it  oc- 
curs, does  not  in  the  least  reveal  the  fact  of 
its  having  had  a  past,  of  its  having  similarly  ap- 
peared once  before.  The  hypnoidic  state  is  the  past 
itself,  and  nothing  more  than  the  past.  Like  the  mo- 
ment-consciousness of  the  crustacean,  or  that  of  the  in- 
vertebrate, it  reacts  to  the  stimuli  of  the  external  en- 
vironment with  a  given  moment-content,  with  a  definite 
set  of  highly  complicated  sensori-motor  reactions.  From 
this  standpoint  the  hypnoidic  state  may  be  regarded  as  a 
reversion  to  a  primitive  form  of  psychic  life,  it  is 
a  reversion  to  the  fixed  moment  of  the  desultory  type. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  SYNTHETIC  MOMENT  AND  ITS  REPRODUCTION 

IN  our  last  analysis  we  have  examined  the  trait  of 
reproduction  in  the  lowest  types  of  psychic  life, 
such  as  the  different  forms  of  desultory  moment- 
consciousness.  We  may  now  turn  to  the  higher 
types  of  moments  and  show  that  in  them,  too,  the  same 
fundamental  character  is  present,  only  of  course,  be- 
coming more  complicated  and  more  differentiated  with 
the  progress  of  psychic  life.  The  moment  which  we 
have  thus  far  studied  is  one  in  which  growth  is  impossi- 
ble as  the  reproduction  of  the  moment  does  not  embody 
the  previous  manifestations  of  the  moment.  In  other 
words,  the  type  examined  is  of  such  a  character  as  only 
to  synthetize  content  within  the  occurring  moment,  but 
it  lacks  synthesis  of  moments  themselves.  The  repro- 
duction is  of  inherited  content,  it  is  phylogenetic  in  na- 
ture. We  turn  now  to  higher  types  of  moments  in  which 
content  and  moments  are  synthetized  alike.  Such  a  type 
of  psychic  activity  may  be  termed  synthetic  conscious- 
ness, and  its  moment  the  synthetic  moment-conscious- 
ness. 

The  reproduction  of  the  synthetic  moment-conscious- 
ness is  not  isolated,  it  stands  in  relation  to  the  antecedent 
and  subsequent  moments.  Each  reproduction  modifies 
the  next  one  to  a  certain  degree,  however,  slight  that 
may  be.  The  moment  is  essentially  modifiable  and  capa- 
ble of  improvement  up  to  a  certain  point  of  which  its 
internal  organization  permits.    The  reproduction  of  the 

326 


The  Synthetic  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction  327 

synthetic  type  bears  in  its  organization  the  stamp  of  its 
previous  life  history.  We  may  say  that  just  as  the  mo- 
ment of  the  desultory  type  is  an  epitome  of  phylogenetic 
evolution,  so  is  the  moment  of  the  synthetic  type  an  epi- 
tome of  ontogenetic  development. 

In  its  lowest  form  the  synthetic  moment  undergoes 
modification  by  the  fact  of  previous  functioning  ac- 
tivity. The  synthetic  moment  in  its  reproduction  may 
be  represented  in  a  series  of  moments,  each  repro- 
duced moment  is  modified  by  the  preceding  moment 
and  in  its  turn  modifies  the  succeeding  moment.  The 
series  is  interrelated  and  interconnected.  Each  link  in 
the  series  includes  the  previous  link,  and  is  in  its  turn 
included  by  the  succeeding  link.  Each  member  in  the 
series  possesses  itself  of  the  wealth  and  being  of  its 
predecessor,  and  is  itself  inherited  by  its  successor.  The 
whole  series  is  really  a  history  of  the  continued  growth 
and  development  of  the  one  moment-consciousness 
passing  through  various  stages  in  the  way  of  reaching 
maturity,  both  in  structure  and  function. 

It  is  true  that  once  the  synthetic  moment  has  reached 
its  maturity  it  may  go  on  reproducing  in  the  same  way 
as  the  desultory  moment,  but  the  element  of  modifica- 
tion is  still  present,  although  it  cannot  be  so  clearly 
seen  by  a  superficial  examination.  To  detect  this 
element  of  modifying  influence  of  one  reproduction  on 
the  succeeding  one,  we  must  watch  the  moment  closely 
and,  if  possible,  experiment  on  it.  As  long  as  the  con- 
tent of  the  moment  remains  relatively  unchanged,  no 
change  is  observed  in  its  reproductions  after  having 
reached  the  acme  of  development.  Should,  however, 
some  change  be  introduced  during  the  functioning  of 
the  moment,  at  once  this  modification  reappears  on  the 


328  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

reproduction  of  the  moment. 

A  change  may  be  introduced  in  the  moment  in  a 
somewhat  different  way,  namely,  by  letting  it  rest  for 
a  time  longer  than  requisite  for  its  restitution  by  arrest- 
ing its  activity.  This  introduces  a  change  in  the  inter- 
nal constitution  of  the  moment,  weakening  the  intensity 
of  its  activity,  or  loosening  the  co-ordination  of  its  in- 
ternal relationship.  The  co-ordination  and  activity 
of  the  psychic  elements  synthctized  in  the  moment  be- 
come shaken;  the  stability  of  the  moment  is  interfered 
with;  its  equilibrium  gained  in  growth  and  develop- 
ment by  the  successive  series  of  modifications  is  partial- 
ly overthrown ;  the  moment  becomes  unstable,  its  struc- 
ture and  function  regress  and  fall  back  a  few  steps 
lower  in  the  course  of  its  adaptation  to  the  conditions 
of  the  external  environment,  adaptations  acquired  dur- 
ing the  life  history  of  its  individual  development.  The 
mere  arrest  of  the  moment's  function  for  a  shorter  or 
longer  period  at  once  tells  on  the  subsequent  reproduc- 
tion of  the  moment.  The  function  of  the  moment  suc- 
ceeding the  period  of  arrest  is  less  perfect ;  the  moment 
is  less  adapted  in  its  reactions  to  external  stimuli. 
These  facts,  it  seems,  clearly  indicate  that  in  reaching 
maturity  the  moment  has  not  lost  its  capacity  for 
adaptability  and  modification. 

Furthermore,  the  fact  of  arrest  with  subsequent 
modification  and  degradation  of  function  shows  that 
the  adaptation  reached  by  the  moment  in  its  mature 
state  is  really  kept  in  stable  equilibrium  by  its  more 
or  less  continued  reproduction.  Each  reproduction  of 
the  moment  is  indispensable  to  the  existence  of  the 
next  one,  and  manifests  its  influence  by  maintaining 
the  succeeding  moment  in  the  stage  of  maturity  reached 


The  Synthetic  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction  329 

by  the  long  series  of  modifications. 

The  moment  of  the  synthetic  type  profits  by  experi- 
ence, the  moment  of  the  desultory  type  does  not.  We 
realize  now  the  difference  between  the  moment  of  the 
desultory  type  and  the  moment  of  the  synthetic  type. 
The  desultory  reproductive  moment  is  highly  stable  in 
its  organization,  formed  by  variations  and  the  iron  hand 
of  natural  selection;  it  is  crystalized  in  character,  func- 
tion does  not  effect  its  organization.  The  reproductive 
moment  of  the  synthetic  type,  however,  while  having  on 
the  one  hand  as  its  basis  a  functioning  apparatus,  formed 
in  the  course  of  phylogenesis,  has  on  the  other  hand  a 
large  capacity  for  modification,  and  is  mainly  built  up  by 
function;  it  is  profoundly  modified  by  its  own  function- 
ing activity.  In  other  words,  while  the  moment  of  the 
desultory  type  is  entirely  organic  in  its  nature,  the  mo- 
ment of  the  synthetic  type  is  mainly  of  a  functional  char- 
acter. The  contrast  between  the  two  types  of  moment 
may  be  summarized  in  the  one  phrase :  "function  vs. 
structure."  The  aphorism  "function  maketh  structure" 
holds  good  only  of  the  synthetic  moment. 

In  speaking  of  the  fact  that  the  synthetic  moment 
profits  by  its  experience,  while  the  desultory  moment  does 
not,  we  must  be  guarded  against  the  term  'experience.' 
For  it  implies  a  psychic  state  belonging  to  a  higher  type 
of  moment-consciousness,  and  it  is  misleading,  unless  the 
term  be  qualified,  when  used  for  a  lower  type  of  psychic 
life.  Experience  would  imply  that  the  moment  under 
consideration  has  an  idea  of  its  state  and  remembering 
it  takes  on  another  occasion  advantage  of  its  acquired 
knowledge.  Nothing  of  the  kind  occurs  in  the  synthetic 
type.  The  synthetic  moment  has  no  knowledge  of  what 
is  taking  place  in  its  psychic  activity,  it  is  not  conscious 


53^  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

of  the  states  it  is  living  through.  The  only  knowledge 
the  synthetic  moment  possesses  is  the  one  characteristic 
of  sensory  life  in  general, — it  is  somewhat  like  what 
some  writers  term  knowledge  of  acquaintance.  The 
content  of  the  synthetic  moment  only  approaches  to  this 
form  of  knowledge,  which  is  really  different  in  nature, 
inasmuch  as  "knowledge  of  acquaintance"  is  only  a 
lower  stage  of  mental  activity  characteristic  of  a  higher 
type  of  moment  than  the  one  under  investigation. 
Knowledge  of  acquaintance  implies  a  sensation  also  the 
free  image  and  free  idea  of  that  sensation.  The  synthetic 
type  on  the  contrary  has  only  the  sensation,  the  free 
image  and  idea  are  totally  wanting. 

The  psychic  life  of  the  infant  is  probably  the  near- 
est that  comes  up  to  the  nature  of  knowledge  or  ex- 
perience characteristic  of  the  synthetic  moment.  I  say 
that  the  infant's  psychic  life  comes  nearest  to  that  of 
the  synthetic  moment,  but  still  the  two  are  not  exactly 
the  same.  In  the  infant's  consciousness,  however 
young,  free  images  and  ideas  are  potential  and  on  the 
way  to  germinate,  while  the  synthetic  moment  lacks 
this  potentiality,  inasmuch  as  the  synthetic  moment 
reaches  its  full  development  without  giving  rise  to  free 
psychic  elements.  The  consciousness  of  the  infant  is  a 
low  stage  of  a  high  type  of  moment-consciousness; 
w^hile  the  synthetic  consciousness  is  a  high  stage  of  a 
low  type  of  moment-consciousness.  The  high  stage  of 
a  low  type  and  the  low  stage  of  a  high  type  may  be 
respectively  illustrated  by  the  algebraic  formulae: 
(«4-Z?)"  and  {a+b-\-c+d-\-e-\-f-h .  .  .  .y  where  a,  b,  c,  d 
....  are  the  functions  of  the  moment  and  n  the  de- 
gree of  development  of  the  moment. 

The  consciousness  of  the  young  infant  as  closely  re- 


The  Synthetic  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction  33 1 

sembles  the  synthetic  moment  as  the  fish  stage  of  the 
human  embryo  resembles  the  fish  itself.  Still  the  anal- 
ogy is  useful  as  it  gives  a  closer  insight  into  the  consti- 
tution and  relations  of  the  two  types  of  moment-con- 
sciousness. The  infant  in  its  psychic  growth  no  doubt 
passes  through  the  inferior  types  of  moment-conscious- 
ness, but  in  a  most  general  and  sketchy  form.  The 
ontogenesis  of  psychic  life  is  probably  as  much  an  epi- 
tome of  its  phylogenesis  as  the  ontogenesis  of  biosis 
is  an  epitome  of  its  phylogenesis.  Both  give  a  most 
generalized  epitome  modified  by  adaptations  and  by 
the  specific  type  of  organization  in  which  the  ontogene- 
tic evolution  is  taking  place. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  ACCUMULATIVE   CHARACTER  OF  THE  SYNTHETIC 

MOMENT 

THE  experience  of  the  synthetic  moment 
means  not  consciousness  of  the  presented 
content,  but  simply  modification  of  psychic 
function.  The  experience  of  the  functioning 
moment  influences  the  content  on  its  next  reproduction. 
If  A  is  the  original  functioning  synthetic  moment  and 
bi,  bi,  bs,  b*  its  modifications  due  to  the  functioning  ac- 
tivity, then  the  successive  reproductions  of  the  moment 
may  be  represented  by  the  following  formula:  A,  Ai^i, 
A^^a,  AsZ^s,  A*^«,  Asbs  until  it  reaches  its  maturity  or  state 
of  stable  equilibrium,  say  An^n-  The  whole  series  may 
be  represented  by  the  formula:  A,  Ai^i,  Aa^a,  Atb* — 
An^n*  Each  member  of  the  series  reproduces  in  an 
epitomized  form  all  the  members  that  preceded  it  and 
the  last  one,  the  mature  moment  in  its  state  of  equil- 
ibrium, representing  an  epitome  of  the  whole  series. 
The  series  in  its  successive  stages  represents  the  life 
history  of  the  growth  and  development  of  the  synthetic 
moment. 

Concrete  examples  may  help  to  make  the  matter 
clearer.  The  fish  in  making  repeated  attacks  on  an- 
other fish  contained  in  the  same  tank  and  meeting  re- 
peatedly with  failures  will  finally  desist  from  its  at- 
tempts. The  fish  that  has  been  snapped  at  many  times 
and  has  escaped  will  keep  away  from  the  dangerous 
place.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  fish  remembers  its 
experiences,  that  it  is  conscious  of  its  failures,  of  the 

332 


Accumulative  Character  of  Synthetic  Moment  333 

futility  of  its  attacks,  or  that  it  knows  that  yon- 
der is  a  dangerous  place  which  is  to  be  avoided. 
The  whole  matter  is  far  simpler.  Each  repeated  fail- 
ure modifies  the  moment-consciousness  so  that  the  con- 
tent slightly  changes,  the  unsuccessful  motor  reactions 
diminish  and  finally  disappear,  while  in  their  place 
others  are  substituted.  Thus  the  fish  on  perceiving  its 
prey  may  either  avoid  it  and  swim  away,  or  it  may 
keep  quiet  simply  following  the  prey  with  its  eye. 

The  chick  on  emerging  from  the  egg  may  peck  at  its 
excrements  a  few  times,  but  each  time  the  disgust  ex- 
perienced modifies  the  moment.  The  reaction  of  the  next 
moment,  when  confronted  with  the  same  stimulus,  be- 
comes less  vigorous  and  finally  with  the  reproductions  of 
the  moment,  the  adaptation  becomes  so  perfect  that  the 
mere  sight  of  the  disagreeable  object  suffices  to  repel  the 
chick  and  make  it  turn  aside.  Here  once  more  it  is  not 
that  the  chick  remembers  the  disgust,  and  as  soon  as  it  is 
confronted  with  its  excrements,  its  straightway  remem- 
bers the  disgust  it  has  experienced.  This  is  to  ascribe  a 
high  form  of  consciousness  to  a  moment  of  a  low  type. 
The  process  that  has  taken  place  is  simpler.  The  disgust 
experienced  has  so  modified  the  sensory  motor  reactions 
of  the  moment  that  finally  different  reactions  result  in 
response  to  definite  stimulations  under  definite  condi- 
tions. 

The  same  holds  true  of  the  cat,  and  the  dog.  The 
first  weeks  of  their  life  kittens  or  puppies  are  unable  to 
walk  well,  they  seem  to  pick  their  way  continuously; 
gradually  they  learn  to  walk  and  run ;  the  dog  soon  be- 
gins to  race  and  the  cat  becomes  graceful  and  nimble  in 
its  movements.  It  will  certainly  be  agreed  that 
young  puppies  or  young  kittens  do  not  actually  remem- 


334  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ber  the  steps  of  their  experiences.  What  happens  is 
that  the  activity  of  the  organs,  along  with  the  growth 
of  the  corresponding  motor  cells,  so  modifies  the  func- 
tion that  the  walking  becomes  more  and  more  perfect 
until  it  reaches  perfect  adaptation. 

The  same  thing  occurs  in  the  training  of  brutes.  It 
is  not  that  the  brute  remembers  the  steps  of  the  process, 
and  knows  how  improvement  has  taken  place  by  a  given 
way  of  action.  In  the  process  of  training  modifications 
are  brought  about  by  each  successive  reproduction  of  the 
moments  in  response  to  the  action  of  external  stimuli. 
Modifications  due  to  successful  chance  action,  being 
more  satisfactory  to  the  brute,  are  stronger  and  modify 
the  moment  in  their  own  direction,  while  unsuccessful 
reactions  tend  to  drop  out  and  thus  adaptation,  improve- 
ment is  brought  about.  The  cat  in  scratching  for  the 
door  to  open  it  scratches  at  first  aimlessly  and  does  not 
open, — the  actions  are  unsuccessful.  Should  the  cat  hap- 
pen to  scratch  the  handle  and  open  the  door,  which 
certainly  is  probable,  considering  the  activity  of  the  cat's 
paw,  the  result  is  satisfactory.  The  repetitions  of 
such  chance  actions  will  gradually  so  modify  the  cat's 
scratching  that  it  will  become  more  and  more  definite. 
The  successful  actions  alone  will  be  repeated,  the  un- 
successful will  drop  out.  Finally  the  adaptation  will 
become  so  perfect  that  the  sight  of  the  closed  door  will 
at  once  result  in  the  reaction  of  scratching  the  handle 
and  opening  the  door. 

The  young  bird  is  brought  in  the  world  in  a  rather 
helpless  condition  as  to  movement  of  co-ordination, 
especially  flying  movements.  The  apparatus  for  flying 
is  undeveloped,  but  it  soon  reaches  its  perfect  adapta- 
tion through  activity,  exercise,  practice,  that  modify 


Accumulative  Character  of  Synthetic  Moment  335 

both  structure  and  function.  The  bird  does  not  remem- 
ber the  steps  of  its  acquisitions  and  profits  by  its  failures 
so  as  to  make  consciously  better  and  more  adaptive 
movements.  The  process  that  takes  place  is  far  more 
simple:  Each  act  of  functioning  produces  and  repro- 
duces modifications,  both  in  structure  and  function,  until 
the  apparatus  and  its  activity  reach  perfect  adaptation. 
The  total  moment  is  modified  on  each  reproduction  until 
a  point  is  reached  where  further  growth  and  develop- 
ment ceases  and  maturity  of  function  is  established. 

The  same  holds  true  in  the  case  of  the  child.  The 
child  on  learning  to  sit  is  doing  it  in  a  very  clumsy 
fashion,  tumbles  over  every  time;  it  must  be  sup- 
ported by  pillows  to  keep  it  in  the  same  position  and  also 
to  prevent  it  from  being  hurt.  The  structure  works  im- 
perfectly. The  exercise  of  the  apparatus,  along  with 
its  further  growth,  brings  about  a  more  perfect  adapta- 
tion, and  the  child  finally  learns  to  maintain  its  equi- 
librium when  in  the  sitting  posture.  The  standing  up- 
right passes  through  a  similar  history.  When  the  co- 
ordinating apparatus  for  walking  begins  to  appear,  it 
works  at  first  in  a  very  awkward  manner.  The  child 
first  walks  by  holding  on  to  some  objects,  such  as  chairs, 
or  the  wall,  or  the  hand  of  his  parent  and  nurse.  When 
he  makes  a  step  all  by  himself,  he  is  almost  frightened, 
and  when  left  alone  often  cries. 

Practice  and  growth  of  the  walking  apparatus  be- 
comes more  and  more  perfect.  The  child  makes  two 
or  three  steps  hesitatingly,  stops,  asks  for  help  and  sup- 
port. Gradually  his  movements  become  more  certain, 
and  more  steps  are  taken  until  finally  the  child  learns 
to  walk,  still  imperfectly,  in  the  waddling  fashion 
characteristic  of  young  age.     The  walking  apparatus 


336  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

grows  and  keeps  on  functioning.  The  function  reacts 
on  the  further  growth  making  the  movements  more 
and  more  perfect.  Each  attempt  makes  the  next  one 
easier.  Adaptations  develop  not  only  by  the  mere 
growth  of  the  apparatus,  but  also  by  function.  In  fact 
function  largely  determines  the  growth  of  the  appar- 
atus. 

It  must,  however,  be  pointed  out  that  the  example 
taken  from  baby  life  may  be  used  only  as  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  way  the  synthetic  moment  grows  by  func- 
tion or  reproduction.  The  child's  growth  does  not  ex- 
actly follow  the  same  lines  as  those  of  the  synthetic 
moment,  since  the  psychic  life  of  man  develops  on  a 
higher  level  belonging  to  a  higher  type  of  moment.  In 
the  efforts  of  the  baby  to  walk  some  germs  of  deliber- 
ation and  reflection  may  be  observed,  but  it  is  hardly 
probable  that  these  elements  are  present  in  the  first 
attempts  of  the  cat  to  walk  or  of  the  bird  to  fly.  The  mo- 
ment of  the  synthetic  type  grows  by  simple  modifica- 
tions of  its  function  brought  about  by  its  repeated  re- 
productions. 

The  modifications,  however,  of  the  moment's  func- 
tion are  not  mere  chance  modifications.  The  function, 
is  modified  on  a  definite  line  in  the  direction  of  more 
perfect  adaptation. 

Reactions  to  stimuli  coming  from  the  external  en- 
vironment become  more  defined  until  a  definite  set  of 
reactions  is  established.  This  involves  the  selective  ac- 
tivity of  the  moment.  Certain  fit  reactions  are  selected 
and  assimilated  by  the  moment,  while  others,  unfit  are 
rejected.  This,  however,  is  a  trait  which  is  character- 
istic not  only  of  the  synthetic  moment,  but  of  the  mo- 
ment-consciousness in  general. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  SIMPLE  AND  COMPOUND  SYNTHETIC  MOMENT 

A  FURTHER  examination  of  the  synthetic 
moment  reveals  two  stages,  a  lower  and  a 
higher.  The  moment  may  consist  of  a  nu- 
cleus having  only  one  kind  of  sensory  ele- 
ments and  of  a  net-work  of  subsidiary  relations  belong- 
ing to  the  domain  of  the  same  sensory  elements.  The 
animal  may  trace  its  food  or  its  prey  by  the  sense  of 
smell  alone.  This  act  becomes  more  perfect  with  further 
function.  The  modifications  accumulate  in  the  domain 
of  the  same  sense-element  and  the  adaptations  occur  in  a 
relatively  simple  one-sided  sensori-motor  apparatus. 
Modifications  of  such  a  character  occur  phylogenetically 
in  the  sensory  apparatus  of  the  lower  invertebrates,  such 
as  Crustacea,  arthropodes,  and  possibly  also  in  the  lower 
forms  of  vertebrates.  Such  a  phylogenetic  accumula- 
tion in  these  low  types  of  moments  is  formed  only  by 
variation  and  natural  selection,  while  in  the  case  of  the 
synthetic  moment  the  accumulation  is  formed  during 
the  life  history  of  the  particular  individual.  The  one 
is  racial  acquisition,  the  other  is  individual  experience. 
Both,  however,  may  agree  in  the  general  character  of 
the  modification  effected.  The  modifications  are  in  one 
sensory  organ,  and  the  psychic  moment-content  consists 
of  similar  sense-elements.  Such  a  stage  of  psychic  ac- 
tivity may  be  termed  simple  accumulative  synthetic  mo- 
ment-consciousness. 

If  A  represents  the  first  occurrence  of  the  moment,  the 

337 


338  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

first  functioning  of  the  simple  sensori-motor  apparatus 
as  given  by  phylogenesis,  and  if  a  be  the  modification  ef- 
fected, then  the  accumulative  process  may  be  represented 
by  the  powers  of  a;  thus  the  first  will  be  A,  the  next 
is  Aia\  the  following  is  A2«^  then  K^a  and  so  on.  The 
total  process  to  the  point  of  maturity  may  be  represented 
by  the  following  formula :  A,  Ai^',  As^^  As^",  Ai^*, .... 
Anfl".  Antf"  represents  the  highest  stage  of  perfection 
reached  by  the  simple  accumulative  synthetic  mo- 
ment. 

The  synthetic  moment  may  also  have  a  higher  stage 
where  many  different  sensori-motor  elements  are  syn- 
thetized,  the  accumulative  modifications  occur  along 
different  lines  of  sensory  responses  and  motor  reac- 
tions. The  moment  reaches  here  the  highest  form  of 
consciousness  as  mere  perceptual  in  character.  The 
fish  perceives  its  prey  not  only  by  smell,  but  also  by 
sight  along  with  muscular  and  touch  sensations;  all 
of  them  go  to  form  the  percept  of  the  prey  yonder,  as 
far  as  perception  of  fish  space  is  concerned. 

The  American  flounder  of  the  Atlantic  coast  may  be 
taken  as  an  illustration.  Although  the  flounder  is  per- 
fectly quiet,  almost  lying  motionless  at  the  bottom  of 
the  tank,  only  occasionally  moving  his  small  protrud- 
ing eye,  no  sooner  is  some  small  fly  thrown  into  the 
tank,  than  the  flounder  at  once  darts  in  that  direction, 
and  attacks  its  prey  with  a  snap.  I  wanted  to  find  out 
how  far  visual  perception  is  concerned  in  the  tracing 
of  the  prey,  and  how  far  sense  of  smell  and  touch  are 
important  in  this  particular  fish  at  least.  The  flounder 
was  deprived  of  its  organs  of  sight,  and  after  having 
been  given  about  twenty-four  hours  time  to  recover 
from  the  effects  of  the  operation,  it  was  thrown  into  a 


The  Simple  and  Compound  Synthetic  Moment  339 

tank  teeming  with  little  fishes  on  which  it  feeds. 

The  flounder  settled  to  the  bottom,  but  in  about  a  few 
minutes  raised  itself  in  the  attitude  of  attack,  so  highly 
characteristic  of  this  species,  either  smelling  the  little 
ones  or  feeling  the  vibrations  made  in  the  water  by  the 
swimming  movements  of  the  little  fish;  it  made  a  dart 
in  the  direction  of  a  whole  mass  of  them,  but  missed. 
This  has  been  repeated  many  times  over,  the  flounder 
failing  every  time  and  only  snapping  water  or  air  bub- 
bles. The  little  folk  soon  became  emboldened  and 
avoiding  his  front  they  came  from  behind  pecking  at 
his  blind  eye.  The  flounder  could  not  reach  these  lit- 
tle fellows. 

Moreover,  the  bottom  of  the  tank  where  the 
blind  flounder  was  lying  was  full  of  small  sea-robins 
which  like  to  walk  on  the  bottom  with  their  high- 
ly sensitive  leg-feelers.  The  blind  flounder  did  not  at- 
tack them,  although  with  his  eyes  in  good  order,  he 
would  have  instantly  attacked  the  sea-robins.  It  ap- 
pears then  that  the  flounder  tracks  its  prey  by  the  sense 
of  sight  mainly,  while  the  other  senses  are  indefinite 
guides.  Still  the  other  senses  seem  to  take  an  active 
part  in  tracing  the  prey,  as  the  blind  flounder  was  most 
of  the  time  in  an  attitude  of  attack.  Evidently  he  was 
smelling  the  prey  or  feeling  its  movements  all  the  time 
and  was  aware  of  its  presence,  though  the  senses  with- 
out sight  could  not  give  him  the  definite  direction  in 
which  the  prey  was  to  be  found.  In  other  words,  the 
other  senses  awaken  only  the  sensations  of  presence  of 
the  food,  but  do  not  give  its  direction  and  location. 

It  is  highly  probable,  then,  as  far  as  we  can  infer  from 
this  experiment  as  to  the  psychic  state  of  the  fish,  that 
the  flounder  does  not  get  a  definite  percept,  unle$$ 


340  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

many  different  sensory  elements  are  combined  in  a 
synthesis  giving  rise  to  a  well  defined  motor  reaction 
of  more  or  less  perfect  adaptation.  The  synthetic  mo- 
ment, then,  in  this  particular  species  at  least,  seems  to 
be  of  a  highly  complex  character,  inasmuch  as  many 
different  sense-elements  go   to   malce   up    its   content. 

Similarly  It  is  affirmed  of  the  sea-robin  that,  if  its  deli- 
cate leg-feelers  are  cut  off,  the  fish  is  unable  to  feed.  If 
that  be  true,  then  the  touch  sensation  is  important  here 
and  enters  as  a  determining  element  in  the  moment 
along  with  other  elements  coming  from  other  sense- 
organs.  In  the  dog  smell  is  mainly  the  determining 
factor,  but  the  functioning  of  other  senses  are  requisite 
to  form  secondary  sensory  elements;  here  too  the  mo- 
ment is  made  up  of  many  series  of  various  sense-ele- 
ments. In  the  bird,  in  the  ape,  in  the  man,  sight  is  the 
chief  element  in  perception,  but  the  percept  arises  not 
from  visual  elements  alone,  but  from  a  synthesis  of 
a  multitude  of  elements  coming  from  other  sense-or- 
gans the  visual  elements  often  taking  the  lead. 

From  a  purely  biological  standpoint  we  can  under- 
stand the  importance  of  the  leading  part  played  by  the 
visual  elements  in  the  psychic  life  of  the  higher  verte- 
brates and  especially  of  that  of  man.  It  is  of  the 
greatest  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence  to  de- 
velop a  sense  organ  that  admits  of  the  most  delicate 
objective  discrimination.  No  other  senses,  not  even 
that  of  hearing,  are  so  free  from  the  general  organic 
sensation  as  the  sense  of  sight.  Hence  the  sensory 
elements  coming  from  the  sense  organs  other  than 
sight  are  confused  and  lack  the  objective  clearness 
characteristic  of  the  sense  of  sight.  The  visual  sense 
further  is  of  the  highest  sensitivity  to  extremely  low 


The  Simple  and  Compound  Synthetic  Moment  341 

and  distant  stimulations  such  as  are  produced  by  ether 
waves.  An  animal  therefore  that  will  by  natural  se- 
lection have  its  moment  consciousness  organized  round 
a  nucleus  of  highest  sensitivity  such  as  that  of  visual 
sense  elements  will  have  better  chances  to  survive  and 
succeed  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Still,  even 
in  man  the  elements  coming  from  other  sense 
organs  may  become  predominating  in  the  nucleus 
and  give  rise  to  various  mental  types,  such  as  audiles, 
motiles,  and  so  on.  This  holds  specially  true  of  the 
higher  representative  elements.  A  moment-conscious- 
ness that  has  a  varied  content  of  many  different  sen- 
sory-elements synthetized  in  one  compound,  accompan- 
ied on  the  motor  side  with  a  complex  of  motor  reac- 
tions may  be  termed  compound  synthetic  moment-con- 
sciousness. 

The  compound  synthetic  moment-consciousness  is 
characterized  in  its  series  of  accumulations  in  the  same 
way  as  is  the  simple  synthetic  moment,  the  only  differ- 
ence being  the  complexity  of  the  lines  of  accumula- 
tions. The  accumulated  sensori-elements  of  the  same 
kind  or  of  the  same  sense-organ  form  primary  com- 
pounds among  themselves  and  secondary  or  double 
and  treble  compounds  with  other  compounded  series  of 
sensory  elements.  If  V  represents  the  original  pri- 
mary visual  sensory  element,  T  tactual,  A  auditory,  O 
olfactory,  and  M  muscular  sensory  elements,  then  the 
series  for  the  development  of  the  highly  adapted  A 
aspect  of  the  moment  may  be  represented  by  the  form- 
ula already  given,  in  our  analysis,  namely:  A,  Aia*, 
A»a*,  A»a*,  A«a*.  .  .  .Ana".  The  V  aspect  of  the  moment 
similarly  gives  V,  Y^v\  V.v*,  V.v,  W.  .  .  .V^V". 

The  T,  O,  and  M  series  will  give  respectively  the 


34*  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

following  formulae: 

T,  Ttt,  T.t\  T.t',  T«t* T«t"  T„e. 

O,  Oio,   0»o',  0.0',  0«o* Oioo"         0„o°. 

M,  M.m,  M^m',  M.m*,  M^m' Miom" .  .  .  Mnin". 

The  process  of  composition  begins  not  at  the  first 
members  of  the  series,  but  rather  further  on.  Some 
accumulations  must  be  made  first  in  each  series  sepa- 
rately before  combinations  of  the  different  series  can 
take  place.  For  simplicity  sake  we  may  postulate  that 
the  process  of  composition  of  all  lines  begins  in  each 
alike,  although  this  may  not  be  the  case ;  let  us  assume 
that  such  a  process  begins  in  the  tenth  stage  of  the  ser- 
ies. Before  that,  say  in  the  third  stage  compositions  may 
be  found  only  on  two  or  three  lines,  such  as  V8vT»t''  or 
still  further  V.vT.t'M^m',  or  V.v  T.t'O.o' M.m*.  The  V 
precedes  in  the  formula  indicating  its  primary  import- 
ance in  the  case  of  the  moment  where  the  visual  sensory 
elements  are  mainly  the  guide  for  sensori-motor  reac- 
tions, the  visual  sensations  constituting  the  leading  and 
central  elements  of  the  compound.  In  a  moment  of 
the  same  type  but  with  a  differently  related  content  O  or 
A  may  be  the  main  elements  of  the  compound,  an  ele- 
ment round  which  other  sense-elements  become  grouped. 
The  formula  may  then  be  Oso'Ti>t''M5m*,  or  in  the  case 
where  A  is  predominant  Asa'Tut'lMom',  etc.  The  syn- 
thetic moment  will  from  its  starting  point,  say  Viov^Ttot" 
Oioo"Aioa"Miom"  proceed  onward,  reaching  its  height  of 
development  and  adaptation  in  the  compound  V°v„ 
T°t„0°OnA°anM°m„.  This  last  stage  of  the  moment 
has  at  its  disposal  the  accumulations  of  all  the 
previous    synthetic    moments    both    simple    and   com- 


The  Simple  and  Compound  Synthetic  Moment  343 

pound.  The  compound  synthetic  moment  is  the  heir 
of  all  previous  acquisitions  and  accumulations,  and,  as 
such,  may  be  characterized  as  the  compound,  accumula- 
tive, synthetic  moment. 

Although  the  simple  synthetic  moment  and  the  com- 
pound moment  differ  in  character  and  complexity  of 
content,  they  still  agree  in  one  general  trait  character- 
istic of  the  synthetic  moment,  namely,  fixed  synthesis. 
The  series  of  sensory  elements,  both  primary  and  sec- 
ondary, that  enter  into  the  content  of  the  moment  are 
firmly  combined.  The  elements  of  such  compounds 
cannot  get  disengaged  and  do  not  therefore  exist  in  a 
free  state,  they  form  stable  compounds. 

The  form  of  reproduction  common  to  all  the 
moments  thus  far  examined  is  that  of  reinstate- 
ment. The  sensori-motor  elements  of  the  moment 
are  reinstated  in  all  their  reality.  The  moment 
in  its  successive  stages  of  reproduction  is  brought 
to  life  by  impressions  coming  from  external  stimuli. 
Primary  and  secondary  sense-elements  enter  into  the 
moment's  constitution  whenever  it  reappears.  In  both 
forms  of  the  synthetic  type,  the  moment  with  the  recur- 
rence of  the  reproductions,  becomes  enriched  in  sen- 
sory elements,  primary  and  secondary;  but  these  ele- 
ments must  be  present,  and,  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  types  of  moments  under  consideration,  no  other 
elements  can  possibly  be  present.  The  series  in  which 
the  successive  steps  of  the  moment,  desultory  or  syn- 
thetic, manifests  itself  is  composed  entirely  of  sen- 
sory elements,  most  or  all  of  which  vary  but  little  from 
one  beat  of  the  moment  to  the  other. 

The  fact  of  the  simple  reinstatement  is  especially 
dear  in  the  case  of  the  desultory  moment.    Each  rein- 


344  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

stated  moment  induced  by  external  stimuli  is  an  exact 
copy  of  its  predecessor.  In  the  synthetic  moment  the 
content  of  two  adjoining  stages  is  a  little  varied,  still 
the  sensory  elements  constituting  the  content  of  the 
preceding  moment  is  reinstated  in  the  succeeding  one. 
It  is  true  that  even  the  desultory  moment  is  not  abso- 
lutely smooth  in  its  course  of  repetitions  or  reinstate- 
ments. Interruptions  of  functions  due  to  unfavorable 
stimuli  often  occur  within  the  series,  interruptions, 
which  may  be  brought  about  by  artificial  conditions  and 
in  which  different  psycho-motor  responses  are  interpo- 
lated, but  these  responses  do  not  enter  into  the  content 
of  the  moment  when  the  favorable  conditions  are  re- 
stored,— the  responses  do  not  become  habitual.  Thus 
the  rhythmical  pulsations  of  the  vorticella  may  be 
temporarily  arrested  by  the  evaporation  of  the  liquid 
in  which  it  is  contained,  but  no  number  of  evaporations 
will  change  the  series  of  rhythmical  pulsations  by  hav- 
ing stages  of  arrests  interpolated  into  the  series.  Simi- 
larly it  is  highly  questionable  whether  a  fly,  beetle,  or 
cockroach  could  contract  any  habits. 

Some  eminent  psychologists  go  to  the  length  of  af- 
firming that  even  the  lowest  representative  animal  life, 
the  protozoa  (possibly  bacteria,  bacilli),  possess  idea- 
tional and  volitional  processes,  that  the  lower  stages  of 
mental  life  manifest  association,  reproduction,  mem- 
ory, cognition,  and  recognition.  Other  psychologists 
are  more  moderate,  they  regard  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge  as  adaptation  through  habit,  characteristic 
of  the  lowest  representative  of  animal  life.  Thus  one 
psychologist  propounds  the  question,  "How  is  it  that 
we  or  the  brute  learn  to  do  anything?"  Does  the  amoe- 
ba learn  at  all?     What  belongs  to  our  type  of  con- 


The  Simple  and  Compound  Synthetic  Moment  345 

sciousness  is  assumed  as  being  true  of  all  types — the 
old  psychological  fallacy.  "Learning,"  habits  are  bio- 
logical variations  characteristic  of  the  higher  types  of 
consciousness  and  are  not  present  in  the  lower  forms 
of  mental  activity. 

It  is  highly  questionable  whether  the  formation  of 
habits  is  possible  even  in  the  highest  representatives  of 
the  invertebrata,  such  as  the  bee  and  the  ant.  The 
ant  is  probably  largely  guided  by  the  sense  of  smell, 
while  the  bee  is  prompted  in  its  activity  both  by  smell 
and  sight.  The  activities  of  these  animals,  though 
highly  complex,  are  still  fixed  in  their  character  becom- 
ing manifested  with  the  recurrence  of  definite  sensory 
stimulations.  The  individual  acquires  nothing  by  ex- 
perience and  forms  no  habits;  everything  is  formed  by 
the  species.  Spontaneous  variation  and  natural  selec- 
tion are  the  only  agencies  of  the  relatively  high  or- 
ganization and  complex  psycho-motor  life-activity  of 
the  higher  types  of  the  synthetic  moment. 

Habit  is  a  character  that  does  not  belong  to  the 
desultory  moment,  it  comes  only  with  the  birth  of  the 
synthetic  moment.  The  fixed  character  of  the  desul- 
tory moment  admitting  of  no  modifications  precludes 
the  formation  of  any  habits ;  the  moment's  reproduction 
therefore  is  reinstatement  par  excellence, — each  repro- 
duced moment  being  an  exact  copy  of  its  original.  The 
individual  presents  only  the  history  of  the  species.  The 
reproductions  of  the  synthetic  moment  begin  to  show 
the  history  of  the  modification  which  have  appeared  in 
the  course  of  the  moment's  life  activity.  Each  recurrent 
reproduction  of  the  synthetic  moment  is  an  epitome  of 
its  individual  life-history,  an  epitome  of  its  ontogenetic 
psychogenesis. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  DESULTORY  TYPE  IN  PATHOLOGICAL  STATES. 

A  FORM  of  reproduction  analogous  to  the 
ones  present  in  the  desultory  moment  is  to 
be  found  in  various  psychopathological 
states.  The  nature  of  reproductions  of  the 
hypnoidic  states  comes  very  near  to  the  simple  form  of 
reinstatement  characteristic  of  the  desultory  moment. 
The  main  feature  of  this  pathological  state  is  its  re- 
current sensory  character  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the 
individual's  psychic  life.  Experiences  emerging  in 
this  state  are  actually  lived  over  again.  The  hypnoidic 
state  is  desultory,  it  forms  no  connected  relations  in  its 
various  reproductions,  it  does  not  become  modified  by 
its  many  occurrences,  and  the  first  stage  is  as  rich 
in  psychic  content  as  the  last  stage.  The  hyp- 
noidic state  is  relatively  fixed.  Of  course,  between  the 
desultory  moment  and  the  hypnoidic  state  there  is  only 
an  analogy  in  the  nature  of  functioning,  otherwise  the 
states  are  actually  different,  inasmuch  as  they  belong 
to  altogether  different  types  of  moments. 

The  nature  of  reinstatement  characteristic  of  the  re- 
productions of  the  synthetic  moment  is  clearly  revealed 
in  the  way  modifications  are  effected  and  non-adaptive 
reactions  are  eliminated.  Sensory  responses  and  mo- 
tor reactions  that  have  met  with  failure  and  evil  con- 
sequences are  modified  by  degrees,  in  portions  so  to 
say.  The  law  that  regulates  the  succession  of  the  mod- 
ifications effected  is  the  order  of  the  degree  of  harm 

346 


The  Desultory  Type  in  Pathological  States     347 

consequent  on  the  reactions  to  which  the  sensory  re- 
sponses lead.  If  then  the  most  harmful  reactions  be- 
long to  the  middle  of  the  series  of  motor  reactions 
constituting  the  motor  aspect  of  the  moment,  these 
are  modified  by  being  gradually  dropped  out  and  oth- 
ers substituted.  The  rest,  the  more  or  less  indifferent 
reactions  of  the  series  are  gone  through,  although  they 
bear  no  longer  any  relation  to  the  sensori-motor  reac- 
tions that  have  immediately  preceded  them.  To  an 
external  observer  such  reactions  are  ridiculous  and  un- 
intelligible, since  they  cannot  be  understood  with  refer- 
ence to  their  immediate  antecedents;  their  nature  can 
only  be  made  clear  from  the  history  of  the  moment. 

Such  traces  in  the  organization  of  the  synthetic  mo- 
ment are  vestiges  of  previous  useful  functions,  of  a 
series  of  adaptive  reactions;  they  are  like  rudimentary 
organs  in  the  economy  of  the  organism.  Thus  a  chick 
may  peck  repeatedly  at  his  waste  products  or  at  a  burn- 
ing match  and  repeatedly  wipe  his  bill ;  finally  a  marked 
modification  is  brought  about  in  its  sensory  responses 
and  reactions.  When  the  chick  is  confronted  with 
those  objects,  it  comes  up  to  them,  looks  at  them,  does 
not  peck,  but  wipes  its  bill.  To  an  external  observer 
to  whom  the  history  of  the  chick's  experience  is  un- 
known, the  wiping  of  the  bill  would  have  been  entirely 
unintelligible. 

Reinstatement  can  be  similarly  observed  in  cases 
where  conditions  have  changed,  but  the  modification 
has  not  yet  been  effected  within  the  content  of  the  mo- 
ment. Thus  the  story  of  the  actions  of  the  hen  that 
brought  her  brood  of  chicks  to  the  river  and  urged 
them  to  swim  would  have  appeared  strange,  possibly 
mysterious,  if  not  for  our    knowledge    of    the    hen's 


348  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

former  experience  with  a  brood  of  ducklings.  The 
mode  of  reproduction  of  the  synthetic  moment  is  a 
series  of  successive  phases  of  more  and  more  modified 
reinstatements  which  can  only  become  intelligible  on 
following  up  more  or  less  closely  the  history  of  the 
moment's  development. 

The  forms  of  reinstatement  characteristic  of  the 
synthetic  and  desultory  moments  are  to  be  found  in 
higher  types  of  moments.  When  undergoing  the  pro- 
cess of  dissolution,  secondary  dementia,  the  terminus  of 
chronic  insanity  offers  a  wealth  of  facts  at  our  disposal. 
The  mental  states  of  secondary  dementia  are  like  the 
ruins  of  great  castles,  like  fossils  of  former  growth  of 
vegetation  and  animal  life.  The  active  living  moments 
are  disintegrated,  decomposed  and  only  some  of  the 
constituents  are  left  to  function.  These  constituents, 
remnants  of  former  life-activity,  are  simply  reinstated. 
One  who  has  not  known  the  history  of  the  case  will 
hardly  comprehend  the  actions  of  the  patient.  Thus 
one  dement  may  keep  on  covering  himself  with  a 
blanket,  or  hiding  himself  into  corners.  He  who  is  ig- 
norant of  the  history  of  the  case  would  regard  the  ac- 
tion as  capricious  and  meaningless,  he  would  hardly 
guess  from  the  patient's  actions  that  the  latter  when  in  a 
state  of  chronic  melancholia  labored  under  the  delu- 
sion that  he  was  made  of  glass,  and  that  people  could 
see  the  actions  of  his  guts.  The  synthetized  and  sys- 
tematized delusion  itself  was  swept  away  in  the  general 
ruin  and  decomposition,  only  some  remnants  were  left, 
a  few  sensori-motor  elements  remained.  These  elements 
are  now  being  reinstated  in  the  same  fashion  as  the  sim- 
ple types  of  the  synthetic  and  desultory  moments.  Simi- 
larly it  would  be  hard  to  guess  from  the  frequent  mum- 


The  Desultory  Type  in  Pathological  States    349 

bllng  of  the  words  'Alexander/  that  the  dement  in  his 
early  stages  of  mental  alienation  was  under  the  delusion 
that  he  was  the  deceased  Russian  czar  come  to  life.  The 
word  'Alexander'  is  simply  a  chip  of  a  former  highly 
systematized  moment,  the  chip  now  reproducing  itself 
after  the  simple  fashion  of  the  desultory  moment. 

The  phenomena  of  imperative  concepts,  insistent  or 
fixed  ideas,  uncontrollable  impulses  all  grow  and  de- 
velop along  the  general  lines  of  the  synthetic  moment. 
They  are  reinstatements  of  portions  of  dissociated  mo- 
ments buried  in  the  subconscious  and  growing  by  the 
process  of  modification  with  each  recurrent  reinstate- 
ment. 

Hypnoidal  states  described  by  me  bear  evidence  to 
the  same  truth  of  reinstatement  of  psychic  elements. 
In  the  hypnoidal  states  fractions  of  dissociated  mo- 
ments present  in  the  subconscious  come  up  like  bubbles 
to  the  surface  of  the  patient's  consciousness,  burst,  dis- 
appear, and  vanish  never  to  come  again.  The  frag- 
ments are  reinstated  chips  of  highly  organized  mo- 
ments, now  in  a  state  of  disaggregation.  The  hypnoi- 
dal chips  sometimes  manifest  themselves  in  their  re- 
production after  the  mode  of  simple  or  elementary 
desultory  consciousness,  mental  states  appear  and  dis- 
appear, leaving  no  traces  behind  them. 

In  the  phenomena  of  automatic  writing,  crystal  gaz- 
ing, shell-hearing  and  so  on,  reinstatement  of  moments 
in  different  degrees  and  stages  of  organization  takes 
place.  Finally  in  the  phenomena  of  hypnosis  we  meet 
with  similar  conditions,  the  states  are  induced  artifi- 
cially in  the  otherwise  healthy  and  normally  function- 
ing individuality.  Such  are  the  phenomena  of  person- 
ality metamorphosis  and  of  post-hypnotic  or  hypnoner- 


350  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

gic  states.  In  these  states  moments  are  artificially 
formed  in  the  dissociated  subconscious  moments  which 
rise  to  the  surface  of  consciousness  with  all  the  energy 
supplied  to  them  by  the  subconscious.  They  reproduce 
and  perpetuate  themselves  after  the  mode  of  the  syn- 
thetic moment  until  their  end  is  achieved,  when  they 
gradually  fade  away,  or,  what  is  still  more  often  the 
case,  vanish  in  the  same  sudden  and  abrupt  way  as  they 
come. 

The  artificially  induced  post-hypnotic  or  h)rpnoner- 
gic  states  studied  from  the  standpoint  of  the  moment- 
consciousness  are  found  to  be  analogous  to  many  psy- 
chopathic conditions.  The  main  character  of  these 
states  is  their  dissociation  and  reproduction,  or  rather 
reinstatement  on  the  basis  of  lower  types  of  moment- 
consciousness. 

In  psychopathic  functional  states  not  only  does  dis- 
integration of  content  occur,  but  there  is  also  present 
functional  degradation  of  the  type  of  the  moment.  The 
function  of  the  moment  reverts  to  lower  types  of  psy- 
chic activity,  while  the  content  consists  of  constituents 
formed  on  higher  lines  of  psychic  life.  Hence  the 
lack  of  adaptation,  the  conflict  in  psychopathic  states 
between  function  and  content.  It  is  like  the  formation 
of  a  barbaric  society  out  of  the  remnants  of  a  ruined 
civilization. 

We  may  then  affirm  that  the  characteristic  mode  of 
reproduction,  both  of  the  desultory  and  synthetic  mo- 
ment, is  reinstatement.  The  difference  between  the 
two  moments  being  that  while  the  moment  of  the  des- 
ultory type  reproduces  by  reinstatement  only,  that  of 
the  synthetic  type  reproduces  by  both  reinstatement 
and  modification. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

PRESENTATIONS  AND  REPRESENTATIONS 

IN  the  course  of  our  analysis  of  the  lower  types 
of  moments  it  has  been  shown  that  the  psychic 
elements  entering  into  their  synthetized  content 
occur  not  in  a  free  independent  state,  but  in  fixed 
accumulations  and  stable  compounds,  having  reinstate- 
ment as  the  mode  of  their  reproduction.  There  is, 
however,  a  higher  type  of  moment  in  which  psychic 
elements  occur  in  a  free  independent  state,  having  ac- 
cordingly a  mode  of  reproduction  different  from  that 
of  the  types  we  have  just  examined.  Let  us  see  now 
what  the  nature  of  these  free  elements  is,  how  they 
come  to  arise  and  what  is  the  peculiar  mode  of  their 
reproduction. 

If  we  look  at  the  tree  yonder  and  then  close  our 
eyes,  we  can  represent  to  ourselves  the  tree  in  its  gen- 
eral outlines  at  least.  We  see  its  trunk,  its  branches, 
and  its  green  foliage.  After  our  friend's  departure 
we  continue  to  see  him  in  our  mind's  eye.  We  live 
over  mentally,  in  our  imagination,  all  our  relations, 
our  mutual  enjoyments.  We  seem  to  watch  him  act 
and  hear  him  talk.  The  representative  elements  can- 
not possibly  be  identified  with  or  derived  from  after- 
images. For  after  images  are  really  after-sensations 
and  consist  of  sensory  elements.  The  elements  in- 
volved in  the  state  of  representative  psychic  life  are 
freed  from  all  immediate  coexistence  with  sensory  ele- 
ments, primary  or  secondary;  in    fact,    they    appear 

351 


352  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

when  the  sensory  elements  disappear. 

The  two  sets  of  psychic  elements,  the  presentative 
and  representative,  stand  in  inverse  relation  to  each 
other.  When  the  one  is  at  its  maximum  the  other  is 
at  its  minimum.  When  sensory  elements  appear  the 
free  elements  become  faint.  This  faintness  is  in  pro- 
portion to  the  intensity  of  the  sensory  element.  It  is 
hard  for  us  to  look  at  a  color  and  imagine  it  at  the 
same  time ;  and  the  more  intense  and  brilliant  the  color 
is,  the  harder  it  is  for  us  to  have  the  color,  at  the  same 
time,  represented.  Look  at  an  object,  say  the  lighted 
lamp,  take  in  well  its  sensory  elements  and  you  will 
find  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  represent  it  to  your- 
self at  the  same  time.  Try  hard  to  represent  to  your- 
self the  object  and  you  will  find  that  its  sensory  ele- 
ments will  begin  to  vacillate  and  become  faint,  or  less 
vivid.  When  absorbed  in  our  ideas  we  often  do  not 
notice  even  very  intense  stimuli.  The  two  series  of  ele- 
ments, the  sensory  or,  presentative,  and  the  free  ones, 
the  representative,  cannot  run  together  without  inter- 
fering with  each  other,  nay,  without  arresting  each 
other. 

Representative  elements  bring  with  them  a  new 
fundamental  departure  in  the  mental  activity  of  the 
moment,  they  may  keep  up  its  activity  when  flagging, 
may  intensify  it,  but  may  also  deflect  it,  or  distract  it, 
giving  rise  to  another  conflicting  moment.  Thus  on  the 
one  hand  my  continuous  thought  about  a  certain  scien- 
tific proposition  constituting  the  substance  of  the  pres- 
ent active  moment  may  begin  to  flag,  but  it  is  soon  kept 
up  by  new  observations  and  experiments;  on  the  other 
hand,  the  occasional  glance  at  the  morning  newspaper 
may  tend  to  deflect  mental  activity  to  quite  a  different 


Presentations  and  Representations  353 

channel  by  awakening  the  activity  of  quite  a  different 
moment-consciousness  conflicting  with  the  train  of 
thought  on  scientific  matter. 

Presentative  elements  have  a  permanency  and  sta- 
bility which  representative  elements  totally  lack;  they 
can  be  kept  up  in  their  full  strength  by  keeping  up  the 
same  intensity  of  stimulation,  as  by  maintaining  the  ob- 
ject before  the  particular  sense  organ  that  forms  the 
nucleus  of  the  percept.  Thus  the  pricking  of  the 
needle  is  perceived  as  long  as  the  stimulation  is  con- 
tinued, and  the  chair  yonder  is  seen  as  long  as  it  is  kept 
before  the  eyes.  Representative  elements  on  the  con- 
trary, are  extremely  unstable  and  fluctuating,  and  are 
aptly  characterized  as  being  very  much  like  "the  flare 
and  flicker  of  a  gas  flame  blown  by  the  wind."  When 
representative  elements  become  permanent,  stable,  the 
state  of  the  moment  acquires  a  pathological  character 
manifested  in  the  phenomena  of  insistent  thoughts  and 
fixed  ideas. 

Presentative  psychic  elements  are  always  firmly 
bound  up  with  an  external  object  and  with  stimu- 
lations of  peripheral  sense-organs ;  they  can  never  free 
themselves  from  the  bondage  to  the  external  environ- 
ment. Not  so  the  representative  elements,  although 
appearing  at  first  in  connection  with  sensory  elements 
and  peripheral  stimulations,  they  finally  end  by  freeing 
themselves  from  this  bondage.  The  representative 
elements  involved  in  the  representation  zebra  do  not 
originally  arise  without  some  presentative  elements. 
Once  however,  the  given  representation  has  definitely 
arisen  we  may  imagine  the  zebra  without  actually  per- 
ceiving it.  In  the  midst  of  a  conversation,  or  in  the 
midst  of  an  engaging  study,  the  image  of  a  tiger,  or  of 


354  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

a  palm  seen  in  some  distant  country  may  rise  clearly 
and  vividly  before  the  mind's  eye,  and  temporarily  in- 
terrupt the  course  and  trend  of  our  thought. 

While  I  am  writing  these  lines  a  fleeing  copperhead,  a 
pulsating  vorticella,  a  fish's  tail,  a  cow's  head  and  a  puff- 
ing steam  engine  have  flashed  across  my  mental  field  and 
gone.  They  may  be  ultimately  traced  to  some  sensory 
stimulus  and  positive  after  images,  but  these  are  far  in 
the  background  of  consciousness  and  remain  unnoticed. 
Representative  elements  come  and  go  in  consciousness, 
they  appear  independently  of  all  other  elements,  they 
are  essentially  free  elements.  We  call  this  coming  and 
going  of  these  independent  elements  the  "free  play  of 
the  imagination." 

Where  sensory  elements  appear  in  synthetized  com- 
pounds, or  in  the  precept,  they  cannot  be  separated, 
they  are  firmly  bound  together.  It  is  only  in  repre- 
sentation that  the  corresponding  representative  ele- 
ments free  thmselves  from  the  bonds  of  union  which 
the  sensory  elements  cannot  throw  off.  The  orange 
yonder  is  a  synthetized  compound  of  many  sensory 
elements,  primary  and  secondary,  but  as  long  as  they 
remain  sensory  the  elements  are  kept  in  union  and  can- 
not be  dissociated.  Such  a  dissociation,  however,  is 
fully  possible  with  the  representative  elements  enter- 
ing into  the  representation  of  the  orange.  We  can  think 
of  its  color,  size,  shape,  weight,  smell  and  taste  sepa- 
rately. 

The  freedom  of  the  representative  elements  is  clear- 
ly brought  out  in  the  so-called  free  play  of  the  imagi- 
nation. Sensory  elements  are  synthetized  in  the  com- 
pound in  definite  relations  which  cannot  possibly  be 
severed  unless  the  stimuli  are  rearranged,  and  in  many 


Presentations  and  Representations  355 

cases  the  sensory  elements  do  not  admit  even  of  that 
procedure.  The  sensory  elements  in  the  perception 
of  a  particular  object,  say  a  house,  have  definite  rela- 
tions which  cannot  be  modified  without  first  changing 
the  color,  structure,  shape,  size,  of  the  house  and  rear- 
ranging its  relative  parts.  In  imagination  or  repre- 
sentation, however,  all  that  is  done  in  less  than  no 
time,  without  in  the  least  interfering  with  the  external 
stimuli. 

Representative  elements  manifest  even  more  free- 
dom. In  many  cases  a  modification  of  certain  relations 
in  the  sensory  elements  cannot  possibly  be  effected,  be- 
cause the  relations  of  the  external  stimuli  constituting 
what  may  be  termed  the  external  object  do  not  admit 
of  a  rearrangement.  Thus  we  cannot  have  the  mouth 
of  the  horse  on  his  back,  horns  growing  out  of  his 
sides,  the  mane  on  his  hind  parts  and  the  tail  on  his 
brow.  We  can,  however,  easily  accomplish  such  a  re- 
arrangement in  our  imagination.  Furthermore,  in  rep- 
resentation psychic  elements  appear  in  combinations  of 
which  sensory  elements  do  not  admit.  Pegasus,  a 
horse  with  wings;  mermaid,  a  being  half  woman  half 
fish;  centaurus,  a  being  half  man  and  half  horse,  and 
other  combinations  of  the  most  impossible  character,  as 
far  as  sensory  elements  are  concerned,  may  be  formed 
in  representation. 

At  first  representative  elements  are  started  by  sensa- 
tions and  are  thus  far  bound  up  with  them,  but  they 
gradually  free  themselves  from  it.  Thus  in  a  baby  un- 
der my  close  observation,  the  representative  element 
never  came  unless  the  object  was  present.  If  the  ob- 
ject was  taken  away,  he  soon  forgot  it.  In  the  un- 
educated mind  even  of  a  high  type  of  moment-con- 


356  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sciousness  representations  are  still  bound  up  with  pre- 
sentations. The  gossip  can  keep  on  talking  as  long  as 
the  thought  is  fixed  on  the  concrete.  Persons  who  lack 
scientific,  conceptual  thought  cannot  grasp  an  abstract 
general  proposition  without  having  it  first  expressed  in 
concrete  terms,  or  fixed  in  sensory  pictures.  The  sav- 
age gets  a  headache  when  his  thought  is  forced  to 
flow  in  a  stream  of  representation.  In  the  imbecile, 
in  the  idiot  we  find  the  same  thing  manifested.  They 
can  only  think  in  concrete  sensory  terms.  In  mental 
asthenia  which  approaches  the  state  of  the  higher 
stages  of  imbecility  and  also  in  secondary  dementia, 
states  consequent  on  psychic  degeneration,  we  find 
the  same  truth  illustrated.  The  patient's  men- 
tal activity  falls  many  stages  nearer  to  the  level  of  pre- 
sentative  life.  It  is  only  in  the  higher  forms  of  psychic 
life  that  representative  elements  become  free,  inde- 
pendent, and  are  freely  and  easily  associated  and  dis- 
sociated. 

If  looked  at  from  the  standpoint  of  control,  we  find 
that  sensory  elements,  on  account  of  their  fixed  rela- 
tions in  the  combinations  and  compounds  in  which  they 
enter,  are  uncontrollable.  The  compound  with  all  its 
sensory  elements,  primary  and  secondary,  is  given,  and 
cannot  directly  be  controlled;  it  is  highly  stable,  it  re- 
sists attempts  at  decomposition.  The  combinations, 
however,  formed  of  the  free  representative  elements 
are  of  unstable  equilibrium,  the  elements  can  be  easily 
shifted,  displaced,  rearranged,  easily  dissociated,  and 
new  combinations  formed.  The  mode  of  function  of 
the  representative  element  is  free  association. 

Even  when  entering  into  the  associative  play  the  rep- 
resentative elements  do  not  blend  and  fuse  so  as  not  to 


Presentations  and  Representations  357 

be  discriminated.  Representative  elements  certainly  do 
not  float  about  without  entering  with  others  into  some 
form  of  association,  but  in  the  very  association  and  com- 
bination they  still  manage  to  preserve  relatively  their 
freedom  and  independence.  The  sensory  elements  in 
the  compound  are  so  blended  and  fused  that  they  can- 
not be  discriminated  in  the  compound  without  some  ef- 
fort and  under  special  artificial  conditions.  Oculo-mo- 
tor  sensations,  the  estimation  of  the  visual  angle,  of  the 
size  of  the  image  thrown  on  the  retina  are  not  so  very 
evident  in  the  direct  perception  of  the  external  object. 
Tactual  and  muscular  sensations  are  not  so  very  clear 
in  our  perception  of  space,  nor  are  our  rhythmical,  res- 
piratory and  kinaesthetic  sensations  quite  obvious  in  our 
estimation  of  time.  The  free  associations,  however,  into 
which  representative  elements  enter  give  full  scope  to 
their  components.  The  elements  are  combined  without 
at  the  same  time  losing  their  individuality;  they  remain 
clearly  defined  in  their  nature  and  outlines  in  relation  to 
the  other  elements  with  which  they  form  combinations. 
Representations,  however,  presuppose  presentative 
life,  they  constitute  the  intermediate  stages  of  which 
presentations  form  the  termini.  Representations  begin 
and  end  with  presentations.  At  the  same  time  it  should 
be  clearly  held  in  mind  that  while  representation  refers 
to  presentation,  it  is  by  no  means  true  that  representa- 
tions can  be  analyzed  into  sensory  elements  in  the  same 
way  as  a  living  organism  can  be  analyzed  into  elemen- 
tary cells.  The  living  organism  is  made  up,  is  consti- 
tuted by  elementary  cells;  cells  form  the  organism.  Rep- 
resentations, however,  are  not  formed  out  of  presenta- 
tive elements,  sensory  elements,  sensation  elements.  Sen- 
sory processes  do  not  enter  into  the  make-up  of  a  repre- 


35B  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sentation.  Just  as  the  sensation  black  is  not  black,  so  is 
the  idea  or  representation  of  black  not  a  sensation 
'black.' 


CHAPTER  XIX 

REPRESENTATIONS  AND  THE  LAWS  OF  THEIR  COMBINA- 
TIONS 

REPRESENTATIVE  elements  form  what 
may  be  characterized  as  mental  trains.  The 
elements  of  a  mental  train  are  connected  by 
relations  of  contiguity,  resemblance,  and  con- 
trast. Association  by  contiguity  depends  on  the  fre- 
quency, recency  with  which  the  elements  have  been  as- 
sociated, while  resemblance  and  contrast  may  be  re- 
garded as  two  or  more  mental  trains  of  representative 
elements  associated  by  contiguity,  crossing  and  inter- 
secting in  a  few  points,  in  other  words  having  some  ele- 
ment in  common.  From  this  standpoint  associations  by 
resemblance  and  contrast  are  often  regarded  as  cases  of 
contiguity  which  is  therefore  considered  as  the  mode  of 
association  characteristic  of  representative  elements. 
From  another  standpoint,  however,  resemblance  may 
equally  be  considered  as  fundamental.  It  is  nearer  to 
the  truth  to  regard  both  contiguity  and  resemblance  or 
similarity  as  fundamental  modes  of  association  of  repre- 
sentative elements. 

Association  by  contiguity  may  be  expressed  in  the  fol- 
lowing general  proposition :  Ideas  or  images  which  have 
frequently  followed  one  another  tend  to  recur  in  the 
same  order.  If  a,  b,  c,  d,  e  be  images  or  ideas  that 
have  frequently  followed  each  other  in  a  definite  order 
of  succession,  then  the  tendency  is  that  the  ideas  or  im- 
ages will  occur  in  the  same  order,  if  the  initial  idea  or 
image  is  awakened.    Thus  U  a,  b,  c,  d,  e,  be  that  order, 

359 


360  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

then  if  a  is  awaken  the  rest,  b,  c,  d,  e,  tend  to  emerge 
in  the  same  order  in  which  they  have  followed  each  oth- 
er previously. 

The  formula  for  association  by  contiguity  may  be 
expressed  as  follows :  a-^b-\-c+d+e-\- .... 

Representative  elements,  however,  as  we  have  pointed 
out  are  derivative,  they  are  functions  of  sensory  com- 
pounds, and  vary  concomitantly  with  the  wealth  and  dif- 
ferentiation of  sensory  life-experience.  Blind  people 
have  no  visual  images,  nor  can  deaf  persons  form  any 
idea  of  a  sound.  Although  representative  elements  are 
essentially  different  in  nature  from  sensory  elements  and 
their  compounds,  still  it  remains  true  that  sensory  ex- 
perience is  the  soil  from  which  the  rich  variety  of  rep- 
resentative life  grows  up.  Sensory  elements  and  their 
compounds  are  prerequisites  of  representations  of  their 
combination  and  organization. 

The  course  of  associative  relations  of  representations 
may  be  determined  by  the  course  of  sensory  series.  If 
a  series  of  sensations  and  perceptions  have  frequently 
followed  each  other  pretty  uniformly,  then  their  cor- 
responding representations  will  tend  to  recur  in  the 
same  uniform  order.  Let  A,  B,  C,  D,  E.  .  .  .  be  the 
order  of  succession  of  the  sensory  series,  then  the  order 
of  the  series  of  representations  will  ht:  a,  b,  c,  d,  e .  .  .  . 
When  sensation  A  with  its  corresponding  representation 
a  are  awakened,  or  if  a  alone  occurs,  then  the  rest  of  the 
series  of  representations  tend  to  emerge.  The  formula 
for  association  of  contiguity  may  be  somewhat  modified 
and  represented  as  follows : 

a  b  c  d  e   ....      Representations 

A  B  C  D  E  ....      Presentations 


Representations  and  Laws  of  Combinations    361 

P^-\-a-\- {b+c-\-d-\-e) ^   or   simply  a-\-{b-\-c-\-d-\-e)  .... 

B+b+{c^d+e),  or  simply  b+{c-^d+e) 

We  have  shown  that  ideas  and  images  are  associated 
with  motor  and  physical  reactions,  hence  muscular 
movements  or  rather  kinaesthetic  sensations  and  their 
representations  also  enter  the  circle  of  the  associative 
series.  The  series  of  representations  gives  rise  to  move- 
ments which  in  their  turn  give  rise  to  kinaesthetic  sensa- 
tions, and  these  in  turn  may  either  give  rise  to  another 
series  of  representations,  or  may  maintain  the  same  ser- 
ies. Hartley,  the  father  of  English  associationism,  who 
reduced  all  association  to  contiguity,  states  his  doctrine 
of  association  in  the  following  general  proposition : 

"If  any  sensation  A,  idea  B  or  muscular  motion  C,  be 
associated  for  a  sufficient  number  of  times  with  any  oth- 
er sensation  D,  idea  E,  or  muscular  motion  F,  it  will  at 
last  excite  d,  the  simple  idea  belonging  to  the  sensation 
D,  the  very  idea  E  or  the  very  muscular  motion  F." 

Turning  now  to  association  by  similarity  we  find  that 
the  relations  of  the  elements  are  somewhat  more  com- 
plex than  in  that  of  contiguity.  Where  mental  life  is  com- 
plex and  where  there  are  present  many  different  trains 
of  ideas  and  images,  there  will  be  a  tendency  for  them  to 
cross  and  intersect  at  many  points.  The  course  of  a 
given  train  of  ideas  and  images  instead  of  running  in 
its  habitual  line  will  tend  to  become  deflected  along  oth- 
er lines  and  give  rise  to  that  particular  form  of  associa- 
tion of  representative  elements  known  as  association  by 
similarity  and  contrasts. 

Let  a,  b,  c,  d,  e,  f,  be  one  series  and  let  p,  b,  g,  r,  m, 
another  series,  q,  r,  k,  I,  n,  a  third  series  and  s,  I,  x,  y,  z 
a  fourth  series  and  so  on.  The  course  of  association  in- 
stead of  running  along  one  line  of  habitual  association 


362  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

determined  by  contiguity  will  tend  to  run  on  new  lines. 
The  course  may  be  represented  as  follows : 
a, — b, — c, — d, — e, — f 

i 
p, — b, — g, — r, — ^m 


q, — r, — ^k, — I,- 

i 
s, — 1, — X, — y, — z 
Let  each  series  be  represented  by  a  row  of  squares 
formed  into  a  rectangle  and  let  each  crossing  series  be 
representd  by  a  similar  rectangle  intersecting  the  pre- 
ceding one  at  right  angles,  then  the  course  of  associa- 
tion by  similarity  may  be  diagrammatically  represented 
as  follows: 


P 


m 


c  "  d"    6 


\ 


V 


n 


The  course  of  the  mental  train  of  ideas  is  changed  and 
deflected  along  lines  which  are  otherwise  unhabitual  for 
the  particular  mental  train.  In  association  by  similarity 
the  mental  train  ever  corruscates  along  new  lines. 


Representations  and  Laws  of  Combinations    363 

Association  by  similarity  may  be  expressed  in  the  gen- 
eral proposition:  like  states  often  follow  each  other. 
What  that  likeness  consists  in  we  have  already  seen, — 
it  is  some  common  characters,  some  representative  ele- 
ments which  two  or  more  crossing  trains  of  contiguous 
representations  possess  in  common.  The  crossing  of 
one  train  by  another  at  a  point  where  the  representa- 
tions have  common  features  is  purely  accidental,  as  far 
as  the  crossed  train  is  concerned;  it  is  the  play  of  the 
imagination.  As  an  illustration  of  such  a  crossing  of 
trains  we  may  take  the  example  when  one,  from  a  ser- 
ies of  images  and  ideas  about  the  recent  Americo-Span- 
ish  war,  is  led  to  think  of  the  Anglo-Spanish  war  in  the 
1 6th  Century,  the  common  representation  being  the  de- 
struction of  the  Spanish  fleet ;  and  from  the  mental  train 
on  the  Anglo-Spanish  war  to  the  Franco-Prussian  war 
the  common  representation  being  invasion,  and  from 
this  to  the  Napoleonic  war,  then  to  the  political  affairs 
of  France,  and  thence,  to  the  peace  conference 
of  European  powers.  The  course  of  the  trains  of  ideas 
is  every  time  deflected  along  new  channels.  The  deflec- 
tion depends  largely  on  the  complexity  and  number  of 
the  trains  and  their  activity. 

The  relation  of  likeness  is  present  not  only  in  trains 
of  representations,  but  also  in  presentations  or  in  what 
is  termed  by  us  psychic  compounds.  Thus  twins  we 
say  look  alike,  so  do  eggs,  so  do  animals  of  the  same 
species ;  a  picture  say  of  a  landscape  looks  like  the  actual 
landscape,  and  a  portrait  or  statue  resembles  the  orig- 
inal. In  all  these  examples  the  likeness  is  constituted  by 
the  sensory  elements  common  to  the  presented  psychic 
compound.  Not  that  the  sensory  elements  are  ex- 
actly the  same;  subjectively  considered,  they  may  be 


364  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

totally  different  In  their  psychic  stuff,  in  the  psychic  re- 
lations that  cluster  about  them,  as  no  two  sensations,  no 
two  psychic  compounds,  are  really  the  same,  as  far  as 
the  mental  state  is  concerned,  but  they  refer  to  the  same 
characters  in  the  external  object.  It  is  this  common  ref- 
erence to  the  same  traits  or  characters  in  the  external  ob- 
ject that  constitutes  the  bond  of  association  of  likeness 
in  sensory  element  or  psychic  compound.  On  the  same 
grounds  may  be  explained  the  likeness  between  the  rep- 
resentations and  the  psychic  compound,  the  percept, 
which  it  represents. 


CHAPTER  XX 

REPRESENTATION  AND  RECOGNITION 

IF  from  the  general  consideration  on  the  modes  of 
combinations  or  free  association  characteristic  of 
representations,  we  turn  to  analyse  the  nature  of 
the  moment  with  representative  elements  as  con- 
tent, we  find  that  it  differs  essentially  from  the  synthetic 
and  desultory  moments.  A  close  inspection  of  the  char- 
acter of  representations  reveals  the  fact  of  its  differ- 
ence from  presentation-elements.  A  representative 
element  is  neither  of  the  nature  of  the  primary  nor 
of  the  secondary  sensory  elements,  it  differs  from  both 
in  the  character  of  its  psychic  "stuff."  The  difference 
consists  in  the  fact  that  a  representative  element  is  not 
cognitive,  but  recognitive. 

As  far  as  the  cognitive  aspect  is  concerned  the 
chief  characteristic  of  the  synthetic  and  desultory 
moments,  having  sensory  elements  only  as  their 
content,  is  the  direct  reference  to  the  object,  to  the 
relations  of  the  external  environment,  while  the 
characteristic  feature  of  the  moment,  having  mainly  rep- 
resentative elements  as  Its  constituent,  is  the  indirect  ref- 
erence to  external  relations.  In  other  words,  the  sen- 
sory elements  of  the  synthetic  and  desultory  moments 
have  immediate  cognition,  while  the  representative  ele- 
ments of  the  moment  now  under  consideration  has  me- 
diate cognition,  or  recognition.  I  see  the  book  lying  on 
my  table,  I  close  my  eyes  and  represent  to  myself  the 
whole  thing  over  again.    As  I  look  out  of  the  window 

365 


366  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

I  see  a  house,  a  horse  and  carriage  standing  near  by;  I 
close  my  eyes  and  imagine  the  whole  situation  over 
again.  We  say  then,  incorrectly  though,  that  the  repre- 
sentation is  a  copy  of  the  presentation.  Evidently  the 
representation  is  regarded  as  not  being  the  same  as  the 
presentation  just  as  a  copy  is  really  not  the  same  as  the 
original.  The  psychic  elements  of  representation  have 
the  function  of  cognizing  again,  or  what  is  more  correct 
to  say  the  function  of  re-cognition  which  constitutes 
the  very  essence  of  representation.  In  representation 
events  are  lived  over  again  without  the  actual  recur- 
rence of  those  experiences.  In  representation  the  mo- 
ment becomes  independent  of  the  present,  it  becomes 
free  from  its  immediate  environment. 

In  order  that  a  representation  be  a  true  "copy"  of 
its  original,  it  must  be  cognized  as  a  "copy,"  that  is,  it 
must  be  cognized  as  something  already  cognized,  in  oth- 
er words,  it  must  be  recognized.  This  function  of  re- 
cognition is  the  sine  qua  non  of  representation.  The 
image,  representation,  or  idea  of  a  table  is  not  itself  a 
table,  nor  Is  it  a  synthetized  sensory  compound  refer- 
ring to  the  object,  table,  it  is  a  psychic  element  referring 
to  the  sensory  compound  on  its  objective  aspect.  The 
representation  of  the  table  does  not  refer  directly  to  the 
table  as  it  is  the  case  in  the  sensory  compound,  but  to  the 
table  as  perceived.  The  image  or  representation  refers 
not  to  the  object  immediately,  but  mediately,  to  the  ob- 
ject as  object  of  the  sensory  compound.  Hence  the  ob- 
ject is  cognized  over  in  representation,  in  other  words, 
is  recognized. 

This  recognition  may  be  of  a  general  or  of  a  specific 
character.  The  function  of  recognition  in  its  general 
aspect  is  manifested  in  the  idea.     The  idea  possesses 


Representation  and  Recognition  367 

this  function  of  general  recognition.  The  idea  "man" 
recognizes  its  content  in  a  general  way,  it  refers  to  man 
in  general,  but  does  not  identify  its  content  with  any 
particular  individual.  I  may  represent  to  myself  an  ob- 
ject recognized  as  a  table,  not  as  any  particular  table, 
and  I  may  also  represent  this  particular  table  on  which 
I  am  writing.  The  representation  I  have  of  my  friend 
John  refers  specifically  to  John  not  to  any  one  else.  As 
in  my  imagination  I  scrutinize  the  features  of  my 
friend's  face,  I  all  along  recognize  that  it  is  my  friend's 
countenance.  Recognition,  general  as  well  as  particu- 
lar, is  involved  in  the  very  function  of  representation. 

In  immediate  perception  itself  there  is  no  recogni- 
tion present.  It  is  not  true  to  fact  to  say  that  in  the 
perception  of  a  horse  we  recognize  the  object  by  per- 
ceiving it  as  horse  and  not  as  anything  else.  The  fact 
that  I  perceive  the  object  as  it  is  depends  entirely  on 
the  sensory  compound  which  has  cognition  as  the  func- 
tion of  its  psychic  character.  The  sensory  component, 
the  percept  horse,  is  the  cognition  of  the  object  "horse." 

Some  psychologists  attempt  to  find  the  origin  of  rec- 
ognition in  the  feeling  of  familiarity.  Familiarity,  how- 
ever, is  not  a  primary  state  out  of  which  recognition  de- 
velops, but  on  the  contrary  recognition  is  the  primary 
state  and  familiarity  is  derivative  only.  Familiarity  is 
simply  the  feeling  of  vague,  marginal,  or  subconscious 
recognition.  Of  course,  if  by  the  term  familiarity  is 
meant  not  that  psychic  state  observed  in  the  adult  con- 
sciousness, both  abnormal  and  normal,  but  that  primary 
state  of  recognition  out  of  which  more  definite  recogni- 
tion develops,  then  it  may  be  admitted  that  familiarity 
is  the  germ  of  recognition,  but  then  it  is  only  the  giving 
of  a  special  term  "familiarity"  to  an  elementary  form  of 


368  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

recognition.  The  definite  form  of  recognition  devel- 
ops out  of  the  indefinite  form  of  recognition,  recogni- 
tion must  be  a  primary  element.  Recognition  then 
is  an  irreducible  mode  of  psychic  activity  characteristic 
of  representative  mental  life. 

Some  psychologists  regard  familiarity  as  a  pure  'feel- 
ing of  at  homeness'  or  as  Fouillee  puts  it  in  the  decrease 
of  the  inward  shock  of  surprise.  This  is  however  to 
put  the  cart  before  the  horse.  It  is  not  the  feeling 
of  familiarity  that  gives  rise  to  recognition,  but  it  is 
vague,  indistinct,  marginal,  or  subconscious  recognition 
that  gives  rise  to  the  feeling  of  familiarity.  When  a 
person,  a  scene,  an  event,  or  situation  is  familiar, 
the  psychic  stnte  is  one  of  having  gone  through  the 
same  experience  before.  We  cannot  localize  its  date  in 
our  scheme  of  time  on  which  we  project  our  past  experi- 
ences. We  have  experienced  the  same  before,  but  we 
ask  ourselves, — where  and  when  have  we  seen  that  per- 
son, the  scene  or  the  situation  before  ?  Often  we  succeed 
in  forming  a  complete  association  with  the  past,  we  lo- 
calize the  given  familiar  experience,  and  then  complete 
recognition  ensues.  Familiarity  is  incomplete,  vague, 
indefinite  recognition. 

The  peculiar  experience  of  a  present  novel  situation 
as  having  experienced  or  lived  through  the  same  before 
has  been  mystically  referred  to  a  previous  existence,  the 
theory  of  Platonic  reminiscence.  The  explanation,  how- 
ever, of  this  phenomenon  is  quite  simple,  inasmuch 
that  it  can  be  shown  that  in  such  cases  some 
similar  experience  had  been  gone  through  before.  The 
subject  cannot  close  the  circuit,  so  to  say,  and  effect  a 
connection  with  his  previous  life  experiences,  he  cannot 
associate  fully  the  present  experience  with  his  form- 


Representation  and  Recognition  369 

cr  experience  and  localize  it  in  his  past.  Other  cases  of 
such  familiarity  are  brought  about  by  states  of  dissocia- 
tion. The  patient  perceives,  goes  through  experiences 
in  one  state  and  vaguely  remembers  them  in  another. 
Such  states  of  familiarity  or  imperfect  recognition  can 
be  found  in  pre-epileptic  states,  in  post-hypnotic  condi- 
tions, in  hypnoidal  twilight  states,  and  other  subcon- 
scious dissociative  states. 

In  regard  to  this  phenomenon  of  general  familiarity 
almost  amounting  to  recognition  without  attaining  it 
James  makes  the  following  pertinent  remarks  which 
fully  bears  out  the  fact  that  recognition  is  primary  and 
is  at  the  basis  of  what  we  term  the  sense  of  familiarity. 
"There  is  a  curious  experience"  says  James  "which 
everyone  seems  to  have  had — the  feeling  that  the  pres- 
ent moment  in  its  completeness  has  been  experienced  be- 
fore— ^we  were  saying  just  the  thing,  in  just  this  place, 
to  just  these  people,  etc.  This  'sense  of  pre-existence' 
has  been  treated  as  a  great  mystery  and  occasioned  much 
speculation I  must  confess  that  the  quality  of  mys- 
tery seems  to  me  a  little  strained.  I  have  over  and  over 
again  in  my  own  case  succeeded  in  resolving  the  phe- 
nomenon into  a  case  of  memory,  so  indistinct  that  while 
some  past  circumstances  are  presented  again,  the  others 
are  not.  The  dissimilar  portions  of  the  past  do  not 
arise  completely  enough  for  the  date  to  be  identified. 
All  we  get  is  the  present  scene  with  a  general  suggestion 
of  pastness  about  it."  I  may  say  the  same  thing  in  my 
own  case.  Whenever  I  find  in  myself  the  presence  of 
some  obscure  form  of  familiarity,  I  can  invariably  trace 
it  to  some  vague,  indistinct  memory  of  an  experience 
lived  through  some  time  before.  The  same  holds  true 
in  the  case  of  patients,  as  well  as  of  my  experiments  car- 


370  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ried  out  on  subjects  in  subconscious  states,  hypnotic, 
post-hypnotic,  hypnoidal,  and  others. 

When  an  experience  enters  into  a  number  of  systems, 
or  as  James  would  put  it  into  a  number  of  "settings," 
then  the  special  character  of  the  "setting"  becomes  con- 
fused or  even  obliterated.  The  experience  present  calls 
forth  so  many  different  systems  or  "settings"  that  the 
recognition  element  lapses  and  reverts  to  the  psychic 
state  characteristic  of  the  lower  forms  of  moment  con- 
sciousness, passing  through  the  more  elementary  forms 
of  recognition  to  cognition.  When  the  recognitive  mo- 
ment reproduces  itself  so  that  it  becomes  habitual  and 
automatic,  it  falls  in  the  scale  of  psychic  life  and  reverts 
to  the  type  of  a  lower  moment. 

A  psychic  state  which  recurs  under  a  great  number 
of  conditions  and  circumstances  loses  all  special  and 
local  psychic  color,  so  to  say,  and  hence  becomes  de- 
graded in  the  type  of  its  mental  activity.  All 
ordinary  experiences  which  have  been  recognized 
over  and  over  again,  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
mental  life,  under  different  and  opposite  tendencies,  feel- 
ings and  emotions,  under  various  settings  and  conflicting 
systems  cease  to  be  surrounded  by  a  nimbus  of  pastness 
and  become  cognitive  in  character.  When  too  often  re- 
peated the  experience  becomes  so  much  worn  by  use,  if 
we  may  use  such  an  expression,  that  it  can  no  longer  be 
reproduced  voluntarily  in  consciousness.  Thus  a  strange 
face  seen  a  few  times  or  only  once  can  be  clearly  repre- 
sented, but  the  faces  of  familiar  people  with  whom  we 
are  in  constant  intercourse  can  no  longer  be  clearly  re- 
produced and  represented.  Such  a  reproduction  can  only 
be  brought  about  by  a  perceptual  state,  or  by  various 
subconscious  states,  such  as  dreams,  hypnosis,  or  hyp- 


Representation  and  Recognition  371 

noidal  state.  In  such  cases  there  is  present  a  feeling  of 
familiarity  due  to  the  series  of  recognitions  and  cogni- 
tions.   Familiarity  here  is  lapsed  recognition. 

James  brings  it  out  clearly:  "If  a  phenomenon  is  met 
with,  however,  too  often,  and  with  too  great  a  variety 
of  contexts,  although  its  image  is  retained  and  repro- 
duced with  correspondingly  great  facility,  it  fails  to 
come  up  with  any  one  particular  setting  and  the  projec- 
tion of  it  backwards  to  a  particular  past  date  conse- 
quently does  not  come  about.  We  recognize  but  do  not 
remember  it — its  associates  form  too  confused  a  cloud." 
In  other  words,  recognition  does  not  reach  its  full  de- 
velopment. There  is  recognition  of  the  phenomenon 
as  such,  but  not  as  having  had  the  experience  in  the 
past.  The  halo  of  pastness  is  gone.  James  quotes 
Spencer  "To  ask  a  man  whether  he  remembers  that  the 
sun  shines,  that  fire  burns,  that  iron  is  hard,  would  be  a 
misuse  of  language.  Even  the  almost  fortuitous  con- 
nections among  our  experiences  cease  to  be  classed  as 
memories,  when  they  have  become  thoroughly  familiar. 
Though  on  hearing  the  voice  of  some  unseen  person 
slightly  known  to  us,  we  say  we  recollect  to  whom  the 
voice  belongs,  we  do  not  use  the  same  expression  re- 
specting the  voices  of  those  with  whom  we  live.  The 
meanings  of  words  which  in  childhood  have  to  be  con- 
sciously recalled  seem  in  adult  life  to  be  immediately 
present. 

"James  then  goes  on  saying" :  "These  are  the 
cases  where  too  many  paths,  leading  to  too  diverse  as- 
sociates, block  each  other's  way,  and  all  that  the  mind 
gets  along  with  its  object  is  a  fringe  of  felt  familiarity 
or  sense  that  there  are  associates.  A  similar  result  comes 
about  when  a  definite  setting  is  only  nascently  aroused. 


372  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

We  then  feel  that  we  have  seen  the  object  already,  but 
when  or  where  we  cannot  say,  though  we  may  seem  to 
ourselves  to  be  on  the  brink  of  saying  it.  That  nascent 
cerebral  excitation  can  affect  consciousness  with  a  sort 
of  sense  of  the  imminence  of  that  which  stronger  excita- 
tions would  make  us  definitely  feel,  is  obvious  from 
what  happens  when  we  seek  to  remember  a  name.  It 
tingles,  it  trembles  on  the  verge,  but  does  not  come. 
Just  such  a  tingling  and  trembling  of  unrecovered  asso- 
ciates is  the  penumbra  of  recognition  that  may  surround 
any  experience  and  make  it  seem  familiar,  though  we 
know  not  why."  In  other  words,  imperfect,  diffused 
recognition  with  no  special  system,  or  setting  to  come  in 
live  contact  with  and  be  localized  in  a  mental  series  of 
an  individual  moment  consciousness  fails  to  give  that 
mental  synthesis  which  is  the  essential  characteristic  of 
the  fully  developed  moment-consciousness.  Recognition 
of  an  experience  lived  through  in  the  past  is  the  basis  of 
what  is  known  as  the  sense  of  familiarity. 

Perhaps  we  may  refer  to  the  Bergsonian  view  of  rec- 
ognition, namely  that  recognition  is  interrelated  with 
and  based  on  special  motor  adaptations.  "Every  per- 
ception" says  Bergson  "has  its  organized  motor  accom- 
paniment, the  ordinary  feeling  of  recognition  has  its 
roots  in  the  consciousness  of  this  organization."  While 
it  is  true  that  recognition  deals  with  the  use  of  objects 
and  with  special  adaptations  to  the  external  environ- 
ment, as  far  as  such  recognition  is  expressed  in  motor 
adjustments,  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  this  view  holds 
true  of  recognition  in  general.  In  the  process  of  rec- 
ognition it  is  not  the  motor  accompaniment,  it  is  the 
feeling  of  sameness  of  experience,  the  feeling  of  past- 
ness  with  its  localization  in  a  series  of  "settings"  or  of 


Representation  and  Recognition  373 

systems  that  go  to  form  the  main  elements. 

I  must  say  that  the  motor  accompaniments  have  been 
too  much  overworked  in  our  psychological  theories.  We 
have  carried  over  into  our  philosophy,  such  as  pragma- 
tism, and  into  our  psychology  of  recent  years  too  much 
of  the  haste  and  whirl  of  the  exchange  and  the  shop. 
Everything  is  motor  and  everything  is  practical.  This  is 
a  reflection  of  our  present  industrial  age  in  the  domain  of 
the  mind.  Perhaps  it  expresses  well  the  tendency  of  the 
modern  philosophical  and  psychological  trend  of  trans- 
muting every  thing  into  motion  when  psychologists  de- 
scribe themselves  as  being  "motor  men  on  the  psycho- 
logical car." 

Recognition  is  not  motion  at  least  from  a  psycho- 
logical standpoint,  unless  like  Bergson  we  resort  to 
the  metaphysical,  pan-psychistic  argument  of  reducing 
motion  to  independent  objective  images  as  constituting 
the  nature  of  external  reality.  Barring  such  metaphysi- 
cal speculations  that,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  have  no 
place  in  psychology  which  must  keep  strictly  to  the  dif- 
ference between  the  external  and  internal,  to  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  objective  reality  of  the  material  world  and 
of  the  subjective  reality  of  the  mental  world,  different 
spheres  of  phenomena  which  should  not  be  reduced  one 
to  the  other,  we  cannot  help  realizing  the  fact  that  there 
is  far  more  of  the  character  of  recognition  in  mental 
states  in  which  the  motor  element  is  insignificant  or  nil, 
such  as  sensations,  ideas,  memories,  thought  reasoning 
and  so  on  than  there  is  in  the  automatic  reflex  reactions 
of  behavior  and  motor  adjustments.  When  we  see  col- 
or green  and  recognize  that  we  have  seen  it  the  day  be- 
fore we  can  hardly  speak  of  a  motor  element  present  in 
recognition.    When  I  think  of  the  Bergsonian  theory  of 


374  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

memory,  or  recognition  and  remember  of  my  thinking 
about  it  the  night  before  and  disagreeing  with  it,  the 
motor  element  can  only  enter  by  a  great  strain  of  imagi- 
nation. If  there  are  any  motor  elements  they  hardly 
play  any  significant  part  in  the  process  of  memory  and 
recognition.  We  must  deny  emphatically  the  signifi- 
cance and  importance  of  the  motor  element  in  recogni- 
tion. The  essential  element  in  recognition  is  not  the 
motor,  but  the  psychic  elements. 

Bergson  himself  is  driven  to  take  this  aspect  of  recog- 
nition when  he  develops  his  theory  of  pure  memory  with 
no  action  in  contradistinction  to  the  memory  which  in- 
serts itself  edgewise  into  the  flux  of  sensori-motor  adap- 
tations. Bergson  not  without  some  contradiction 
strongly  contrasts  the  true  pure  memory  with  the 
memory  image  sharply  inserted  into  the  plane  of  action. 
If  we  grant  Bergson  that  such  pure  unadulterated  mem- 
ories are  present,  memories  free  from  all  motor  reac- 
tions, then  we  must  necessarily  agree  to  the  fact  that 
remembrance,  recollection,  and  hence  recognition  can 
exist  without  any  motor  accompaniments.  In  other 
words,  recognition  cannot  be  resolved  into  action,  into 
motor  accompaniments,  into  behavior  and  reactions. 
Recognition  is  a  psychic  quale  sui  generis. 

Each  set  of  particular  representative  elements  carries 
along,  as  James  terms  it,  its  special  "setting"  or 
as  I  describe  it  "system."  It  is  this  special  set- 
ting that  helps  the  process  of  recognition  in  having 
the  particular  experience  projected  in  the  past,  in  having 
it  oriented  among  many  other  systems  of  associations 
and  having  It  localized  in  its  particular  past.  Recogni- 
tion then  arises  when  the  present  experience  calls  forth 
its  special  system,  or  setting  in  a  series  of  mental  events. 
The  present  experience  must  close  with  the  past  experi- 


Representation  and  Recognition  375 

ence  and  form  a  circuit.  At  the  same  time  the  experi- 
ence must  not  be  short-circuited,  because  in  such  a  case 
we  have  a  state  of  dissociation.  The  present  experience 
must  form  a  circuit  with  its  system  or  setting  and  with 
the  personality  as  a  whole.  Recognition  thus  requires  a 
special  setting  in  the  complex  web  and  woof  of  the 
present  total  moment  consciousness  constituting  the  in- 
dividuality of  the  subject. 

In  the  higher  forms  of  mental  life  where  self-con- 
sciousness is  developed,  the  experience  forms  a  live  dr- 
cuit,  so  to  say,  with  the  whole  personality.  The  higher 
states  of  recognition  appear  in  the  form  of  the  "I"  con- 
sciousness. "It  is  I  who  experienced  all  that  in  my  past. 
It  is  I  who  remembers  that  this  bit  of  experience  has 
taken  place  in  *my'  experience  some  time  ago."  There 
is  the  my  present  self  thinking  of  the  experience  as  lived 
through  by  my  past  self. 

In  the  lower  forms  of  recognition  where  the 
self  is  not  present,  as  in  the  higher  vertebrates  and 
possibly  in  infants,  there  exists  the  present  cogni- 
tion of  the  experience  and  the  re-cognition  of  it 
in  the  shape  of  a  vague  memory  that  it  had  been  experi- 
enced before.  The  present  experience  of  an  already  ex- 
perienced event  floats  in  a  cloud  of  pastness.  It  is  this 
psychic  state  of  pastness  in  a  present  experience  that 
makes  it  felt  to  the  subject  who  experiences  it — as  re- 
current and  recognitive.  Of  course,  not  every  recurrent 
experience,  even  of  the  higher  types  of  moments  is 
recognitive,  as  there  are  psychopathic  recurrent  states 
which,  like  the  lower  forms  of  moment-consciousness, 
recur  and  reproduce  Aemselves  with  no  element  of  recv 
ognition  present.  We  can,  however,  fully  assert  that 
every  recognitive  experience  is  recurrent.  Recognition 
requires  former  or  past  experience. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  RECOGNITIVE  MOMENT  AND  ITS  REPRODUCTION 

RECOGNITION  is  one  of  the  essential  attri- 
butes of  representative  life.  The  faintest 
and  most  obscure  representation  requires  the 
presence  of  recognition  in  the  background. 
We  may  say  that  without  recognition  representation  be- 
comes an  impossibility.  Recognition  is  the  function  of 
representative  elements.  Just  as  cognition  is  the  func- 
tion of  sensory,  presentative  elements  so  recognition,  or 
secondary  cognition  is  the  function  of  representative  ele- 
ments. Now  that  moment  consciousness  which  has  rep- 
resentative elements  among  the  constituents  of  its  content 
may  be  termed  recognitive  moment-consciousness. 

The  recognitive  moment  is  of  a  higher  type  than  the 
synthetic  moment.  Like  the  synthetic  moment,  mater- 
ial or  psychic  content  of  the  recognitive  moment  is  as- 
similated in  a  synthetized  form;  like  the  synthetic  mo- 
ment, it  goes  on  reproducing  not  on  the  desultory,  but 
on  the  accumulative  type;  and  moreover,  it  approaches 
more  the  compound,  accumulative  type.  Unlike  the  syn- 
thetic moment,  the  recognitive  moment  is  possessed  of 
representative  elements  having  recognition  as  their 
function.  Representative  elements  with  their  function 
of  recognition,  present  in  the  recognitive  moment,  but 
absent  in  the  other  lower  moments,  make  a  fundamental 
difference  in  the  nature  of  reproduction. 

The  reproduction  of  the  recognitive  moment  is  to- 
tally different  in  character  from  that  of  the  desultory 

376 


Recognitive  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction    377 

and  synthetic  moments.  In  the  desultory  and  synthetic 
moments  reproduction  is  effected  by  means  of  presenta- 
tive  elements,  and  actual  recurrence  of  former  experi- 
ence is  indispensable ;  in  the  recognitive  moment  nothing 
of  the  kind  is  required.  The  reproduction  of  the  recog- 
nitive moment  is  effected  only  in  representation.  The 
moment  with  its  sensory  elements  is  not  reproduced  as 
recurrence,  but  only  symbolized,  or  truer  to  say  substi- 
tuted in  meaning  or  in  function  by  the  representative 
elements.  The  representative  element,  the  image,  the 
idea  is  recognized  as  functioning  as  a  substitute,  as 
standing  for  the  presence  of  the  actual  experience  of  the 
original  moment  with  its  nuclear  primary  and  secondary 
sensory  elements.  In  the  higher  stages  of  the  moment 
this  recognition  may  become  detached,  and  the  act  of 
recognition  may  become  duplicated  and  emphasized  in 
another  subsequent  representation.  In  reality,  however, 
both  in  the  lower  and  higher  forms  of  the  recognitive 
moment,  the  fact  of  recognition  belongs  directly  to  the 
representation  itself;  for  as  we  have  pointed  out  recog- 
nition is  an  essential  function  of  representation. 

Just  as  sensory  elements  express,  or  present  the 
qualities  of  the  external  object,  so  do  representa- 
tive elements  mirror  the  psychic  objects  as  presented 
to  sense-experience.  This  relation  may  be  expressed  in 
a  proportional  form:  as  presentation  is  to  the  external 
object  so  is  representation  to  the  presented  object. 
In  the  higher  forms  of  the  recognitive  moment  the  rep- 
resentation can  be  once  more  represented  and  this  latter 
is  represented  in  its  turn,  each  subsequent  reproduction 
representing,  substituting  and  mirroring  the  preceding 
one.  Thus  I  may  see  the  child  yonder  playing  with  its 
ball,  I  may  represent  to  myself  the  whole  scene,  and 


378  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

may  further  represent  to  myself  the  fact  of  representa- 
tion itself  which  in  its  turn  may  be  once  more  represent- 
ed, and  so  on.  The  content  of  the  recognitive  moment 
in  this  mode  of  reproduction,  becomes  more  and  more 
modified,  more  and  more  different  as  it  proceeds  along 
this  line,  becomes  further  and  further  removed  from  the 
original  experienced  moment  with  its  sensory  elements. 

In  the  more  prevalent  forms  of  the  recognitive  mo- 
ment the  process  of  reproduction  does  not  proceed  in 
this  way;  reproduction  keeps  nearer  to  the  lower  types, 
to  the  content  of  the  types  of  the  synthetic  moments,  or, 
in  other  words,  it  keeps  nearer  to  sense-experience.  The 
representation  has  a  direct  reference  to  the  object  as 
presented  in  sense-experience,  and  in  its  reproduction 
this  direct  reference  is  more  or  less  preserved  through- 
out. 

The  recognitive  moment  is  every  time  reproduced  in 
representation,  and  although  having  different  represen- 
tative elements  with  each  successive  reproduction,  it  still 
refers  to  the  same  object  as  presented.  The  modifica- 
tions that  occur  in  the  moment  take  place  only  in  the 
representative  elements.  Adaptations,  instead  of  tak- 
ing place  by  means  of  changes  in  the  sensory  elements 
due  to  successive  modification  effected  by  the  direct  in- 
fluence of  stimuli  from  external  environment,  are  now 
freed  from  the  direct  influence  of  external  conditions, 
and  may  be  effected  within  the  representative  elements 
of  the  moment  itself,  without  having  recourse  to  the 
modifying  influence  of  stimuli. 

We  have  already  shown  that  the  characteristic  trait 
of  representative  elements  is  their  freedom  from  the 
bondage  in  accumulations  or  compounds  in  which  sen- 
sory elements  are  kept;  representative  elements  can  be 


Recognitive  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction    379 

easily  transposed,  they  can  enter  into  new  free  associa- 
tions without  requiring  special  external  stimuli  to  break 
the  stable  compound.  The  free  associations  of  repre- 
sentative elements  may  be  dissolved  by  other  representa- 
tions. The  stick  lying  near  by  may  be  kicked  away  by 
my  foot,  but  may  also  be  represented  as  a  support;  it 
may  be  imaged  as  a  means  of  defense  and  attack,  and 
finally  the  representation  may  be  changed  in  another  di- 
rection, the  stick  may  be  used  as  an  instrument  for 
bringing  down  apples  from  a  tree.  Adaptation  is 
effected  within  the  process  of  representation  before  any 
changes  are  introduced  into  actual,  presentative  life. 

From  a  teleological  standpoint  one  can  realize  the 
great  gain  in  the  economy  of  life  reactions  by  a  mode 
of  reproduction  independent  of  and  free  from  the  direct 
influence  of  external  stimuli  with  their  consequent  sen- 
sory responses  and  motor  reactions,  resulting  in  further 
and  further  modifications  of  the  original  moment.  The 
recognitive  moment  in  its  growth  and  development  by  a 
series  of  internal  representative  modifications  spares  it- 
self ill  adapted  sensory  responses  and  motor  reactions. 
This  is  an  immense  gain  to  life,  a  great  aid  and  power- 
ful weapon  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 

Regarded  from  this  standpoint  of  modification  the 
moment-consciousness  may  be  said  to  pass  through  im- 
portant stages  in  the  course  of  its  development.  The 
stage  of  non-mo  disability  of  content,  then  the  stage  of 
modifiability  of  the  sensori-motor  content,  and  finally 
modifiahility  in  representation.  The  special  importance 
of  the  recognitive  moment  for  the  being  possessing  it  is 
the  greater  freedom  from  the  dominion  of  the  external 
environment.  External  conditions  are  not  so  literally, 
so  slavishly  reflected  in  the  moment.    Changes  may  oc- 


580  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

cur  in  sensori-motor  reactions  and  adaptations  due  to 
representations  alone,  without  any  previous  material 
changes  in  the  external  conditions.  The  recognitive 
moment  carries  its  external  world  in  itself,  in  its  repre- 
sentation, and  by  affecting  changes  there,  may  bring 
about  changes  in  the  environment,  thus  controlling 
external  conditions,  instead  of  being  controlled  by  them. 
Instead  of  being  driven  by  external  forces  into  blind 
obedience,  into  unintelligent  adaptations,  the  moment  is 
on  the  point,  even  in  its  lowest  forms,  to  acquire  some 
intelligent  character  in  seeing  ahead,  by  living  over  its 
former  experiences  in  the  states  of  representation,  the 
sensori-motor  reactions  being  accordingly  modified. 

The  reproduction  of  the  recognitive  moment  is  not 
induced  by  external  stimuli  only,  but  mainly  by  the 
course  of  other  representations.  Without  actually  being 
confronted  with  the  object  the  representation  of  it  may 
any  time  arise  in  the  mind  and  call  forth  new  adapta- 
tions to  the  external  environment. 

The  representation  by  which  the  recognitive  moment 
effects  its  reproduction  is  not  at  all  a  mode  of  reinstate- 
ment, partial  or  complete,  a  mode  characteristic  of  the 
lower  types  of  moments.  What  the  moment  reproduces 
is  altogether  different  in  nature  and  content  from  what 
has  been  experienced,  or  directly  presented.  What  is 
presented  is  sensory  material,  what  is  reproduced  is  im- 
agery, ideal  "stuff."  Imagery,  ideal  stuff  as  it  is,  it  still 
mirrors,  substitutes,  represents  the  "material"  certainty 
of  sensory  experience. 

From  the  very  nature  of  the  moment  and  mode  of 
its  reproduction  the  original  emotional  tone  of  the 
experience  is  not  reproduced  by  the  recognitive  mo- 
ment.      The    emotional  tone    like    the    rest    of    the 


Recognitive  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction    381 

psychic  content  is  represented  in  recognitive  repro- 
duction, but  not  actually  reproduced.  The  great 
gain  of  it  from  a  biological  standpoint  is  momentous, 
since  the  moment's  reaction  can  be  better  adapted  to  the 
changing  conditions  of  its  environment.  The  repre- 
sentative elements  entering  into  the  idea  or  image  of 
an  object  change  from  reproduction  to  reproduction 
but  they  always  mirror,  refer  to  the  same  sensory  ele- 
ments and  compounds ;  they  recognize  their  object. 

The  recognition  of  an  object  or  an  event,  however 
vague,  means  some  experience  that  has  been  lived 
through  before.  In  other  words,  the  representation,  al- 
though experienced,  as  a  present  psychic  element,  must 
have  a  glow  of  pastness  about  it.  Representation  is  a 
present  experience  referring  to  a  past  life,  to  an  event 
that  is  passing  or  that  has  passed  away.  Representa- 
tion with  its  function  of  recognition  is  a  reference  to  the 
past. 

This  reference  to  the  past  may  range  from  the  in- 
definite to  the  highly  definite  localization  of  experience 
referred  to  the  time  past.  This  depends  on  the  devel- 
opment of  the  moment,  of  its  place  in  the  scale  of  evo- 
lution. The  higher  the  moment  the  more  definite,  the 
lower  the  less  definite  the  localization  is.  The  dog  in 
recognizing  his  master,  Ulysses,  hardly  knew  the  length 
of  time  the  hero  had  been  away  in  his  battles  and  wan- 
derings, although  the  dog  possibly  had  a  dim  feeling  of 
pastness,  revealing  it  by  the  great  joy  manifested  at 
seeing  his  master,  as  if  his  long  delayed  expectations 
have  been  finally  fulfilled.  If  dogs  are  capable  of  rec- 
ognition at  all,  some  vague  feeling  of  pastness  is  pres- 
ent in  the  recognitive  moment,  however  low  it  may 
stand  in  the  scale  of  development. 


382  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

In  the  child  we  find  that  the  time  localization 
is  quite  indefinite.  In  very  young  children  the  fu- 
ture and  the  past  such  as  yesterday  and  to-morrow 
have  no  definite  meaning.  Thus  in  children  of  three 
years  that  have  come  under  ray  observation  the  appre- 
hension of  the  past  and  future,  such  as  yesterday  and 
to-morrow  is  still  wanting.  When  the  child  is  told  that 
something  took  place,  he  referred  it  to  a  "yesterday"  in- 
definitely localized  in  the  past.  The  day  before,  a  week 
ago,  a  month  ago,  years  past  are  equally  projected  into 
the  vague  past.  The  same  holds  true  of  the  child-sense 
of  the  future.  "When  is  to-morrow?"  is  a  question  I 
have  been  often  asked  by  intelligent  children  of  three, 
four  and  even  five  years  old.  The  child  recognizes  his 
old  friend  after  a  departure  of  several  months,  but  he 
localizes  this  event  far  off  in  time,  say  "yesterday." 

The  reference  to  the  past  becomes  more  and  more 
definitely  localized  in  time,  the  higher  the  recognitive 
moment  rises  in  the  scale  of  evolution.  This  process  of 
localization  of  the  recognized  event  in  the  past  depends 
entirely  on  the  time-sense  becoming  fully  definite  with 
the  more  or  less  greater  perfection  of  the  conceptual 
time  scheme.  Thus  savages  and  the  ignorant  classes 
of  even  civilized  societies  have  an  imperfect  form 
of  time  localization.  The  definiteness  of  localiza- 
tion, however,  is  not  of  material  consequence  as  far  as 
our  point  of  view  is  concerned.  For  all  we  know 
Ulysses'  dog,  the  ape  and  the  infant  have  no  time-local- 
ization at  all,  what  is  enough  to  state  from  our  psycho- 
logical standpoint  is  the  fact  that  recognition  involves 
some  form  of  pastness  belonging  to  the  implicated  rep- 
resentative element,  a  pastness  which  in  a  higher  stage 
becomes  time-localization. 


Recogttitive  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction    383 

Under  the  influence  of  toxic  matter,  of  narcotics,  and 
in  some  forms  of  mental  diseases,  this  time-sense  may 
swell,  thus  giving  rise  to  the  projection  of  experience  on 
a  larger  scale  of  objective  time.  Such  states  are  to  be 
found  under  the  influence  of  opium  or  cannabis,  also 
in  some  mental  diseases  when  the  patient  claims  that  he 
is  many  centuries  old.  This  function  of  recognition 
with  its  aspect  of  pastness  is  certainly  present  in  the 
passing  recognitive  moment.  The  process  becomes  more 
complicated  and  also  more  objectified  in  the  higher 
types  of  moment-consciousness.  In  short,  the  recogni- 
tive moment-consciousness  in  addition  to  its  reproduc- 
tion involves  some  form  of  awareness  of  its  being  a  re- 
production by  its  reference  to  a  past  experience.  Be- 
ing freed  from  its  bondage  to  the  present  circumstances, 
living  in  the  by-gone  past  the  recognitive  moment  gets 
a  glimpse  of  the  not  yet  bom  future  into  which  the  free 
representative  elements  are  projected. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  SYNTHETIC  RECOGNITIVE  MOMENT 

THE  recognitlve  moment  in  its  reproductions 
may  be  arranged  in  a  series.  The  first  link 
in  the  series  is  the  sensory  elements  or  com- 
pound. Let  this  be  expressed  by  A  where  A 
is  the  sensory  experience,  and  let  a  be  the  representation 
of  the  first  reproduction,  the  next  reproduction  may  be 
represented  by  ai  and  the  succeeding  series  by  a^,  a*,  ^, 

an,  «e, Each  one  of  the  series  refers  directly  to 

state  A  with  its  external  object.  Each  of  them  recog- 
nizes in  the  reproduced  representation  the  represented, 
formerly  perceived  object  of  the  primary  state  A.  Each 
link  in  the  series  makes  easier  the  occurrence  of  the  suc- 
ceeding one.  The  series  forms  a  progression  in  which 
the  link  further  removed  from  the  beginning  differs  to  a 
certain  degree  from  the  ones  that  preceded  it.  This 
progressive  difference  is  due  to  the  continuous  progress- 
sive  modifications  effected  in  each  successive  link  by  the 
occurrence  or  reproduction  of  the  preceding  links.  The 
process  is  one  and  continuous,  and  with  the  progress  of 
the  series  of  reproductions  each  following  link  becomes 
modified,  emerges  with  greater  ease,  while  the  recogni- 
tion is  effected  without  any  difficulty.  Each  previous 
recognition  makes  the  next  one  easier. 

In  the  character  of  its  modification  the  lower  form  of 
the  recognitive  moment  does  not  differ  from  the  mo- 
ment of  the  synthetic  type  of  consciousness.  Like  the 
synthetic  moment,  the  modifications  are  not  effected  con- 

384 


The  Synthetic  Recognitive  Moment  385 

sciously  in  the  moment.  The  modifications  are  cumula- 
tive, without  there  being  direct  awareness  of  them.  As 
to  awareness  of  the  previous  reproduction  and  recogni- 
tion each  moment  may  be  considered  as  isolated  and 
separated.  The  history  of  the  recurrences,  of  the  re- 
production and  recognition  is  not  given  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  recognitive  moment.  As  in  the  synthetic 
moment,  an  external  observer  is  required  who  should 
read  off  the  history  of  the  recognitive  moment  from  the 
final  forms  taken  by  psycho-physiological  and  sensori- 
motor reactions. 

Expressed  in  a  formula  it  may  be  said  that  each  rep- 
resentation, each  reproduction  of  the  recognitive  mo- 
ment, refers  to  the  object  A  of  the  sensory  state  A  which 
may  be  represented  as  A-*^.  Symbolically  represented 
the  relations  of  the  successive  reproduced  representa- 
tions to  the  object  as  presented  in  state  A  and  to  each 
other  in  order  of  their  succession  may  be  expressed  by 
the  following  diagram: 


386  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

In  other  words  the  representative  states  in  the  series 
of  reproduction  all  refer  to  the  original  experience  A-^ 
and  each  preceding  state  modifies  the  succeeding  one, 
but  the  succeeding  state  does  not  include  consciously  the 
previous  reproduction  and  recognition.  The  partial  in- 
tersecting of  the  circles  indicates  that  the  successive 
states  do  not  include  their  predecessors,  but  are  only  in- 
fluenced and  modified  by  them.  The  state,  however, 
gets  enlarged  the  further  situated  it  is  in  the  progres- 
sion of  the  series.  Each  state  inherits  only  the  modifi- 
cations accumulated  by  the  preceding  ones,  but  it  does 
not  inherit  the  cognition  or  recognition  of  the  state 
itself. 

In. this  respect  the  series  of  states  going  to  make  up 
the  recognitive  moment  differs  from  that  of  synthetic 
type.  The  synthetic  moment  reproduces  by  reinstate- 
ment with  modifications  accumulated  in  the  course  of 
the  process  of  reproductions.  The  recognitive  moment 
on  the  contrary  does  not  reproduce  by  reinstatement  of 
presentation,  but  by  representation.  The  preceding 
state  need  not  be  actually  repeated,  and  if  such  a  refer- 
ence is  present  it  is  represented. 

Representation  is  effected  by  different  psychic  ele- 
ments. The  same  or  like  elements  need  not  be  repro- 
duced in  the  moment  of  the  recognitive  type.  In  the 
recognitive  moment  of  the  stage  considered  by  us  such 
a  reinstatement  is  altogether  absent.  The  states  follow- 
ing each  other  are  different.  Moreover  they  are  isolated, 
disconnected  in  the  series.  The  links  in  the  series  refer 
to  the  same  object  as  presented,  but  they  do  not  refer  to 
each  other  in  the  order  of  their  progression,  state  a 
does  not  refer  to  the  state  a^  that  preceded  it,  nor  does 
a  refer  to  a*,  nor  a*  to  a\  and  so  on.     The  series  of 


The  Synthetic  Recognitive  Moment  387 

states  of  the  recognitive  moment  in  the  stage  under  con- 
sideration do,  however,  effect  modifications  in  the  order 
of  their  succession,  a  modifies  a^  a  modifies  d^  a  modi- 
fies d^  and  so  on  each  preceding  state  modifying  the 
succeeding  one. 

The  dog  on  seeing  a  person  for  the  second 
or  third  time  may  recognize  the  friend  of  his  mas- 
ter, but  he  does  not  remember  that  he  has  recog- 
nized him  already  on  previous  occasions.  Similarly 
when  the  baby  sees  a  strange  person  for  the  first  time,  it 
may  become  scared  and  begin  to  cry.  Subsequent  repe- 
tition of  similar  experiences  may  reduce  or  on  the  con- 
trary may  increase  the  fear  element,  but  the  baby  learns 
to  know  and  recognize  his  man  and  the  psycho-physio- 
logical and  psycho-motor  reactions  follow  as  soon  as  the 
"man"  is  caught  sight  of.  Reproduction  and  recogni- 
tion become  easier,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  the 
baby,  like  the  intelligent  dog,  in  recognizing  the  person, 
is  aware  of  having  recognized  the  person  on  previous 
occasions.  The  dog  and  the  child  are  aware  of  the  per- 
son and  recognize  him,  but  they  are  not  aware  of  the 
series  of  preceding  recognitions.  A  form  of  moment- 
consciousness  with  a  series  of  isolated  reproductions  and 
recognitions,  but  with  accumulated  modifications  may 
be  termed  the  synthetic  accumulative  recognitive  mo- 
ment. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE   SYNTHETIC    MOMENT   OF   SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 

IN  the  higher  stages  of  the  recognitive  moment 
the  states  in  the  series  are  no  longer  isolated.  Each 
succeeding  state  embraces  or  truer  to  say  includes 
and  represents  the  preceding  one.  The  whole  ser- 
ies is  essentially  an  interconnected  one.  The  states  in 
the  series  not  only  refer  to  the  original  experience  of  the 
object  as  presented,  but  also  to  each  other  in  the  order 
of  their  succession.  Let  A  be  the  original  experience  of 
which  A  is  presentative  and  a  is  representative,  then  the 
state  of  the  recognitive  moment  may  be  represented  by 
a^.  State  a  refers  to  «^,  and  the  succeeding  state  a  re- 
fers not  only  to  a^,  but  also  to  a.  The  same  holds  true  in 
the  case  of  the  other  states, — a  refers  to  a^  and  a  and 
not  only  to  a  alone  but  also  to  a;  a  refers  once  more  to 
a^  and  also  to  a',  a,  a,  and  so  on ;  each  succeeding  state 
refers  to  the  original  experience  and  also  to  the  preced- 
ing states  of  recognition.  In  other  words,  each  state  rep- 
resents not  only  the  original  sensory  experience,  but  also 
some  though  not  all  of  the  preceding  series  of  represen- 
tations. There  is,  in  short,  awareness  in  the  act  of  rec- 
ognition. The  preceding  state  modifies  the  succeeding 
one,  and  this  latter  is  fully  aware  of  the  former.  This 
awareness  is  present  during  the  very  occurrence  of  each 
state  in  the  series. 

The    reproduced     state    in    its     recognition    recog- 

388 


The  Synthetic  Moment  of  Self-Consciousness  389 

nizes  the  object  as  presented  to  sense-experience,  recog- 
nizes, or  is  aware  at  least,  that  it  has  had  some  such 
recognitions  on  previous  occasions,  and  at  the  same  time 
recognizes,  or  is  aware  of  its  present  recognition.  Such 
a  recognitive  moment,  the  highest  of  all  the  moments- 
consciousness,  is  characteristic  of  the  fully  developed 
adult  human  consciousness  or  of  self-consciousness  and 
may  be  termed  the  synthetic  moment  of  self-conscious- 
ness. The  synethetic  moment  of  self-consciousness 
forms  a  series  of  selves — the  present  or  the  percipient 
self,  the  past  or  the  perceived  self  and  the  intermediate 
selves  connecting  the  two  selves  as  termini,  the  whole 
forming  a  series  synthetized  by  the  life  of  the  synthetic 
moment  of  self-consciousness. 

If  we  retain  our  previous  denotation  of  objects  and 
of  the  series  of  recognitive  states  and  denote  the  recog- 
nitive reproduction  by  attaching  the  denotation  of  the 
presented  object  as  index  to  the  state  then  the  state  may 
be  denoted  by  ^,  the  succeeding  states  in  the  simple  rec- 
ognitive moment  may  be  denoted  by  «^,  a^^^  a»^,  a*^, 
«5^,  a*^.  The  states  in  the  series  of  the  synthetic  mo- 
ment of  self-consciousness  may  then  be  represented  by 
the  following  formula : 


^, 

a^,       ai, 

a\ 

^1,            Ja, 

a\ 

tfi, 

a^t       a»y 

and  so  on  the   last  being  extremely  complicated.  .  . 
Graphically  the  synthetic  moment  of  self-conscious- 
ness may  be  represented  as  follows : 


390  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


All  along  our  analysis  of  reproduction  we  have  at  the 
same  time  by  implication  discussed  the  various  types  and 
forms  of  what  may  be  conveniently  termed  as  germinal 
memory  in  the  states  of  consciousness  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals. Memory,  however,  is  not  present  in  the  lower 
types  of  moment-consciousness.  Memory  really  begins 
with  the  recognitive  moment  and  reaches  its  full  perfec- 
tion in  the  adult  human  consciousness, — in  the  synthetic 
moment  of  self-consciousness.  It  is  only  in  the  moment 
of  self-consciousness  that  all  the  characteristics  of  mem- 
ory are  to  be  formed,  namely,  reproduction;  not  rein- 
statement, but  reproduction  after  the  kind  of  the  recog- 
nitive moment,  recognition,  definite  localization  in  the 
past  and  finally  awareness  of  its  own  activity,  or  rather 
self-awareness.  Memory  germinates  and  grows  in  the 
recognitive  moment,  and  blossoms  in  the  personality- 
moment. 


APPENDIX  I 

CONSCIOUSNESS 

In  opposition  to  the  metaphysical  view  that  there  ex- 
ists one  consciousness  and  a  separate  content,  James  in 
his  article  "Does  Consciousness  exist?"  flatly  denies  the 
existence  of  such  a  consciousness.  He  lays  stress  on  the 
fact  that  such  a  consciousness  is  of  a  purely  hypothetical 
and  speculative  character.  Psychologically  speaking  all 
there  exists  is  thought,  experience,  while  an  abstract  un- 
differentiated consciousness  may  as  well  be  omitted 
from  the  scheme  of  things.  All  we  deal  with  is  mental 
facts.  James  ridicules  the  position  of  those  who  regard 
consciousness  as  being  independent  of  content:  "To 
consciousness  as  such  nothing  can  happen,  for  timeless 
in  itself,  it  is  only  a  witness  of  happenings  in  time,  in 
which  it  plays  no  part"  .  .  .  "Consciousness  as 
such  is  entirely  impersonal — 'self  and  its  activities  be- 
long to  the  content"  .  .  .  James'  view  is  that  in- 
stead of  an  impersonal  consciousness  we  should  substi- 
tute thought  as  a  function  of  knowing  (James's  italics). 
"To  deny  plumply  that  'consciousness'  exists  seems  so 
absurd  on  the  face  of  it — for  undeniably  'thoughts'  do 
exist — that  I  fear  some  readers  will  follow  me  no  farth- 
er. Let  me  then  immediately  explain  that  I  mean  only 
to  deny  that  the  word  stands  for  an  entity,  but  to  insist 
most  emphatically  that  it  does  stand  for  a  function.  .  .  . 
That  function  is  knowing'  (James'  italics). 

We  can  thus  far  agree  with  James.  When  however 
he  begins  to  speculate  on  unitary  stuff  and  pure  simple 
experience  which  is  both  objective  and  subjective  we 
must  part  company,  for  he  leaves  the  domain  of  psy- 
chology and  enters  the  domain  of  metaphysics.  "My 
thesis  is"  he  writes  "that,  if  we  start  with  the  suppo- 
sition that  there  is  only  one  primal  stuff  or  material  in 
the  world,  a  stuff  of  which  everything  is  composed,  and 

391 


39*  Appendix  I 

if  wc  call  that  stuff  'pure  experience'  then  knowing  can 
only  be  explained  as  a  particular  sort  of  relation  towards 
one  another  into  which  portions  of  pure  experience  may 
enter."  In  this  respect  James  approaches  perilously 
close  to  Wundtian  Voluntarism  which  he  does  not  favor. 
It  practically  means  double  barrelled  experience  which 
on  the  one  hand  is  objective  while  on  the  other  it  is  sub- 
jective. As  James  puts  it,  the  same  experience  is  counted 
twice  over  in  one  stream  which  is  external  and  the  other 
which  is  internal. 

All  objections  urged  against  Voluntarism  may  be 
brought  against  this  view  which  is  really  nothing  but 
the  voluntarism  of  Wundt  under  a  different  garb.  Wc 
are  not  better  off  by  the  assumption  of  the  same  experi- 
ence participating  in  two  different  streams.  We  do  not 
understand  the  streams  any  better  by  assuming  differ- 
ences which  really  amount  to  the  differences  of  matter 
and  mind,  or  of  matter  and  consciousness. 

James  on  the  one  hand  is  too  metaphysical  and  on  the 
other  hand  he  wishes  to  eliminate  the  inactive,  impassive 
consciousness  of  the  idealists  and  of  the  Neo-Kantians. 
He  is  metaphysical  in  assuming  a  pure  experience  which 
is  both  material  and  mental  and  which  in  its  purity  is 
neither  mental  nor  material.  His  true  psychological 
sense  tells  him  that  an  inactive,  passive  consciousness  is 
a  useless,  futile  assumption.  James  draws  a  sharp  differ- 
ence between  internal  and  external  experience.  "We 
find  that  there  are  some  fires  that  will  always  bum  sticks 
and  always  warm  our  bodies,  and  that  there — are  some 
waters  that  will  always  put  out  fires  .  .  .  Mental 
fire  is  what  won't  burn  real  sticks;  mental  water  is  what 
won't  necessarily  (though  of  course  it  may)  put  out 
even  a  mental  fire.  Mental  knives  may  be  sharp,  but  they 
won't  cut  real  wood  .  .  ."  In  short,  James  him- 
self strongly  contrasts  the  two  sets  of  experiences.  That 
is  all  that  the  psychologist  requires.  The  rest  of  the 
speculation, — the  identification  of  the  two  streams  in 
one  unitary,  primitive  stuff-experience  docs  not  belong 
to  psychology  as  a  science. 


Appendix  I  393 

The  whole  view  of  James  is  metaphysical,  and  still 
with  his  clear  psychological  insight  he  cannot  keep 
away  from  psychological  facts.  He  shifts  from  meta- 
physics to  psychology:  "The  stream  of  thinking"  he 
says,  "(which  I  recognize  emphatically  as  a  phenome- 
non) is  only  a  careless  name  for  what,  when  scrutinized, 
reveals  itself  as  to  consist  chiefly  of  the  stream  of  my 
breathing.  The  *I  think'  which  Kant  said  must  be  able 
to  accompany  all  my  objects,  is  the  breath  'I  breathe' 
which  actually  does  accompany  them.  There  are  other 
internal  facts  besides  breathing  (intercephalic  muscular 
adjustments  .  .  .)  and  these  increase  the  assets  of 
'consciousness'  so  far  as  the  latter  is  subject  to  imme- 
diate perception ;  but  breath  which  was  ever  the  original 
'spirit',  breath  moving  outwards,  between  the  glottis 
and  the  nostrils,  is,  I  am  persuaded,  the  essence  out  of 
which  philosophers  have  construed  the  entity  known  to 
them  as  consciousness.  That  entity  is  fictitious  while 
thoughts  in  the  concrete  are  fully  real.  But  thoughts  in 
the  concrete  are  made  of  the  same  stuf  as  things  are." 
(James'  italics).  In  this  passage  James  as  usual  dis- 
plays his  great  psychological  introspection  which  is  un- 
fortunately complicated  with  metaphysical  considera- 
tions. 

Of  course,  even  from  a  purely  psychological  point  of 
view  we  can  hardly  agree  that  sensations  of  respiration 
and  intercephalic,  muscular  adjustments  are  alone  suf- 
ficient as  elements  of  general  consciousness,  for  as  Ri- 
bot  and  others  have  pointed  out  coenaesthetic  sensa- 
tions, sensations  coming  from  muscles,  viscera,  nerves, 
neurones,  peripheral,  central,  and  sympathetic  nervous 
system,  all  enter  as  elements  in  the  synthesis  of  con- 
sciousness. It  may  be  claimed  that  the  sensations  point- 
ed out  by  James  may  be  predominant,  but  this  is  rather 
questionable.  However  the  case  may  be,  the  identifica- 
tion of  matter  and  mind,  one  being  objective  and  the 
other  subjective  thought  is  an  adventure  into  the  realms 
of  metaphysics. 

James   differentiates   the   fire   that  bums   from   the 


394  Appendix  I 

fire  that  does  not  burn,  the  water  that  is  really  wet 
from  the  water  which  is  not  wet,  the  motion  that  obeys 
the  laws  of  mechanics  from  the  motion  that  does  not 
obey  Newton's  laws.  In  order  to  constitute  water  the 
chemist  does  not  mix  oxygen  with  his  thought  of  hydro- 
gen; in  order  again  to  constitute  the  idea  of  water  the 
psychologist  does  not  require  tubes,  retorts,  so  many 
volumes  of  gases  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen.  The  chem- 
ist does  not  put  his  ideas  into  his  chemical  compounds 
and  the  psychologist  does  not  subject  his  mental  states 
to  chemical  tests.  It  is  only  in  metaphysics  that  the 
fundamental  difference  of  mental  states  and  physical  ob- 
jects can  be  explained  away  in  one  unitary  experience. 

I  may  add  that  James  himself  realized  the  truth  of  my 
contention,  for  in  a  private  discussion  with  me  he  ac- 
knowledged that  the  view  taken  by  him  was  purely 
metaphysical,  that  for  the  psychologist  consciousness  is 
as  much  of  a  reality  as  matter,  atoms,  molecule,  ether, 
election,  in  short,  as  some  form  of  material  substance  is 
requisite  for  the  physicist. 

Recently  some  neo-realists  attempted  to  identify  con- 
sciousness with  energy  and  especially  with  that  form 
of  energy  known  as  potential  energy.  Now  we  can- 
not possibly  identify  mental  states  and  processes  with 
physical  forms  of  energy,  whether  kinetic  or  potential. 
Arthur  Gordon  Webster  in  his  "Dynamics"  points  out: 

"Kinetic  energy  is  of  the  dimensions the  same  as 

those  of  work.  Potential  Energy  is  defined  as  work. 
The  C.G.S.  unit  of  energy  is,  therefore,  the  ergJ' 
If  mental  states  or  consciousness  be  potential  energy 
of  the  physicist,  the  neo-realist  should  define  it  in 
terms  of  physical  work.  How  many  ergs  are  there 
in  the  ideas  of  virtue,  goodness,  and  beauty?  It 
is  clear  that  if  we  use  the  term  energy  in  the 
case  of  mental  states  or  processes,  we  can  do  it  only  in 
a  figurative  way.  Energy  in  psychology  cannot  be  used 
\r\  the  same  sense  as  the  physicist  uses  the  term  in  the 


Appendix  I  395 

case  of  kinetic  or  potential  energy.  One  cannot  take 
the  mass  of  the  idea  and  multiply  it  on  the  square  of  its 
length.  Such  a  procedure  is  meaningless,  it  is  therefore 
idle  to  talk  of  consciousness  as  potential  energy.  Ener- 
gy is  used  in  mental  life  as  a  figure  of  speech,  as  an  il- 
lustration or  substitute  taken  from  physical  life,  but  en- 
ergy and  consciousness  can  not  be  identified.  When  we 
say  that  an  argument  is  clear,  we  do  not  mean  that  there 
are  no  particles  of  dust  in  it,  or  that  we  can  use  it  as  a 
medium  through  which  we  can  see  objects  distinctly;  or 
when  we  say  of  a  stupid  person  that  he  is  dense,  we  do 
not  mean  that  he  has  a  high  specific  gravity.  Conscious- 
ness is  not  physical  energy. 

It  is,  however,  quite  possible  that  the  potential  ener- 
gy-consciousness of  the  neo-realist  is  neither  the  poten- 
tial energy  of  the  physicist  nor  the  consciousness  of  the 
psychologist.  In  this  case  we  once  more  deal  with  some 
general  metaphysical  unifying  substratum  akin  to  the 
"pure  experience"  of  James  or  to  the  "unitary  experi- 
ence" of  Wundtian  Voluntarism;  in  other  words,  we 
deal  here  again  with  metaphysics  and  not  with  science. 
One  cannot  help  agreeing  with  Calkins:  "Of  late  years 
vigorous  attempts  have  been  made  to  eject  the  term 
consciousness  from  our  vocabulary,  but,  in  my  opinion, 
these  efforts,  though  richly  significant,  are  metaphysical, 
not  psychological,  since  all  are  mainly  concerned  to 
overcome  the  dualistic  opposition  of  psychical  to  physi- 
cal. For  whether  accurate  or  inaccurate,  the  attempt 
to  balance  the  account  of  thought  and  thing,  that  is,  to 
distinguish  psychical  from  physical,  is  concerned  with 
the  problem  of  ultimate  reality,  not  with  the  explana- 
tion and  description  of  observed  facts,  and  is  therefore 
metaphysical,  not  scientific  in  character." 

While  on  the  one  hand  there  is  danger  that  psychol- 
ogy, dealing  with  mind,  experience,  knowledge,  is  apt  to 
fall  into  epistemological  and  metaphysical  pitfalls,  on 
the  other  hand  there  is  grave  danger  on  the  side  of  phy- 
siologists and  biologists  to  identify  psychic  facts 
with    physiological    and    biological    facts.       Recently 


39^  Appendix  I 

students  of  animal  life  have  made  violent  efforts 
of  merging  psychology  into  biology.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  motor  reactions,  adjustments,  adapta- 
tions, behavior  must  be  taken  into  consideration 
in  the  study  of  psychic  facts,  but  motor  manifesta- 
tions are  of  psychological  significance  only  in  so  far 
as  they  lead  to  an  interpretation  of  the  inner  subjective 
facts,  facts  of  consciousness.  This  knowledge  can  only 
be  given  through  an  introspective  interpretation  of  the 
facts  of  behavior. 

We  can  fully  realize  the  non-psychological  attitude 
when  we  find  writers  like  Watson  who  wish  to  elimi- 
nate ideas  or  kindred  mental  states  from  psychology,  or 
who  like  McDougall  define  psychology  as  a  science  of 
animal  behavior.  The  peristaltic  movements  of  the  in- 
testines, the  action  of  the  heart,  the  lungs  and  the  liver 
belong  to  animal  activities  and  still  they  can  hardly  be 
included  under  psychic  activities.  McDougall  thinks 
that  "psychologists  must  cease  to  be  content  with  the 
sterile  and  narrow  conception  of  their  science  as  the 
science  of  consciousness,  and  must  boldy  assert  its  claim 
to  be  the  positive  science  of  the  mind  in  all  its  aspects 
and  modes  of  functioning,  or  as  I  would  prefer  to  say, 
the  positive  science  of  conduct  or  of  behaviour."  But 
even  from  McDougall's  standpoint  mere  movements  do 
not  constitute  psychological  material,  they  are  psycho- 
logical in  so  far  as  they  are  the  indications  of  some  in- 
ner subjective  experience,  such  as  sensations,  feelings, 
emotions,  strivings,  conations.  Now  it  is  just  these 
phenomena  that  form  the  subject  matter  of  psychology. 
The  psychologist  regards  behavior  as  the  means  for  an 
introspective  comprehension  of  what  that  behavior  may 
indicate  subjectively. 

Psychology,  even  from  McDougall's  standpoint,  is 
after  all  the  science  of  the  mind,  the  science  of  con- 
sciousness which  we  can  study  through  an  introspective 
interpretation  of  motor  reactions  or  behavior.  Know- 
ing introspectively  what  fear  is  from  our  own  introspec- 
tion and  from  the  observation  of  the  motor  reactions  the 


Appendix  I  397 

instinct  of  fear  gives  rise  to  we  can  interpret  similar  re- 
actions or  behavior  in  our  neighbor  or  in  our  lower  kin 
in  the  scale  of  evolution. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  while  on  the  one  hand 
McDougall  and  others  put  motor  reactions,  conduct 
among  psychic  phenomena,  on  the  other  hand  pure  mo- 
tor phenomena  and  physiological  activities  with  but  the 
rudiments  of  psychic  life  are  described  "in  terms  of  the 
three  aspects  of  mental  life  of  all  mental  processes — 
the  cognitive,  the  effective  and  the  conative,'  'terms  which 
are  really  characteristic  of  the  higher  forms  of  mental 
life.  According  to  McDougall  even  "the  lower  ani- 
mals perceive,  feel,  and  act."  This  reminds  one  of 
Binet's  micro-organisms  possessing  perception,  feeling, 
and  volition. 


APPENDIX  II 

PHYSIOLOGICAL  TRACES 

My  attention  was  called  to  a  very  valuable  paper 
"Further  Studies  in  the  Chemical  Dynamics  of  the  Cen- 
tral Nervous  System,"  by  T.  Brails  ford  Robertson,  pub- 
lished in  the  "Folio  Neuro-Biologica"  Band  VII,  19 13. 
Robertson  advances  an  extremely  interesting  hypothesis 
based  on  his  bio-chemical  researches.  Basing  himself 
on  the  fact  that  "the  performance  of  mental  work  ini- 
tially facilitates  its  further  performance  and  subse- 
quently depresses  or  fatigues  it,"  he  builds  up  a  far 
reaching  chemico-physiological  hypothesis  of  the  main 
phenomena  of  normal  and  abnormal  mental  life.  I 
quote  freely  from  his  paper  as  it  is  of  importance  and 
highly  stimulating  to  those  who  wish  to  go  into  the  more 
technical  scientific  details  of  physiological  research  in 
regard  to  the  phenomena  of  normal  and  abnormal 
mental  function. 

"We  meet  therefore  in  the  exercise  of  a  given  intel- 
lectual function  with  two  apparently  contradictory  facts. 
Performance  facilitates  the  exercise  of  the  function  and 
it  likewise  depresses  the  exercise  of  the  function.  We 
note  furthermore  that  the  facilitation  and  depression 
become  evident  at  different  periods  of  time,  the  former 
in  the  earlier  and  the  latter  in  the  later  stages  of  per- 
formance. Now  this  phenomenon  is  not  at  all  limited 
to  the  functions  of  the  central  nervous  system.  It  is 
displayed  in  a  very  striking  way  by  a  variety  of  other 
functions,  for  instance  in  the  contraction  of  the  muscles 
in  response  to  stimulation,  whether  direct  or  indirect. 
The  phase  of  facilitation  is  displayed  initially  in  the  well 
known  'staircase  phenomenon'  and  the  phase  of  de- 
pression by  rigidity  and  inability  to  contract  to  stimuli 
in  response  to  stimuli  which  formerly  evoked  a  maximal 
response.     Again,  as  I  have  shown  in  a  series  of  com- 

398 


Appendix  II  399 

municatlons,  a  similar  phenomenon  is  displayed  in 
growth  which  initially  undergoes  acceleration  and  there- 
after slows  down.  Indeed  acceleration  and  slowing 
may  alternate  a  number  of  times  in  the  same  organism 
producing  what  I  have  termed  'growth  cycles.'  This 
type  of  phenomenon  would  appear  very  generally  dis- 
played in  the  performance  of  life-activities,  and  in- 
deed I  am  inclined  to  think  with  Loeb  that  the  self 
conserving  character  of  the  life-process  will  ultimately 
find  its  solution  in  the  study  of  phenomena  of  this  de- 
scription." 

This  principle  of  "growth  cycles"  is  significant,  inas- 
much as  it  falls  in  line  with  the  fundamental  principle 
of  reserve  energy  developed  by  James  and  myself  from 
different  standpoints. 

Robertson  assumes  the  presence  of  physiological 
traces.  "If  the  central  nervous  system  conditions  these 
phenomena  at  all,  as  we  believe  it  does,  then  the  passage 
of  a  stimulus  through  the  central  nervous  system  must 
lead  through  a  changed  condition  which  for  the  sake  of 
forming  a  concrete  image  we  may  term  in  the  language 
employed  by  Maudsley,  the  deposition  of  a  trace  or  in 
the  terminology  of  Exner,  the  excavation  of  a  channel 
(Bahnung)  .  .  .  The  dynamic  conception  of 
trace  formation  regards  it  as  being  due  to  a  chemical 
alteration  of  cell-material  along  the  path  of  the  trace.' 
We  have  seen  that  trace  formation  is  at  first  facilitated 
by  the  process  which  brings  it  about  and  later  depressed. 
.  At  first  a  stimulus  passes  over  the  'trace'  more 
readily,  because  it  has  previously  done  so,  but  at  a  later 
stage  it  passes  over  it  less  and  less  readily  until  finally  the 
resistance  is  so  great  as  to  almost  inhibit  its  passage 
altogether.  Recalling  this  fact  we  find  ourselves  in  a  po- 
sition to  crystallize  our  problem  and  state  it  in  the  fol- 
lowing terms:  'What  is  the  nature  of  a  chemical  reac- 
tion which  at  first  takes  place  the  more  readily  in  con- 
sequence of  having  previously  taken  place,  but  at  a  later 
stage  is  inhibited  by  its  own  progress?'  When  this  ques- 
tion is  addressed  to  a  physical  chemist  he  does  not  nesi- 


400  Appendix  II 

tate  in  replying:  'The  reaction  is  either  catenary  (con- 
sists of  two  reactions  the  second  of  which  uses  up  the 
product  of  the  first)  or  it  is  autocatalytic,  i.  e.  one  of  the 
products  of  the  reaction  accelerates  the  reaction.'  No 
other  chemical  reactions  are  known  to  the  experience  of 
the  chemist  which  display  at  any  stage  positive  acceleror 
tion." 

The  various  experimental  works  carried  out  by  Rob- 
ertson lead  him  to  the  rejection  of  catenary  reactions 
and  to  the  assumption  of  autocatalysis.  Basing  himself 
on  this  hypothesis  of  autocatalysis  Robertson  goes  on  to 
explain  from  a  purely  chemicho-physiological  standpoint 
the  phenomena  of  memory,  of  amnesia,  of  hypnosis  and 
of  allied  phenomena. 

"Adopting  the  working  hypothesis  outlined  above, 
we  perceive  that  the  canalisation  hypothesis  of  Exner 
can  now  be  expressed  in  a  much  more  definite  and  con- 
crete form.  Each  incoming  stimulus  carves  out  for  it- 
self in  the  central  nervous  system  or  deepens  a  pre-ex- 
isting channel  in  the  central  nervous  system,  but  the 
channel  is  not  a  trough  formed  by  the  physical  displace- 
ment of  particles,  it  is  a  chemical  channel,  a  thread  or 
trace  of  the  autocatalyst  of  central  nervous  activities,  a 
thread  which  need  not  necessarily  be  supposed  to  be 
more  than  a  few  times  the  diameter  of  'the  sphere  of 
molecular  influence'  in  width.  This  deposit  necessarily 
follows  faithfully  the  path  pursued  by  the  original  im- 
pulse and  permits  succeeding  impulses  to  pass  over  the 
same  path  more  readily  by  virtue  of  its  presence.  It  is 
possessed  of  course  of  a  definite  spatial  location,  but, 
and  this  is  a  very  important  point,  if  by  any  chance  it 
should  be  obliterated  or  destroyed  it  is  not  irreplaceable 
even  if  the  continuity  of  the  original  path  be  forever  in- 
terrupted. For  it  is  only  one  of  a  conceivably  enormous 
number  of  paths  which  might  be  traversed  by  a  stimulus 
in  its  passage  from  one  extremity  of  the  original  path 
to  the  other.  Furthermore,  the  trace  is  capable  of  be- 
ing traversed  by  other  subsequent  or  performed  traces 
in  as  many  different  ways  as  the  axons  and  ganglion  cells 


Appendix  II  401 

of  the  central  nervous  system  intercommunicate,  that  is, 
so  far  as  our  knowledge  extends,  in  a  number  of  ways 
which  for  all  practical  purposes  may  be  regarded  as  in- 
finite. 

"It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  trace  consists 
of  a  deposit  of  an  autocatalyst  which  we  are  obviously 
compelled  to  assume  is  an  autocatalyst  for  the 
propagation  of  all  impulses.  It  follows,  therefore,  that 
if  a  faint  trace  runs  into,  that  is  to  say,  traverses  or  in- 
tersects a  well-marked  trace,  there  will  be  a  tendency  for 
the  impulse  forming  or  following  the  faint  trace  to  be 
deflected  completely  at  or  in  a  great  part  into  the  well 
marked  trace.  Indeed  if  the  intersecting  trace  be  suf- 
ficiently well  marked  and  formed  subsequently  to  the 
faint  trace,  we  can  see  how  impulses  now  arriving  by  way 
of  the  faint  trace  would  become  so  largely  deflected  into 
the  new  well  marked  trace  as  to  leave  the  parts  of  the 
faint  trace  remote  from  the  point  of  intersection  almost 
untraversed  by  any  impulses  at  all.  Instances  of  the 
mental  correlates  of  these  physico-chemical  phenomena 
abound  in  our  daily  psychic  life." 

In  our  next  book  on  "Symptomatology"  we  shall  re- 
fer to  Robertson's  application  of  his  theory  to  the  vari- 
ous phenomena  of  hypnosis,  multiple  personality,  am- 
nesia and  various  forms  of  dissociation.  I  wish  here  to 
call  attention  to  Robertson's  valuable  paper  and  point 
out  his  relation  to  the  hypothesis  of  unconscious  cere- 
bration on  the  one  hand  and  to  my  psycho-biological 
doctrines  of  the  moment-consciousness  on  the  other. 

Robertson  fully  realizes  the  shortcomings  and  crude- 
ness  of  the  physiological  theories  advanced  by  many 
physiologists  to  the  effects  of  crowding  out  mental  phe- 
nomena or  consciousness,  the  very  phenomena  which  the 
physiological  theories  were  constructed  to  explain  phy- 
siologically or  rather  to  follow  out  physiologically  step 
by  step.  As  I  have  insisted  in  this  volume  a  physiolog- 
ical correlative  must  be  postulated  for  all  phenomena  of 
consciousness.  This  however  is  far  from  denying  the 
mental  facts  themselves  and  thus  being  left  with  a  phy- 


402  Appendix  11 

slological  hypothesis  instead  of  the  facts  themselves 
for  which  this  hypothesis  was  constructed.  When  a 
physiologist  or  biologist  constructs  a  physiological  hy- 
pothesis as  a  correlative  of  consciousness  he  is  so  carried 
away  with  it  that  he  soon  forgets  the  purpose  of  the 
hypothesis  and  proceeds  to  deny  the  main  facts.  From  a 
purely  scientific  standpoint  we  must  postulate  that  each 
and  every  act  of  experience,  of  consciousness  has  a  phy- 
siological correlative,  a  point  on  which  I  have  laid  spec- 
ial stress.  The  reasoning  of  a  Newton,  Aristotle,  and 
Plato  as  well  as  the  moral  thoughts  and  feelings  of  pro- 
phets and  saints  have  their  physiological  correlatives. 
This  however  would  not  mean  that  all  those  experiences 
of  genius,  intellectual  and  moral,  are  unconscious  cere- 
brations devoid  of  all  conscious  awareness.  Under  such 
conditions  it  is  best  to  stick  to  the  facts  and  regard  the 
physiological  hypothesis  as  a  pretty  speculation  which 
may  do  more  harni  than  good,  inasmuch  as  it  distracts 
the  attention  from  the  facts  at  issue. 

What  I  claim  is  that  a  good  deal,  if  not  the  most  of 
what  is  described  as  subconscious,  is  essentially  of  the 
same  inner,  subjective  experience  of  what  we  otherwise 
describe  as  conscious  awareness,  inasmuch  as  introspec- 
tive experience,  both  direct  and  indirect,  given  by  imme- 
diate experience  and  by  memory,  as  well  as  by  reactions 
and  behavior  are  the  same  as  found  in  fully  conscious 
states.  If  we  deny  awareness  to  subconscious  manifesta- 
tions, such  as  hypnosis  and  allied  states,  we  should  also 
call  in  question  the  awareness  of  all  other  similar  states. 
It  goes  without  saying  as  I  have  pointed  that  hypnosis 
and  allied  states  being  phenomena  of  consciousness  must 
have  a  physiological  correlative,  but  it  is  still  to  be 
proven  that  in  such  states  there  is  only  a  physiological 
process  without  any  conscious  accompaniment.  We  may 
as  well  claim  that  the  Iliad,  Hamlet,  the  Principia,  the 
Parthenon,  Venus  de  Milo  and  other  creations  of  genius 
are  the  result  of  physiological  processes.  In  a  certain 
sense  the  claim  is  true,  there  is  a  physiological  correla- 
tive to  the  highest  flight  of  genius,  but  it  is  man- 


Appendix  II  403 

ifestly  absurd  to  omit  the  conscious  elements  that  go  to 
constitute  the  very  essense  of  what  we  regard  as  genius. 
Conscious  and  subconscious  phenomena  have  alike  phy- 
siological correlatives  and  both  of  them  are  character- 
ized by  consciousness,  awareness,  and  feeling.  The 
subconscious  is  a  consciousness,  an  other-consciousness, 
a  consciousness  other  than  the  usual  personal  conscious' 
ness. 

Robertson  is  fully  aware  not  only  of  the  crude  at- 
tempts of  what  he  terms  static  physiological  theories, 
but  also  of  the  fallacy  of  denying  consciousness  and  in- 
stalling in  its  place  physiological  currents,  traces,  and 
deposits.  "It  must  be  admitted"  he  says,  "that  the 
sporadic  attempts  which  have  been  made  from  time  to 
time  by  biologists  to  advance  interpretations  of  the  phy- 
sical correlates  of  psychic  phenomena  have  seldom  been 
either  well  judged  or  attended  by  any  measure  of  suc- 
cess." In  another  place  he  says;  "The  static  conception 
as  that  developed  by  Munk  and  Ziehen,  regards  the 
'trace'  as  some  structural  modification,  some  physical  al- 
teration, an  alteration  in  other  words  in  the  distribution 
of  cell-matter  in  space.  I  have  elsewhere  dwelt  rather 
at  length  upon  the  more  manifest  objections  to  this 
point  of  view,  at  least  in  the  crude  form  in  which  it  has 
hitherto  been  presented.  It  would  require  each  idea, 
mental  image  and  conception  to  be  very  strictly  local- 
ized. Such  a  localization  of  ideas  has,  of  course,  never 
been  demonstrated." 

The  "trace"  is  conceived  by  Robertson  in  dynamic 
terms.  This  dynamic  "trace,"  the  correlative  of  mem- 
ory, conscious  and  subconscious,  is  more  or  less  per- 
manent, because  "the  persistence  of  memories  proves 
that  the  'trace,'  whatever  it  may  be  is  rather  per- 
manent and  only  very  slowly  fades  away." 

Robertson  fully  realizes  the  importance  of  the  sub- 
conscious for  the  conscious  activity.  "The  phenomena  of 
subconscious  memory  reveal  clearly  that  memories  may 
persist  from  childhood  to  advanced  maturity  without 
intermediate  self-conscious  recollection  to  reinforce  the 


404  Appendist  II 

trace.  Occasional  subconscious  recollection  cannot  of 
course  be  ruled  out,  but  it  must  be  rare  in  many  cases, 
for  otherwise,  as  Sidis  has  pointed  out,  our  entire  men- 
tal life  would  be  occupied  in  recollecting." 

In  speaking  of  the  static  physiological  theories  Rob- 
ertson says:  "Sidis  proceeds  to  dispose  of  all  these 
theories  collectively  on  the  ground  that  a  mere  modi- 
fication left  behind  as  a  trace  cannot  possibly  explain, 
memory,  recollection,  the  fact  of  referring  a  particular 
bit  of  experience  to  an  experience  felt  before."  Robert- 
son fully  sees  the  function  of  the  physiological  theories 
as  correlatives  of  conscious  states,  not  as  substitutes.  He 
realizes  fully  that  the  function  of  a  good  physiological 
theory  of  the  physiological  correlatives  of  conscious 
states  is  not  the  ruling  out  of  the  subjective  phenomena 
which  after  all  form  the  real  material  of  investigation. 
He  assumes  the  presence  of  consciousness  as  a  datum  to 
which  he  wishes  to  find  a  physiological  correlative. 
"Such  criticism"  he  goes  on  to  say  "is  perfectly  sound,  if 
these  theories  are  seriously  advanced  as  'explanations' 
(rather  as  substitutes  as  I  would  say  considering  the  hy- 
pothesis of  the  subconscious  advanced  recently  by  some 
writers  on  the  subject)  of  the  subjective  experience  of 
memory.  A  subjective  experience  of  recollection  can  no 
more  be  identified  with  a  physical  modification  of  a 
nerve  element  than  the  subjective  experience  of  a  given 
color  can  be  identified  with  a  particular  wave  length  of 
light.  But  I  submit  that  regarding  memory  from  an 
objective  standpoint  as  a  pure  objective  fact  (modifica- 
tion of  the  present  as  a  result  of  previous  reactions  to 
stimuli)  it  demands  objective  interpretation  with  pre- 
cisely the  same  force  as  any  other  objective  fact." 

That  memory  has  physiological  correlatives  we  must 
regard  as  one  of  the  fundamental  assumptions  of  psy- 
chology, both  normal  and  abnormal.  What  I  protest 
against  is  the  metaphysical  "Unconscious"  which  claims 
to  take  the  place  of  subjective  facts.  The  Unconscious 
(with  a  capital  U)  as  formulated  by  Carpenter,  Ziehen 
and  by  other  modern  writers,  under  the  belief  and  pos- 


Appendix  II  405 

sibly  with  the  good  intention  of  being  more  scientific,  in- 
troduces Hartmanian  metaphysics  of  the  marvels  of 
the  Unconscious  into  psychic  life.  We  must  re- 
member once  for  all  that  "deposits  of  images 
in  memory  ganglion  cells,"  "unconscious  disposi- 
tions," "neurograms"  and  other  kinds  of  figura- 
tive representations,  are  in  the  last  resort  figura- 
tive images  which  may  help  to  picture  the  possibility 
of  physiological  correlatives  of  psychic  states,  but  they 
cannot,  from  their  very  nature,  replace  the  real  facts,  the 
facts  of  consciousness.  As  soon  as  such  claim  is  made 
by  the  "Unconscious"  it  must  be  declared  to  be  what  it 
really  is,  namely  a  speculative  hypothesis  of  certain 
mental  phenomena  which  alone  constitute  the  real  facts. 

Perhaps  it  is  in  place  to  add  a  few  words  as  to  the 
hypothesis  of  autocatalysis  in  relation  to  what  Robert- 
son discusses  as  Sidis'  hypothesis  of  neuron  disaggre- 
gation Robertson  thinks  that  the  theory  of  neuron  dis- 
aggregation stated  from  the  standpoint  of  neuron 
retraction  should  be  abandoned.  It  seems  to  me 
however,  that  the  theory  of  neuron  disaggre- 
gation or  of  systemic  neuron  disaggregation  does 
not  depend  on  the  theory  of  neuron  retraction.  The 
latter  is  provisional.  Systems  of  functioning  neurons 
may  be  thrown  out  of  association  due  to  changes  of 
their  thresholds.  This  rise  and  fall  of  threshold  devel- 
oped in  my  Multiple  Personality  puts  the  hypothesis  of 
neuron  disaggregation  on  a  more  solid  and  more  certain 
physiological  basis. 

In  fact  the  rise  and  fall  of  thresholds  of  neuron 
systems  may  be  very  well  stated  in  Robertson's 
own  hypothesis  of  autocatalysis.  The  theory  of 
the  rise  and  fall  of  thresholds  is  based  on  a  series  of 
known  physiological  and  psychological  facts.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  the  rise  and  fall  of  thresholds  which 
gives  rise  to  neuron  disaggregations  with  its  accompany- 
ing phenomena  of  dissociation  are  ultimately  due  to 
changes  in  the  formation  of  systems  of  autocatalytic 
products.     Should  the  latter  hypothesis  be  proven  I 


4o6  Appendix  II 

think  the  theory  of  neuron  disaggregation  would  rest  on 
a  sure  chemico-physiological  basis. 

The  theory  of  neuron  disaggregation  may  well 
be  stated  in  Robertson's  theory  of  autocatalysis 
correlative  with  psychic  phenomena.  In  fact,  Rob- 
ertson himself  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  his  theory 
does  not  fundamentally  clash  with  mine,  the  two  may 
in  fact  be  in  full  accord.  "Abandonment  of  the  postu- 
late of  neuron  disaggregation,"  (rather  neuron  retrac- 
tion) Robertson  concludes  his  paper,  "does  not  in  the 
least  involve,  however,  rejection  of  the  really  essential 
features  of  Sidis'  hypothesis  of  'moment  consciousness.' 
My  hypothesis  does  not  traverse  the  hypothesis  of  Sidis, 
it  merely  supplements  it  and  renders  necessary  a  read- 
justment of  the  physiological  equivalents  of  his  termi- 
nology. From  Sidis'  point  of  view  the  full  waking  con- 
sciousness may  be  likened  to  a  pyramid  having  for  its 
base  a  greater  or  smaller  number  of  'moments  conscious- 
ness.' From  my  point  of  view  it  may  be  likened  to  a 
complicated  textile  fabric  built  up  out  of  the  psychical 
correlates  of  a  greater  or  smaller  number  of  intercon- 
nected traces.  It  is  obvious  that  for  the  purpose  of 
purely  psychological  analysis  the  two  hypotheses  are  al- 
most completely  interchangeable;  but  for  Sidis'  'mo- 
ments consciousness'  we  must  read  not  'neurones,'  but 
'traces,'  'channels,'  or  'deposits  of  autocatalyst.'  " 

The  criticism  passed  on  Robertson's  theory  that  it 
fails  to  account  for  conservation  of  memory  is  unjusti- 
fied. Robertson's  theory  is  fully  adequate  to  explain 
conservation  of  memories. 


INDEX 


Abnormal,  47,  48 

moment,  283 

psychology,  119,  122,  203, 
230 

type,  45,  47,  48 
Absence  of  controlling  agency, 

294 
Absolute  moment,  23 

desultory     moment,     230, 
240 
Accidental  processes,  96 

variations,  96,  98 
Accumulative  moment,  248 

moment,  simple,  241 
Acquired  characters,  319,  320 
Activity,   105 

change  of,  26 

mental,  79,  97,  186 

mental,    of    moment,    287, 
288,  290,  293 
Adaptation,  88 
Aesthetic,  18 
Affect,  44 
Affection,  44 
Affective  state,  134 
Agency,  absence  of  controlling, 

294 
Aggregate,  moment,  248,  254, 
255,  257,  294,  311,  314 

threshold  of,  304 
Amnesia,    46,    284,    288,    289, 
290,  291,  325 

post-hypnotic,  305,  306 
Amorphous  life,  324 

psychosis,  324 
Animal  life,  38 
Antechamber  of   consciousness, 

97.  98 


Aphasia,  46 
Arc,  reflex,  12 
Aspect,  social,  27 

teleological,  90,  91,  95 
Assimilation   by  moment,   272, 
273,  275,  277,  282,  283, 
284 
Assimilation,    power    of,    275, 

277,  284 
Association,  contiguity  of,  359, 
361 
contrast,  359,  361 
immediate,  210,  212 
indissoluble,  208 
mediate,  209 
by  resemblance,  359,  361 
by  similarity,  363 
Assumption,    16,    69,    70,    203, 

206 
Attention,  process  of,  99 
Attributes,  sensory,  160,  163 
Automatic,  recognitive  moment, 

370 
Automatism,  186,  192,  249,  271, 
285 
psychology,   190 

Baldwin,    164,    166,    167,    168, 

169,  172 
Behavior,    119 

hypothesis,  42 
Behaviorist,  views  of,  43 
Bergson,    119,    139,    140,    141, 

203,  204,  372,  373,  374 
Biological    activity,    301,    302, 

303 
process,    87,    90,    91,    92, 
95.  96,  138 


407 


4o8 


Index 


Biosis,  39 

Brain  currents,  190 

currents,     localization    of, 
24 
Biichner,  57 

Cabanis,  57 
Causal  necessity,  85 
Causation,  efficient,  88,  92 

final,  88 

principle  of  efficient,  91 

purpose,  88 
Cause,  the,  loi 
Censor,  loi 
Central  elements,  134,  135 

experience,  235,  236 
Cerebration,    unconscious,    175, 
176,  177,  178,  180,  183, 
184 
Chance,  100 

thought,  99 
Chemo  taxis,  130 
Co-conscious,  the,  207 
Coefficient,  ideational,  165,  170 

memory,   166 

of  reality,  166,  168 

of  representation,  165 

sensory,   165,   170 
Coexistent,  80,  no 
Cognition,  immediate,  365 

mediate,  365 
Complexes,    mental   suppressed, 

198,  199,  200,  203 
Compound,  perceptual,  151 

psychic,  133 

synthetic      moment,      241, 

337,. 341.  343 

synthetic     moment,     accu- 
mulative, 341,  343 
Conditional  reflexes,  21 1 

stimulus,  211 


Consciousness,  13,  15,  19,  20, 
23,  24,  30,  31,  32,  37. 
41,  42,  59,  60,  62,  71, 
79,  82,  83,  98,  106,  107, 
108,  III,  112,  113,  133, 
136,  184,  188,  189,  196, 
206,  229,  230,  231,  290, 
296 

antechamber  of,  97 

content  of,  186 

desultory,    256,    257,    322 
323 

double,  290 

figured,  152 

focus   of,    258,    259,    279, 
280,  281 

moment,     214,   229,    232, 
233,  234,  235 

passive,  194 

selective,  96 
Constellation  of  moments,  254, 

255 
Content,    49,  231 

mental,  49,  194,  195,  231 

of  the  precept,  132 

psychic,  46 
Content  of  conscience,   14,   15, 

186 
Contiguity  of  association,  359 
Continuity,  mental,  287,  293 

principles  of,   82,    83,    86, 

Contrast,    association    of,    359, 

361 
Controlling  agency,  absence  of, 

294. 
Corporeal  individual,  37 
Criterion    of   perceptive   truth, 

165 
Cross  section  of  moment,  236 
Cumulation,  process  of,  263 
Currents,  brain,  190 


Index 


409 


Darwin,  47,  90 

Data  of  science,  15 

Day  reveries,  99 

Degeneration,  mental,  296 
process  of,  313,  315 

Delusion,  the,  283,  284 

Descartes,  42,  186 

Desire,  109 

Desultory  moment,  239,  243, 
323,  327,  329,  343,  344. 
345,  346,  347,  348,  349, 
365,  377 

Desultory  moment  of  conscious- 
ness, 256,  257,  322,  323 

Desultory  moment  of  self-con- 
sciousness, 245 

Desultory    moment,    recurrent, 

324 
Desultory  type,  346 
Disaggregation,  308,  309 

mental,  310,  313 

of  moments,  308 

of  moments,  law  of,   309, 

3",  313 
of     moments,    process   of, 
296 
Diseases,  functional,  75,  76 
mental,  311,  314 
psychopathic,  271,  284 
Dissociated  moment,  3  50 
Dissociation,  76,  150,  153,  158, 
159,  163,  186,  188,  189, 
197,  216,  217,  223,  230, 
271,  284,  295,  308,  369, 

375 
Dissolution,  process  of,  314 
Disturbance,  psychopathic,  296 
Doctrine,  Spinozistic,  64 
Dominant  moment,  284 
Double  consciousness,  290 
Dreams,  99,  307 


Dynamogenesis,  217 

of   dissociation,   295,   303, 
304 

Ebbinghaus,  49 

Efficient  causation,  principle  of, 

91 
Elements  of  affective  state,  134, 

137 
central,  134,  135 
freedom  of,  354,  355 
nuclei,      127,      131,      132, 

135,  136 
of  objective  state  primary, 

137 
sensory,  primary,  137,  319 
sensory,     secondary,     137, 

138,  145,  319 
Emotion,  44 
Emotional  states,  113 

tones,  134 
Energy,  20,   21,   79,   80,    128, 
216,  218,  123,  225 
kinetic,  20 
nervous,  218 
neuron,  218 
principle    of    subconscious, 

270,  277 
reserve,     219,     220,     221, 
222,  223,  224,  225,  226 
Epilepsy,  equivalent  of,  218 
idiopathic,  202 
psychic,    217,     218,     291, 
295 
Epistemology,  27,  30,  no,  118 
Equivalent  of  epilepsy,  218 
Errors,  99 

Essence  of  percept,  132 
Ethics,  18 
Evolution,  47,  91,  254,  275,  285 


4IO 


Index 


Experience,  immediate,  69,  70 

mediate,  70 

unitory,'57,  68,  69 
External  reality,  26,   130,  164, 
166,  171,  172,  182,  183 
Externality,  27 

Faculty  hypothesis,  358 
Faith,  realm  of,  ig6 
Fallacious  percept,  141 
Fallacy,  21,  24,  35,  190 

psychological,      35,       113, 
114,  117,  122,  125,  171, 

345 

psychologist's,  229 
Familiarity,  367,  368,  369,  371, 

372 
Family  moment,  274 
Fatigue,  303 

Fechner,  59,  298,  300,  301 
Figured  consciousness,  152 
Finality,  83,  88,  89 

principle  of,  83 
Focus  of  consciousness,  258,  259, 

279,  280,  281 
Food  instincts,  310,  311 
Forgetfulness,  203 
Free  association,  356,  357 

aggregate,  304,  305 
Function  of  moment,  260,  265, 

290,  294,  327,  336 
of  percept,  128 

of  substitution,  162,  163 
periodicity  of,  217,  2l8 
Functional  diseases,  75,  76 

psychosis,    154,    163,    192, 
304 

Galton,  97 

Gap,  mental,  293 

classification  of,  293 
psychic,     287,     288,    290, 

291,  292,  293 


Generic   recognition,  242,  243, 

244 
Genius,  99 
Geometry,  11,  14 
Growth  of  moment,  260,  262, 

263 
Guesses,  method  of,  280 

Habit,  214,  312,  319,  345 
Hallucinations,    27,    141,    142, 
146,  149,  153,  154,  155, 
156,  158,  164,  165,  171 
Hartley,  125,  361 
Herbert,  199,  200 
High  type  moment,  250,  251, 

252,  253 
Hobbs,  126 

Hoffding,  170,  205,  207 
Hume,  125 
Hypnogogic,  39 
Hypnoidal  state,  99,  212,  279, 
280,  282,  291,  325,  349 
Hypnoidic  state,  346 
Hypnoidization,  282 
HjT)nosis,    46,    84,    176,    177, 
179,  188,  271,  279,  280, 
285,  287,  290,  291,  305, 
349     _ 
Hypnotic  individuality,  189 

faculty,  358 
Hypothesis,  201,  202 
faculty,  358 
materialistic,  57 
psychological,  73 
psycho-physiological,  73 
spiritualistic,  51,  52 
transmission,  59,  61 

Ideas,  44,  66,  97,  114,  115,  116, 

117,  120,  124,  125,  135, 

138,  141,  142,  147,  164, 

190,  230,  242,  360,  361 

painful,  203 

pleasurable,  203 


Index 


411 


Images,  43,  122,  123,  125,  135, 
138,  139,  140,  141,  142, 
147,  159,  160,  164,  165, 
166,  169,  170,  171,  172, 
204,  230,  361 

memory,  166 

object,  204 

subjective,  204 

substitution  by,  162,  163 
Immediate  association,  210,  212 

experience,  69 
Imperative  concepts,  349 

impulses,  295 
Impulses,  imperative,  295 

uncontrollable,  349 
Increase  of  sensation,  300,  302 
Indissoluble  association,  208 
Individual,  89,  90 

corporeal,  37 
Individuality,  psychic,  231 
Inhibition,  214,  215,  216,  219, 

223,  225 
Insistent  ideas,  170 
Instinctive  reaction,  268,  269 
Instincts,  309,  310 

food,  310,  311 

periodic,  217 

sex,  310,  311 

social,  310,  311 
Intellect,  realms  of,  196 
Intensity,  160,  161,  162,  163 

of  stimulation,  297 
Intermediate    links,    208,   209, 
210 

mental  links,  212 
Internal  reality,  171 
Introspection,  44,  192 
Investigation,  methods  of,  49 
Irradiation,  146,  152,  153,  304 

James,  William,  59,  122,  152, 
200,  270,  374 

Kinetic  energy,  20 


Kiilpe,-  120 

Ladd,  52 

Lamark,  91 

Law  of  degeneration,  313,  315 

of  disaggregation,  309,  311, 
312 

of  thresholds,  215 

Weber's,  297,  298 
Life,  87 

amorphous,  324 

animal,  38 

mental,  100,  loi 

moral,  310,311,  312 

personal,  310,  311,  312 

processes,  87 

psychic,  24,  230,  231 
Likeness,  relation  of,  363 
Logic,  18,  22 

Low  types  of  moment,  250,  251, 
252,  253,  257,  285,  286 

Mach,  102 
Maimon,  187 
Mania,  314 
Material  nature,  19 
Materialistic  hypothesis,  57 
Matter,  20,  24,  57,  204 
Mechanics,  15,  20 
Mechanism,  definition  of,  90 
Mediate  association,  209 

experience,  70 
Melancholia,  311,  314 
Meltzer,  223 

Memory,  46,  49,  I39»  140,  182, 
191,  192,  203,  289,  290, 
374,  390 

image,  1 66 
Mental  activity,  79,  97 

complexes,  suppressed,  198, 
199,  200,  203 

content,  194,  195 
271,  287 


412 


Index 


Mental  contInuity,236,  249,  253 

degeneration,  286 

disaggregation,  310,  313 

diseases,  311,  314 

energy,  21 

gap,  293 

life,  100,  lOi 

movement,  278 

process,  16,  80,  87 

purpose,  315 

selection,   162 

state,  37 

synthesis,  53,  54,  294 

synthesis,  principles  of,  114 

system,  162,  213,  214 
Metaphysics,  15,  22,  23,  29,  30, 

57,  iio,  118 
Method  of  biology,  50 

of  content,  46 

of  function,  46 

of  guesses,  280 

of  psychology,  50 
Mill,  J.  S.,  120,  202 
Mind,  24,  33 
Modification  of  moment,   262, 

318,  334,  337 
Moleschott,  57 
Moment  absolute,  239 

absolute     desultory,     230, 

240 
aggregate,   254,   255,   257, 
294,  304,  305,  307,  311, 
314 
assimilation  by,   272,  273, 

275,  276,  277,  282,  283, 

284 
assimilative  power  of,  275, 

277,  284 
compound  synthetic,  241 
consciousness,      166,       116, 

214,  229,  232,  233,  234. 

235,  236,  249,  260,  265, 

271,  272,  275,  277 


Moment,  cross  section  of,  236 
cumulative,   240,   387 
desultory,    239,    243,    323, 

327,  329,  344,  346,  347 

desultory  of  self -conscious- 
ness, 245 

disaggregation,    295,    308, 

dominant,  284 

family,  274 

forces,  259 

function  of,  260,  327,  328, 
336 

generic,  recognitive,  243, 
244 

low^  forms  of,  257,  258 

percept,  260,  277 

perceptual,  237,  260,  273 

purpose  of,  260 

recognitive,  241,  243, 
244,  376,  377,  378,  380, 
381,  382,  383,  384,  385* 
386,388,  389 

recognitive  of  self-con- 
sciousness, 345 

recurrent,  324 

reflex,  239,  240,  317,  321, 
322 

representative,  381,  386 

reproductive,  264,  265, 
317,318 

self-consciousness,  388,  389, 
390 

sensitivity  of,  266 

simple,  accumulative,  241 

single,  synthetic,^  337,  338 

specific,  recognitive,  242, 
243,  244,  245 

stage,  260,  277 

structure  of,  237 

synthetic,  240,  241,  326 
327,  329,  330,  331,  332, 
336,  337,  33^,  341,  342, 
343,  344,  345,  346,  347. 


Index 


413 


Moment,    synthetic,    348,    350, 
376,  384,  386,  388 
synthetic      compound     ac- 
cumulative, 341,  343 
synthetic  of  self-conscious- 
ness, 245 
threshold,   214,   216,   220, 

297,  308 
type  of,  239,  253 
Moments,  abnormal,  283 
constellation  of,  254,255 
inter-relation  of,  294 
organization  of,  254 
subconscious,  277,  279 
submerged,  259 
Multiple  personality,  290 
Multiplicity,   115,    116 
Mysticism,  197 

Narcosis,  312 

Natural  selection,  96,  201,  221, 
225,  273,  307,  309,  319, 
329,  337.  341,  345 

Nature  of  things,  204 

Necessity,  causal,  85 
principal,  85 

Nervous  energy,  218,  219,  220 

Neurasthenia,  223,  226 

Neuron  aggregate,  218 

Neurosis,  24,  39,  78 

Normal,  the,  45,  47,  48 

Normal  psychology,  200 

Nuclei  elements,  127,  131,  135, 
136 

Object,  community  of,  27 
Objective  images,  204 

time,  244 
Ontogenesis,     249,     252,     256, 
257,  268,  285,  310,  331 
Ontogenetic  series,  13 
Organic  unity,  90,  91,  263 
Organism,  definition  of,  90 


Overaction,  295 

Pain,  202,  203 
Painful  ideas,  203 
Parallelism,  64,  78 
Paranoia,    283 
Pathological  states,  346 
Pathology,  74,   103 
Pavlow,  210,  211,  212,  271 
Pearson,  103 

Percept,  89,  126,  128,  130,  131, 
133,  135,  137,  138,  144. 
149,  150,  159,  165,  171. 
172,  174,  276 
Perception,  content  of,  13.1 

essence  of,  132 

function  of,  138 

structure  of,  127 

theory  of,  119 
Perceptual  compound,  151 

moment,  237 

synthesis,  150 
Periodicity  of  function,  218 
Personality,  28,   192,  375 
Persons,  27,  28 
Pffefer,  302,  303 
Philosophy,  16,  22 
Phylogenesis,     249,    252,    309, 
329,  331,  338 

object,  29,  30 
Physical  phenomena,  26 

process,  84,  85 

series,  78,  87 

universe,  29 
Physiology,  86 
Plato,   170,  175 
Pleasurable  ideas,  203 
Post-hypnotic  amnesia,  305 

suggestion,  217 
Postulate,    16,    17,   22,   23,  30, 
67,  82,   106,   no.    III, 
112 

of  psychology,  67,  68,  106 


414 


Index 


Precept,  social,  26 
Presentations,  351,  356 
Presentative  elements,  352,  353 
Primary   elements  of  objective 

state,  137 
Principle  of  continuity,  83,  86 

of  efficient  causation,  91 
92 

of  finality,  83 

of  finiteness,  83 

of  necessity,  85,  86 

of  reserve  energy,  219 
Processes,  accidental,  96 

accumulative,  263 

biological,  87,  91 

mental,  16,  80,  87 

psychic,  26,  84,  85,  87, 
107 

psychological,  96 
Psychasthenia,  223,  226 
Psychic  compound,  133 

content,  49,  231 

epilepsy,  218,  292 

gap,  287,  290,  291 

modification,  265 

object,  29,  30 

phenomena,  26 

postulate,  106 

process,  24,  25,  26,  76, 
82,  83,  84,  85,  87,  105, 
112,   135 

series,  78 

state,  31 
Psychiatry,  74 

Psycho-biological  element,  319 
Psychological  fallacy,   35,   171, 
172 

hypothesis,  73 

laws,  16 

methods,  50 

processes,  26 
Psychology,  13,  14,  16,  17,  18, 
19,  20,  21,  30,  31.  32, 


Psychology,  36,  37,  39,  40,  51, 

57,  61,  69,  71,  72,  81, 

86,  92,   106,   107,   no, 

III,  112,  117 

abnormal,    119,    122,  203, 

230 
automatism,  190 
sources  of,  40 
Psychopathic,  diseases,  84,  212 
disturbance,  296 
maladies,  311 
state,  350 
Psychopathology,  75,  175,  220 
Psycho-physical  relation,  109 
Psycho-physiological    hypothesis, 

73 
relation,  109 
Psychosis,  24,  39,  78,  324 

functional,  163 
Purpose,    38,    90,    91,    95,    99, 

100,  135,  315 
Purposive  life,  38 

Reaction,  37,  128,  130,  136, 
188,  213,  260,  261,  262, 
263,  266,  267,  268,  269, 
270,  271,  272,  273,  274, 
275,  294,  314,  315.  333, 
336,  338,  341,  342,  346, 
347 

Reality,  23,  33 

external,    130,    164,    166, 
171,  172,  174,  182,  183 

Recognition,  182,  183,  242,  244, 
265,  363,  366,  367,  368, 
369,  371,  372,  373,  374, 

375,  376,  377,  382,  383, 
384,  385,  386,  387,  388, 
389 

Recognitive,  element,  182 

moment,    241,    324,    370, 

376,  378,  380 
moment,  threshold,  246 


Index 


415 


Recurrent  moment,  324 
Reductive,  the,  217 
Reflex  arc,   12 

moment,  239,  317,  321 
Reflexes,  255,  256,  257 

unconditional,  211 
Reinstatement,    343,   344,    345, 
346,  347,  349,  350,  351, 
390 
Relation,  psycho-physical,  109 

psycho-physiological,  109 

type  of,  II,  12,  13 
Representation,    160,   165,  351, 

353,  356,  359,  361,  363 
law  of,  359 

Reproduction,  239,  240,  241, 
318,  323,  324,  325,  326, 
327,  328,  343,  346,  350, 
351,  376,  377,  378,  380, 
384,  385,  386,  387,  390 

Reproductive  moment,  264 

Reserve  energy,  219,  221,  225, 
226 
principles  of,  219 

Ribot,  182,  288 

Rise  of  threshold,  213,  215,  221, 
246,  299,  303 

Routine  of  experience,  104 

Savadsky,  211 
Science,  11,  13,  16,  21 
Secondary  consciousness,  181 
Selection,  principle  of,  285 
Selective  consciousness,  96 
Self,  175 

Self-consciousness,      175,      176, 
205,  206,  208,  229,  231, 
232,  375,  388,  389 
Self-cosmic,  197 
Self-preservation,  315 


Sensation,   20,    138,    140,    147, 

148,  149,  151,  160,  163, 

164,  166,  169,  171,  173 

centrally  excited,  121 

motor  character  of,  141 

threshold     of,     298,     299, 

301,   302 
unit  of,  299,  301 
Sense  of  reality,  173,  174 

of  perceptual  truth,  165 
Sensitivity,  condition  of,  213 
Sensory  coefHcient,   165,   170 
Sensory  elements,  primary,  137 
elements,    secondary,    137, 

138,  145 
Sequence,  causal,  105 

invariable,  loi,  no 

necessary,  105,  no 
Series,  physical,  78,  87 

psychic,  78 
Setting,  370,  371,  372,  374,  375 
Signal  of  reality,  135 
Similarity,  361,  362,  363 

association  of,  363 
Simple  S5mthetic  moment,  337 
Sleep,  83,  84,  99,  108 
Sociality,  172 

Somnambulism,  287,  290,  291 
Soul,  52 

hypothesis,  55,  56,  57 
Soul-consciousness,  194,  195 
Sources  of  psychology,  40 
Specific,     recognitive     moment, 

243 
Spencer,  122 
Spinoza,    122 
Spinozistic  doctrine,  64 
Spontaneous  variation,  95,  243 
Stage,  moment,  260,  277 
States,  pathological,  346 

psychic,  31 

psychopathic,  350 
Stimulation,  308,  309 


4i6 


Index 


Stimulus  threshold,  214,  298 

Structure  of  moment,  237 

Subconsciousness,  84,  175,  184, 
185,  186,  191,  193,  194, 
195,  196,  197,  198,  204, 
205,  206,  207,  208,  212, 
217,  276,  277,  278,  279, 
280,  281,  282,  296,  349, 
350 

Subject,  the,  231,  235 

Suggestion,  hypnotic,  176 
post-hypnotic,  176 

Sully,  120 

Suppression,  theory  of,  203 

Synaesthesia,  152 

Synthesis,   92,    116,    117,    133, 
152,  214,  218,  233,  235, 
263,  275 
mental,  17,  53,  113 

Synthetic    moment,    240,    326, 
327,  329,  332,  350,  365, 
387,  388 
moment    compound,     337, 

341,  343 
moment   of   self-conscious- 
ness, 245 
Synthetic  type  of  consciousness, 

Synthetic  unity,  116,  230 
System,  mental,  163,  213,  214 

Taine,  120 
Teleology,  92,  93,  95 
Theory  of  suppression,  203 
Things,  27 
Thoughts,  34,  35,  42 
Threshold,  54,  213,  215,  221, 
223 

aggregate,  304 

fatigue,  303 

moment,  216,  297 

of    sensation,     298,     299, 
301,  302 


Threshold,  rise  of,  213, 215, 221, 
246,  299,  303 

stimulus,  214,  298,  304 

theory  of,  175 
Time,  objective,  244 
Transmission  hypothesis,  59,  61 
Tropism,  130,  187 
Type,  abnormal,  45,  47,  48    . 

moment,  253 

relation,  11,  12,  13 

synthetic,  381 

Unconditional  reflexes,  211 

stimulus,  211 
Unconscious,  the,  185,  198,  199, 
202,  205,  207,  212 

phonation,   155,   156,   157, 
158 
Uniformity,  no,  iii 
Unit  of  sensation,  299,  301 
Unitary  experience,  57 
Unity,  S5aithetic,   116 

Variation,  319,  337 
accidental,  96,  98 
spontaneous,  95,  96 

Views  of  behaviorist,  43 

Vividness,  160,  161,  162,  163 

Vivisection,  48 

Volition,  83,  230 

Voluntarism,  67 

Voluntaristic  school,  64 

Watson,  42,  43,  44 
Weber,  298 

Weber-Fechner  law,  300 
Willers,  28 
World  of  appreciation,  196 

description,  196 
Wundt,  209 

Ziehen,  176 


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